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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis assesses neoliberal urban developments in post-civil war Lebanon. It 
does so by focusing on the reconstruction of Downtown Beirut, which contributed 
towards: firstly, increasing a public debt that was burdening the country at the time; and 
secondly, reproducing sectarian divisions in Lebanese politics and society. To explain 
this outcome, this thesis analyses the policies of specific agents who were involved in, 
and in control of, the reconstruction process. The agents being referred to were led by the 
former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri until his death in 2005. When analysed, these policies 
are found to follow the neoliberal logic of the late prime minister, but also to have been 
designed and implemented in a way to create and extract as much rent as possible for the 
benefit of those with invested interests in the reconstruction process. In this regard, it is 
argued that rent-seeking activities and behaviours heavily influenced the decision-making 
processes in key institutions concerned with reconstruction matters. Rent-seeking is used 
to refer to a wide range of social activities. In the case of Lebanon, we find a clear 
overlap between rent-seeking and two other processes that are endemic to the country: 
corruption and clientelism. The overlap between rent-seeking and these two other 
processes is a significant demonstration of how the nation-state and local politics shape 
the development and implementation of neoliberal economic policies, so that ‘actually 
existing neoliberalism’ is highly uneven from one region to another, and even from one 
country to the next. Because agency is placed at the centre of the analysis, this thesis 
adopts an approach that is more sociological in nature. It also makes use of two sets of 
literatures: those of liberal peacebuilding and new urban governance. This allows 
concepts and explanations to be used from both, in turn, complementing the analysis 
when delineating the patterns of neoliberalism that are specific to post-civil war Lebanon. 
 
4 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
 
 
Declaration ......................................................................................................................... 2 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. 3 
List of Figures and Tables ................................................................................................ 8 
List of Abbreviations ...................................................................................................... 12 
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... 14 
Chapter One: Introduction ............................................................................................ 17 
I. Setting the scene: .............................................................................................. 17 
II. The research question(s): .................................................................................. 19 
III. The hypothesis of the thesis ............................................................................. 20 
i.      Explaining the hypothesis in detail .................................................................. 21 
ii. The key propositions ........................................................................................ 26 
IV. Analysing the reconstruction of Downtown Beirut as a ‘neoliberal urban 
development’ .................................................................................................... 28 
i.      Neoliberalism – a definition ............................................................................ 29 
ii. Neoliberalism in new urban governance and liberal peacebuilding 
literatures ..................................................................................................... 30 
V. The agents behind neoliberal urban developments .......................................... 34 
i.      Analysing the agents as transnational capitalists .............................................. 35 
ii. Identifying the agents through a sociological approach ................................... 38 
VI. The methodology of the thesis ......................................................................... 40 
i.     The influence of context on the methodology used .......................................... 41 
ii. The veracity of information collected using this methodology ........................ 43 
iii.   Coupling these methods with already-existing literature ................................. 45 
5 
 
VII. The structure of the thesis ................................................................................ 47 
PART I: Contextualising neoliberal urban developments .......................................... 49 
Chapter Two: The regional context............................................................................... 50 
I. The Arab elites – agents of neoliberal urban developments in the Arab world     
 .........................................................................................................................  51 
i.     The Arab elites over the past few decades ....................................................... 52 
ii. Differentiating between the Arab elites ............................................................ 56 
II. Neoliberal urban developments in the Arab world .......................................... 60 
i.      A ‘Gulf moment’? ........................................................................................... 62 
ii. The rise of Gulf-based real estate conglomerates ............................................ 65 
iii.    The ‘Gulfication’ of the Arab urban environment ........................................... 70 
Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 78 
Chapter Three: The domestic context ........................................................................... 80 
I. The elites of post-civil war Lebanon ................................................................ 81 
i.      How did the elites govern in post-civil war Lebanon? ..................................... 82 
ii. Who exactly was governing in post-civil war Lebanon? ................................. 85 
iii.   What did the elites do with the Lebanese state? ............................................... 91 
II. Neoliberal urban developments in post-civil war  Lebanon ............................. 97 
i.      Neoliberal urban developments in the reconstruction process ........................ 97 
ii. Popular mobilisations against neoliberal urban developments ...................... 103 
iii.   The elites and neoliberal urban developments ............................................... 107 
Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 113 
PART II: Neoliberal urban developments and their place in Beirut’s urban history
 ......................................................................................................................................... 117 
Chapter Four: Episodes of transformation: from modern to neoliberal urbanism       
 ......................................................................................................................................... 118 
I. The modern and post-modern configurations of Beirut ................................. 119 
i.     The first steps towards modernisation ............................................................ 121 
ii. The impact of modernisation on the city and its citizens ............................... 128 
iii.   The emergence of ‘post-modern’ perspectives ............................................... 133 
II. The Keynesian attempts to address Beirut’s urban issues .............................. 141 
6 
 
i.     Keynesianism and its effects on urbanism ..................................................... 142 
ii. The failure of Keynesian policies and the rise of neoliberal forces ............... 148 
iii.   Examples of neoliberal urbanism during the civil war ................................... 156 
Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 165 
Chapter Five: Towards neoliberal urban developments: the role of Rafiq Hariri   
 ......................................................................................................................................... 167 
I. Hariri and the ‘clean-up’ of Beirut ................................................................. 168 
i.     Hariri’s life before the clean-up operation ..................................................... 169 
ii. How Hariri became involved in the clean-up operation ................................. 172 
iii.   The clean-up operation as an avenue for large-scale urban developments .... 177 
II. Hariri and the Ta’if Peace Accords ................................................................ 185 
i.     The unwritten rule of Ta’if – Hariri in charge of reconstruction in Beirut .... 186 
ii. After Ta’if – the approval of Law 117 to create private real estate 
companies .................................................................................................. 191 
iii.   The birth of neoliberal urban developments – Solidere, Linord and 
Elyssar........................................................................................................ 200 
Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 213 
PART III: Analysing and assessing the Solidere project: Exploratory case study . 215 
Chapter Six: The consequences of the Solidere project ............................................ 216 
I. How did Solidere contribute towards increasing the public debt? ................. 218 
i.      The main institutions involved in rent-seeking .............................................. 218 
ii. How were rents being created and extracted from these institutions? ........... 223 
iii.   Expenditures on corruption and patron-client exchanges to capture rents ..... 237 
II. How did Solidere contribute towards reproducing sectarian divisions? ........ 247 
i.       Elite rivalries and the anti-corruption campaign against Hariri ..................... 248 
ii. The repercussions of the anti-corruption campaign against Hariri ................ 252 
iii.   Hariri’s transformation into a sectarian leader and its reflection in the 
image of the Solidere project ..................................................................... 258 
Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 269 
Chapter Seven: The Solidere project after Rafiq Hariri ........................................... 272 
I. The Solidere project and the post-2005 governments .................................... 273 
7 
 
i.     The governments of Siniora, Saad Hariri and Mikati ..................................... 274 
ii. The three governments and the individual business interests in the 
Solidere project .......................................................................................... 281 
iii.   The three governments and the collective economic interest in the 
Solidere project .......................................................................................... 287 
II. From Solidere to Solidere International ......................................................... 293 
i.      Solidere’s post-2005 challenges .................................................................... 294 
ii. The plan to expand Solidere’s operations abroad .......................................... 299 
iii.   Who decided to expand Solidere’s operations? ............................................. 303 
Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 307 
Chapter Eight: Concluding remarks ........................................................................... 310 
I. The Solidere project as an artefact of the neoliberalisation phenomenon ...... 311 
II. The arrival of new contractors and its local, regional and global implications
 ........................................................................................................................ 315 
III. Closing thoughts and questions ...................................................................... 319 
Appendix ........................................................................................................................ 324 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 327 
 
8 
 
List of Figures and Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: A process-diagram demonstrating main propositions ....................................... 27 
Figure 2: A selection of images displaying various towers that have been built across       
Beirut over the past few years. ......................................................................... 73 
Figure 3: An image of the new, ‘Sama Beirut’ tower under construction. ....................... 75 
Figure 4: A selection of images displaying the aswaq project........................................ 100 
Figure 5: A selection of images of archeological ruins discovered in the area, as  
                well as colonial-era buildings that were preserved and recuperated  .............. 102 
Figure 6: View of Beirut looking east (ca. 1840)............................................................ 120 
Figure 7: View of German and d’Orient Hotels.............................................................. 122 
Figure 8: View of Continental Hotel and Avenue Français ............................................ 122 
Figure 9: Images of Beirut before modernisation ........................................................... 125 
Figure 10: A view of Beirut with the Grand Serail, the military hospital and a clock  
                  tower reflecting Istanbul time in the background ......................................... 126 
Figure 11: Image of Martyrs’ Square in 1910 ................................................................. 126 
Figure 12: A view of Mina el-Hosn ................................................................................ 129 
Figure 13: A view of Basta ............................................................................................. 129 
Figure 14: Image of the Orosdi Bek Department Store after completion in 1894 .......... 131 
Figure 15: Mansions and Palaces of the bourgeoisie families ........................................ 131 
Figure 16: View of the Sursock Palace ........................................................................... 132 
Figure 17: A French proposal for the city centre ............................................................ 135 
Figure 18: Demolition works in the city centre .............................................................. 136 
Figure 19: View of Martyrs’ Square ............................................................................... 136 
Figure 20: French construction of Allenby, Foch and Weygand streets (1910s-1930s) . 137 
9 
 
Figure 21: The Danger Plan (1932) ................................................................................ 139 
Figure 22: Aerial view of St. Georges Hotel and Yacht Club (1931) ............................. 140 
Figure 23: Map illustrating the location of the historic city centre and the ‘belts of  
                  misery’ that emerged in the pre-civil war era ............................................... 143 
Figure 24: Plan Directoire Beyrouth et Ses Banlieux (1963) ......................................... 147 
Figure 25: The APUR Plan (1977) ................................................................................. 158 
Figure 26: A residential building in Hamra taken over by squatters  ............................. 160 
Figure 27: The IAURIF Plan (1986) ............................................................................... 163 
Figure 28: A general plan for the southern suburbs by OGER Liban (1983) ................. 176 
Figure 29: A general plan for Downtown Beirut by OGER Liban (1984) ..................... 182 
Figure 30: A general plan for Saifi and Martyrs’ Square by OGER Liban (1984) ......... 182 
Figure 31: A map of the Oger Liban/Dar Al-Handasah Plan (1983) .............................. 183 
Figure 32: A map of the preliminary, Eddeh Plan (1991) .............................................. 183 
Figure 33: A view of Martyrs’ Square in the 1930s........................................................ 193 
Figure 34: A view of Martyrs’ Square in 1975 ............................................................... 193 
Figure 35: An artist’s impression of what Martyrs’ Square would look like after  
                  the Eddeh Plan is implemented  .................................................................... 194 
Figure 36: Illustrations from the Eddeh Plan that bore absolutely no resemblance  
                  to the old character of the city centre ............................................................ 194 
Figure 37: Before demolitions  ....................................................................................... 196 
Figure 38: After demolitions  .......................................................................................... 196 
Figure 39: View of Martyrs’ Square after the war, but before the demolitions  
                  (facing south) ................................................................................................ 202 
Figure 40: Demolition of the Rivoli building (facing north) .......................................... 202 
Figure 41: View of Martyrs’ Square (facing north). Most of the buildings have  
                  been removed by this stage ........................................................................... 203 
Figure 42: View of Martyrs’ Square (facing north). Notice the poster in the  
                  background displaying what the area will look like after reconstruction  .... 203 
Figure 43: Artist’s impression of the new plan. Notice how the rendering  
                  includes preserved historic buildings ............................................................ 207 
Figure 44: Artist’s impression of the new plan. Notice, as well, the emphasis  
10 
 
                  on the creation of a friendly and open space ................................................. 207 
Figure 45: The Detailed Plan that was endorsed by the CDR on the 21
st
 of October 1993   
 ......................................................................................................................................... 210 
Figure 46: A map illustrating the northern littoral divided between Linord and  
                  Joseph Khoury’s company ............................................................................ 211 
Figure 47: A map illustrating the Elyssar project ........................................................... 212 
Figure 48: An image of the reclaimed land converted from a landfill ............................ 228 
Figure 49: Another image of the reclaimed land converted from a landfill ................... 228 
Figure 50: An image of completed 5-star hotels and luxury apartment buildings  
                  in the Hotel district ........................................................................................ 233 
Figure 51: Another image of completed 5-star hotels and luxury apartment  
                  buildings in the Hotel district ........................................................................ 234 
Figure 52: An image of construction sites in the Hotel district ...................................... 234 
Figure 53: An image of Murr Tower (Arabic: Burj el-Murr) ......................................... 240 
Figure 54: An image of An-Nahar’s new headquarters .................................................. 241 
Figure 55: Abandoned building in Downtown Beirut occupied by displaced citizens  
                  after the civil war .......................................................................................... 245 
Figure 56: The people in the picture above are displaced persons from the  
                  South of Lebanon after the Israeli invasion .................................................. 246 
Figure 57: An image of the Mohammed Al-Amin mosque in Downtown Beirut .......... 260 
Figure 58: An image of the Mohammed Al-Amin mosque towering over the St.  
                  George Cathedral next to it ........................................................................... 263 
Figure 59: An image of a campanile under construction next to the St. George  
                  Cathedral    .................................................................................................... 264 
Figure 60: An image of Rafiq Hariri’s tomb (darih) in the white tent next to  
                  Mohammed Al-Amin mosque....................................................................... 266 
Figure 61: An image of Rafiq Hariri’s tomb (darih) ...................................................... 266 
Figure 62: Image taken of the 8
th
 March protest in 2005 ................................................ 268 
Figure 63: Image taken of the 14
th
 March protest in 2005 .............................................. 268 
Figure 64: Digital model of what the Waterfront district will look like after  
                  construction     ............................................................................................... 282 
11 
 
Figure 65: A recent image of the St. Georges Hotel ....................................................... 284 
Figure 66: An image of Zaitunay Bay ............................................................................ 286 
Figure 67: An image of the excavation site where parts of the Roman Hippodrome  
                  were discovered ............................................................................................. 289 
Figure 68: An image of the excavation site where parts of the Phoenician Port  
                  were discovered ............................................................................................. 292 
Figure 69: An image of the Phoenician Port after it was demolished ............................. 292 
Figure 70: An artist’s impression of the Phoenician Village project in Downtown  
                  Beirut     ......................................................................................................... 296 
Figure 71: An image of the Place d’Etoile in Downtown Beirut .................................... 297 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: A table illustrating the influence that Gulf cities have had on three large-scale 
urban developments outside the Gulf region .................................................................... 77 
Table 2 – A table illustrating elite types in post-civil war Lebanon ................................. 87 
Table 3 – A sample of the main projects launched in Beirut after the civil war ............. 116 
Table 4 – A list of some of the most prominent businessmen to emerge in Lebanon during 
the civil war year ............................................................................................................. 155 
Table 5 – A small sample of projects that have been completed (or are under 
construction) in the city centre ........................................................................................ 280 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
 
 
 
 
AAVB  Agence pour l’Aménagement de la Vallée du Bouregreg 
AID  Abdali Investment Development 
AORBCD  Association of Owners of Rights in the Beirut Central District 
APSAD Association for the Protection of the Natural Sites and Ancient Buildings 
APUR  Atelier parisien d’urbanisme 
AUB  American University of Beirut 
BCD  Beirut Central District 
BOT  Build-Operate-Transfer 
BWD  Beirut Waterfront Development 
CDR  Council for Development and Reconstruction 
CLS  Centre for Lebanese Studies 
COFER Council of Foreign Economic Relations 
DAMAC A Dubai-based real-estate conglomerate 
DGA  Directorate General of Antiquities 
DGT  Directorate General of Transport 
DIFC  Dubai International Financial Centre 
ECC  Economic Consultative Council 
EDB  Economic Development Board 
EMAAR Another Dubai-based real-estate conglomerate 
FAR  Floor-Area-Ration 
FFA  A financial services provider in Beirut, Lebanon 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
HCUP  Higher Council of Urban Planning 
IAURIF Institut d’amenagement et d’urbanisme de la region Ile-d-France 
13 
 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
KIPCO Kuwait Projects Company 
KLA  Kosovo Liberation Army 
MEEC  Middle East Economic Consultants 
MIG  Mediterranean Investment Group 
OGER  A French company acquired by Rafiq Hariri in 1979 
PLO  Palestine Liberation Organisation 
PSP  Progressive Socialist Party 
REC  Real-Estate Company 
RHR  Royal Hotels and Resorts 
SBH  Save Beirut Heritage 
SDRMB Le schéma directeur de la région métropolitaine de Beyrouth 
SEBC  Syrian Enterprise and Business Centre 
SI  Solidere International 
STARCO A building in Downtown Beirut 
TCC  Transnational Capitalist Class 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
VRE  Venus Real-Estate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
 
 
 
The PhD process has been a difficult, but life-enriching journey. Along the way, I 
have travelled to many places and met a number of inspiring and interesting people, who 
I am deeply indebted to. I would like to take this occasion to thank those people that have 
supported me over the years, and who have been indispensable throughout the ‘PhD 
journey’.  
 
Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Fawaz Gerges, not only for 
his excellent insights and feedback, but also for his patience and encouragement over the 
past four years. I would also like to thank my co-supervisor Dr Jens Meierhenrich for the 
advice and guidance that he provided in the last couple of years of the PhD process. I am 
also so grateful to Dr Jad Tabet, who helped guide me during my stay at Sciences Po in 
the last few months of 2013. I am deeply grateful for their time, unprecedented dedication 
and intellectual wisdom. 
 
This thesis could not have been completed without the assistance and support of the 
Middle East Centre. During the PhD, I had the opportunity to work with the Middle East 
Centre on a number of projects. I would also like to acknowledge the generous financial 
support I received from the centre in 2013. Thanks to their financial support, I was able to 
pursue my research and complete an exchange in Sciences Po. I am especially indebted to 
the centre manager, Robert Lowe, for providing me with assistance and direction over the 
years. Other names worth mentioning are Ribale Sleiman-Haidar and Sara Masry, both of 
whom have made my working experience at the Middle East Centre a cheerful one. I also 
owe thanks to Ribale for all her ‘stationery help’. 
 
15 
 
I am indebted to those I met during my fieldwork, and who have been particularly 
helpful during my stays in Beirut and Paris. In Beirut, I would like to start by thanking 
Janine Mallis, Jackie Daoud and Lynn Itani. You three made my stay in Hamra in 2012 
one of the most rewarding experiences of my life. I would also like to thank Ambassador 
Lakhdar Brahimi for the opportunity to work with UNSCOL that year. I am especially 
grateful to Pascale el-Kassis (my boss in UNSCOL) and Rami Jreige (my colleague 
there) both of whom inspired me with their unprecedented dedication and ‘spiritual 
discussions’. All the same, I am immensely grateful to the people I met during my second 
stay in Beirut in the summer of 2013 – most particularly, Elias Der Sahaguian, Tony 
Kadis and Hamza Zahran. In Paris, I would like to thank PSIA for the opportunity to use 
their facilities during my research there. But my stay in Paris would have not been 
complete without Christophe de Sahb, who ‘tried’ to teach me French during my stay. 
 
I am also indebted to my colleagues and peers of the wonderful ‘Q103’ office. In 
the three years I have worked there, I have met a number of kind and supportive 
individuals; all of whom deserved to be mentioned in this section. To begin with, I would 
like to thank Benedetta Voltolini, Stefano and Natali Pagliari, Philipp Lamprecht, Outi 
Keranen, Zeynap Kaya, Yaniv Voller and Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen for welcoming me 
into their ‘territory’ at the beginning of my second year. I also want to thank them for 
their invaluable and inspiring encouragement and support when I needed it most. I am 
also grateful to the newcomers in Q103. I am especially grateful to Simone Datzberger, 
Viviane Dittrich, Lukas Linsi and Andrew Delatolla for all their generosity, patience and 
warmth during the long mental and physical strains at the end of the PhD process.  
 
In addition, I would like to thank my friends outside the LSE. In particular, those 
that always had the time to cheer me up whenever the clouds turned grey. First, I wish to 
thank my friends in London – Sarah Ghabina, Mohammed Walji, Hassan Bader, Fatima 
Saleh, Nada Tayeb and Stephanie Chamary – who patiently put up with me during my 
most stressful hours (particularly in my last year). There are also my friends back home 
in Bahrain – Ali Amer, Nader Najat, Yasser Redha, Yousif Jaffar, Ahmed Jishi, Yousif 
Jishi, Mustafa Ali, Manuel Mutawa, Janine Mallis (again), Rameez Raja, Imane Alaiwat 
16 
 
and Said Salah – all of whom do not know how much their continued friendship has 
positively impacted me and aspects of my PhD.  
 
Finally, this journey would not have been complete without the help of my relatives 
in Lebanon and the support of my loving family in Bahrain. Firstly, to my parents, for 
their belief in me and their everlasting support for whatever new challenges I decide to 
pick up along the way, and secondly, to Hoomam, whom I am so proud to call my 
younger brother. I am blessed to have all three of you in my life, and for that, I am always 
in your debt.  
17 
 
Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
 
“The more neoliberalism is recognized as a failed utopian rhetoric masking a 
successful project for the restoration of ruling-class power, the more the basis 
is laid for a resurgence of mass movements voicing egalitarian political 
demands and seeking economic justice, fair trade, and greater economic 
security.”1 
 
 
 
I. Setting the scene: 
 
On Wednesday the 14
th
 of July 1998, at approximately 3.40pm, a battalion-sized 
unit of policemen, armed with rifles and led by Brigadier Zein (the commander of the 
Beirut city police who answered only to the then Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri), descended 
upon the Khayat building in the Tabaris quarter on the south-eastern corner of what is 
today Downtown Beirut.
2
  
 
Mounir Doumani, the son of the building’s owner Victoria Khayat Doumani, 
recalls his family receiving word of the imminent demolition of their building early that 
morning. Upon hearing the disturbing news, the Doumani family frantically called friends 
and relatives, as well as human rights organisations and a number of local and 
international media outlets, to come to the site; the purpose being to try and create as 
much media coverage of what was about to happen. 
 
After heading down to their building, the family went upstairs and occupied the 
office. Fearing the worst, Constantine (Mounir’s father) chained himself to one of the 
                                                          
1
 See: David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.157. 
2
 Unless otherwise indicated, much of the information in this subsection about the Doumani family and the 
Khayat building was obtained from an interview with Mounir Doumani held on 27 July 2012 in Beirut. 
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office windows. Mounir remembers that there were about 30 police officers ready to oust 
the family. The policemen brought in labourers from a real estate holding company called 
Solidere with hammers to break Constantine’s chains. After the family refused to leave, 
the police resorted to force. At the end of the ordeal, Mounir, his younger brother Nasim, 
and his parents were all arrested; each of them requiring medical attention. Victoria was 
released to empty the building of all their essential belongings before it was demolished. 
The rest of the family were not released until later that evening at 10.15pm. After 
Victoria had emptied the Khayat building of all their belongings, the building was turned 
over by the police to Solidere, which proceeded with its demolition.
3
 
 
Solidere was officially founded under the leadership of former Prime Minister 
Hariri. Its shares are traded on the Beirut and other stock exchanges. Moreover, it was 
created with a questionable mandate to reconstruct the entire downtown area of Beirut. 
Under the company’s Articles of Incorporation, the property owners would receive 
compensation in the form of shares in the company; a method of payment that many 
property owners found inadequate.
4
 The Doumani family, for example, never wanted to 
exchange their building for shares. By an incredible stroke of luck, their building had not 
been destroyed or even damaged during the protracted Lebanese civil war. As soon as the 
war ended, their seven-floor building was operational again. In this context, many other 
landowners – along with the Doumani family – felt betrayed by the Lebanese government 
(and the legal system) for transferring their private properties to what was – as far as they 
could tell – nothing more than a private profit-making machine for the benefit of Hariri.  
 
But not everyone opposed the Solidere project. Because the civil war had dragged 
on for sixteen years, during it many of the original owners and tenants had simply packed 
up their belongings and left altogether, leaving their old homes and businesses behind and 
setting up a new life somewhere far away from all the fighting. Some of the worst 
                                                          
3
 For further details, see: Nada Al-Awar, “Outrage at disputed building’s demolition”, The Daily Star, 17 
July 1997. 
4
 In total, Solidere had the right to expropriate up to 160 hectares of land from the city centre, and the right 
to reclaim 46 hectares of land on the sea front. Indeed, by 1994, the company had acquired land from well 
over 40,000 landowners in Downtown Beirut. See Articles of Incorporation for details on the expropriation 
mechanism and how it worked. 
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destruction occurred in areas such as the Place d’Etoile and Saifi. Martyrs’ Square, as 
well, did not escape the bullets. Indeed, most of the fighting occurred around the square 
because it used to straddle along what was dubbed the ‘Green Line’, an infamous 
demarcation line that once divided Beirut’s Christian factions in the East from the 
Muslims in the West. So when the civil war finally ended, reconstructing Downtown 
Beirut was perceived to be a massive task; one that the bankrupt and debilitated 
government could not afford on its own. In these circumstances, the government passed 
Law 117 (dated 7
th
 of December 1991), which granted private companies exclusive rights 
to expropriate land for large-scale reconstruction.
5
 The notion of delegating a public 
responsibility – such as reconstruction – to a private company – such as Solidere – is an 
artefact of the neoliberalisation process in post-civil war Lebanon. 
 
 
II. The research question(s): 
 
The primary question that this thesis attempts to answer is: did the Solidere project 
positively affect post-civil war Lebanon? In order to answer this, there are secondary 
questions that should be addressed as well: what were the objectives of Solidere? Did 
Solidere achieve these objectives? If not, what kind of consequences did the 
reconstruction of Downtown Beirut have on the country instead?  
 
To answer these questions, this thesis will reflect on the most obvious consequence 
of the Solidere project, namely, the major divide that it has engendered in public opinion. 
As demonstrated by the above example of the Doumani family, not everyone in Lebanese 
society was happy with the reconstruction process in Downtown Beirut. But what 
explains this divide? Was it simply over the government’s neoliberal approach? Was it 
about the individual, personal interests between those who gained and those who lost out? 
Or was it a mixture of both? To answer these questions, this thesis will be based on the 
personal insights and opinions of the main protagonists sat on either side of the divide.  
                                                          
5
 See: Solidere, Law No. 91 – 117 of 7th December 1991: Fifth Edition, (Beirut: Solidere, 1996). More 
details on the content of this law and its implications will be provided in Chapter 5. 
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The choice of Solidere’s reconstruction of Downtown Beirut as the case study of 
this thesis is methodologically motivated. It is the single largest reconstruction project in 
the country after the civil war. Thus, it is the most important to consider when 
understanding the consequences of the neoliberalisation approach to the reconstruction 
process on a country like post-civil war Lebanon. However, this thesis will not only treat 
the Solidere project as the object that explains the consequences of the neoliberal 
approach. More importantly, it will treat it as the object to be explained, as it is equally 
important to understand how Solidere came about and how it was manipulated. In that 
sense, this thesis is interested both in the origins – and not just the effects – of Solidere.  
 
Finally, it must be stressed that while the contribution of this thesis lies in its 
empirical research, the interdisciplinary approach it uses underscores its theoretical 
contribution as well. In this regard, the thesis involves a combination of both new urban 
governance and liberal peacebuilding literatures – something that has never been done 
before. It combines insights from both scholarships in order to advance a deep, 
interpretive analysis that recognises the interplay between urban issues (more generally), 
and postwar situations (as is the case with Solidere project being a reconstruction project 
in post-civil war Lebanon). In turn, the joint construction of both literatures can improve 
our knowledge of both.  
 
 
III. The hypothesis of the thesis 
 
The neoliberal approach adopted by the Lebanese government for the 
reconstruction of Downtown Beirut had two particular objectives: firstly, that it would 
help bring economic growth and prosperity to the country’s population; and secondly, 
that it would help to reconcile and reintegrate a divided society.  
 
If we measure the scale and size of the Solidere project, we can begin to understand 
why these objectives were laid out. To begin with, the Solidere project aims to 
21 
 
reconstruct the downtown area of the capital city; in other words, the most significant and 
most symbolic piece of territory in the entire country. It is the economic heart of the 
country that once served as the trade and services hub of the Arab/Middle Eastern region 
in the pre-civil war era. At the same time, it is the socio-political heart of a country where 
all of society’s economic classes converge, where eighteen religious sects are represented 
through its multiple churches, mosques, and even a synagogue, and where most state 
institutions – such as the government and parliament buildings – are located. In this 
context, the idea that reconstruction in the city centre would spearhead the healing 
process for the rest of the country was perceived as a realistic objective.
6
  
 
But two decades since the company’s incorporation, the country appears to be 
suffering from: firstly, a staggering public debt; and secondly, an exacerbated level of 
sectarian divisions. In light of this, this thesis attempts to explain why the Solidere project 
failed to meet its objectives. 
 
 
i. Explaining the hypothesis in detail 
 
In order to understand why the Solidere project failed to meet its objectives, we 
must analyse the rent-seeking activities that surrounded the reconstruction process more 
generally. In order to understand what rent-seeking is and what it means for the 
reconstruction process in post-civil war Lebanon, other terms need to be clarified first: 
most particularly, ‘rent’. Historically, rent was the ‘income’ derived from the ownership 
of land and other natural resources that come for free in nature and that are in fixed 
supply. Today, rent is used to refer to an income that is derived from a payment for a 
factor of production (such as land, labour, capital or enterprise), which is higher than the 
minimum that an individual or company would have accepted in an alternative 
opportunity.
7
 However defined, it must be stressed that rents come in a wide range of 
                                                          
6
 For a good understanding of the important role that Downtown Beirut plays in economic and socio-
economic terms, see: Samir Khalaf, Heart of Beirut: Reclaiming the Bourj, (London: Saqi, 2006). 
7
 The concept of rent has played an important role in the works of various classical economists, such as 
David Ricardo, who used it to refer to differences in the agricultural productivity of land. For details, see: 
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forms. They include income that is not just monopoly profits, but also subsidies and 
transfers organised through political mechanisms, illegal transfers organised by private 
mafias, short-term super profits made by innovators before competitors imitate their 
innovations, and so on.
8
  
 
Now that the term ‘rent’ has been defined, the next step is to understand ‘rent-
seeking’. The academic literature on rent-seeking is relatively new. The term was initially 
coined by Anne Krueger in 1974.
9
 Since then, Krueger has authored a number of articles 
and books on development policy. Throughout, she argues that state control in less-
developed nations creates opportunities for rent-seeking, and under such conditions, 
should expect a ‘rent-seeking society’.10 Krueger, therefore, calls for shrinking the role of 
the state via privatisation programmes, the elimination of tarrif and import licenses, 
ending special subsidies, and the elimination of any policy that might create gains for 
groups with a special interest in maintaining such policies. In little time, other thinkers 
began to explore the rent-seeking phenomenon further.
11
 Some went as far as adopting 
Krueger’s explanations and published similar works showing that state intervention in 
developmental societies created conditions for rent-seeking.
12
 By 1982, Krueger was 
appointed as chief economist of the World Bank. For the next 6 years, the World Bank 
                                                                                                                                                                             
David Ricardo, On the principles of political economy and taxation, (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001), 
pp.39-50. 
8
 Much of the information in this paragraph was obtained from: Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo Kwame 
Sundaram, ‘Introduction’, in Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram (Eds.), Rent, Rent-Seeking and 
Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
p.5. 
9
 See: Anne O. Krueger, ‘The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking Society’, The American Economic 
Review, 64(3), (1974), pp.291-303. 
10
 Krueger concentrates on the endemic wastage, social distrust and instability of these states, and uses the 
term to explain that in an environment that is riddled with corruption and inefficient behaviour, we should 
expect the state to become a source of rents via subsidies, tax exemptions, tarrifs, and the likes, for groups 
that have a vested interest in keeping such policies in place. See, for example: Anne O. Krueger, 
Liberalization attempts and consequences, (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1977). 
11
 For example, see: Richard Posner, ‘The social costs of monopoly and regulation’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 83, (1975), pp.807-827.1975; James M. Buchanan, Richard Tollison, and Gordon Tullock (Eds.), 
Towards a theory of the rent-seeking society, (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1980); 
Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ‘Directly unproductive, profit-seeking (DUP) activities’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 90, (1982), pp.988-1002; Robert Tollison, ‘Rent-seeking, a survey’, Kyklos, 35, (1982), pp.575-
602. 
12
 See, for example: Charles D. De Lorme, David R. Kamerschen, and John M. Mbaku, ‘Rent Seeking in 
the Cameroon Economy: Krueger’s Analytic Technique Helps to Account for Development Lag in 
Colonial States’, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 45(4), (1986), pp.413-423.  
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witnessed a shift towards neoliberalism. The international organisation has since become 
one of the leading advocates of neoliberal reform.
13
  
 
By the end of the 1980s, however, some thinkers – one of them being Gordon 
Tullock – began to show that there is no way to avoid rent-seeking; they are ubiquitous 
and all nations (developed or not) have to learn to live with them.
14
 Therefore, they 
suggest that neoliberal reform can in itself be used by those seeking to create and extract 
rent. Today, rent-seeking is used by economists to describe the actions and behaviours of 
individuals and groups trying to alter public policy (which can be either neoliberal or not) 
in order to gain personal advantage at the expense of others; in other words, activities that 
seek to create, maintain, or change the rights and institutions on which particular rents are 
based. This evolved interpretation represents a far cry from earlier understandings of rent-
seeking. Defined in this ‘new’ way, we realise that rent-seeking is used to refer to a wide 
range of social activities. Importantly, “these activities can range from bribing or even 
coercion at one extreme, to perfectly legal political activities such as lobbying or 
advertising at the other”.15 Such a social activities approach can provide a framework that 
enables us to broaden the scope of our analysis to include patterns such as those related to 
corruption and clientelism (or patron-client relationships).  
 
It is important to mention corruption and clientelism here because both processes 
are present and tolerated in a country like post-civil war Lebanon. Resources that are 
spent on both of these processes are (sometimes) expended to capture rents.
16
 If this is the 
case, then these expenditures are two variants of rent-seeking. But rent-seeking is 
analytically distinguishable. First, rent-seeking is sometimes (but not always) illegal. 
Corruption is always illegal: commonly defined as the, “misuse of public office for 
                                                          
13
 Between 2001 and 2006, Krueger would serve as First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF. 
14
 See: Charles K. Rowley, Robert D. Tollison and Gordon Tullock, (Eds.), The Political Economy of Rent-
Seeking, (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1988), p.367; See also: Gordon Tullock, Rent seeking, (Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993). 
15
 This is according to: Khan and Sundaram, ‘Introduction’, p.5.  
16
 Some scholars, such as Paul D. Hutchcroft highlight that there can be clear overlaps between rent-
seeking and processes such as corruption or patron-client exchanges. See: Paul D. Hutchcroft, ‘Obstructive 
corruption: The Politics of Privilege in the Philippines’, in Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram 
(Eds.), Rent, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.207-247. 
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private gain”.17 A further distinction needs to be made between corruption and patron-
client relationships. A person of higher social status (patron) is connected to those of 
lower social status (clients) by linkages of reciprocity that can change over time and 
place. A patron is not necessarily corrupt. But, “when a patron occupies a public position 
or extracts favors from those in public positions, patronage and corruption [can] 
overlap”.18 The use of all three paradigms together allows us to gain a deeper 
understanding of the way the Lebanese political economy was structured: rent-seeking is 
the general term used to refer to all social activities used to extract rent; corruption 
examines how public roles and private influences can conflict within the administrative 
bodies and institutions; and clientelism allows us to analyse the social relationships that 
may – or may not – permeate throughout the state, market and society.  
 
As will be shown in subsequent chapters, public and private resources were 
distributed by Hariri (and his allies and friends) to ensure the smooth functioning of the 
rent-creating and -extracting mechanisms he put in place. Particularly, public (and 
private) resources were distributed to potential opponents (who can act as ‘spoilers’). 
Most of these resources were distributed in the form of cash.
19
 For Hariri, such an 
exchange was ‘business as usual’. But this ‘business as usual’ seems to be a euphemistic 
expression for an act that was borderline bribery and/or patronage money. Overall, the 
expenditure of public resources on corruption and patron-client exchanges allowed Hariri 
and his entourage to push forward special laws and decrees, which in turn, allowed them 
                                                          
17
 This definition is taken from: World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the 
World Bank, (Washington DC: World Bank, 1997), p.8. There are, however, some definitions that are 
slightly different. For example, Seymour Martin Lipset and Gabriel Salman Lenz define it as ‘private again 
at public expense’. See: Seymour Martin Lipset and Gabriel Salman Lenz, ‘Corruption, Culture and 
Markets’, in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington, (Eds.), Culture Matters: How Values Shape 
Human Progress, (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p.112. In contrast, Susan Rose-Ackerman uses the word 
misuse instead of abuse. This way, she explains, it takes into account that some private benefits are 
legitimate as well. See: Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘Corruption’, in Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich G. 
Schneider, (Eds.), Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, (New York: Springer, 
2008), p.551. 
18
 See: John Waterbury, ‘Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime’, World Politics, 25, 
(1973), p.537, quoted in Hutchcroft, ‘Obstructive corruption: The Politics of Privilege in the Philippines’, 
p.215. For a study showing the conceptual links between corruption and clientelism, see: Junichi Kawata, 
Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism, (Burlington: Ashgate, 2006). 
19
 In terms of private resources, they also included cash, but also properties, shares and positions in the 
company. Since Hariri was prime minister, he also distributed governmental institutions and cabinet 
positions. More details on this will be given in Chapter 6. 
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to appropriate as much rent as possible from the reconstruction effort. It is no hidden 
secret that Hariri (along with his allies and friends) benefited richly from these special 
laws and decrees.
20
 Solidere supporters argue that, at least, Hariri was able to provide a 
‘public good’; namely, reconstruction of Downtown Beirut. In their assessment, for 
example, Mark Neal and Richard Tansey argue that the late prime minister’s leadership 
was ‘corrupt’ but ‘effective’ because he was able to reconstruct the downtown area of 
Beirut.
21
 Yet, it is more fruitful to analyse the ‘costs’ of Hariri’s rent-seeking activities 
before praising their ‘effectiveness’ – not least because, as will be shown in Chapters 6 
and 7, their impact was more harmful than Neal, Tansey and others think. In a country 
that was expected to miss out on substantial economic returns as a result of these special 
laws and decrees, the squandering of public resources meant that the economy was about 
to pay an even heavier price. It is argued that Hariri’s desire to create and appropriate as 
much rent as possible from the reconstruction process, mixed with the expenditure of 
public resources on corruption and clientelism, led to increasing levels of public debt. 
                                                                           
At this point, it is easy to assume that the resources spent by Hariri (and his 
entourage) enabled him to continue extracting rents. However, this assumption is 
misleading, to say the least, because it does not take into consideration the institutional 
and political changes that accompanied Hariri’s rent-seeking activities. In these terms, the 
rent-seeking framework needs to be extended to understand the extent of institutional 
change that came with Hariri’s ‘neoliberal’ laws and decrees. Neoliberal reform in any 
country’s political economy is closely related to its institutional structure, and any 
changes that are introduced to this structure can unleash distributive conflicts between 
different interest-groups.
22
 Hariri’s neoliberal agenda involved strengthening the ‘right 
hand’ of the state (which was concerned with economics and finance), at the expense of 
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 One cannot overlook the fact that Hariri’s personal wealth had grown tremendously during the same 
period. By 2004, he was ranked as the 108
th
 richest man in the world (according to Forbes Magazine’s 18th 
annual list of world’s billionaires), with a fortune that had grown to a staggering US$4.3 billion. See: Tarek 
El Zein, ‘Hariri 108th richest man in the world, says Forbes magazine’, The Daily Star, 01 March 2004. 
21
 See: Mark Neal and Richard Tansey, “The dynamics of effective corrupt leadership: Lessons from Rafik 
Hariri’s political career in Lebanon”, The Leadership Quarterly, 21, (2010), pp.33-49. 
22
 Paying attention to institutional and political variables can help us determine which individuals or groups 
are likely to win distributive conflicts over rents: Mushtaq H. Khan, ‘Rents, Efficiency and Growth’, in 
Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram (Eds.), Rent, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: 
Theory and Evidence in Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.21-69. 
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the ‘left hand’ of the state (which was concerned with the provision of welfare).23 
Because the welfare-related agencies functioned as patronage instruments for many of his 
rival elites – most significant of which were the former militia leaders – they often tried 
to resist by launching accusations of corruption against Solidere. By 1998, these 
accusations escalated into an all-out campaign to oust Rafiq Hariri and his allies from 
those administrative bodies and institutions concerned with reconstruction matters in 
general, and in Downtown Beirut in particular. Such elite squabbling mirrored the 
sectarian culture of Lebanese politics and, therefore, it was not long before Hariri 
transformed himself from a ‘national leader’ to a specifically ‘Sunni leader’. Hariri’s 
transformation was reflected in Downtown Beirut when he decided to build a gigantic 
mosque next to Martyrs’ Square: a symbolic claim that the reconstruction project in the 
city centre belonged to the Sunni community and therefore to him. Inevitably, the 
politicisation of the Solidere project helped drive sectarian divisions further. 
 
 
ii. The key propositions 
 
The research in this thesis yields a number of propositions that are summed up 
below (and illustrated in Figure 1):  
 
Firstly, the Solidere project was part of a wider neoliberal agenda that former Prime 
Minister Rafiq Hariri pursued in order to enrich himself (and those closest to him). 
Because of the endemic nature of corruption and clientelism in the country’s political 
economy, (1) considerable resources (both public and private) were spent by Hariri and 
his protégés on both these processes in order to capture rents. The level of expenditure on 
these two processes was markedly high, and therefore, (2) marked as a huge drain on the 
public resources of the country. This high expenditure of public resources contributed 
towards (3) increasing a public debt that the country had slipped into after the civil war.  
                                                          
23
 The idea of dividing the state into a ‘right hand’ and a ‘left hand’ was initially proposed by Pierre 
Bourdieu. According to Bourdieu, neoliberalisation leads to a strengthening of the economic ministries that 
make up the right hand of the state and the neglect or weakening of the welfare functions of the state that 
constitute the left hand. For details, see: Pierre Bourdieu, Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the 
Market, (New York: New Press, 1998), p.2. 
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Secondly, Hariri’s neoliberal agenda threatened state welfare services. Because 
state-welfare services functioned as patronage instruments for some of the elites, (1) this 
generated a huge backlash against Hariri (particularly from former militia leaders). The 
Solidere project is closely associated with Hariri’s neoliberal agenda, and therefore (2) 
the reconstruction process in Downtown Beirut became a legitimate target for rival elites. 
Because elite squabbling mirrored the sectarian culture of Lebanese politics, (3) it was 
not long before the Solidere project became associated with the Sunni community, which 
in turn, helped fuel the reproduction of sectarian divisions.  
 
The Solidere project will be analysed according to the key propositions mentioned 
above. In doing so, it will be shown that the Solidere project was implemented with clear-
cut objectives to contribute towards healing a wartorn country. But the rent-seeking 
activities that were working simultaneously behind the reconstruction process essentially 
undermined Solidere’s given objectives. 
 
Process 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
Process 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – A process-diagram demonstrating main propositions 
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IV. Analysing the reconstruction of Downtown Beirut as a ‘neoliberal urban 
development’ 
 
Of course, Solidere is not the only large-scale development and/or reconstruction 
project of its kind that has been set up in the world today. In many parts of the country, 
the region and the world we find similar projects taking shape. What all these projects 
have in common is that they are preceded by a set of legislation that creates special 
exemptions and freedoms for the project at hand. In much of the literature, this kind of 
legislation falls in line with what many scholars often describe as neoliberal economic 
policies. It is for this reason that the Solidere project can be described as an artefact of 
neoliberalism.  
 
 Over the past twenty years, the concept of ‘neoliberalism’ has become quite 
widespread in academic literature. In this vast body of literature, however, it is difficult to 
find an even-handed account of neoliberalism built on the more moderate voices. Take, 
‘Neoliberalism – A Critical Reader’, for example.24 In this edited book, Alfredo Saad-
Filho, Deborah Johnston and several other contributing authors deplore the spread of 
neoliberalism and its ‘negative impact’ on the state and the market. Like A Critical 
Reader, most works have tended to exhort a non-sympathetic point of view about 
neoliberalism and its different components.
25
 One is forced, therefore, either to take up a 
position against it, or else contribute to its diffusion and entrenchment.  
 
 Because several of these works use the concept of neoliberalism as a generic term 
of deprecation, it is generally adopted to describe any form of economic or political 
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 See: Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston (Eds.), Neoliberalism – A Critical Reader, (London: 
Pluto Press, 2005). 
25
 For example, see the works of: Pierre Bourdieu, Contre-feux: Propos pour servir à la résistance contre 
l'invasion néo-libérale, (Paris: Éditions Liber, 1998); Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of 
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development that is deemed to be undesirable. A Critical Reader is in many ways a 
typical example of this trend against neoliberalism. In this ‘critical scholarship’, however, 
several scholars accord neoliberalism an overwhelming significance, while also 
remaining seemingly happy with leaving the concept of neoliberalism completely 
undefined, claiming, along with Saad-Filho and Johnston, that it defies definition. In this 
vast body of literature, therefore, it is difficult to find a fruitful definition of 
neoliberalism.  
 
 
i. Neoliberalism – a definition 
 
While it is difficult to find a definition that accurately and objectively explains the 
concept of neoliberalism, David Harvey’s understanding of neoliberalism in ‘A Brief 
History of Neoliberalism’ stands out as being one of the few that has been able to give a 
detailed explanation of the neoliberalisation process. Harvey states the following: 
 
“Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices 
that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and 
free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional 
framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for 
example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those 
military, defence, police and legal structures and functions required to secure 
private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper 
functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as 
land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental 
pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond 
these tasks the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once 
created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the 
state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market 
signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort 
and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own 
benefit.”26 
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 See: Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p.2. 
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Harvey’s detailed and wide-ranging understanding of neoliberalism sheds light on what 
kind of phenomenon neoliberalism really is. According to his definition, it can be 
understood that neoliberalism is not simply a continuation of liberalism ‘proper’.27 
Rather, it is something that is deeply embedded so that it lives on independently of 
mainstream liberal values and policies. This is demonstrated when Harvey claims that 
neoliberalism can be more accurately described as ‘a theory of political economic 
practices’, rather than simply a ‘political ideology’. If we apply this definition to the 
context of reconstruction in post-civil war Lebanon, it will be shown that it is well suited 
to accommodating the overall analysis of this thesis.  
 
 
ii. Neoliberalism in new urban governance and liberal peacebuilding literatures 
 
The definition used above helps to understand the neoliberalisation process 
surrounding the Solidere project. But how do we define and understand the Solidere 
project as a ‘neoliberal urban development’? There is much literature across various 
disciplines analysing the emergence of neoliberal urban developments (and the role of the 
state in such matters). But the kind of literature chosen in this thesis is a mixture of both 
new urban governance and liberal peacebuilding literatures. The reason why the two have 
been chosen instead of one or the other is that the concepts and explanations from both 
help to complement one another, particularly in the case of Solidere: while the project is a 
‘development’ project that was inspired by similar projects that appeared in other parts of 
the First and Third worlds, it is also a ‘reconstruction’ project that was launched as a 
result of destruction caused by war. 
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 It must be understood that ‘liberalism’ is, like ‘neoliberalism’, a rather vague and often highly contested 
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First, the literature on new urban governance helps to draw similarities between 
urban projects in different parts of the world. It begins by looking at the regulatory 
changes introduced by the state, and the steps it takes to support a particular 
‘developmental vision’. If we look at post-civil war Lebanon, for example, the state has 
passed a number of laws that have enabled the creation of private real estate companies to 
oversee large-scale reconstruction projects. The most significant of these laws was Law 
117, which was briefly mentioned earlier. The steps taken by the Lebanese state bear 
huge resemblance to those taken by states elsewhere in the region and the globe, where 
the regulatory framework was modified substantially to foster a particular form of 
development.
28
 In addition, new urban governance literature helps to illustrate the 
growing impact of neoliberal urban developments on urban environments. In particular, it 
helps us understand the growing regional and socio-economic inequalities caused by such 
developments. In the case of post-civil war Lebanon, they have led to the creation of 
exclusive spaces of consumption that cater to a predominately rich Arab Gulf clientele. 
Through these lenses, we see that most Beirutis – and Lebanese, as a matter of fact – 
cannot afford to purchase or rent properties in the city centre. The literature also provides 
us with useful terminology that can help describe some of the main features of the 
downtown area. One of these terms is ‘gated communities’. In this regard, Downtown 
Beirut is awash with residential gated communities, where ‘unwanted’ or ‘undesirable’ 
people are often barred from entering the area. These residential communities are isolated 
from their socio-spatial environment and accessed by a main driveway and narrow 
pedestrian (service) entrance. And together, they have led to the creation of ‘islands of 
wealth’ connected symbolically by their expensive relation to the rest of the city.29 Other 
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than that, we find that Solidere has also produced a set of rules on the kind of businesses 
and restaurants that are allowed to open in the area. In this regard, we find luxury suites, 
5-star hotels and high-end office spaces dotted all around the downtown area. Meanwhile, 
a short ten-minute drive out of the city centre will take a visitor to many impoverished 
neighbourhoods (most particularly in the southern suburbs of Beirut). 
 
In contrast, the literature on liberal peacebuilding helps to compare the 
reconstruction experiences of postwar societies. According to many of the examples 
provided in this literature, we find that peace is maintained by ‘deals’ that often involve 
dividing the reconstruction process amongst the various elites. Such deals are without 
doubt a symptom of former militia leaders becoming part of the postwar consensus.
30
 In 
post-civil war Lebanon, we find the reconstruction process divided amongst three key 
players: former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who was given large discretionary powers in 
the overall reconstruction of Beirut through personal control over the ‘Council for 
Reconstruction and Development’ (CDR); Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who enjoyed 
near autonomous control in the running of reconstruction and relief programmes in the 
South through the ‘Council for South Lebanon’; and Druze leader Walid Junblatt, who 
was awarded full discretion in directing the ‘Ministry of the Displaced’ and the ‘Fund for 
the Displaced’. Looking at the reconstruction of Downtown Beirut in terms of this 
division helps us to understand whether the Solidere project was like a ‘spoil of war’ – or 
more like a ‘spoil of peace’.31 Furthermore, liberal peacebuilding literature sheds light on 
neoliberal economic policies, which have been part of the reconstruction process of many 
postwar societies. In particular, it attempts to understand whether these policies enable 
certain members of the elite to carry over wartime economic structures into the postwar 
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period.
32
 While the jury is still out on whether neoliberal economic policies are to blame, 
many scholars agree that there is a huge ‘wastage’ of public resources in postwar 
societies.
33
 For the first five years after the end of the civil war, the Lebanese government 
expenditure on reconstruction projects was a staggering US$75 billion. According to 
some reports, it was alleged that only a relatively trifling US$6 billion went to these 
projects, while the rest disappeared.
34
 It must be remembered, however, that this wastage 
is not simply a result of corruption. It is a result of public expenditures on the processes 
of corruption and clientelism together to capture rents.  
 
At this point, it is important to stress that while there are many examples round the 
world that can be used to understand the way the Solidere project is being implemented, 
addressing such a project with reference to a broad range of projects in various countries 
can result in some broad and sweeping claims that emphasise commonalities between 
them rather than differences and particularities between them. This point is brought to our 
attention by a number of scholars, such as Jamie Peck, Adam Tickel, Ronaldo Munch, 
Neil Brenner, Nik Theodore, and even David Harvey, when they refer to ‘actually 
existing neoliberalism’.35 In their works, they argue that the reality is that actually 
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existing neoliberalism is highly uneven across the globe because the nation-state and 
local politics shape the development and implementation of neoliberal economic policies 
as well. In light of the above statement, this thesis takes the stance that the Solidere 
project is – without doubt – a neoliberal urban development like many other projects 
round the world. At the same time, however, it is influenced and shaped by the historical 
sociology of the country that it is located in; in this case, post-civil war Lebanon. What 
makes Lebanon unique from the rest is its sectarian dimension. Several authors have 
identified sectarianism as the essence of Lebanese politics and the determinant of 
political behaviour.
36
 In order to grasp the historical sociology of post-civil war Lebanon, 
it will be necessary to collapse the analysis made by scholars of both liberal 
peacebuilding and urban governance literatures: firstly, within the Arab/Middle Eastern 
context; and secondly, within the Lebanese context. 
 
 
V. The agents behind neoliberal urban developments 
 
Generally speaking, there is much literature looking at neoliberal urban 
developments. As detailed above, there is: (1) new urban governance literature that looks 
at these developments in terms of the creation of exclusive spaces; and (2) liberal 
peacebuilding literature, which looks at these developments as reconstruction projects 
that are exploited – more often than not, by war elites – for private gain. But as this thesis 
is more concerned with the rent-seeking activities that surrounded Solidere, it will look at 
the consequences of the reconstruction effort in terms of the agents that pushed it 
forward. This way, we can better understand the phenomenon of rent-seeking that is 
central to the discussion in this thesis.  
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i. Analysing the agents as transnational capitalists 
 
Neoliberal urban developments are pushed forward by what is often described as a 
‘transnational capitalist class’ (TCC). This TCC takes shape in different shapes and forms 
from one region to the other and from one country to the other. In the Arab world, for 
example, this TCC can be described as a group of businesspeople and private sector 
representatives; a growing number of which have attained an education or working 
experience in the West. Specifically within Lebanon, we find that this TCC comprises of 
businesspeople and private sector representatives as well. But a large number of them 
included those who became successful in the Arabian Gulf and West Africa, and later 
returned to Lebanon – particularly at the end of the civil war – to snatch up contracts in 
the country’s reconstruction process. The most successful member of this ‘new contractor 
bourgeoisie’ was none other than former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri (the founding father 
of Solidere).
37
  
 
Beginning in the 1980s, businesspeople and private sector representatives across 
the Arab/Middle Eastern region were recruited by the ruling elites; either as economic 
advisors, or as members of new institutional bodies.
38
 But even though businesspeople 
and private sector representatives were awarded significant influence and power over 
economic matters in their respective countries, they were at the same time heavily 
dependent on the ‘will’ and ‘priorities’ of their respective rulers. This is because the 
political regimes governing in Arab countries are based on a system of rule that is ‘neo-
patrimonial’.39 Neo-patrimonialism implies the existence of a political leader who holds 
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ultimate power and exercises it, often, by informal means of patronage networks and 
clientelist relations incorporating loyalists of that leader’s choice.40 Lebanon may not be 
classified as a typical example of a neo-patrimonial state, but the leaders who hold 
ultimate power in the country have built patronage networks very similar to those that can 
be found elsewhere in the region.  
 
But in Lebanon, an additional characteristic can be identified that differentiates 
some businesspeople and private sector representatives there from others in the region. In 
this regard, some have built their own patronage networks and clientelist following, and 
have in turn, succeeded in infiltrating Lebanese politics and becoming part of the ruling 
elites. This is particularly the case for many of the new contractors, the most significant 
of which was Hariri. Because of their neoliberal logic, these new contractors recruited 
and employed businesspeople and private sector representatives as well, just like the 
political leaders in the region were doing. These new recruits can be described as 
technocrats who help the new contractors to push through neoliberal economic policies, 
especially if they were appointed to some of the top posts in the institutions. At this point, 
though, a distinction needs to be made between the new contractors and the technocrats 
they recruited. While the new contractors pursue neoliberal globalisation as a political 
project to, “re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power 
of economic elites”, the technocrats drive neoliberal globalisation as a utopian economic 
project to, “realise a theoretical design for the organisation of international capitalism”.41 
According to some scholars, like Stephen Gill, these technocrats fit the profile of 
‘globalising elites’, defined as a grouping of ‘organic intellectuals’ and ‘political leaders’ 
that are strategically located in transnational companies, banks, universities, think tanks, 
media companies, governments and international organisations such as the IMF and the 
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World Bank. Through their activities, they seek to make ‘transnational capital’ a class for 
itself.  Because of their international orientation, they are linked together as a global 
political and civil society that seeks to develop strategy and make policy 
recommendations at both ‘national’ and ‘international’ levels.42 There are exceptions to 
this group, such as Fouad Siniora. It is possible that upon becoming prime minister, 
Siniora justified the implementation of neoliberal economic policies with reference to 
market ideology, but may have actually been politically-motivated. It is because of these 
exceptions that one must be cautious when using sweeping terminology, such as TCC.  
 
By using such ‘structural’ terms, we overlook the importance of agency. The same 
goes for other terms, such as class, group, and network, to name but a few.
43
 To some 
extent, Marxist scholars – such as David Harvey – provide us with invaluable analysis on 
the social and political characteristics of the agents pushing forward neoliberalism. But at 
times, even these scholars have fallen into ‘the trap’ as they portray the agents of 
neoliberalism as a clique of ‘financial experts’ behind every twist and turn of neoliberal 
globalisation.
44
 In this context, some interviewees – for example, Charbel Nahas – did not 
agree that Hariri was a neoliberal.
45
 Others – Kamal Hamdan – describe Hariri as a 
neoliberal ideaologue who, “hoped to imitate Reagan and Thatcher with a Gulf and 
Lebanese twist”.46 In much of the literature documenting the neoliberal phenomenon 
round the world, therefore, scholars rarely attempt to prove what kind of agents help to 
bring neoliberalism about. There is an important sociological dimension missing in those 
accounts that rely exclusively on class for analysing social structure and politics. 
Neoliberalism is more open and unpredictable than what is often assumed, and can have 
unintended consequences which are regularly overlooked. In this regard, we also find that 
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many people who did not belong to Hariri’s patronage network (from now on referred to 
as the ‘Hariri network’), but that had come to benefit from the neoliberal economic 
policies implemented by Hariri and his protégés, were eager to see the reconstruction 
process in Downtown Beirut continue. Most notably, this included many within the elites 
– of particular significance, the former militia leaders – who were initially opposed to 
Hariri’s policies in the 1990s and early 2000s. In order to grasp the complex relationships 
between different individuals, agency needs to be placed at the centre of the analysis. 
And because agency is placed at the centre of the analysis, an approach that is more 
sociological in nature needs to be adopted to understand the role of specific agents who 
are seeking rents.  
 
 
ii. Identifying the agents through a sociological approach  
 
While it is relatively easy to identify classes in relation to the means of production 
(a structuralist approach helps us to map class positions), this does not tell us how they 
act as social forces, how they are socially or politically represented and, most 
importantly, how they push for their self-interests – it is assumed as self-evident that 
members of the capitalist class would follow their collective economic and individual 
business interests. In other words, the question is: how does this class organise itself in 
pursuit of its interests?  
 
Adopting an approach that is more sociological in nature helps us to address the 
question at hand. First, it allows us to focus on elites as opposed to classes. Focussing on 
elites is useful because it is a more open category, compared to classes. In turn, it allows 
us to produce a richer account of individuals and the social and political positions they 
represent. But before producing a study that uses the concept of elite, we must first 
provide a definition of the term. Elites can be defined as ‘decision-makers’47, or 
alternatively, as those with a high degree of social, symbolic, economic, and/or cultural 
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‘capital’.48 These two definitions are not meant to be mutually-exclusive: this is because 
decision-makers are very likely to possess great capital as well. If we take Hariri as an 
example, he was a ‘decision-maker’ who pushed a neoliberal agenda as an actor endowed 
with a specific form of capital – financial capital in particular abundance. In sum, the two 
definitions are two different ways of thinking about elites and they are both equally 
relevant to the topic here.  
 
The study of elites was initially established as part of political science in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by two Italian sociologists Vilfredo Pareto and 
Gaetano Mosca.
49
 Their aim was to enquire about the techniques of leadership, the 
relations between leaders and what sorts of people attained positions of leadership. The 
research they produced offered a way of understanding the structure of modern politics; 
in particular, the relationship between leaders and the masses (an aspect that many saw as 
central). Interestingly, these theorists adopted an approach which they claimed was 
‘scientific’, and that was identical to those adopted in the natural sciences. Both theorists 
were concerned with the striking absence of a neutral, ‘objective’ analysis in political 
science, free from any ‘ethical contamination’. This objectively allowed them to make the 
contribution that they believe advances our understanding of politics.
50
 A shortcoming of 
the approach used by the two theorists is that their focus is on national elites as opposed 
to transnational ones. Sociologists such as Ralph Miliband, John Scott and Michael 
Useem have overcome this shortcoming in their own research.
51
  
 
In sum, reconstruction in post-civil war Lebanon is complicated not only in how, 
where and why it occurred, but also in how it is perceived from individual to individual. 
                                                          
48
 See: Michael Hartmann, The Sociology of Elites, (Oxford: Routledge, 2007), pp.46-48. 
49
 What is often regarded as the ‘classic texts’ of thought on elites are Pareto’s The Mind and Society 
(Treatise of General Sociology) and Mosca’s The Ruling Class. To these texts, others can be added, such as 
Robert Michels’s Political Parties, James Burnham’s The Managerial Revolution and C. Wright Mills’s 
The Power Elite. For a detailed analysis on these ‘classical elite theorists’ and their work, see: Parry, 
Political Elites, pp.30-63. 
50
 See: ibid, pp.15-29. 
51
 See: Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, (London: Quartet Books, 1973); John Scott, The 
Sociology of Elites, Volume II: Critical Perspectives, (Aldershott: Elgar, 1990); John Scott, The Sociology 
of Elites, Volume III: Interlocking Directorships and Corporate Networks, (Aldershott: Elgar, 1990); 
Michael Useem, The inner circle: large corporations and the rise of business political activity in the U.S. 
and U.K., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).  
40 
 
Thus, the complexity of the topic being studied in this thesis necessitates the adoption of 
an approach that is more sociological in nature in order to highlight the competition 
between the elites as well. As explained shortly, this thesis primarily involves intimate 
face-to-face interviews with the elites that were deeply involved in the reconstruction 
process.
52
 In other words, it rests on the use of a comprehensive, and mainly qualitative, 
set of interpersonal and in-depth methods. Of course, it also makes reference to a range of 
secondary sources, such as textbooks, journal/newspaper articles, criticisms and 
commentaries by observers of the Solidere project.  
 
 
VI. The methodology of the thesis 
 
The topic of reconstruction is highly sensitive and painful in post-civil war 
Lebanon. This is because reconstruction evokes memories and feelings of a traumatic and 
violent past, and acts as a reminder of fear and uncertainty for the future. Even though 
outwardly it does not appear to concern the Lebanese very much, underneath the surface 
the reconstruction of Lebanon is very close to the hearts of its people. In this context, it 
would be pointless to collect unemotional dispassionate information. Therefore, surveys 
and other detached methods have to be ruled out in favour of interpersonal and in-depth 
methods. This is because interpersonal and in-depth methods can help shed light on the 
experiences of the participants, their emotions and feelings, and the researcher’s 
impressions of them; all of which cannot be deduced through surveys or reading 
transcripts alone. Indeed, most of the research was conducted through ‘in-depth’ or 
‘semi-structured’ interviews with individuals who are directly involved in the Solidere 
project, or who are well-known observers of the project.
53
 For example, these included 
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the Financial Manager of Solidere Mounir Douaidi, the former Finance Minister Georges 
Corm, the architect Jad Tabet, the urban planner Assem Salam, the economist Kamal 
Hamdan, the journalist Violette Balaa, the former rights holder Mounir Doumani, and the 
heritage activist Giorgio Tarraf, to name a few. 
 
 
i. The influence of context on the methodology used  
 
Despite surviving sixteen years of infighting, the country remains politically 
divided and unstable. As a result of the conflict, the Lebanese people have separated 
themselves amongst religious sects under the umbrella of one multi-confessional nation. 
The unresolved residues of the fighting are still apparent: the hatreds, blame, atrocious 
memories, religious identities, and the fears and vulnerabilities including a general 
distrust of the government (and of other groups) are still apparent. All of these things 
together make post-civil war Lebanon a case study that is full of challenges when using 
interpersonal and in-depth methods.  
 
One might therefore ask how this context – these post-civil war and religious 
tensions – can impact research. The characteristic distrustfulness of people (that can come 
from war) becomes apparent if one is just to scratch under the surface. For instance, the 
author was constantly asked by the participants of the study numerous questions about his 
personal background, the dissertation, the supervisor, and the London School of 
Economics to ease their minds and settle their curiosities. Some questions to do with 
where the author lived and studied were asked to ‘size him up’ in a way. The fact that the 
author lived abroad all his life and graduated from a university outside Lebanon indicated 
that the he was somewhat an ‘outsider’. Many of the interviewees saw this as a plus as 
they saw the author as someone that was not driven by political and/or religious 
intentions. However, one of the participants commented negatively on the fact that the 
author had not lived and experienced the post-civil war period, saying that a researcher 
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studying from the outside could never understand the realities of post-civil war life 
without being too idealistic, judgmental or ‘western’. 
 
Nevertheless, most participants interviewed felt some kind of kinship with the 
author due to his Lebanese background; the shared culture and language played a role in 
this.
54
 This enabled the author to capture the personal stories of those living and/or 
working in Beirut very well. The author’s impressions of the mindset of the participants 
interviewed, their customs and traditions, and of the cultural biases together put these 
stories into perspective. In addition to that, the access and the contacts the author had was 
a definite advantage – particularly in a political context ripe with instability and danger. 
As will be shown later, a couple of the people interviewed for this study are distantly 
related to the author. Despite all these advantages, religious tensions were also dwelling 
just beneath the surface; not least because of the author’s Lebanese background. The 
author was often asked what part of Lebanon he came from – particularly by members of 
the older generation. The origin of one’s residence in Lebanon – along with the family 
name – can be an indicator of religion and sect and, therefore, political affiliation as well. 
As the author’s name gives a clear indication of the religious group he belongs to, one 
suspects this may have affected the interviews. Sometimes, the author was asked about 
his religious sect outright. It was interesting to find that none of the female participants 
asked any questions about the author’s religious background but seemed more interested 
in the study or in the academic aspects of my life. Thus, it is deduced that Lebanese men 
asked much more detailed questions about the author’s background. 
 
On multiple occasions, the participants were suspicious of my research and its 
objectives. This was particularly the case for those who worked inside Solidere. In this 
regard, some interviewees were worried that the aim of the study was to paint a negative 
picture of the company they worked for. In part, this is due to their past negative 
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experiences with media and public criticism. The author was able to settle their minds 
over the matter. But this took some time before the interviews and even during the 
interviews themselves. On a couple of occasions, the author found himself having to 
reveal his personal connections to the Solidere project: for example, that one of the main 
shareholders in the company is a family relative, or that his own mother – a former tenant 
in the area – holds shares in the company. Furthermore, the highly sensitive political and 
religious context was taken into serious and careful consideration while drafting the 
questions. The author did his best to make sure that the questions could not be taken in 
any way to be accusatory or political in nature. As the questions were posed, the 
participants began to realise that the author was not out to criminalise anyone. The 
questions of neoliberalism, however, seemed to put a couple of participants on edge as 
they were worried they were being personally blamed: they went on the defensive 
immediately. This innate sensitivity to the issues surrounding neoliberalism – that some 
companies, such as Solidere, have been criticised for in the past – makes it a touchy 
subject that had to be approached very cautiously. 
 
 
ii. The veracity of information collected using this methodology 
 
In circumstances such as those presented above in the context of post-civil war 
Lebanon, research in this thesis is presented with numerous obstacles. To begin with, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to use interpersonal and in-depth methods all while 
maintaining a distance and remaining impersonal. It is even more difficult in the case of 
reconstructing Downtown Beirut, because the participants selected to be interviewed in 
this thesis are clearly split between opponents and supporters of the Solidere project. In 
this regard, it was found that the views of both groupings stem from the firm belief in 
forwarding public interest.  
 
On the one hand, the opponents argued that public interest should be decided by the 
public itself. For them, public interest can only, and should only, be achieved through 
public involvement. They called for public involvement because they believe it sets a 
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precedent for shaping national planning policies and practices based on building 
consensus and democratic participation. By consistently remoulding and reshaping 
reconstruction to take into account the views and opinions of the public, they argue, we 
are more likely to arrive at a final design that most people are willing to live in. They 
voiced their opposition against the prevailing official tendency to privatise public 
responsibilities and to relax governmental control. For them, the public sector had been 
lured by the private sector into relinquishing its traditional role as the representative and 
defender of public interest. As a result, this created enormous economic and social 
injustices, which further undermined public trust in the state and its institutions. 
According to its opponents, Solidere not only compromised the financial future of the 
country, but it also diverted the process of urban planning away from its social and 
political objectives and this led to major and undesirable side-effects. Namely, they 
argue, the reconstruction process failed to restore Lebanon’s fragmented society and 
jeopardised the democratic principles of the country. 
 
In contrast, the supporters of Solidere felt that resorting to a fully privatised scheme 
of reconstruction would eventually serve the public interest. To them, adopting measures 
that would jump-start and stimulate an ailing economy was more important and more 
urgent than adopting measures that began with solving decades of political problems. The 
most immediate concern for them was to start the reconstruction process sooner rather 
than later in order to consolidate and build upon the ‘Ta’if Peace Accords’.55 The more 
the process was delayed, the more precarious the social and political consequences would 
be. Alongside this, supporters repeatedly argued that the Lebanese state would have not 
been able to handle a large-scale project of this kind on its own. They asserted that the 
concept of fully privatising the reconstruction process helped to insulate it from the 
political polarisation of the government, the inefficiency of the bureaucratic 
administration, widespread corruption, and to provide proper leadership able to attract 
private financing. Moreover, they claim that many of the set-backs in the reconstruction 
process were not caused directly by the implementation methods of Solidere, but rather 
by the political crises that befell the country and the rest of the region in subsequent 
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years. All in all, supporters maintain that the Solidere project should be recognised for 
creating thousands of jobs, bringing in huge amounts of foreign investment, encouraging 
the return of professional expatriates living abroad, and attracting tourists (especially 
from the Arab Gulf states) to visit the country once again. 
 
Because of this split of opinions, this thesis was exposed to biases with the potential 
to affect its research. When using interpersonal and in-depth methods especially, it is 
often difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a distance and remain detached. The risk of 
impartiality particularly applies to the author, because his Lebanese background and 
personal connections enabled him to form a close-relationship with some of the people 
that were interviewed. However, it must be stressed that there is no other way of 
collecting deeper and more intimate information on the experiences of the participants. In 
this regard, the author is convinced that the methods used helped to accomplish more 
meaningful and useful results that not only shed light on the conversations and debates 
that are taking place, but that also expose the major divide that exists when discussing 
Solidere in post-civil war Lebanon. 
 
 
iii. Coupling these methods with already-existing literature 
 
Because the topic of reconstruction in post-civil war Lebanon is a highly 
complicated and difficult one to conceptualise within a formalised hypothesis-testing 
framework, this thesis cannot be completed without making use of the various secondary 
sources that are available as well. The reconstruction of Downtown Beirut, in particular, 
has become the focus of a great many articles, books and conferences.
56
 Many of these 
sources have been used throughout this thesis. But some stand out more than others and, 
therefore, deserve some discussion.  
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First being those that contain factual accounts of the decisions made during the 
reconstruction process. An important example is Nicholas Blanford’s ‘Killing Mr. 
Lebanon’ – an account of Rafiq Hariri’s past.57 This detailed and well-written biography 
of the life of Hariri brings to light the important role that the former prime minister (and 
those close to him) played during the reconstruction of Downtown Beirut. Another 
similarly important account is Fadel el-Shalaq’s ‘Tajrabatyy ma'a al-Hariri’ [My 
experience with Hariri].
58
 Then there are those publications that have been produced by a 
number of local independent experts who actively opposed the Solidere project. One of 
the earliest examples is Oussama Kabbani’s ‘Prospects for Lebanon: The Reconstruction 
of Beirut’.59 Another notable example is ‘Beyrouth: Construire l'avenir, reconstruire le 
passe?’ (Beirut: Building the Future, Reconstructing the Past); a book that was co-edited 
by Nabil Beyhum, Assem Salam and Jad Tabet.
60
 As will be shown later on, Hariri and 
Solidere attempted to ‘co-opt’ some of these experts in order to defeat the opposition. 
Finally, are those produced by people that were commissioned by Solidere – such as 
‘Beirut Reborn: The Restoration and Development of the Central District’, a publication 
thatwas co-edited by Angus Gavin and Ramez Maluf.
61
  
 
Undoubtedly, all this literature is important to use when studying a hotly contested 
topic such as reconstruction in post-civil war Lebanon. However, there is one noticeable 
problem that must be highlighted: some of the authors in this literature are clearly biased 
because they provide us with one-sided interpretations of the reconstruction process. It is 
therefore difficult to imagine that some of these authors maintained a clear perspective 
when reflecting on the Solidere project. Notable examples include Gavin and Maluf’s 
glossy coffee-table publication Beirut Reborn (mentioned in the previous paragraph), 
Ayman Trawi’s photography book ‘Beirut’s Memory; Dhakirat Bayrut; La Memoire du 
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Beyrouth’, and Robert Saliba’s architectural publication ‘Beirut City Center Recovery: 
The Foch-Allenby and Etoile Conservation Area’. In all three cases, we find the author(s) 
producing highly-positive accounts of Solidere without leaving any room for critical 
feedback.
62
 In this regard, it is worth taking into account the backgrounds of the different 
authors to understand why they were prone to being partial and biased. For example, 
Gavin was part of a team of foreign consultants commissioned by Hariri in the early 
1990s to sketch a revised master plan of Downtown Beirut.
63
 He would later become the 
Head of Design in Solidere – a position he still holds today. Similarly, Trawi used to be 
the former prime minister’s personal photographer. His book, which is a collection of 
‘before and after’ photos of key downtown sites that underwent reconstruction, was 
published by noneother than Hariri’s Banque de la Méditerranée.64 
 
Thus, this thesis treats a number of these secondary sources with a great degree of 
‘suspicion’. Any information cited from these sources was often cross-checked with other 
secondary sources or during interviews with various participants. It came as no surprise, 
though, that opponents and supporters of the Solidere project often refuted or rejected one 
another’s claims. But on some occasions, people on both sides of the divide would repeat 
certain pieces of information.   
 
 
VII. The structure of the thesis 
 
The remainder of this thesis – excluding the conclusion chapter – is organised into 
six chapters.  
 
Chapter 2 begins by taking the concept of neoliberal urban developments out of its 
original, international context and ‘collapses’ it into the regional context. To this end, the 
concept becomes useful for comparative analysis between countries specific to the 
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Arab/Middle Eastern region. Chapter 3 then introduces the concept to the domestic 
context. Here, the focus of the analysis is on the sectarian nature of Lebanon’s political 
system, which will help demonstrate how neoliberal urban developments have been 
shaped in the specific context that is post-civil war Lebanon.  
 
In Chapters 4 and 5, the analysis situates the concept of neoliberal urban 
developments in the history of Beirut’s urban expansion. Specifically, they chronicle the 
prelude to the Solidere project. The period under investigation stretches from the early 
nineteenth century to the end of the civil war in the late 1980s. From this vantage point, 
the chapters trace the emergence of different elite groups and explain the interests each of 
them had in the city and its urban expansion. Although these chapters make reference to 
various individuals as agents to be explained, these agents are important to mention 
because their actions and behaviours are what do the explaining. 
 
Chapter 6 returns to the main purpose of the thesis: explicating the failure of the 
Solidere project on post-civil war Lebanon. Importantly, the chapter takes the concept of 
neoliberal urban developments and applies it to the empirical field research obtained on 
the Solidere project. Chapter 7 extends the arguments made in Chapter 6, but focuses on 
explaining the survival of the Solidere project many years after the death of Hariri in 
2005. The point of this is to show how the process of rent-creation and -appropriation is 
one that is constant and structural, and not just specific to particular agents such as Hariri 
and his entourage.  
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PART I 
 
 
 
Contextualising neoliberal urban developments 
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Chapter Two 
 
The regional context 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis argues that the Solidere project contributed towards: firstly, increasing 
the public debt; and secondly, reproducing sectarian divisions. Without a perspective on 
the context in which the Solidere project was implemented, however, it is impossible to 
understand how this outcome came about. Therefore, the next couple of chapters in this 
thesis will demonstrate why context matters: Chapter 2 will look at neoliberal urban 
developments within the Arab/Middle Eastern context; and Chapter 3 will look at them 
within the Lebanese context. 
 
It is understood from the literature that members of the capitalist class – local and 
transnational alike – work together to develop and implement neoliberal urban 
developments. But ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ is highly uneven across the globe: as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, members of this class take different shapes and forms from one 
region to another – and even, from one country to another. There must be, therefore, other 
aspects of the capitalist class that need investigating. By adopting narrow concepts such 
as the ‘transnational capitalist class’ (TCC) we risk overlooking, and failing to identify, 
the specific agents involved and the interests they are pushing forward.  
 
This chapter will begin by providing a detailed discussion as to what was 
happening in the Arab/Middle Eastern region at the time that influenced the Solidere 
project. Generally speaking, throughout the region, one observes that globalisation has 
led to the emergence of businesspeople and private sector representatives, who are 
gradually playing a bigger role in managing economic matters in their respective 
countries (this includes Lebanon). Importantly, many of these individuals were pushing 
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‘neoliberal globalisation’ forward. But as will be shown, the ‘neo-patrimonial’ 
leaderships of Arab countries have restricted the degree of influence that these 
businesspeople expected to wield politically. The second section will explain that the 
Arab Gulf countries have taken the lead in asserting their cities as ‘global cities’ to be 
invested in for business- and tourism-related activities. As a result, other Arab countries 
have looked to the Gulf region for ‘inspiration’ and replicated many of the urban 
developments that were implemented in cities such as Dubai.  
 
This ‘macro-level’ explanation helps to show that the driving forces behind 
neoliberal urban developments are structural; that is, to do with the spread of neoliberal 
ideas and its application, the spread of market-based social relations, and the emergence 
of new social identities. But while a ‘structuralist’ approach helps us to identify the social 
forces and the structural trends, it limits the analysis to mapping class positions. Because 
this thesis is also concerned about rent-creating and -seeking, it is important to identify 
the specific members of social classes and how they push for their interests. Therefore, 
the approach adopted here is both ‘structuralist’ and ‘sociological’ in nature so that on the 
one hand, we can map the different types of elites (and the social and political positions 
they represent in their respective countries), and on the other, understand how the elites 
push their interests forward. 
 
 
I. The Arab elites – agents of neoliberal urban developments in the Arab world 
 
The political regimes in the Arab world vary considerably from one another. But 
what they all have in common is the elitist nature of political participation at the top 
echelons of their decision-making hierarchies. While they attempt to hide their 
authoritarianism behind a populist façade, decision-making powers are concentrated in 
the hands of a narrow, self-recruiting coalition of elites. In all these countries, however, 
the elites attempt to secure the skills and knowledge of technocrats with economic 
expertise. In the last few decades, they have also tried to incorporate ‘businesspeople’ and 
‘private sector representatives’ into formal decision-making or consultative structures. 
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Across the region, therefore, we find business elites are gaining influence or are finding 
their way into the realm of economic policy decision-making. Often, these 
businesspeople are labelled as being part of a transnational capitalist class.
65
 But as 
explained in Chapter 1, this broad definition goes far beyond the accepted Marxist 
definition of ‘class’ as a group that is united by the same relationship with the means of 
production. In light of what has been said previously, therefore, this section will focus 
more on elites rather than classes in order to show how different capitalists organise and 
how neoliberalisation occurs in a social space that is not determined by the economic ‘in 
the last instance’.66  
 
 
i. The Arab elites over the past few decades 
 
The social and professional profile of Arab elites has changed considerably over the 
past couple of decades.
67
 Studies indicate that there are fewer technocrats from either the 
military or bureaucracy, and more technocrats with a professional experience in the 
private rather than public sector.
68
 Therefore, one cannot speak of emerging political 
elites in the Arab world without asking questions about their ‘private’ backgrounds. For 
example: who are they? What are their educational and/or professional backgrounds and 
worldviews? What do they consider to be policy priorities? And, what items on their 
agenda are of lesser relevance to them? In short, these newcomers include a ‘younger’ 
generation of Arabs, most of whom have gained an education abroad. As ‘expatriates’, 
they prepared themselves to invest their skills and their capital in their homeland, and 
therefore, have entered or may enter the fold. Thus, it is argued that these people are 
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members of a transnational capitalist class that was brought about by the globalisation of 
industrial production and marketing.  
 
Of course, elite change in any given state can have a direct impact on its relations 
with other regional and international states.
69
 But external factors affect the composition 
and conduct of local elites as well. Over the past century in particular, the composition 
and conduct of elites everywhere have been affected by major, discursive and structural 
shifts caused by globalisation.
70
 Although all political elites have had to deal with these 
shifts, those who ‘hopped on’ to the ‘globalisation train’ earlier rather than later tended to 
be the ‘younger elites’. This is because they viewed the prospects of economic openness 
and cooperation with other countries as a strategic instrument that could be used to deal 
with the economic challenges that they were facing back home. In the Arab world, this 
view was further bolstered by a growing awareness of the economic benefits of settling 
regional conflicts (such as the Arab-Israeli conflict), and in turn, enhancing economic 
cooperation amongst regional neighbours.
71
 In Lebanon as well, the former Prime 
Minister Rafiq Hariri was convinced that his country would experience an economic 
boom if a ‘peace’ agreement was signed with Israel.72  
  
The young leaders that have emerged across the region over the last few decades 
can be described as “members of the reinvigorated and more self-confident ‘traditional’ 
business classes that have reestablished themselves in the course of economic 
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liberalization”.73 Moreover, it can be argued that the Egyptian Gamal Mubarak started 
this trend in the early 1980s. Since then he has been followed by the sons of the Algerian, 
Libyan, Saudi and Syrian policymakers and generals. But because the political elites of 
Arab countries are not true politicians – who in the Weberian sense live for politics, 
rather than from politics – we find that the offspring of the bureaucratic and military 
classes turned into new entrepreneurs or joined the business class in order to make private 
gains.
74
 Therefore, the main objective of the young leaders in the Arab monarchies and 
republics over the past three decades has been to attain political influence and power in 
order to acquire personal wealth or establish a private business, not the reverse. In 
Lebanon, ‘new contractors’ such as Rafiq Hariri (and to a lesser extent, Najib Mikati, 
Mohammed Safadi and Issam Fares), remain impressive exceptions to the rule because 
they were businessman who acquired political power through their financial resources.
75
 
It would not be surprising, however, if similar cases should arise in the future, especially 
after some of the structural changes caused by the recent upheaval of the Arab Uprisings. 
 
Because of the elitist nature of political participation in the top echelons of the 
decision-making hierarchy in many countries across the Arab world, those ‘politically 
relevant elites’ (i.e., those that are able to wield political influence and power), are 
limited to those young leaders who inherit or take over the political leadership.
76
 Anyone 
else – such as businessmen, members of the media, or religious leaders, to name but a 
few – is considered part of the politically relevant elite only when they are allowed to 
contribute to the local decision-making processes. In light of the changes caused by the 
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forces of globalisation, we find that political influence and power have been awarded by 
the young leaders to those whose skills and knowledge were considered relevant to all 
decisions concerning economic reform that in one way or another involved economic 
liberalisation.
77
 Over the last decade or so, the leaderships of Arab countries such as 
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Tunisia, placed greater 
emphasis on securing the skills and knowledge of businesspeople and private sector 
representatives with economic expertise, either through informal arrangements, or by 
incorporating some of them into formal decision-making or consultative processes and 
structures. With the notable exceptions of Lebanese politicians such as Hariri, Mikati, 
Safadi and Fares, few others have been able to acquire leading government positions: one 
such being, for example, Moroccan Prime Minister Driss Jettou. 
 
Many of these new recruits belonged to what some scholars – such as Robert Cox, 
William Robinson and Leslie Sklair – call the ‘transnational capitalist class’ (TCC) which 
pushes the process of ‘neoliberal globalisation’.78 In terms of the Arab countries 
specifically, the recruits were typically young Arabs, most of whom had gained an 
education abroad, and who prepared themselves to invest their skills and their capital in 
their homeland.
79
 We therefore find a growing percentage of people recruited by the 
elites to have undergraduate degrees or doctorates from universities that are based in 
Europe or the United States.
80
 Amongst the new recruits, one finds an increased number 
of economists with experience in international organisations (such as Palestinian finance 
minister Salam Fayyad, Lebanese economy minister Bassel Flayhan, or Syrian Minister 
of Economy and Trade Ghassan al-Rifa’i, amongst others). Lebanese politicians such as 
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Hariri, Mikati, Safadi and Fares were truly ‘transnational’ as well. If we take Hariri as an 
example, he had migrated to Saudi Arabia and became a Saudi citizen. He operated 
equally between Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. In addition, he built a close connection with 
France. This came after he bought the French construction company, OGER, in 1979. 
This company was later incorporated in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, which made Hariri 
the owner of a transnational company. 
 
 
ii. Differentiating between the Arab elites 
 
So while these businesspeople and private sector representatives are labelled as 
being part of this TCC, their rise could be defined in terms of the region or the country 
they belong to.
81
 In order to arrive to such a distinction, some scholars have placed their 
rise within the specific historical sociology of the region or country they are based in. 
Pierre-Arnaud Barthel, for example, has suggested the term ‘trans-Arab capitalism’, 
which he uses to describe the rise of the businesspeople and private sector representatives 
of the Arab/Middle Eastern region.
82
 But it is important not to explain the rise of these 
individuals in the context of the impersonal dynamics of ‘global capitalism’ alone, as this 
can mislead us into viewing all businesspeople and private sector representatives as one 
and the same thing.
83
  
 
In Chapter 1, a distinction was made between the new contractors, who pursue 
neoliberal globalisation as a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital 
accumulation and the reconstitution of power to capitalists (both national and 
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transnational), and the recruited technocrats, who drive neoliberal globalisation as a 
utopian economic project to provide a theoretical template for the reorganisation of 
international capitalism.
84
 These two categories are analytically distinct from one another 
because a tension appears in their relationship.
85
 In the Arab world, however, it is 
difficult to identify those politically relevant businesspeople and private sector 
representatives who seek to drive neoliberal globalisation as a political project because 
political regimes there do not award ‘outsiders’ political powers that are considered to be 
‘structural’ or ‘deep’. Take, for example, the ‘Economic Development Board’ (EDB)86 in 
Bahrain, the ‘Economic Consultative Council’ (ECC)87 in Jordan, or the ‘Syrian 
Enterprise and Business Centre’ (SEBC)88 in Syria, which were all new institutional 
bodies that brought together businesspeople and private sector representatives into the 
decision-making process.
89
 While members of these three institutional bodies were 
awarded significant influence and power over economic matters, they were at the same 
time heavily dependent on the ‘will’ and ‘priorities’ of their respective rulers (King 
Hamad, King Abdullah II and President Bashar al-Assad).
90
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 The monarchs and presidents of the Arab world are considered the central agent, de jure and de facto, at 
the centre of the core elite. Therefore, the rulers of these countries could dismiss any individual elite 
member in the circle of political influence and power if necessary to maintain their grip on power. This 
includes dismissing the businesspeople and private sector representatives who were awarded particular 
powers. 
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As a rule of thumb, however, the personal ties (‘wasta’) that a given individual has 
to the King, the President, or those in the regime’s ‘inner circle’ – be they a ruling party 
or a ruling family – determines the degree of influence he or she can expect to wield 
politically.
91
 A prime example of this was Morocco’s Driss Jettou; a prominent 
businessman and trusted ally of the king. He began his political career in 1993, when he 
was appointed by King Hassan II as Minister of Trade and Industry. He then served as 
Minister of Interior from 2001 to 2002. Due to his continued loyalty to the monarchy, he 
was appointed by King Mohammed VI as Prime Minister (2002-2007).
92
 In this regard, 
Jettou’s gradual political ascent put him, arguably, in a better position than others to push 
neoliberalism as a political project. The same situation can be seen in Lebanon, especially 
during the civil war. Political ascendancy was blocked by militias which dominated 
politics within their confessional group. This meant that Lebanese businesspeople had to 
associate more closely with militias to gain political influence. For instance, the 
businessman Roger Tamraz gained significant political clout when he became the 
business representative of then President Amin Gemayel (who was the elder brother of 
Maronite militia leader Bachir Gemayel).
93
 But businessmen like Hariri, Mikati and 
Safadi were exceptional cases. This was because they came from the Sunni community. 
Sunni militias were fatally weakened by the Israeli invasion in 1982, which expelled their 
main sponsor – the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) – from the country. This 
meant that Sunni businessmen did not have to contend with militias within their own 
community in the same way that, for example, Tamraz had to from the Maronite 
community. More details on this point will be provided in Chapter 4. 
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Citizen Hariri and Neoliberal Politics in Post-War Lebanon, (London: PhD Thesis, SOAS, 2012), p.62. 
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But one must also bear in mind that the political regimes governing in Arab 
countries are based on a system of rule that is ‘neo-patrimonial’. Neo-patrimonialism 
implies the existence of a political leader who holds ultimate power and exercises it, 
often, by informal means of patronage networks and clientelist relations incorporating 
loyalist of that leader’s choice.94 Going back to Morocco as an example, King 
Mohammed needed loyalists, such as Jettou, because the latter would not challenge the 
former’s uncontested and privileged position ‘above’ society. If Jettou appeared to have 
built a clientelist network of his own, the king would have perceived it as a threat to his 
position of dominance and, therefore, would have had him removed and replaced. The 
same explanation could also be applied to Lebanon if, for example, Tamraz had ‘stepped 
out of line’. But Lebanon cannot be classified as a typical example of a neo-patrimonial 
state. The mode of governance there is based on a formula for power-sharing amongst the 
many officially-recognised religious communities.
95
 Because Lebanon was created as a 
liberal democratic state, some scholars describe the country as a ‘consociational 
democracy’.96 But as Tom Najem rightly explains, Lebanon never established ‘truly 
effective mechanisms’ to regulate the political influence of patronage networks and 
clientelist relations. On the contrary, he argues that a ‘vibrant, omniprescent patron-client 
system’ emerged after independence. Patron-client interactions occur largely outside the 
formal democratic framework. And this remains the case, even to this very day.
97
 As a 
result, the liberal democratic character of the Lebanese state was ‘muted’ to a significant 
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extent. It is due to this, that Lebanon conforms more to the neo-patrimonial than to the 
liberal democratic mode of governance.
98
 More details will be provided in Chapter 3. 
  
While this breakdown of different elites within their particular social and political 
contexts helps us arrive at a more nuanced perspective of the neoliberal phenomenon in 
the Arab world in general, and post-civil war Lebanon in particular, it must be 
emphasised (again) that by using structuralist concepts such as classes, groups or 
networks, we limit the analysis to the mapping of class positions while learning nothing 
about how specific elites push for their interests. Thus, by adopting an approach that is 
more sociological in nature will provide us with a ‘careful mapping of the neoliberal 
offensive’99 that is required to explain the dynamics of neoliberal urban developments in 
the region.
100
  
 
 
II. Neoliberal urban developments in the Arab world 
 
As business elites gained influence over the realm of economic policy decision-
making in their respective countries, Arab states adopted the neoliberal logic of 
competing with one another to attract global capital. One way of attracting this capital has 
been by packaging and introducing cities in the market as business and tourist 
‘commodities’ to be invested in and visited.101 Even though cities have for a long time 
attracted international investment, it is only in recent years that Arab states have 
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consciously sought to compete over it.
102
 Lebanon is undoubtedly part of this 
competition:  
 
“With the increasing internationalization of trade and financial services, 
Beirut and its revived center will find itself in competition with other cities of 
the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. But it has many clear advantages, 
both old and new, as a city of culture, tourism and commerce… As a re-
emerging business center, Beirut will find its new opportunities somewhat 
different from those that stimulated the growth of other centers in the region 
during the Lebanese war. In the past, growth depended on the recycling of oil 
revenues from the Arab world for investment in the West. New opportunities 
will no longer depend on the historic outflow of petro-dollars, but for 
managing the growing inflow of capital that needs to be directed towards 
investment sectors and identified projects – initially within Lebanon and later, 
in a new order of security and cooperation, throughout the region. Compared 
with other competing centers, Beirut is well placed to benefit from such 
emerging opportunities.”103 
 
However, this regional competition has had considerable consequences for the way in 
which large-scale urban projects are being conceived.
104
 In post-civil war Lebanon most 
particularly, this has led to a concentration of reconstruction projects in the country’s 
capital, Beirut.
105
 It has also led to the dominance of real estate conglomerates. With a 
few exceptions, the leading conglomerates are those based in the Gulf, where one specific 
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city stands way above the rest – Dubai.106 These conglomerates will be the main focus in 
the analysis below. But because this thesis takes an approach that is more sociological in 
nature, the analysis will also pay attention to the elites running and benefiting from the 
conglomerates.  
 
 
i. A ‘Gulf moment’? 
 
To begin with, it must be stressed that there is a great divide in the region between, 
the Gulf states on the one hand and the non-Gulf states on the other. This divide, of 
course, is based on the abundance of capital that Gulf states had accumulated – or were 
projected to accumulate – from oil wealth.107 Several economic reports and studies have 
been produced to illustrate the abundance of capital in the Gulf region. Indeed, some of 
the figures used are quite striking. For example, in one study commissioned by the World 
Bank, it was indicated that while the total population of Gulf states was approximately 10 
per cent of the Arab population of the Middle East and North Africa in 2007, the Arab 
Gulf economies accounted for more than half of the region’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) at about US$826 billion in the same year.
108
  
 
Because of this oil ‘surplus’109, and aided by the lack of historical ‘burdens’, the 
Gulf states have easily asserted their cities as ‘global cities’ – equipped with exclusive 
mixed-use developments, international museums and centres of learning, world-class 
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airports, etc.
110
 Of course, the rulers of Dubai led this trend, as they transformed their 
poor fishing and pearling village into a modern metropolis that would serve as a trade and 
services hub for the rest of the world. Not long after, the rulers of other Gulf states began 
to follow suit.
111
 This is particularly the case for cities such as Abu Dhabi, Doha and 
Riyadh.
112
 Today, these cities are part of a conglomeration that is united through their 
‘mega-projects’, and have, to some extent, set themselves apart from the rest of the 
Arab/Middle Eastern region.
113
 But this sense of separation goes beyond the physical 
transformation of their cities. By developing their cities with little financial difficulty, 
these countries have become increasingly aware of their newly-acquired status as socio-
economic powers, and have in turn, used their powers to influence events in the rest of 
the region.
114
 This is most visibly expressed by the official rhetoric adopted by local 
officials and scholars. To take one example, Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, a UAE University 
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Professor of political science talks about ‘the Gulf moment’ and how the significance of 
states such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria has effectively diminished.
115
 
 
This ‘great divide’ has had many consequences for the region; two of which are 
particularly important for this study. Firstly, it has increased the rate of migration from 
the poor Arab countries to the richer ones in the Gulf region.
116
 This came to include 
Lebanese migrants as well (Rafiq Hariri was part of this group).
117
 And secondly, it has 
forced the non-oil-rich Arab states to look to the Gulf region for capital investments. 
Undoubtedly, both sides had much to benefit from such investment. For the Gulf states, 
this was an opportunity to keep their capital surplus in a region that they considered ‘safe’ 
for their investments. After 9/11 in particular, much Gulf capital was kept in the 
region.
118
 While for the other Arab states, this was a golden opportunity to attract the 
huge amounts of capital that they needed to relieve themselves of their financial and 
socio-economic burdens. In light of this, certain reports highlight that the bulk of the oil 
surplus has indeed gone into investments in the wider Arab/Middle Eastern region.
119
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These numbers have changed significantly given the turmoil that has engulfed many parts 
of the region during the Arab Uprisings.
120
  
 
 
ii. The rise of Gulf-based real estate conglomerates 
 
The development that has characterised cities of the Arab Gulf countries has led to 
the rise of various real estate conglomerates. These real estate conglomerates are worth 
billions of dollars on the stock market. By 2013, the 50 top conglomerates listed on the 
Gulf’s main stock markets had a market cap of US$55.77bn.121 Today, the top ranking 
conglomerate is Qatari-owned Ezdan Holding Company, which has a market cap of 
US$12.95bn. This is then followed by Dubai-based EMAAR Properties, which has a 
market cap of US$7.98bn (and which is globally recognised for the construction of Burj 
Khalifa). And in third place is the Saudi-based Jabal Omar Development Company, 
which has a market cap of US$5.28bn (and which is known for its projects in the Holy 
City of Mecca). Other important names include Al Dar Properties, Barwa Real Estate 
Company, Dar Alarkan Real Estate Development Company, Sorouh Real Estate 
Company, Al Mabanee, Deyaar Development Company and Arabtec Holding, to name 
but a few examples.
122
  
 
Governments and heads of state across the Arab world have opened up their 
respective economies to these powerful conglomerates.
123
 In some cases, they have even 
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established a series of real estate partnerships with them.
124
 One example includes the 
Abdali Boulevard Company in Jordan, which is jointly owned by the government-owned 
real estate developer National Resources and Development Corporation (Mawared), 
OGER Jordan (a subsidiary of OGER Saudi), as well as the United Real Estate Company 
– Jordan, under the group of Kuwait Projects Company (KIPCO).125 It is worth noting 
that OGER belongs to the Hariri family (more details on OGER will be provided in 
Chapter 5). In Morocco as well, a governmental agency called Agence pour 
l’Aménagement de la Vallée du Bouregreg (AAVB) was created, which was based on a 
50/50 joint venture with private actors in both stages of the project: in the first stage, a 
joint venture would be formed between AAVB and the Abu-Dhabi-based property 
development company Al Maabar; and in the second stage, another joint venture is 
formed between AAVB and Sama Dubai, the real estate arm of the state-owned Dubai 
Holding Group.
126
 And in the West Bank, one finds the Bayti Real Estate Investment 
Company, which is jointly owned by the Palestinian National Authority, Massar 
International (a local real estate company owned by prominent Palestinian businessman 
Bashar al-Masri), and the Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Company (part of the Qatar 
Investment Authority’s property investment fund).127 
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It must be stressed that Gulf-based conglomerates are not the only players 
competing for partnerships throughout the region. In some cases, real estate 
conglomerates outside the Gulf have become part of this ‘regional competition’ as well. 
The most significant example of this is Solidere itself through the establishment of 
‘Solidere International’ (also known as SI). Since its formation, SI has engaged with 
partners in the development of the following projects: ‘Al Zorah’ project in Ajman 
(UAE); ‘Eastown’ and ‘Westown’ projects in Cairo (Egypt); and the ‘Bodrum’ project in 
Turkey.
128
 According to scholars of New Urban Governance, the growing number of 
partnerships that we are witnessing throughout the Arab/Middle Eastern region – what 
they often refer to as ‘public-private partnerships’ –  is the most visible expression of 
neoliberal state-restructuring that has characterised various countries around the world; 
especially after the end of the Cold War.
129
 In these partnerships, the private sector 
handles the tasks and functions that were traditionally dealt with by governments.
130
 Such 
transfer of ‘responsibility’ to the private sector occured as governments struggled to keep 
up with the changes and pressures of a highly uncertain external environment.
131
 It began 
as early as the 1970s in a number of US cities like Atlanta, Baltimore and Boston.
132
 The 
trend then reached Europe and was particularly evident in the UK with the London 
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Dockland Development Corporation.
133
 Not long after that, it reached the Middle East 
(which includes Lebanon). As Harvey rightly points out, these partnerships work to the 
advantage of the private sector because the state typically produces legislation and 
regulatory frameworks that allows the private sector to take most of the profits.
134
 This 
point will be underscored when assessing the Solidere project in Chapter 6. 
 
Out of all the aforementioned conglomerates, though, Dubai’s EMAAR Properties 
has the most impressive partnerships throughout the region; in places like Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The one that stands out the most is 
that in Egypt.
135
 Here, EMAAR launched an Egyptian subsidiary called ‘EMAAR 
Misr’.136 Its projects include ‘Cairo Gate’ (a mega-shopping mall), ‘Mivida’ and 
‘Uptown’ (two gated communities in Cairo), and ‘Marassi’ (another gated community in 
Alexandria). But as discussed above, it is impossible to understand the influence that 
EMAAR has had on Egypt’s urban environment without also taking into account the 
positions of the people running it. EMAAR was founded by prominent Emirati 
businessman Mohamed al Abbar. He is a typical example of an Arab businessperson who 
gained an education abroad and returned to invest his skills and/or capital in his 
homeland.
137
 Even though al Abbar has no royal background, he was appointed as a 
senior aide to Dubai’s ruler and UAE’s Vice President Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al 
Maktoum.
138
 In this regard, al Abbar fits the profile of local businesspeople recruited by 
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local rulers in order to help in the management of economic matters. Importantly, 
EMAAR is majority owned by the government of Dubai with a shareholding value of 
32%.
139
 Thus, al Abbar and the Dubai royals are some of the most important individuals 
leading the real estate industry in Egypt and elsewhere.
140
 
 
Of course, the regional leaders of real estate activity are not only limited to al 
Abbar and the Dubai royals. If one looks at a list of people considered to be at the 
forefront of this gigantic industry, one finds a ‘consortium’ of capitalists (both local and 
transnational) that include: Gulf royals; Gulf-based businesspeople and private sector 
representatives; and to a lesser extent, businessmen outside the Gulf region.
141
 But again, 
the transnational capitalists are very much embedded into the Arab context that they are 
part of, and therefore, are shaped and influenced by the social patterns and structures that 
define Arab society. To begin with, one finds that these transnational Arab capitalists are 
male, reflecting the male-dominated society that they live in. The rate of family 
involvement in the businesses they run is also one of the highest in the world. According 
to a study by Forbes magazine examining the fortunes of 1,253 ultra-high net worth 
individuals worldwide, billionaires in the Middle East have one of the highest rates of 
family involvement standing at 62%.
142
 Take Najib Mikati as an example: he built his 
fortunes in cooperation with his brother, Taha Mikati. Finally, most of the fortunes are 
                                                          
139
 See company webpage: http://www.emaar.com/index.aspx?page=investorrelations (Accessed 23 
February 2014). 
140
 This is particularly the case for al Abbar: Euromoney Magazine named him one of five prominent Arabs 
in only 50 global economy leaders (1996); Advertising Age selected him as one of its International 
Marketing Superstars of the Year (1996); while Arabian Business ranked Al Abbar second among top 100 
most powerful Arabs (2007). See: Gulf News, ‘The region needs more than one Dubai’, Gulf News, 14 July 
2003, from: ; Arabian Business, ‘100 most powerful Arabs 2007’, 18 March 2007, from: 
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/100-most-powerful-arabs-2007-147830.html (Accessed 23 February 
2014). 
141
 This is according to a blog article listing the Middle East’s top real estate players. On the list is Nasser 
Chammaa (acting as Chairman of Solidere and loyalist of the late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri). 
His name will come up again in later chapters. See: Brett Siegel, ‘Middle East Real Estate Power Elite List 
2013’, UAE Mega Projects (Blog), 08 February 2013, from: 
http://uaemegaprojects.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/middle-east-real-estate-power-elite.html (Accessed 23 
February 2014). 
142
 Only India has a higher rate of family involvement. This is mainly for cultural reasons rather than of 
economic history or other reasons. The families are often close-knit, but this is not to say that divisions do 
not happen. Take the Emirate al-Futtaim brothers who are estranged. See: Clara Knutson, ‘Middle Eastern 
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inherited by older male relatives.
143
 A clear example of this is with Saad Hariri and his 
three brothers, who inherited the wealth of their father, Rafiq Hariri, after he was 
assassinated in 2005.   
 
 
iii. The ‘Gulfication’ of the Arab urban environment 
 
Having identified who the main real estate conglomerates ‘running the show’ in the 
region are, one can begin to understand the kind of projects that have been implemented 
as well. In this regard, the urban projects that we see throughout the Arab world reflect a 
particular vision: to create spatial environments that cater to a rich Arab clientele. In 
effect, this means the creations of spaces that are exclusionary. In this regard, they 
represent clear examples of neoliberal spatial reordering and urban restructuring.
144
 But 
regardless of the similarities between these neoliberal urban developments and those 
taking shape in other parts of the world, the influence consists mainly of processes that 
are activated from the inside by local actors. It is because of this that scholars point to 
these projects as ‘Arab mega-projects’; as if to suggest that there is an ‘Arab way’ of 
urban development and planning.
145
 But it is more specific than simply an ‘Arab way’ of 
development. What we are witnessing can be better described as a ‘Gulf way’ of urban 
development and planning. 
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In the 1960s, the Arab world looked to ‘traditional cities’, such as Beirut, for 
inspiration in urbanism.
146
 This changed as soon as cities in the Gulf region developed 
much more rapidly than other Arab ones. One of the earliest examples of this happening 
was in the city of Jubail, located in the Eastern Province of the Saudi Kingdom. A US-
based construction company called Bechtel was contracted by the Saudi government to 
implement what was dubbed ‘the largest civil engineering project in the world’. Since 
Bechtel began construction in the mid-1970s, the project has led to the development of 
‘Jubail Industrial City’, which today hosts a population of more than 100,000 people. 
This – as well as many other large-scale projects that would appear in the Gulf in 
subsequent years – became models for other Arab governments to emulate in their own 
countries. According to Jad Tabet, it was the Jubail project which inspired Hariri’s 
Solidere project in Downtown Beirut. To begin with, Solidere’s Board of Founders 
included Saudi businessman Yehia Bin Laden.
147
 Importantly, Yehia Bin Laden is the 
General Manager of ‘Mohamad Bin Laden Construction Company’, which is a key 
investor in Bechtel via the ‘Fremont Group’.148 Furthermore, the Solidere project was, in 
a sense, a replication of the Jubail project because it involved expropriation and 
distribution of shares. Of course, the impacts of both vary considerably because Jubail’s 
socio-economic and political roles do not match those of Beirut. In this respect, Tabet 
notes that Solidere was ‘neoliberal with a Saudi inspiration’.149  
 
The Solidere project is not the only urban development in Beirut to be inspired by 
projects in the Gulf. Today, Beirut is dotted with ‘Gulf-inspired’ urban developments. 
Undoubtedly, the most significant project (to date) has been Solidere’s in Downtown 
Beirut. But other significant schemes include the ‘Linord project’ in the northern littoral, 
the ‘Elyssar project’ in the southern suburbs, as well as other smaller-sized gentrification 
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projects that are spreading across the city; such as in Achrafiyeh (East Beirut) and Hamra 
(West Beirut).
150
 Alongside this, the Lebanese state has worked hard to provide Beirut 
with ‘world class’ infrastructure. This is the phase widely associated with the 
neoliberalisation of the country, because huge investments were deployed in developing 
highways, a new international airport and port, and several large-scale development 
projects all geared towards the re-instatement of Beirut as a regional finance and services 
hub.
151
 As elsewhere, public officials were preoccupied with the formulation of neoliberal 
policies that decentralised administrative power and provided incentives for the private 
sector to develop numerous five-star hotels, luxury residential blocks, shopping malls and 
high-end office spaces (similar to those found in the Arab Gulf cities). In most cases, 
these projects comprise of high-rise buildings with apartments that are roughly over 
252m
2 
and that are luxuriously designed with a price tag of US$3,000 to US$10,000 per 
m
2
.
152
 These apartment buildings are isolated from their socio-spatial environment and 
accessed by a main driveway and narrow pedestrian (service) entrance. And together, 
these towers have led to the creation of ‘islands of wealth’ connected symbolically in 
their towering relation over the city.
153
 See Figure 2 for a selection of images displaying 
various towers that have been built across Beirut over the past few years. The most 
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Figure 2 – A selection of images displaying various towers that have been built across 
Beirut over the past few years. Notice how they tower over some of the older buildings 
between them. Photos taken by author. 
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significant high-rise yet is ‘Sama Beirut’ (see Figure 3), which is set to become 
Lebanon’s highest tower with ultra-luxurious amenities, apartments and office spaces.154 
 
Of course, Beirut is not the only city in the Arab world inspired by urban 
developments in Gulf cities. Other cities include: Algiers, Baghdad, Cairo, Casablanca, 
Damascus, Khartoum, Nouakchott, Sana’a and Tunis.155 At the same time, the Gulf city 
of Dubai is setting a precedent and is becoming ‘the model’ to be replicated in cities 
throughout the Arab world through the development of the world’s two largest man-made 
islands (Palm Jumeirah and Palm Jabal Ali), as well as through its major skyscrapers and 
luxury hotels on Sheikh Zayed Highway.
156
 Amman represents one such example of an 
Arab city that is looking to Dubai for cutting-edge urbanist ideas. Here, we find the 
emergence of high-end business towers that offer exclusive spaces for consumption and 
refuge (for example, the Abdali and Jordan Gate projects), upper-end residential ‘gated 
communities’ all over the city (such as Green Land and Andalucia), and even low-income 
residential cities (such as, Jizza, Marka and Sahab), that work to push the poorer 
segments of society to the outskirts of the city.
157
 In Rabat as well, local authorities have 
looked to Dubai for inspiration. Here, we find the large-scale development of the 
Bouregreg Valley, which will include a yacht marina, five-star hotels, pleasure beaches, 
luxury offices, hundreds of boutiques and stores, shopping centres and open-air 
amphitheatres. Like in Amman, Rabat is also creating low- and middle-income 
developments (such as Tamesna), which are meant to represent ‘new cities’ on the 
outskirts of the capital, and which are meant to act as ‘compensation’ for many who have 
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Figure 3 – An image of the new, ‘Sama Beirut’ tower under construction. When 
completed it will be the tallest building in Beirut. Photo taken by author. 
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found prices in Rabat to be well above their financial reach.
158
 Of course, the way 
heritage and urban regeneration is being conceived, has led to growing criticisms against 
these projects. See Table 1 for examples of these criticisms. 
 
All in all, findings from different countries confirm the work of Yasser 
Elsheshtawy, who minimises the idea to a phenomenon he refers to as ‘Dubaisation’ or 
‘Gulfication’ of the Arab city.159 But Gulfication is not the only phenomenon influencing 
the Arab city. This proposition is supported by Rami Daher, when he refers to Solidere’s 
reconstruction of Downtown Beirut as a ‘model’ that has been replicated in Jordan: 
 
“The Solidere model of urban restructuring became the adopted approach 
within the region. Not only was it copied in Amman in the Abdali Project, but 
there are plans to apply it elsewhere within the region. This neoliberalization 
in the creation of public urban space circulates urban images, spectacles, and 
models and is leading to the dilution of local differences and the circulation 
of ‘corporate’ urban forms and images.”160  
 
Therefore, Arab cities are being influenced by various models coming from all parts of 
the Arab/Middle Eastern region. But while Arab cities have been influenced by models 
emanating from Gulf cities – or in Amman’s case, from Beirut – they will take different 
shapes and forms within different local contexts. Scholars such as Erik Swyngedouw, 
Frank Moulaert and Arantxa Rodriguez use the term ‘glocalization’ when explaining how 
neoliberal urban developments are incorporated and influenced by localised 
characteristics and settings.
161
 Thus, Arab metropolises are under various influences and  
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Project and its 
location 
The developers involved Criticisms 
The Abdali 
project 
(Amman) 
 
The project is overseen by a state-
owned corporation called Mawared, 
this corporation has formed a 50/50 
joint venture with OGER Jordan (a 
subsidiary of OGER Saudi) to form 
Abdali Investment Development 
(AID). In turn, AID has formed its 
own partnership with the Kuwaiti 
Investment Group (KIPCO).  
 
Critics argue that the Abdali project 
is part of a wider phenomenon in 
Amman, which includes the 
proliferation of malls and gated 
communities for elitist and 
exclusive consumption practices. 
They therefore believe that it is 
exacerbating spatial and social 
inequality in the city.  
The Bouregreg 
Valley project 
(Rabat) 
 
The project is overseen by a 
governmental agency called Agence 
pour l’Aménagement de la Vallée du 
Bouregreg (AAVB), this agency has 
formed a 50/50 joint venture with 
private actors in both stages of the 
project. In the first stage, a joint 
venture is formed between AAVB and 
the Abu-Dhabi-based property 
development company Al Maabar. 
And in the second stage, another joint 
venture is formed between AAVB and 
Sama Dubai, the real estate arm of the 
state-owned Dubai Holding Group. 
 
Critics argue tht the Bouregreg 
Valley project has had considerable 
physical and social consequences on 
the twin cities of Rabat and Salé. 
Critics argue that the project has 
alienated the twin cities and left 
them to deteriorate. This is 
particularly so in the historical 
medina of Salé, which has 
deteriorated to an extent that it now 
bears little resemblance to some of 
the more romantic alleys of the 
medina of Rabat.   
The Solidere 
project 
(Beirut) 
 
The project needs approval from the 
state-run Council of Development and 
Reconstruction (CDR), which will also 
be responsible for approving the 
master plan and the necessary 
reimbursements for Solidere (the 
private real estate company overseeing 
the reconstruction process). A number 
of developers will be allowed to 
purchase properties from Solidere for 
construction.  
 
Like the above examples, critics 
argue that the new city centre has 
become a finely-crafted site that is a 
replication of Dubai in terms of its 
exclusive housing compounds, 
private marinas and luxurious 
shopping centres. The 
characteristics of the aswaq, 
Zaitunay Bay, and the Waterfront 
district reflect this very well.  
 
 
Table 1 – A table illustrating the influence that Gulf cities have had on three large-scale 
urban developments outside the Gulf region. The information in this table was taken 
from some of the same sources cited in this chapter. 
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at the crossroads of urban models leading to the creation of a mix between the local, 
regional, and of course, global cultures.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Having situated the global phenomenon of neoliberalism within the context of the 
Arab/Middle Eastern region, we can now identify the main commonalities and 
differences between Lebanon and the rest of the Arab/Middle Eastern region. Like in 
other Arab countries, we find businesspeople and private sector representatives being 
recruited to play a bigger role in managing economic matters in Lebanon. The amount of 
influence that such businesspeople and private sector representatives were able to wield 
politically was limited by the ‘neo-patrimonial’ system of rule of their respective 
countries. But as shown, some Lebanese businesspeople and private sector 
representatives were able to gain significant political influence. Rafiq Hariri, Najib 
Mikati, Mohammed Safadi and Issam Fares were briefly mentioned as some notable 
examples. Unlike many of their contemporaries in the region, these individuals were able 
to use their financial wealth to gain political power. It therefore means that they, unlike 
many others in the region, could push neoliberal globalisation as a political project rather 
than an economic utopian project only.  
 
Since gaining influence in the realm of economic policy, many Arab states 
(including Lebanon) have adopted the neoliberal logic of competing with one another to 
attract global capital. Much of this capital came from real estate conglomerates based in 
the Gulf region. There were, however, a few exceptions; amongst them Solidere through 
its international branch, SI. The urban developments these conglomerates pursued were 
heavily inspired by the urban evolution of cities in the Gulf region. Through some of the 
examples provided in cities like Amman and Rabat, it was shown that many of the 
projects that characterised the urban environment of Beirut followed the Gulf model of 
urban development and planning as well. The Solidere project is no exception: the 
reconstruction of Downtown Beirut was inspired by a large-scale project in the Saudi city 
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of Jubail. But as Daher argues, the Solidere project has become a model in its own right 
because of the influence that it appears to be having on urban developments in the rest of 
the Arab world – most particularly, in Amman. But it was stressed that all these 
developments take different shapes and forms within different local contexts. The 
question then arises as to why this is so. It is to this question that Chapter 3 turns to.  
 
While neoliberal forces outside are influencing urban developments across the Arab 
world, this influence consists of processes that are activated from the inside by local 
actors. The analysis will use the reconstruction process in post-civil war Lebanon to 
explain this. But it will be shown that there is a ‘diversity’ of reconstruction projects that 
can be characterised as ‘neoliberal reconstruction projects’. To highlight the variance in 
the shape and form of different projects, however, we must zero in on the agents driving 
these projects forward and take into account their specific interests. In Lebanon 
specifically, we find a new coalition of heterogeneous elites emerging after the civil war. 
Of all these elites, the new contractor bourgeoisie (with Rafiq Hariri at its head) were the 
ones pushing forward a neoliberal approach in the reconstruction process. Even so, 
reconstruction projects that were not controlled by the new contractor bourgeoisie carried 
neoliberal characteristics as well. 
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Chapter Three 
 
The domestic context 
 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapter focused on the regional context. Without a perspective on the 
local context, however, it is impossible to explain why the Solidere project: firstly, did not 
bring economic prosperity to the country’s population; and secondly, did not contribute 
towards the reconciliation and reintegration of Lebanese society. Therefore, this chapter 
will take the analysis on the regional context and collapse it into the domestic context. In 
light of this, more detailed questions need addressing as to the kind of political authority 
that emerged after the end of the Lebanese Civil War and the way the reconstruction 
process was played out. 
 
The first section of this chapter will explain that the elites governed post-civil war 
Lebanon through a mixture of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ decision-making. It therefore 
reflects the emergence of an institutional environment whereby additional flexibility is 
provided to the elites participating in local decision-making processes. The elites came 
from various backgrounds. Importantly, they included former militia leaders (and the 
businessmen allied to them), pre-civil war bourgeois families, Shihabist technocrats, 
military and security officials, and most significantly, new contractors. Informed 
Lebanese commentators would not necessarily use the same categories mentioned above 
but they would certainly understand what they mean. The forced cohabitation of these 
heterogeneous elites, however, led to inevitable clashes of interests. In this context, it is 
important to outline the clashing interests of these different elites to help us differentiate 
between reconstruction projects.  
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The second section will delineate the neoliberal phenomenon in the reconstruction 
process. Various examples of reconstruction projects will be used for the analysis; and 
not just that of Downtown Beirut. In turn, differences and similarities between the various 
projects will be identified to show how their shape and form depended on the interests 
being pushed behind them. In particular, it will be shown that there were major 
differences between those projects controlled by Rafiq Hariri (the ‘Elyssar’ project in the 
southern suburbs, the ‘Linord’ project in the northern littoral, and most significantly, the 
Solidere project in the downtown area), and those controlled by Hezbollah (specifically, 
the ‘Waad Initiative’, which is also in the southern suburbs of Beirut). But despite these 
differences, all these projects carry with them neoliberal characteristics. This will help 
support the claim made at the end of Chapter 2 that there is a ‘diversity’ of reconstruction 
projects that can be characterised as ‘neoliberal reconstruction projects’.  
 
As discussed in previous chapters, we should be careful when using such sweeping, 
agency-less concepts, such as class, group, and network. By relying on them, we learn 
nothing about the actions, behaviours and decisions of specific individuals; especially 
those who represent significant social and political positions in Lebanese society. 
Nonetheless, social categories such as former militia leaders and new contractors 
(amongst others), will be used to denote different types of elites. They will also be used 
in subsequent chapters when analysing those individuals involved in the Solidere project. 
This is because they help give a better sense of what kind of interests were being pushed 
forward, and how it was being done. In other words, the use of these categories is meant 
to complement the analysis; not to replace the individuals.  
 
 
I. The elites of post-civil war Lebanon 
 
During the interwar period, the French mandate established a regime to govern 
what came to be known as Lebanon. The model of governance adopted by this regime 
was one based on a mixture of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ decision-making. After the end of 
the civil war, the regime came to include transnational capitalists, who will be referred to 
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here as ‘new contractors’. Unlike others in their ranks, these new contractors embarked 
on a mission to bring Lebanon into the twenty-first-century ‘neoliberal economic order’. 
Of course, this neoliberal push was met with staunch opposition; most particularly, from 
other decision-makers who had a different vision of how to restructure the Lebanese state 
and economy. But before delving into the details, we must answer the following 
questions: how did the elites govern in post-civil war Lebanon? Who exactly was 
governing? And, what happened to the Lebanese state? 
 
 
i. How did the elites govern in post-civil war Lebanon?  
 
The elites governed post-civil war Lebanon through a mixture of ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’ decision-making. But what do we mean when we say formal/informal 
decision-making? Informality refers to unregulated behaviour. It includes actions and 
communications that are neither prescribed nor proscribed by any rules. The idea of 
informality also refers to casual and spontaneous interactions and personal affective ties 
amongst participants. The informalistic approach produces ‘creativity’ and a ‘free flow’ 
of information, affective involvement and relative chaos. This comes in contrast to the 
formalistic approach, which produces routinisation of interaction, procedural fairness and 
detachment.
162
  
 
In terms of governance, informal decision-making refers to decision-making 
processes that have been informalised. In this regard, it must be understood that 
informalisation in governance is appealing to decision-makers because it provides the 
‘flexibility’ that is needed to make more decisions in ‘mutual agreement’ (on an ad-hoc 
basis), rather than in a ‘state-legislated format’. One of the possible advantages of 
informalisation in governance is that it allows conflict resolution and mediation to take 
place in ‘unregulated spaces’ that are between the public agencies and that are outside the 
                                                          
162
 This is according to information obtained from a study by David Morand who contrasts formalistic 
interaction orders (or behavioural practices in formal organisational systems) with informalistic interaction 
orders to demonstrate how each system works and what its consequences are. For further details, see: David 
A. Morand, ‘The role of behavioral formality and informality in the enactment of bureaucratic versus 
organic organizations’, The Academy of Management Review, 20(4), (1995), p.843. 
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public spotlight.
163
 In such spaces, participants in decision-making processes conduct 
‘informal dialogue’ and ‘operate largely consensually’ because they are no longer 
worried about ‘outsiders taking their words out of context’.164  
 
In most Arab countries, decision-making is largely informalised. This is because of 
the neo-patrimonial nature of political regimes there. As explained in Chapter 2, neo-
patrimonialism implies the existence of a political leader who holds ultimate power and 
exercises it, often, by informal means of patronage networks and clientelist relations 
incorporating loyalists of that leader’s choice. In these countries, there is a clear division 
between the formal and informal ‘political spheres’. The informal political sphere is a 
space occupied by the regime’s inner circle – be they a ruling party or a ruling family. 
The regime’s inner circle – led by the leader – constricts the formal political sphere. As a 
result, key decision-making processes exist in the informal political sphere, while formal 
positions and representation are largely ceremonial. The dynamics between the formal 
and informal political spheres are no different in Lebanon. But the informal political 
sphere there requires one additional qualification; namely, that it is divided amongst 
many leaders. This implies that the informal political sphere is occupied and shared by 
more than one patronage network, each represented by a leader.  
 
In Arab countries, the neo-patrimonial nature of political regimes has meant that 
informal (ad hoc) decisions there do not go through ‘transparent channels’ and are not 
accountable to the mechanisms put in place by the formal political sphere (which is what 
happens in other countries).
165
 In a country that lacks accountability and transparency 
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 In a formal setting, conflict resolution and mediation normally takes place in the presence of the general 
public. This formal arrangement can ‘stifle speculative dialogue’ that ‘challenges assumptions and leads to 
innovative ideas’. For details, see: Judith E. Innes, Sarah Connick, and David Booher, ‘Informality as a 
planning strategy’, Journal of the American Planning Association, 73(2), (2007), pp.195-210. 
164
 For details, see: Judith E. Innes and David E. Booher, ‘Reframing public participation: Strategics for the 
21st century’, Planning Theory and Practice, 5(4), (2005), pp.419-436. 
165
 The shift from formality to informality is seen as a transition from ‘hierarchically-organised’ 
coordination to ‘heterarchically-organised’ coordination. In a formal system, authority is designated to an 
individual – or, alternatively, a body of individuals – at the top of the hierarchy. In turn, power flows from 
the top of this hierarchy all the way down to the bottom, so that all participants in local decision-making 
processes are answerable to this authority. In contrast, informal decision-making is not based on a ‘top-
down’ model of authority. As a result, both authority and power are ‘co-located’. Consequently, informal 
decision-making is required to go through transparent channels of decision-making, either through formal 
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mechanisms, members of the regime’s inner circle are therefore provided with a ‘leeway’ 
to shape policies in a way that best fits their own interests; even if it means bending the 
rules more than would normally be allowed.
166
 Although mandated by law, public 
oversight in Lebanon appears to be non-existent. As a result, decision-making is easily 
swayed towards private interests; as has been abundantly documented in the 
reconstruction of Downtown Beirut (and as will be shown in subsequent chapters).
167
 
This is not to say that informal (ad hoc) decision-making is a failure of informalising 
governance practices. On the contrary, it can be argued that informalising governance 
appears to be a deliberate strategy implemented by Arab leaders who find in its flexibility 
a leeway to organise and regulate legislation according to their own interests. In terms of 
conflict resolution and mediation, however, the informalisation of decision-making has 
been of little benefit to Lebanon. This is because Lebanon’s informal political sphere is 
occupied by many leaders, all of whom are competing for power and influence. 
 
Lebanon is made up of multiple leaders because the political system is based on a 
formula for power-sharing amongst the many sectarian communities. Of course, the 
country’s social sphere is divided by other distinctions (like class, region, quarter, social 
status etc.). Sectarianism is just one of them. Nevertheless, several authors have argued 
that sectarianism is the essence of Lebanese politics and the determinant of political 
                                                                                                                                                                             
agencies or through public opinion. For details, see: Jon Pierre, ‘Introduction: Understanding governance’, 
in Jon Pierre (Ed.), Debating Governance. Authority, Steering, and Democracy, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), pp.1-10; Jon Pierre, ‘Public–private partnerships and urban governance: 
Introduction’, in Jon Pierre (Ed.), Partnerships in Urban Governance: European and American 
Experiences, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp.1–10; Gerry Stoker, ‘Introduction’, in Gerry Stoker (Ed.), 
The New Politics of British Local Governance, (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), p.3. 
166
 In terms of urban planning, it allows decision-makers to implement particular exemptions or 
circumventions, but not others. This kind of authority provides actors, and particularly urban developers, 
more flexibility in their projects. It even allows developers to bending the rule more than what would be 
normally allowed within the framework of the law. This is what some scholars, such as Anaya Roy 
describe as the ‘informalisation’ of the planning process, which she argues stems from the need for 
neoliberalism to shape spaces according to particular interests and needs. See: Anaya Roy, ‘Why India 
cannot plan its cities: informality, insurgence and the idiom of urbanization’, Planning Theory, 8, (2009), 
pp.76-87. 
167
 For details, see: Leenders, ‘Public Means to Private Ends: State Building and Power in Post-war 
Lebanon’, pp.304-336. See also: Charles Adwan, ‘Corruption in Reconstruction: The Cost of ‘National 
Consensus’ in Post-War Lebanon’, in Daniel Large (Ed.), Corruption in Post-War Reconstruction: 
Confronting the Vicious Circle, (Beirut: LTA, 2005), pp.39-55; Richard Becherer, ‘A Matter of Life and 
Debt: The Untold Costs of Rafiq Hariri’s New Beirut’, The Journal of Architecture, 10, (2005), pp.1-42; 
Khalil Gebara, Reconstruction Survey: The Political Economy of Corruption in Post-War Lebanon, (Beirut: 
LTA; London: Tiri, 2007). 
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behaviour.
168
 Therefore, claiming that confessional groups are ‘imagined communities’, 
or that they are ‘constructed’, does not mean that they are in any way ‘imaginary’ or 
‘fabricated’.169 On the contrary, sectarianism is a very real and powerful social force. It 
can create distinctions and hierarchies, which can become stable over long periods of 
time. In other words, sectarianism is ‘situational’, and not something that is simply 
constructed. Of course, describing a particular action or behaviour as ‘sectarian’ is a 
matter of careful interpretation. Furthermore, describing someone as ‘being sectarian’ or 
not depends on what he or she seeks to achieve and in what context. In this regard, 
examining the sectarian logic of different elites will allow us to examine what it means to 
‘be sectarian’.170 Of course, recourse to shared sectarian identity may be appropriate in 
the Lebanese context only. 
 
 
ii. Who exactly was governing in post-civil war Lebanon? 
 
Before the civil war, the Lebanese state and economy were influenced by local 
businessmen, entrepreneurs and merchants (the history of Lebanon’s political economy 
will be covered in more detail in Chapter 4).
171
 This ‘coalition of elites’ came together as 
part of the 1943 National Pact; characterised, amongst other things, by a hegemonic 
presidency and a Maronite predominance in parliament.
172
 However, the outbreak of civil 
war in 1975 represented a dramatic turning point, during which various warring militias 
took over the country, and moral slackness and loosened social values invaded the 
                                                          
168
 For details, see: Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon, p.32; Lijphart, Democracy in Plural 
Societies: A Comparative Exploration, p.5; Ofeish, ‘Lebanon's Second Republic: Secular Talk, Sectarian 
Application’, pp.97-116. 
169
 See: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (London: Verso, 2006), p.6. See also: Ian Hacking, 
The Social Construction of What?, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
170
 When and how does one accentuate sectarian identity, or choose to appeal to alternative categories such 
as Lebanese nationalism or universal principles? 
171
 For details, see: Yusif A. Sayigh, Entrepreneurs of Lebanon: The Role of the Business Leader in a 
Developing Economy, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); Michael Johnson, Class and Client in 
Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State 1840–1985, (London: Ithaca Press, 1986), 
pp.25-26. 
172
 In other words, authority was designated to the president at the top of the hierarchy. In turn, power 
flowed from the presidency all the way down to the bottom, so that all participants in local decision-making 
processes were answerable to the president’s authority. For details, see: Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of 
Modern Lebanon, (London: Pluto Press, 2007), pp.109-111. 
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country’s economy. When the fighting officially ended in 1990, the signing of the Ta’if 
Peace Accords did not pave the way for a return of the pre-civil war elites, nor did it 
represent a return to the pre-civil war consensus.  
 
The Ta’if Peace Accords led to an ‘extreme’ dispersal of political power. This 
power was formally dispersed amongst the three ru’asa’, or ‘presidents’: the President of 
the Republic (a Maronite Christian), the President of the Council of Ministers (a Sunni 
Muslim), and the President of the Parliament (a Shiite Muslim).
173
 But it was informally 
dispersed amongst a ‘new coalition of elites’ that emerged at the end of the civil war, as 
well. This new coalition was dominated by ‘former militia leaders’174 and the 
‘businesspeople allied to them’.175 But it also included pre-civil war bourgeois families, 
Shihabist technocrats, military and security officials, and new contractors. See Table 2 for 
more information on each type of Lebanese elites. Despite this variety, the lack of 
accountability and transparency mechanisms is closely attributed to the arrival of the 
former militia leaders (and the businesspeople allied to them), who sought to maintain 
many of their ‘criminal’ and ‘predatory’ practices.176  
                                                          
173
 By creating a ‘three-man show’, the post-civil war consensus made the country a much more volatile 
and unpredictable place. For further details, see: Kamal S. Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History 
of Lebanon Reconsidered, (Berkeley: University of California Press 1998); Samir Khalaf, ‘Ties that Bind: 
Sectarian Loyalties and the Restoration of Pluralism in Lebanon’, The Beirut Review, 1(1), (1991), pp.32-
61; Samir Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of 
Communal Conﬂict, (New York: Columbia University Press 2002). 
174
 On the rise of former militia leaders, see: Kamal A. Beyoghlow, ‘Lebanon’s New Leaders: Militias in 
Politics’, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 12(3), (1989), pp.28-36; Fawwaz Traboulsi, 
‘Al-Takwîn al-Tabaqî li-l-Sultah al-Siyâsiyah Ba`d al-Harb’ [The class composition of the Lebanese post-
war elite], Ab`âd, 6, (1997), pp.79-92; Elizabeth Picard, The Demobilization of the Lebanese Militias, 
(Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1999). 
175
 See: Georges Corm, ‘The War System: Militia Hegemony and Reestablishment of the State’, in Deirdre 
Collings (Ed.), Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp.215-
230. 
176
 There is a wide range of studies that talk about criminal and predatory activities during the civil war by 
the former militia leaders. For examples, see: Georges Corm, ‘Liban: L’Argent Des Milices’, Cahiers de 
l’Orient, 10, (1988), pp.271-287; Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and 
Rise of a Nation, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), pp.323-360. There are also some studies that illustrate the 
continued practice of these criminal and predatory activities in the post-civil war period. See: Georges 
Corm, ‘The War System: Militia Hegemony and the Reestablishment of the State’, pp.215–230; William 
Harris, Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 
1997), pp.279-322; Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon, a Shattered Country: Myths and Realities of the Wars in 
Lebanon, (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers Inc., 1996), pp.144-152; Jürgen Enders, ‘Profiting from 
war: Economic rationality and war in Lebanon’, in Deitrich Jung (Ed.), Shadow Globalization, Ethnic 
Conflicts and New Wars, (London: Routledge, 2003), pp.119-139. 
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Elite Type Examples 
State policies and 
Institutional 
Expressions 
Sources of Rents 
Pre-civil war 
bourgeoisie 
Omar Daouk, 
Tammam Salam and 
Lady Yvonne 
Sursock Cochrane 
The creation of a 
minimal state and 
the pursuit of 
laissez-faire 
economics 
Trade and 
Financial Sectors 
Shihabist 
Technocrats 
Fuad Shihab, Elias 
Sarkis, Salim el-
Hoss and Georges 
Corm 
State-led 
(Keynesian) 
development and 
planning (E.g. the 
creation of the CDR 
in 1977) 
Government 
Expenditure 
Military and 
Security Officials 
Emile Lahoud Building a strong 
and capable army 
Military 
expenditures 
Former Militia 
Leaders (and 
businessmen allied 
to them) 
Amine Gemayel, 
Nabih Berri and 
Walid Junblatt 
Maintaining state 
welfare services to 
be used as patronage 
resource  (E.g. 
appropriation of the 
Council for South 
Lebanon and 
Ministry of 
Displaced) 
Various: foreign 
state support, 
goods, land and 
financial 
speculation 
New contractors 
Rafiq Hariri, Najib 
Mikati, Mohammed 
Safadi and Issam 
Fares 
Takeover of 
institutions and 
neoliberal 
transformation of 
the state and 
economy (E.g. 
Hariri's takeover of 
the CDR and 
Central Bank) 
Contracts in 
various sectors of 
the economy; 
most particularly, 
in banking and 
real estate (land 
rents) 
 
 
Table 2 – A table illustrating elite types in post-civil war Lebanon. This table was 
adapted from a table produced in: Baumann, Citizen Hariri and Neoliberal Politics in 
Post-War Lebanon, p.284. Notice how different types of elites had different sources of 
rents. The individuals mentioned were chosen based on their relevance in this thesis. 
Details on these individuals will be provided in subsequent chapters. 
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These elites do not always enjoy significant, formal representation in the main 
political bodies (i.e. the presidency, the government and the parliament).
177
 But even so, 
they have always enjoyed informal control over the ‘hens’ (administrative bodies and 
institutions) laying the ‘golden financial and political eggs of the state’.178 These 
administrative bodies were considered to be ‘autonomous’, ‘independent’ and beyond the 
reach of ‘accountability mechanisms’. According to Lebanese sources, the most 
significant examples were: former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who was given large 
discretionary powers in the overall reconstruction of Beirut through personal control over 
the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR); Parliament Speaker Nabih 
Berri, who enjoyed near autonomous control in the running of reconstruction and relief 
programmes in the South through the Council for South Lebanon; and Druze leader 
Walid Junblatt, who was awarded full discretion in directing the Ministry of the 
Displaced and the Fund for the Displaced.
179
 But despite this informal collaboration to 
distribute responsibilities in a way that is equally spread out amongst a coalition of 
recognised players, the heterogeneous elites continued to compete amongst one another 
for control over other state enterprises and agencies. The competition between the former 
militia leaders and the new contractors are of particular interest to this thesis. 
 
To begin with, Rafiq Hariri (the leading member of the new contractor bourgeoisie 
or class that had been taking shape since the 1980s), took political office in 1992, and for 
the next decade or so until his assassination in 2005, began implementing neoliberal 
economic reforms in three main areas. Firstly, he pushed through laws related to 
reconstruction matters in the country (but more particularly related to the Solidere project 
in Downtown Beirut). Secondly, he supported government over-borrowing beyond what 
was required to finance the budget deficit which created artificial demand for Lebanese 
                                                          
177
 See: Reinoud Leenders, ‘The Political Economy of Corruption in Post-War Lebanon’, presentation at 
the conference ‘Distributive and Normative Processes in the Arab Countries and the Mediterranean’, Cairo, 
24-26 February 1999, referenced in: Adwan, “Corruption in Reconstruction: The Cost of ‘National 
Consensus’ in Post-War Lebanon”, p.44. 
178
 See: ibid. 
179
 The post-civil war ‘deal’ in Lebanon involved very few and weak institutional control mechanisms, 
which were most often politically controlled. The consequence was the replacement of checks and balances 
with political mutual consent, where the benefit of the majority of politicians leads to tolerance of each 
other. These conditions set the framework of post-civil war politics that dominated the public sphere for 
many years to come. For further details, see: ibid. 
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pounds, thus stabilising the currency. And thirdly, he pushed for privatisation in various 
economic sectors (the main targets – telecommunications, Middle East Airlines, and 
electricity and water – however, remained under various forms of state-control). Hariri’s 
efforts created huge sums of ‘neoliberal’ rent for himself and other new contractors like 
him; amongst them, Najib Mikati, Mohammed Safadi and Issam Fares.
180
 In this respect, 
Mikati, Safadi and Fares lent their support to Rafiq Hariri’s neoliberal strategy as soon as 
they too entered politics.
181
 Generally speaking, those elites that implemented neoliberal 
economic reforms received substantial amounts of financial aid and political support from 
‘core countries’ in times of need.182 And since neoliberalism is also commonly regarded 
as an ‘imperial’ project in much of the literature, it is instructive to see the extent with 
which these core countries – such as France and the US – were able to project their power 
onto Lebanon, and in turn, the kind of resistance that this projection of power engendered 
both locally and regionally from countries such as Syria.
183
 More attention to the 
‘imperial’ dimension of neoliberalism will be given in Chapter 6.  
 
Importantly, very few – if any – of the elites opposed Rafiq Hariri’s neoliberal 
drive in the early 1990s: many of the laws and decrees promulgated by the new 
contractors were supported by other elite figures – most significantly, Nabih Berri and 
                                                          
180
 For details, see: Hourani, ‘Transnational Pathways and Politico-economic Power: Globalisation and the 
Lebanese Civil War’, pp.301-204. See also: Baumann, ‘The ‘new contractor bourgeoisie’ in Lebanese 
politics: Hariri, Miqati and Faris’, pp.125-144; Baumann, Citizen Hariri and Neoliberal Politics in Post-
War Lebanon, p.62. 
181
 Most significantly, Najib Mikati would become Prime Minister on two occasions after Hariri’s 
assassination in 2005. Details on this will be provided in Chapter 7. 
182
 For example, three major conferences, PARIS I (2001), PARIS II (2002) and PARIS III (2007) were 
held subsequently in order to request help from the international community to assist Lebanon manage its 
public debt. To that end, France and Saudi Arabia were the biggest donors, followed by other Gulf 
countries and Malaysia. Saudi Arabia’s role was primarily financial, providing the largest chunk of aid. 
French support was due to Hariri’s close relations with President Jacques Chirac. Unless otherwise 
indicated, the following data about Paris I, Paris II and Paris III are derived from: EIU, Country Report: 
Lebanon, April 2001, p.31; EIU, Country Report: Lebanon, January 2002, p.21; EIU, Country Report: 
Lebanon, April 2007, pp.18-20. 
183
 In this regard, it is well-known that international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank lent their full weight and ammunition to those who sought to implement harsh 
austerity measures and privatisation policies. Indeed, barely a month after the civil war ended, the IMF 
began pressuring the Lebanese government for the implementation of neoliberal policies. The World Bank, 
too, exerted pressure on the Lebanese government by making a much needed donor conference throughout 
1992 conditional on the implementation of neoliberal policies. For details, see: World Bank, 
Implementation completion report on a loan in the amount of US$20.0 million to the Lebanese Republic for 
an administrative rehabilitation loan, (Washington DC: World Bank, 2003). See also: Hourani, 
‘Transnational Pathways and Politico-economic Power: Globalisation and the Lebanese Civil War’, p.291. 
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Walid Junblatt – because they too sought to snatch up contracts, or to invest, in the 
private sector. But as Hariri’s neoliberal ‘push’ expanded to include the privatisation of 
‘state welfare services’, red flags were raised. Many of the elites were pursuing the very 
different economic and political logic of using state welfare services as a ‘patronage 
resource’. This meant that certain state apparatuses were being used to provide public 
services and jobs to a specific clientele in return for votes. Maintaining these services, 
however, ran against the neoliberal logic of cutting back social welfare. But because the 
political survival of most former militia leaders came to depend on these state welfare 
services – such as Nabih Berri, who primarily used the Council for South Lebanon, and 
Walid Junblatt, who mainly used the Ministry for the Displaced – they often resisted 
Rafiq Hariri’s privatisation policies.184 There were also incidents in which the neoliberal 
logic of the new contractor bourgeoisie clashed with the aspirations of the military and 
intelligence apparatus; the most significant clash being between Rafiq Hariri and Army 
Commander Emile Lahoud.
185
  
 
A final point to stress: while members of this new coalition of elites can be split 
into smaller categories – such as former militia leaders (and the businessmen allied to 
them), traditional pre-civil bourgeoisie, Shihabist technocrats, military and security 
officials, and new contractors – these are in themselves broad ‘terms’ that can be very 
misleading when trying to make sense of individual actions and behaviours.
186
 Thus, 
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 But as shall be demonstrated in Chapter 6, what started off as an anti-corruption campaign against Hariri 
quickly turned into a strategic instrument for many rival elites to push for out Hariri and quell his neoliberal 
drive. 
185
 Following neoliberal logic, Hariri sought to cut military expenditure; a move which would have hurt the 
military and intelligence establishment. In this context, Army Commander Emile Lahoud is considered to 
be one of Hariri’s staunchest political opponents. Since Lahoud was also considered to be one of Syria’s 
closest allies in Lebanon, the neoliberal economic agenda was considered to be an attack on Syria’s 
interests in the country. By 1998, Lahoud succeeded Elias Hrawi as president after receiving strong Syrian 
support. He used his presidency to curtail the rents earned from government debt management, but more 
specifically, to undermine the Solidere project. To some extent, Lahoud’s efforts at undermining Hariri’s 
economic and political power can be compared to Fuad Shihab’s attacks on the pre-civil war bourgeoisie in 
the 1960s. Further details will be given in Chapter 6. 
186
 It cannot be stressed enough how different every individual is. If we look at the new contractors, for 
example, while all of them appear to share similar traits (all: pursue collective economic and individual 
business interests; support a neoliberal transformation of the economy and state in order to create 
investment opportunities for the private sector; compete amongst one another for contracts and the chance 
to snatch up privatised state enterpises and to control market-regulating agencies), they all appear to have 
very varied degrees of political success. This was due to the difference in foreign allies (if any at all), and 
the strength of support they received. In this regard, Rafiq Hariri was the most successful individual in the 
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these terms, as well, are used as a way to complement rather than replace the specific 
individuals that are involved in the reconstruction process (and the interests they are 
trying to push forward). 
 
 
iii. What did the elites do with the Lebanese state? 
 
The state was dominated by a new coalition of elites. What happened thereafter was 
the takeover and apportionment – or ‘muhasassa’, as it is locally called – of the 
administrative bodies and institutions amongst themselves. To some extent, this takeover 
and apportionment of the administrative bodies and institutions was unprecedented. 
Nevertheless, the analysis must be expanded a bit further. Lebanese elites have always 
competed for control over the state in order to restructure it to their own interests (as will 
be shown in Chapters 4 and 5). The difference now, compared with before, was that this 
takeover was accompanied by new types of elites; the most significant of these being the 
new contractors, whose members pursued a neoliberal logic. Because other types of 
elites, such as the former militia leaders, pursued a very different economic and political 
logic to that of the new contractor bourgeoisie, it is important to differentiate between 
acts of state-restructuring that conformed to a neoliberal logic, and those acts that did not 
conform to it. 
 
To begin with, state-restructuring in post-civil war Lebanon led to the independence 
of many administrative bodies and institutions beyond state-control. Most particularly 
were those that were privately-allotted to the key elites (such as the CDR, the Council for 
South Lebanon and the Ministry of the Displaced). According to some liberal 
peacebuilding scholars, such as Michael Pugh, this ‘private-allotment’ of the institutions 
was a result of the neoliberal ‘prescriptions’ or ‘principles’ that were ‘imposed’ or 
‘implanted’ in the postwar society.187 But Pugh’s assessment of the situation in post-civil 
war Lebanon must be used with caution. As detailed previously, the Council for South 
                                                                                                                                                                             
group because he received unwavering support from the Saudi monarchy. For details, see: Baumann, “The 
‘new contractor bourgeoisie’ in Lebanese politics: Hariri, Miqati and Faris”, pp.126-127. 
187
 See: Pugh, ‘Protectorates and Spoils of Peace: Political economy in south-east Europe’, pp.52-53. 
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Lebanon and the Ministry of the Displaced belonged to former militia leaders Nabih Berri 
and Walid Junblatt respectively. Both figures pursued an economic and political logic 
that was not neoliberal, and therefore, were pushing for the privatisation of these 
institutions in order to siphon public assets and distribute them amongst their clientele. 
Only the CDR’s allotment to Rafiq Hariri could be said to be a result of neoliberal 
prescriptions imposed after the end of the civil war. But with time, even the CDR became 
an instrument of patronage for Hariri.  
 
State-restructuring also entailed bolstering the apparatuses of repression. This was 
reflected by the enforcement of old – or the implementation of new – laws and 
regulations. For example: old censorship laws that were previously ignored were 
suddenly enforced once again; new media laws, which eliminated all but a handful of 
radio and TV stations, brought the media under tighter control in the public sphere; and 
more seriously, a nation-wide ban on street protests came into effect.
188
 This last law is 
particularly significant. Since it was passed in the mid-1990s, there has been an increase 
in security crack-downs on street protests. The labour unions, in particular, encountered 
difficulties exercising their constitutional right to demonstrate. In 1996, for example, then 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri displayed little interest in meeting the demands of the labour 
unions, who were (naturally) opposed to his neoliberal policies.
189
 Although he did try to 
foster alliances with some trade union federations (for instance, in the banking sector), 
Hariri was happy to call on the security apparatuses to quell any opposition. This seems 
to contrast with his subsequent image of having ‘resisted’ the Syrian occupation.190 Of 
course, Rafiq Hariri’s use of this tactic underscores the contradictions between 
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neoliberalism’s claim to furthering freedom (on the one hand), and the need to curtail 
civil liberties in the process of implementing neoliberal policies (on the other).
191
 But it 
must be stressed that the coalition of elites collectively-agreed to the use of such a tactic 
so as to preserve the status-quo. It is a tried-and-tested method of breaking anyone who 
opposes certain policies or threatens particular interests, and is therefore, not solely 
associated with the arrival of neoliberalism in the country.
192
  
 
Most significantly, state-restructuring in post-civil war Lebanon involved passing 
legislation that would open-up the economy to capital forces (both inside and outside the 
country). The most significant legislation passed was ‘Law 117’ (dated 7th of December 
1991), which gave the CDR the authorisation to oversee the establishment of private real 
estate holding companies that would undertake large-scale reconstruction projects in 
destroyed areas. Due to the lack of funds, the government of the time was quick to pass 
such a law and transfer the ‘responsibility’ to a private actor. Not long after the law was 
passed, three real estate companies were established to oversee reconstruction projects in 
three areas of Beirut. These were: Elyssar (in the southern suburbs), Linord (in the 
northern littoral), and most significantly Solidere (in the downtown area).
193
 More 
information on all three companies will be provided in Chapter 5. By the time these 
companies were established, Rafiq Hariri himself had become the country’s new prime 
minister. He then used his position to modify the regulatory framework and create a 
bundle of subsidies and facilities to help attract foreign investment into these 
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companies.
194
 Of course, reconstruction was not the only area where the Lebanese state 
made significant modifications to the regulatory framework. For example, the state 
passed laws that would privatise the telecommunication sector in the country as well. 
Two telecom companies – Libancell and Cellis – received ‘build-operate-transfer’ (BOT) 
contracts to run the mobile phone network between 1994 and 2004. Cellis is an 
interesting example, because France Telecom owned two thirds of Cellis while the 
brothers Taha and Najib Mikati owned the rest. In this regard, it must not be forgotten 
that Najib and his brother Taha were both members of the new contractor bourgeoisie.
195
  
 
Therefore, the legislation that led to the creation of private real estate holding 
companies can be seen as an act that conformed to the neoliberal logic that Rafiq Hariri 
and other new contractors carried with them. Since then, the delegation of large-scale 
reconstruction projects to private real estate companies has become common practice in 
Lebanese planning; especially after the 2006 war.
196
 A few miles south of Downtown 
Beirut, in the neighbourhood of Haret Hreik (part of the southern suburbs of Beirut, and 
which was heavily bombed in the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon), Hezbollah’s private 
construction firm, known as Jihad al-Bina, has rebuilt some 200 multi-storey apartment 
buildings to the most up-to-date standards (part of the ‘Waad Initiative’). But as studies 
by Roger Mac Ginty and Christine Hamieh have shown, the case of Jihad al-Bina is a 
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local adaptation of the neoliberal approach that has tried to be more culturally 
appropriate, cost-effective, sustainable and empowering to the local population.
197
 For 
example, Jihad al-Bina has used Hezbollah’s networks and resources – which have been 
built up over many years – to embed itself within the population (specifically, within the 
Shiite community). More importantly, Jihad al-Bina has developed ‘deep roots’; to the 
extent that many Shiites expected it would provide for them in a clientelistic manner. 
Thus, Jihad al-Bina is only neoliberal because it has used the same legislation used to 
establish Solidere. But unlike Solidere, Jihad al-Binna was built within a community (the 
Shiites) and could not be described as an ‘alien imposition’.  
 
Importantly though, all these companies can be said to be ‘semi-regulated’. In the 
case of Jihad al-Bina, for example, it never consulted with the CDR (considered the main 
authority in reconstruction matters). Instead, Jihad al-Bina is accountable only to its 
patron – Hezbollah. This company never consulted with the CDR because the 
relationship between the administrative bodies and institutions on the one hand, and 
Hezbollah on the other, were based on ‘mutual suspicion’. For example, one 
representative of CDR said that Waad’s plans were ‘stolen’ from them and that Hezbollah 
was effectively a ‘subcontractor’ for the government without formally signing an 
agreement. Meanwhile, Waad believed that the government dissuaded overseas donors 
(Kuwait in particular) from supporting its project, and instead urged donors to route 
monies through its coffers.
198
 In contrast to Jihad al-Bina, Solidere consulted with the 
CDR (especially during the company’s initial years), but never with most other 
administrative bodies and institutions. This was because the CDR’s top post (unlike most 
others) was occupied by a close ally of Solidere’s founding father – Rafiq Hariri. In light 
of this, some cabinet ministers complained (both privately and publicly), about the lack of 
influence they had over the Solidere project. For example, in the spring of 1993, Tourism 
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Minister Nicolas Fattoush criticised the CDR, saying: “the cabinet was kept in the dark 
about many details of the government’s finances and the CDR was allowed to operate as 
a kind of super ministry accountable to no-one”.199  
  
Both examples illustrate that decision-making deployed vis-à-vis these companies 
was also informalised. This informalisation, as explained previously, was something that 
was not solely associated with the arrival of neoliberalism to the country. Of course, the 
extent to which neoliberalism is featured inside these companies has to be assessed on a 
case by case basis. For example, Solidere’s structure can be described as a ‘corporate’ 
one similar to that of private shareholding companies found elsewhere in the world: all 
major decisions in Solidere are formally voted on by the shareholders at its Annual 
General Meetings.
200
 In other words, what this informalisation of the decision-making 
process demonstrates is that state-restructuring was not so much the result of 
neoliberalisation as it was the takeover of the state by the new coalition of elites – which 
included neoliberals – seeking to restructure it to suit their own interests. To be sure, the 
creation of private real estate holding companies and the modification of the regulatory 
framework associated with these companies conformed to neoliberal logic. But there was 
a confusion of, or an overlap between, public and private interests. Some scholars refer to 
this confusion of public and private interests as the ‘colonisation’ of the former by the 
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latter.
201
 More specifically to the Solidere example, Saree Makdisi describes it as 
‘Harirism’.202 
 
 
II. Neoliberal urban developments in post-civil war  Lebanon 
 
Strong patterns of neoliberalism can be found influencing and shaping the urban 
environment in post-civil war Lebanon. This is most visibly reflected in the concentration 
of urban developments in the country’s capital, Beirut. But it is also reflected in the high 
number of projects that have been conceived and designed to attract as much capital as 
possible from the global market. But in order to paint a better picture of how much 
Beirut’s urban environment has been influenced by patterns of neoliberalism, the analysis 
will need to be presented with reference to several reconstruction projects there. In 
addition, the analysis will have to show the role that elites were playing in the 
reconstruction process, as well as show the popular resistance that different 
reconstruction projects faced from civil society.  
 
 
i. Neoliberal urban developments in the reconstruction process 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Arab states have packaged and promoted their cities as 
commodities to be invested in and visited. The rationale for targeting cities follows the 
neoliberal logic of making cities ‘competitive’ in the global market.203 This has had 
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considerable consequences for the way in which urban projects are being conceived. In 
post-civil war Lebanon, this has led to a concentration of reconstruction projects in 
Beirut. In turn, observers argue that these projects have mobilised urban spaces as 
‘arenas’ for both ‘market-oriented economic growth’ and ‘elite consumption practices’, 
thus, catering to the richer segment of society.
204
  
 
Solidere’s reconstruction of Downtown Beirut demonstrates this particularly well: a 
commercial and entertainment hub that has become unaffordable for most of the country 
(where the current minimum wage is set at US$450 per month).
205
 In this respect, it is 
widely believed that the new Downtown Beirut caters to the needs of Lebanese 
expatriates – and to a lesser extent, Arab Gulf nationals – rather than to those of the local 
population. The road network built at the time gives a clue as to whose needs the new 
Downtown is to serve: an eight-lane highway connecting the airport to the city centre 
offers an easily accessible route for the tourist or businessperson arriving in the country 
that bypasses the poorer quarters of southern Beirut.
206
 Even the Waad Initiative, which 
differs from other urban developments in the country in that it doesn’t seek the 
accumulation of ‘financial capital’, has confused the boundaries between needs and 
luxury through the accumulation of different ‘political capital’.207  
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Therefore, these various projects are typical ‘arenas’ – what some scholars call 
‘elite playing fields’ – where the elites shape an urban future in line with their own 
interests.
208
 However, these projects do not only reflect a process of astonishing self-
enrichment. They also reflect a process of self-imagination, in which capitalist forces – 
and specifically, the new contractor bourgeoisie – have imposed a particular vision and 
version of: firstly, what the urban environment ought to look like, and secondly, how 
people should use it.
209
 This is not to say that people have used these newly-created 
spaces in the way that the elites had hoped for. Cities, after all, have a way of evolving in 
a way that often subverts the agendas of the organisers and planners.
210
 Still, the efforts 
exerted by the new contractors have not only led to the replacement of ‘scarring 
memories’ (such as wartorn buildings), but also to the replacement of archaeological 
discoveries, old traditional buildings and structures, and the scant remains of green 
spaces. In Beirut, critics argue that the old city centre is disappearing from history and 
memory: traditional names that are historically associated with the area, such as Bab 
Idriss, Souk Ayyass, Khatayan and Khan Antoun Bey, have disappeared from popular 
vernacular
211
; the traditional aswaq have been replaced with an American-style mall – see 
Figure 4 – that does not resemble the traditional Arab markets either in terms of physical 
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Figure 4 – A selection of images displaying the aswaq project. Notice how it looks more 
like a shopping mall than a traditional Arab market. Photos taken by author. 
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appearance or of socio-economic activity
212
; and all the urban functions that were once 
associated with the city centre have been replaced with high-value office spaces, luxury 
residences and bouitique shops to be used by rich Lebanese and Arab Gulf visitors.
213
  
 
Of course, not everything old or traditional has been torn down and replaced. The 
preservation of history is also present in the city. For example, the discovery of a 2,000-
year-old Roman bath house at a site in Achrafiyeh where a luxury 23-storey residential 
building is to be constructed will be dismantled and reintegrated into the new building 
project as a small ‘public museum’.214 In another project in Mar Mikhael, where a US$30 
million residential building known as AYA Tower is to be built, the developer has agreed 
to preserve the façade of a traditional house on its site.
215
 In the downtown area as well, 
one cannot help but notice the private company’s detailed and obsessive restoration, 
recuperation, and preservation of ‘older heritage’ (turath) – specifically, archaeological 
and colonial-era architectural sites in the area (see Figure 5).
216
 But while many projects 
have contributed towards the preservation of the city’s rich history, the selection of what 
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Figure 5 – A selection of images of archeological ruins discovered in the area, as well as 
colonial-era buildings that were preserved and recuperated. Photos taken by author. 
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to preserve and how to preserve it has led to the ‘commodification’ of heritage, and the 
imposition of a ‘war amnesia’ on the country’s population.217  
 
 
ii. Popular mobilisations against neoliberal urban developments 
 
The focus of this thesis is very much on elite politics surrounding the reconstruction 
process in post-civil war Lebanon, but the bottom-up mobilisation that the reconstruction 
process engendered does require some attention too, not least because it threatened to 
derail the rent-creation mechanisms put in place by Rafiq Hariri (and other new 
contractors like him). This popular mobilisation comprised of several civil society 
groups, each carrying different interests and concerned with certain projects over others. 
They included landowners and tenants who were evicted from their properties without 
feeling adequately-compensated, an assemblage of intellectuals who were disappointed 
by how reconstruction has not taken certain aspects into consideration (such as, heritage 
protection), and even ordinary citizens who were at the outset unaffected but would later 
become concerned about the future implications that certain projects would have on 
Beirut and on them as inhabitants of the city. Again these social categories should serve 
to complement rather than replace the voices of those individuals leading grassroots 
movements.  
 
The central issue that unites all these groups is the lack of control they have over 
the reconstruction process. As Heiko Schmid argues in his analysis of the Solidere 
project, this lack of control is related to the transfer of power to the private real estate 
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companies caused by Law 117 and others.
218
 With this increased outsourcing of public 
responsibility to private real estate companies comes a transition from a collective-
interest approach to an approach that is more ‘profit-orientated’. In other words, the 
problem is that real estate companies in post-civil war Lebanon are being allowed to 
pursue an approach that is defined less by long-term and non-profit visions and more by 
medium- and short-term profits.
219
 A larger problem with these companies is the way 
they integrate market actors (such as Hariri and his protégés) while also excluding other 
actors and interests.
220
 In this regard, new urban governance scholars criticise these 
companies for their ‘extraordinary degree of autonomy and impermeability’.221 Ingemar 
Elander and Maurice Blanc criticise them for their insulation from external interests and 
influences.
222
 While Frank Moulaert, Erik Swyngedouw and Arantxa Rodriguez criticise 
them for being ‘bunkered’ against participation and ownership by local community 
groups.
223
 Due to all this, there appears to be an inherent ‘lack of democracy’ in – and a 
‘lack of legitimation’ of – such companies.224 
 
The profit-oriented approach adopted by many private real estate companies – 
mixed with the rent-creation mechanisms put in place by the new contractor bourgeoisie 
– created many ‘losers’; most significant of which were the landowners and tenants who 
were evicted from their properties. In his unpublished master’s thesis, Hicham el-Achkar 
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explains how plans to demolish over 50 old buildings in the Achrafiyeh neighbourhood 
of Beirut and replace them with high-end apartment buildings forced around 350 families 
to relocate to more affordable areas in the suburbs.
225
 Of course, these forced evictions 
did lead to fierce – and often, violent – confrontations on the ground. But el-Achkar 
highlights how a large number of these families failed to claim their properties back 
because many of the real estate companies in question were protected by elite figures 
using their political positions and/or relationships. In this regard, he refers to members of 
the new contractor bourgeoisie, such as Rafiq Hariri, Mohammed Safadi and Najib 
Mikati. But he also provides a list of other prominent elite figures who had invested in the 
aforementioned projects. Significantly, this list includes former militia leaders, such as 
Nabih Berri and Walid Junblatt.
226
 It therefore suggests that many of the laws and decrees 
promulgated by the new contractors were supported by other elite figures – such as the 
former militia leaders – because they too sought to invest in the real estate sector.227  
 
These popular protests are often labelled as symptoms of ‘local vs. global’228, 
‘Jihad vs. McWorld’229, or a ‘heritage crusade’230. But these descriptions can be expanded 
further to show how different elites dealt with opposition to their interests. In terms of the 
new contractors, one finds that protest organisers were almost always offered generous 
bribes to call off the protests. On some occasions, this co-optation tactic worked; for 
example, the Elyssar project in southern suburbs of Beirut.
231
 On other occasions, 
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Governance in Post-War Beirut: Resources, Negotiations, and Contestations in the Elyssar Project’, pp.272-
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however, popular protests went ahead and were even successful at halting reconstruction 
projects altogether; most notably, the Linord project on the Metn north coast of Beirut.
232
 
It is worth noting that Linord and Elyssar were similar to Solidere in that they were 
started with Rafiq Hariri’s participation in the reconstruction effort after the Israeli 
Invasion of 1982, and that they were eventually set-up as private real estate companies in 
the 1990s.
233
 Those protesting against Solidere were offered cash incentives, but also jobs 
in the private firm. Those who were hired were allowed to soften the rough edges of the 
Solidere project, all while leaving the fundamental mechanisms of rent-creation and -
appropriation intact. The movement of rights holders and heritage activists was also co-
opted by members of pre-civil war bourgeoisie families who felt they had ‘lost out’ to the 
new contractors. Members of these families took part in organising and leading some of 
the protests. Some important examples include Yvonne, Lady Cochrane Sursock, 
Tammam Salam and Fadi Khoury. In some cases, they even founded their own action 
committees and groups to undermine the Solidere project; for example, Omar Daouk and 
the Association of Owners of Rights in the Beirut Central District, and Giorgio Tarraf and 
Save Beirut Heritage (SBH).
234
 The most successful example of co-optation was during 
popular protests by mostly Shiite refugees evicted by Solidere. Amal and Hezbollah – the 
two main patrons of the Shiite community – clientelised the protest movement and used it 
to extract ‘compensation’. But what started off as a protest for compensation turned into a 
tactical opportunity to push for a share of the rents from Hariri’s mechanisms of rent-
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creation and -appropriation.
235
 The rents that Amal and Hezbollah obtained came as cash. 
But members of the two parties also gained positions and shares in Solidere, and posts in 
various administrative bodies and institutions (as will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6). 
 
Of all the private real estate companies, Solidere experienced the most opposition 
from civil society; after all, the private company was in charge of the most significant 
reconstruction project in the country. In contrast, Jihad al-Bina experienced the least 
opposition from civil society. This was because, as Mac Ginty and Hamieh rightly 
explain, the company adopted the practice of ‘local participation’ in its reconstruction 
projects. By persuading local people to ‘take responsibility’ for projects, this has helped 
projects, such as the Waad Initiative, to connect with ‘local aspirations and cultural 
norms’.236 In this context, Jihad al-Bina tries to position itself against Solidere by 
claiming that it is not a private real estate company. But as Mona Fawaz rightly argues, 
Jihad al-Bina is still very much a private firm, and Waad a neoliberal project: “If 
neoliberalism is supposed to refer to the delegation of public tasks to private actors in the 
market, then it is difficult for Jihad al-Bina to claim that the Waad Initiative is not like the 
Solidere project”.237  
 
 
iii. The elites and neoliberal urban developments 
 
As previously mentioned, the new coalition of elites informally divided entire 
economic sectors amongst themselves and ensured that all would enjoy a large degree of 
autonomy in their respective ‘domains of specialisation’. In reconstruction matters as 
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well, elites enjoyed a large degree of autonomy.
238
 This situation is not unique to 
Lebanon, but rather, is endemic to many postwar societies. In the Balkans, for example, 
leaders of local ethnic groups established ‘economic protectorates’ in their respective 
‘ethno-geographical sectors’. These protectorates symbolised a continuation of personal 
and patrimonial links that had existed during the war, which were unmediated by 
‘constitutional accountability, legal norms and processes’. As a result, in Kosovo, the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) became the de facto reconstruction authority in the bulk 
of the country, whereas in each of the Croat and Muslim areas of Bosnia, the major 
political organisations became the de facto reconstruction authorities in their respective 
ethno-geographical sectors as well.
239
  
 
In postwar societies, scholars have documented the huge profits that elites have 
made from reconstruction matters. In the Balkans, for example, Pugh explains that the 
elites became what he calls ‘peace profiteers’ or ‘reconstruction racketeers’. Interestingly, 
he uses post-civil war Lebanon as an example to explain the situation in the Balkans:  
 
“Features of wartime economies carry over into relative peace, as amply 
demonstrated in Lebanon, where militias and political elites became 
“legitimate” reconstruction racketeers, dealers and directors taking advantage 
of the state’s marginalisation and an ultra-liberal, unregulated economic 
environment in which public government has been paralysed.”240  
 
However, it is assumed to be self-evident that elite members would exploit an 
unregulated economic environment for their private gain. What is not so evident from the 
statement above is how they were doing this. In the Lebanese context, the racketeering 
was not only limited to former militia leaders. New contractors were believed to be 
swaying the reconstruction effort to their advantage as well. But unlike the former militia 
leaders, the new contractors embarked on a mission to draft and issue laws and decrees 
                                                          
238
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related to the reconstruction process that would generate significant rent that could later 
be appropriated. The most significant law was Law 117 (discussed earlier), which enables 
the creation of private real estate holding companies (such as Solidere), and in turn, 
grants such companies with attractive incentives (such as a ten-year tax exemption from 
income tax from the date of its formation).
241
 Being Solidere’s main investor, Rafiq 
Hariri was thus the main beneficiary of Law 117.  
 
The new contractors tolerated the corruption of other elites because it was a crucial 
element of the clientelist networks built by the elites for their respective followers. This 
shows how corruption and patronage can overlap.
242
 For example, as Rafiq Hariri became 
the country’s largest real estate owner, he used his tenure as prime minister to allow 
kickbacks from public spending to enrich all major government figures who would have 
otherwise acted as ‘spoilers’ of his reconstruction plans.243 Sometimes, however, the rent-
seeking behaviours of the new contractors led to political clashes with other elites.
244
 The 
most visible clashes occurred between Rafiq Hariri – as the leading member of the new 
contractor bourgeoisie – and the former militia leaders – as representatives of more 
popular constituencies.
245
 In line with his neoliberal agenda, Rafiq Hariri sought to 
strengthen the ‘right hand’ of the state (which was concerned with economics and 
finance), at the expense of the ‘left hand’ of the state (which was concerned with the 
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provision of welfare).
246
 Because the welfare-related agencies functioned as instruments 
of patronage for the former militia leaders, they often tried to resist by launching 
accusations of corruption against Solidere.
247
 By 1998, these accusations escalated into an 
all-out campaign to oust Rafiq Hariri and his allies from those administrative bodies and 
institutions concerned with reconstruction matters in general, and in Downtown Beirut in 
particular. The most important bodies were the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of 
Finance, the Lebanese Central Bank and the CDR.
248
  
 
But there was more to the reconstruction process than elite division over Rafiq 
Hariri’s neoliberal agenda. The reconstruction process was also an opportunity for the 
elites to build and/or maintain their clientelist networks. This was done by involving local 
constituencies in the projects they implement. In their analysis of reconstruction projects 
after the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, for example, Mac Ginty and Hamieh 
argue that some political camps gained more support than others based on whether locals 
felt ‘alienated’ or ‘integrated’ into the projects that they implemented.249 Using the 
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example of the Waad Initiative in the southern suburbs of Beirut, they explain that by 
developing pre-project plans and embarking on rounds of consultations with the locals, 
and showing willingness to revise plans in the light of community reactions, Hezbollah 
was able to connect with the hearts and minds of the local inhabitants, and in turn, gain 
popular support.
250
 This argument can be stretched to the Solidere project as well. Rafiq 
Hariri was able to garner support from many Beirutis who expected to reapp benefits 
from the Solidere project. The project created new jobs and investment opportunities. The 
company also distributed shares to all the former landowners and tenants.
251
 As 
shareholders, the former landowners and tenants were given voting power on all major 
issues, including the election of board directors, as well as proposals for fundamental 
changes affecting the company (such as mergers and expansions).
252
 But as mentioned 
earlier, not everyone was satisfied with what Rafiq Hariri had to offer, sensing that the 
mantra of public participation was being used to mask the power relations whereby 
meaningful participation is constrained and outcomes are pre-ordained.
253
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A final, yet important, point to make is on the management of these private real 
estate companies. Immanuel Wallerstein has found that ‘cadres’ at the mid-level and 
managerial-level of many companies (or bureaucracies) are recruited according to 
‘universal principles’.254 This means that there is a priority to recruit based on merit over 
identity. But this is a somewhat simplistic assessment of the recruitment process in the 
companies mentioned above. It must be stressed that companies, in general, are not just 
neutral reflections of impersonal market forces. They consist of complex webs of social 
relations defined by a number of social characteristics, be they ethnic, racial or 
religious.
255
 In Lebanon especially, where distinctions are made between different groups 
based on religion, it is not clear why recruiting on the basis of sectarian identity should be 
trumped by a rationale to recruit ‘the best and brightest’. Many of these companies are 
driven by the same elites who often use populist appeals – including appeals to sectarian 
identity – to the electorate to win parliamentary elections. In this context, there is no 
reason to believe that their companies would not be driven according to their sectarian 
logic as well.
256
 We find, therefore, that the management in many of these companies was 
a mixture of meritocracy at the managerial level of things and sectarian populism at the 
grassroots level.
257
 So what do we mean by this? 
 
For example, while Jihad al-Bina needs non-indigenous actors – such as Syrian 
labourers – and professional experts – such as architects, engineers and urban planners – 
it made a conscious effort to include local people and supporters of Hezbollah in its 
projects as well.
258
 The professional experts – or as Wallerstein calls them, mid-level 
professionals – tend to be the ones who make Jihad al-Bina run smoothly. And the local 
people and supporters of Hezbollah – who were recruited to consult with the locals – tend 
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to be the ones who gather popular support from the Shiite community. A somewhat 
similar situation can be observed in Solidere: while the private firm uses meritocracy as a 
way to distance its project from sectarian affiliations (meritocracy is often used as a plank 
of neoliberal political discourse and rhetoric), its Board of Directors were comprised of 
technocrats as well as ‘experts’ in sectarian clientalism.259 As will be shown in Chapter 6, 
those experts in sectarian clientalism held shares on behalf of significant political leaders 
and religious institutions. 
 
The difference between these projects, however, is that the Solidere project was not 
designed to gain the support of a specific community (in the case of Waad, it was 
designed to cater for the Shiite community). The Solidere project was advertised as a 
‘national project’. It therefore needed the approval of all Lebanese. In this context, Hariri 
styled himself as a ‘national leader’. It was only after 1998 – when Rafiq Hariri began 
transforming himself from a national leader to a specifically ‘Sunni leader’ – that the 
Solidere project became more closely associated with the Sunni community. The 
construction of the gigantic Mohammed Al-Amin Mosque – which will be discussed in 
Chapter 6 – was seen as a symbolic claim that the city centre belonged to the Sunni 
community.
260
   
 
 
Conclusions 
 
To conclude, this chapter has situated the global phenomenon of neoliberalism 
within the local context. It can be inferred, therefore, that the emergence of neoliberalism 
in post-civil war Lebanon is closely linked to the arrival of the new contractor 
bourgeoisie. The most important – and arguably, most successful – member of the new 
contractor bourgeoisie was the late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. But others included 
Najib Mikati, Mohammed Safadi and Issam Fares. Together, the new contractors pushed 
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forward neoliberal economic reforms. Many of the laws and decrees promulgated by the 
new contractors were supported by other elite figures – most significantly, Nabih Berri 
and Walid Junblatt – because they too sought to snatch up contracts, or to invest, in the 
private sector. However, the apportionment of the administrative bodies and institutions 
amongst the new coalition of elites that emerged after the civil war proved to be a tricky 
business: by the time neoliberal economic reforms expanded to include the privatisation 
of the state welfare services, faultlines began to appear.  
 
The reconstruction process in Beirut demonstrates particularly well the main 
patterns of neoliberalism in the country. As Table 3 demonstrates, Beirut has witnessed 
multiple reconstruction projects, all of which can be described as ‘neoliberal’. But there 
are many differences between these projects as well. It therefore shows that there is a 
‘diversity’ of reconstruction projects that can be characterised as ‘neoliberal 
reconstruction projects’. Undoubtedly, this diversity was linked to the range of interests 
in the reconstruction process. The new contractors were not the only actors involved in 
this process. Other actors – most particularly, Hezbollah – were involved as well. The 
social and political background of Hezbollah, mixed with its interests in the Shiite 
community, influenced the shape and form of the reconstruction projects it was in control 
of: the most significant example being the Waad Initiative. This does not mean that the 
projects controlled by the new contractors – such as Elyssar, Linord and Solidere – were 
exact replicas of neoliberal urban developments found elsewhere in the region or the 
world. These projects were controlled by a type of elite which, although it could be 
classified as part of the capitalist class, was also a social and political force that was 
shaped by local politics. For this reason, we find that the management of the Solidere 
project was not simply technocratic in nature. Rather, it was a mixture of meritocracy at 
the managerial level of things and clientelistic populism at the grassroots level. 
 
Having elucidated the importance of context, we can now pay closer attention to the 
individual elites that played a role in shaping Beirut’s urban sphere. So far, these elites 
have been placed into categories – such as former militia leaders (and the businessmen 
allied to them), traditional pre-civil war bourgeoisie, Shihabist technocrats, military and 
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security officials, and new contractors. These ‘terms’ were used as a way to complement 
rather than replace the specific individuals that are involved in the reconstruction process 
(and the interests they are trying to push forward). But because these categories are in 
themselves, broad terms that can be very misleading when trying to make sense of 
individual actions and behaviours, the next two chapters will provide an account of 
Beirut’s turn to neoliberal urban developments based on the historical sociology of these 
different types of elites over the past couple of centuries. 
 
 
Period launched Project location Authority/Project Nature 
1990-1995 
Downtown Beirut CDR-Solidere Infrastructure 
works and 
rehabilitation of 
the city centre 
1992-1997 
Southern Suburbs CDR-Elyssar Infrastructure 
works and 
rehabilitation  
1995-1997 
Northern Littoral 
(Nahr el-Mott) 
CDR-Linord Infrastructure 
works and 
rehabilitation  
2006-2008 
Southern Suburbs Jihad al-Bina Reconstruction of 
war-damaged 
neighbourhoods 
Other large-scale urban projects that were featured in Beirut 
1994-1997 
Beirut Sport City CDR Reconstruction 
1994-1997 
Northern entrance 
into Beirut 
CDR Road network 
expansion 
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1992-2000 
Beirut International 
Airport 
CDR Rehabilitation and 
expansion 
1995-2000 
Beirut Port CDR Rehabilitation and 
expansion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 – A sample of the main projects launched in Beirut after the civil war. Notice that 
most projects in Beirut were overseen by the CDR, which fell under Hariri's control. 
 
117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II 
 
 
 
Neoliberal urban developments and their place in Beirut’s 
urban history 
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Chapter Four 
 
Episodes of transformation: from modern to neoliberal urbanism 
 
 
 
 
 
In the previous two chapters a detailed discussion was presented regarding 
neoliberal urban developments: firstly, within the Arab/Middle Eastern context; and 
secondly, within the Lebanese context. The purpose of this discussion was to show that 
context matters when trying to understand the consequences of particular projects. In this 
regard, it was argued that such projects will always take completely different forms from 
one context to another, and therefore, have completely different consequences from one 
context to the other as well. But it was shown in Chapter 3 that as well as being shaped 
by the context, projects there were being shaped by the interests of the elites that 
controlled them as well. In light of this: Chapter 4 will explain the different interests; and 
Chapter 5 will discuss the interests of a specific elite figure – that of the former Prime 
Minister Rafiq Hariri. 
 
While much of the analysis in the previous chapters focused on the new contractor 
bourgeoisie, it highlighted the important role that the former militia leaders played in the 
reconstruction process as well. This is not to say that other types of elite did not have an 
interest in Beirut’s urban scene. The pre-civil war bourgeoisie and the Shihabists, for 
example, were involved in Beirut’s urban scene long before the emergence of both the 
former militia leaders and the new contractors. Therefore, the analysis needs to take into 
account the historical sociology of these other types of elites as well in order to 
understand their interests today. As will be shown, their interests nowadays are very 
much a result of past developments that shaped the city. These past developments are 
many, and can be traced back to the early nineteenth century. What this means is that 
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some of the interests we are talking about are not limited by the lifetime of a single 
individual, but rather, are carried over and maintained across multiple generations.  
 
This chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will look at the rise 
of Beirut from a relatively insignificant town in the Eastern Mediterranean to a major city 
and the capital of Lebanon. The rise of Beirut encompasses two periods: firstly, during 
the Ottoman period, when the rulers in Istanbul tried to reassert their authority in the city; 
and secondly, after the end of the First World War, when French intervention in 
architecture and planning was deformed by Orientalist schemes. In turn, the second 
section will look at the decline and fall of Beirut. This moment in Beirut’s history is 
characterised by two periods as well: firstly, following Lebanon’s independence 
(specifically, under the leadership of President Fuad Shihab), when a serious attempt was 
made to overcome the rapidly intensifying degree of congestion caused by population 
growth; and secondly, during the civil war, when sixteen years of brutal sectarian fighting 
transformed the city into an unrecognisable urban mess.  
 
What is clear, therefore, is that Beirut experienced four main stages of ‘urban 
transformation’. As will be shown, each transformation provoked a rare mood of nascent 
and growing public awareness of urban issues. Each time as well, various elite figures 
were becoming increasingly concerned by – and involved in – the radical changes that 
were taking place in the urban spaces around them. Thus, these stages of transformation 
are important to consider in the analysis because they help us map elite interests today. It 
is from understanding where the various interests developed from that any reflection 
upon the Solidere project (and the rent-creating and -extracting mechanisms that Rafiq 
Hariri put in place) can begin. 
 
 
I. The modern and post-modern configurations of Beirut 
 
Until the mid-nineteenth century, through Arab rule and most of the Ottoman 
period, Beirut remained a relatively insignificant town, characterised by its medieval 
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silhouette of mosques, castles and fortification towers (Figure 6).
261
 The city was 
optically dominated by Burj al-Mina and Burj al-Musalla on the northern coastal side, 
Bur Dabbous and Burj al-Jedid on the southwest side, and Burj al-Kashaf on the 
southeast side (whose solid construction had succumbed to bombardment by the British 
fleet in 1840).
262
 Towering above the twenty-metre high city walls were the minarets of 
mosques (notably, ‘Umari, al-Amir Munzir, and al-Amir Mansur ‘Asif).263 Sahat al-Sur 
and Sahat al-Burj were the two main squares where many inhabitants in the city 
converged. The economic life of the city thrived around the aswaq and khans down the 
                                                          
261
 For a detailed historical account of Beirut, see: Samir Kassir, Beirut, (Berkley: University of California 
Press, 2010). 
262
 See: Michael F. Davie, ‘Trois cartes inédites de Beyrouth’, Annales de Géographie de l’Université 
Saint-Joseph, Beyrouth, 5, 1984, pp.37-82. 
263
 See: Taha al-Wali, Bayrut fi-l-tarikh wa-l-hadhara wa-l-‘umran [Beirut: History, Culture and 
Urbanism], (Beirut: Dar al’ilm lil-malayyin, 1993), pp.167-80. 
Figure 6 – View of Beirut looking east (ca. 1840). Source: Jens Hanssen, ‘“Your Beirut Is 
on My Desk”, Ottomanizing Beirut under Sultan Abdulhamid II 1876-1909’, in Peter G. 
Rowe and Hashim Sarkis, (Eds.), Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the Construction and the 
Reconstruction of the City, (Munich: Prestel Verlag, 1998), p.43.  
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narrow streets and alleyways. And political activity converged around the Serail building, 
situated on the eastern flanks of the city wall.
264
 Within a few generations, however, the 
urban profile of Beirut was dramatically transformed.  
 
 
i. The first steps towards modernisation  
 
In the nineteenth century, there was an increase in European demand for food and 
raw materials, and also markets and outlets for its energy, capital and population.
265
 In 
Mount Lebanon, Europeans were growingly interested in a number of commodities as 
well. Most significantly, they were interested in the region’s silk industry. While this 
region had already specialised in raw silk production, it was not until European 
penetration in the Middle East that silk exports began to expand.
266
 A nascent hotel 
industry began to grow in order to accommodate the European travellers. Hotels were 
built and managed first by Greeks, Italians, Maltese, and eventually, native Lebanese (see 
Figures 7 and 8). As Europeans became growingly involved in the region, they began to 
place their investments in modernising Beirut’s trade and financial infrastructure.267 The 
port city of Beirut was favoured by European merchants to the detriment of other port 
cities in the region, such as Acre, Sidon, Tripoli and Tyre.
268
 But the Europeans were not 
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 See: May Davie, Beyrouth et ses Faubourgs, (1840-1940): Une integration inachevée, (Beirut: 
CERMOC, 1996), p.20. 
265
 See: Charles Philip Issawi, An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa, (London: 
Methuen, 1982), p.1. 
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 For details, see: Boutros Labaki, Introduction a l’histoire economique du Liban: soie et commerce 
exterieur en fin de periode ottoman (1840-1914), (Beirut: Lebanese University Press, 1984), p.28; Charles 
Philip Issawi, The Fertile Crescent 1800-1914: a documentary economic history, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1966), p.321. 
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 For some details of these projects, see: Jacques Thobie, Interets et imperialism francais dans l’empire 
ottoman: 1895-1914, (Paris: Sorbonne, 1977); Jens Hanssen, ‘“Your Beirut Is on My Desk”, Ottomanizing 
Beirut under Sultan Abdulhamid II 1876-1909’, in Peter G. Rowe and Hashim Sarkis, (Eds.), Projecting 
Beirut: Episodes in the Construction and the Reconstruction of the City, (Munich: Prestel Verlag, 1998), 
pp.48-52; Marlène Ghorayeb, ‘L’urbanisme de la Ville de Beyrouth sous le Mandat Francais’, 
Revue d'études de la Méditerranée et du monde musulman, 73-74(3-4), (1994), pp.297-309. 
268
 This was because Beirut’s trade was least tied to Egypt and Turkey, and the most active with Europe. 
Unless otherwise specified, the information obtained in this section is from: Caroline Gates, The Merchant 
Republic of Lebanon: Rise of an Open Economy, (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1998), pp.15-16. 
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Figure 7 – View of German and d’Orient Hotels. Source: Samir Khalaf and Philip S. 
Khoury, (Eds.), Recovering Beirut: Urban Design and Post-War Reconstruction, 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998), p.261.  
Figure 8 – View of Continental Hotel and Avenue Français. Source: Khalaf and Khoury, 
(Eds.), Recovering Beirut: Urban Design and Post-War Reconstruction, p.261.  
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the only ones investing in the city at the time: many of the locals invested their wealth in 
Beirut’s trade and financial infrastructure as well.269  
 
One of the earliest documented examples was provided by the investments of the 
highly successful Sursock family; they invested heavily in the Beirut-Damascus road and 
railway, the enlargement of Beirut Port, and other development projects.
270
 The Sursock 
family also had investments outside Beirut; most particularly, in Egypt. But even so, 
Beirut remained their base of operations. The Sursock family was regarded as one of the 
‘Seven Christian families’ that rose rapidly and became recognised in the highest circles 
of Ottoman and European high society. Due to their high status, people often approached 
the Sursocks to intercede on their behalf with the Ottoman government. One sign of their 
closeness to the sources of Ottoman power was the appointment of Alfred Sursock to the 
post of secretary at the Ottoman Embassy in Paris in 1905. In France, Alfred quickly 
climbed up in the titled circles of Europe and married Maria Serra di Cassano (who came 
from an old Italian princely family). Their daughter, Yvonne – more commonly known as 
Yvonne, Lady Cochrane Sursock – would become a leading figure of the opposition 
movement against Rafiq Hariri and the Solidere project.
271
  
 
These first steps towards modernisation coincided with, and were most possibly 
associated with, the promulgation of new standardised construction laws and directives 
for urban management in the wake of the Tanzimat (reforms).
272
 Under the auspices of 
Ismail Kemal Bey, the wali of Beirut, serious efforts were launched to implement these 
construction laws in the city.
273
 From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, a number of 
urban developments were launched in Beirut whereby the sustenance of the public 
domain was a recurrent theme. On the basis of these construction laws, the Ottoman 
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 See: ibid, p.16. 
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 This is according to information obtained from: Leila Tarazi Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants in 
Nineteenth-Century Beirut, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp.91-92. 
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 Unless specified, details on the rise of the Sursock family were obtained from: ibid, pp.92-93. 
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Abdulhamid II 1876-1909’, p.52. 
124 
 
authorities sought to regularise public spaces in Beirut. In 1896, Beiruti municipal 
engineer Amin ‘Abd al-Nur, had translated and edited the Ottoman construction laws, 
“hoping that this service will promote public works, enable the municipal departments to 
carry out their business, and make the property owners aware what their rights and duties 
are”.274 Important aspects of these laws included regulations on the alignment and width 
of streets, the heights of buildings, and the cleanliness of crossings and passageways.
275
 
Details were also given on the norms and regulations for raising buildings, permissions, 
fees, and prohibitions of restoration, registration fees, and penal codes.
276
 
 
The modernisation process was in full swing when the Ottomans demolished large 
parts of the medieval fabric (Figure 9) and launched a string of infrastructure projects 
(such as aswaq, khans, sahat, electric tramways, gaslights, and the like), and constructed 
monumental buildings that overwhelmed Beirut’s original skyline. Notably, these 
buildings included the infantry barracks (or the ‘Grand Serail’ as it was later called), 
which was completed in 1853 (Figure 10). This building represented a smaller version of 
the Selimiyye Barracks in Istanbul.
277
 Other than that, a smaller structure known as the 
‘military hospital’ and a clock tower reflecting Istanbul time were erected alongside the 
Grand Serail, the heights of minarets were matched by church and school towers to 
emphasise the diversity of religious and educational activities in Beirut, and public spaces 
and parks such as the Sahat al-Sur (later to be called Sahat Riyadh al-Solh) and Sahat al-
Burj (later, Sahat al-Hamadiyye, Place des Canons, or Martyrs’ Square) were subjected to 
a series of major physical and functional transformations (Figure 11).
278
 As in other 
cities, however, the construction of numerous public buildings, barracks, hospitals, 
schools, and serails was not only a response to practical necessity. It was also a response 
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 See: Amin ‘Abd al-Nur, Tarjim wa sharah qanun al-abna’ wa qarar al-istimlak, (Beirut: almatba’a al-
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Figure 9 – Images of Beirut before modernisation. Source: Samir Khalaf, Heart of Beirut: 
Reclaiming the Bourj, (London: Saqi, 2006), p.60. 
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Figure 10 – A view of Beirut with the Grand Serail, the military hospital and a clock 
tower reflecting Istanbul time in the background. Source: Hanssen, ‘“Your Beirut Is on 
My Desk” Ottomanizing Beirut under Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909)’, p.58. 
 
Figure 11 – Image of Martyrs’ Square in 1910. Source: Khalaf, Heart of Beirut: 
Reclaiming the Bourj, p.186. 
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to a growing reassertion of Ottoman control over Beirut.
279
 Through the “magnificence of 
the buildings’ dimensions”, the ‘amplitude of their lines’, the ‘uniformity of their design’, 
and the ‘functional effect of their decorative elements’, they confirmed the power of the 
Ottoman Empire; providing both visual and physical evidence of modernity.
280
 
 
Without doubt, the modernisation process occurred over a protracted amount of 
time. But the pace picked up as soon as more immigrants arrived in the city. According to 
one study, Beirut’s population grew by an estimated twentyfold: from 8,000 inhabitants 
in 1825 to, 70,000 in 1863, and 200,000 in 1913.
281
 People of different ethno-religious 
backgrounds and socio-economic classes came to the city in search of better 
opportunities.
282
 Indeed, these immigrants came as a result of Beirut’s newly-acquired 
status and role as a regional centre for trade and finance, which it had attained when it 
was incorporated into the ‘nineteenth-century international market economy’.283 While 
Sunni Muslim merchants tended to dominate trade with the Arab hinterland, their 
Christian counterparts dominated trade with Europe. With time, Lebanon came to acquire 
a particular role in the regional and world economy; namely as the commercial and 
financial intermediary between the Arab East and Western financial markets.
284
 In due 
course, Beirut became a regional seat for European consuls and concessionary offices, 
and an influential cultural and educational centre where many American, British and 
French schools and universities were established and are still present today.
285
 In light of 
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all these developments, Beirut was on its way to becoming one of the most attractive and 
prosperous cities in the region.
286
 
 
 
ii. The impact of modernisation on the city and its citizens 
 
As previously mentioned, Beirut witnessed an influx of people from the 
hinterlands. No sooner had they arrived, the city started to spread beyond its old city 
walls. The new arrivals included people of different socio-economic classes, amongst 
them many bourgeoisie families from Greater Syria and Palestine who sought to take 
better advantage of the opportunities that were on offer in the city.
287
 Subsequently, this 
influx of bourgeoisie families contributed towards the emergence and expansion of a 
class of businessmen, entrepreneurs and merchants. It was during this period that the 
urban spill beyond the walls of the old city began to assume the contours of fairly distinct 
living quarters. Generally, the Christians established residences on the eastern and 
western flanks of the city in places like Saifi, Rmeil, Mina el-Hosn, Achrafiyeh and 
Jietawi. In contrast, Muslims settled southwards in the direction of Bachoura, Mazraa, 
Basta and Moussaytbeh (see Figures 12 and 13). 
 
It was also during these years, when Beirut’s population was growing, that the 
city’s inhabitants became increasingly concerned about what was being done to the urban 
spaces around them. It started when the Ottoman authorities sought to regularise public 
spaces in the city, as part of their modernising schemes. The proposed projects aroused 
considerable opposition by local inhabitants against the Ottoman authorities. In one 
famous incident, locals were shocked to learn about the demolition of a large number of 
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Figure 12 – A view of Mina el-Hosn. Source: Khalaf and Khoury, (Eds.), Recovering 
Beirut: Urban Design and Post-War Reconstruction, p.266. 
 
Figure 13 – A view of Basta. Source: Khalaf and Khoury, (Eds.), Recovering Beirut: 
Urban Design and Post-War Reconstruction, p.266. 
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houses to make way for two aligned streets. One of these alignments was meant to 
connect the port with the bazaars, whilst, the other was intended to connect Sahat al-Burj 
to Bab Idriss, effectively piercing through Souk al-Fashkha, Souk al-Tawileh and Souk 
al-Jamil.
288
 Serious efforts were made by the Beirut municipality to distribute 
compensations to everyone who would be affected by the demolitions; but to no avail and 
the opposition continued. However, the plan was approved and pushed through by the 
authorities.
289
 At this stage, not everyone was opposed to the modernising schemes of the 
Ottoman authorities. To the delight of some merchants, two luxury shops were opened 
near the intersection of the new streets in Souk al-Tawileh, Souk al-Fashkha and Souk al-
Jamil.
290
 Also, when the Ottoman authorities launched the construction of the ‘Orosdi 
Bek Department Store’ (see Figure 14), many in the upper echelons of Beiruti society – 
particularly from the class of businessmen, entrepreneurs and merchants – were grateful 
to the Ottoman authorities.
291
 At this point, the most successful businessmen, 
entrepreneurs and merchants joined in and began investing their wealth in Beirut’s trade 
and financial sectors. But they also invested in the city’s real estate sector.292 
 
This was firstly reflected by the countless mansions they constructed throughout the 
city (see Figures 15 and 16). The most elaborate homes built include the Ayyas, Beyhum, 
Bustros, Daouk, Salam, and Sursock Palaces. Of these mansions, the Ayyas Palace 
warrants important consideration. This palace was initially built by the Ayyas family, but 
it was later inherited by the Nsouli family when Anis Nsouli married Mariam Ayyas. 
During the reconstruction process, the Ayyas Palace was taken by Solidere and sold to 
the Hariri family (who renovated it and renamed it ‘Beit al-Wasat’, or ‘Home of the City 
Centre’).293 Today, Mohammed Anis Nsouli (son of Anis and Mariam Nsouli) is fighting 
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Figure 15 – Mansions and Palaces of the bourgeoisie families. Source: Khalaf, Heart of 
Beirut: Reclaiming the Bourj, p.53. 
 
Figure 14 – Image of the Orosdi Bek Department Store after completion in 1894. Source: 
Khalaf, Heart of Beirut: Reclaiming the Bourj, p.71. 
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a legal case against Solidere to retrieve what he believes is rightfully his.
294
 Other than 
palaces, the wealthier or more ‘aristocratic’ families acquired and developed a broad 
swath of properties throughout the city. Consequently, the aswaq were named after them. 
The most significant aswaq included Souk Ayyas, Souk Bustros, and Souk Sursock, to 
name but a few.
295
 Streets, as well, acquired the names of notables: for example, Omar 
Daouk Street and Abdallah Beyhum Street. Over the years, these properties were either 
divided amongst family members through inheritance or sold off to new families, such as 
the Khoury, Tarraf and Tuwayni families. After Solidere was created, many of their 
descendants lost their rights to these properties. One of those descendants interviewed for 
this thesis laments about how he and his family felt when they lost their rights:  
 
“I saw my mother cry twice in my life. Firstly when my father died, and 
secondly when our house and properties were taken away from us. So she 
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Figure 16 – View of the Sursock Palace. Source: Khalaf and Khoury, (Eds.), Recovering 
Beirut: Urban Design and Post-War Reconstruction, p.267. 
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went to Solidere to defend her rights. They told her, ‘the game of the mighty, 
you little ones cannot play it’. This was the embodiment of the how the heart 
of this mellenia old city was taken away from its people who built it that is 
given to a soulless company that is creating a ‘Disney land’ to be given to a 
population that does not include me.”296 
 
With such historically-entrenched interests, it is therefore not surprising to find many 
descendants of these pre-civil war bourgeoisie families opposing the Solidere project in 
recent years. Notably, they include: Lady Cochrane Sursock, founder of the Association 
for the Protection of the Natural Sites and Ancient Buildings (APSAD); Omar Daouk, 
head of the Association of Owners of Rights in the Beirut Central District (AORBCD); 
Tammam Salam, director of the Maqasid Foundation; Fadi Khoury, owner of the St. 
Georges Hotel and Yacht Club; Giorgio Tarraf, spokesperson for Save Beirut Heritage 
(SBH); and Ghassan Tuwayni, publisher and editor-in-chief of An-Nahar Daily 
Newspaper. Some of these names and the groups/institutions they represent will be 
mentioned again in subsequent chapters.  
 
 
iii. The emergence of ‘post-modern’ perspectives 
 
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in September 1918, a French Mandate 
was established in the Eastern Mediterranean under which several states were created in 
what was once Greater Syria. With Beirut as its capital, Lebanon was to be one of these 
states. Therefore, Beirut began to assume a new role and identity as a capital city. This 
new state was led by members of some of the aforementioned families; such as Alfred 
Sursock, Salim Salam, Omar Daouk and Ahmad Beyhum. Moreover, they represented a 
combination of politics and business interests. For example, Salim Salam was a 
prominent politician under both Ottoman and French rule, as well as a leading import-
export businessman.
297
 His son, Saeb Salam, would later become a six-time prime 
minister and build close relations with Rafiq Hariri in the 1980s (more details in Chapter 
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5). The fusion of ‘the political’ and ‘the economic’ would remain a feature of the political 
system following independence. 
 
The leaders of Lebanon – and their descendants – would come to be known as 
‘zu’ama’ (singular: ‘za’im’).298 The zu’ama came to represent the interests of Lebanon’s 
commercial-financial bourgeoisie (Christians and Muslims alike). Their aim was to 
establish a political economy that would generate substantial rents in trade and finance. 
This would be achieved through a structure characterised by the rotation of members of 
these families between various economic sectors and the highest political offices. This 
bore greater economic benefits than sectarian conflict. In the first few decades following 
independence as well, Lebanon’s economy generated substantial rents that were 
appropriated by this cross-confessional bourgeois alliance. Of course, distributing these 
rents amongst themselves was not easy; especially in a country divided along sectarian 
lines. But due to the zu’ama’s ability to maintain a sectarian-based consociational 
democracy – as well as a ‘laissez-faire’ (let be) economy whereby Lebanon would act as 
a trade and financial intermediary between the Arab East and Western markets – the new 
‘Merchant Republic’ was able to prosper.299  
 
Because of the events of the First World War, many of the Ottoman projects were 
never completed. However, modernising the city remained a pressing issue because 
Beirut had acquired a new role and status as the capital of a new state. In this context, 
French planners picked up where the Ottomans left off. One famous example was the 
long-delayed project of modernising the aswaq.
300
 French urban planners were brought to 
Beirut, and used to produce studies that would transform the city into an ideal-type 
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 A za’im referred to a male political leader and holder of a fief or feudal office who exercises power in 
both urban and rural areas. Today, most of the zu’ama are regarded as feudal or spiritual leaders of their 
respective religious sects. 
299
 A laissez-faire economy refers to a system unhindered by the restrictions of government. Between 1948 
and 1952, the Lebanese economy was completely liberalised and officials established a laissez-faire 
programme involving the abolition of all laws constraining the market. For details on this system in the 
Lebanese context, see: Toufic Gaspard, A Political Economy of Lebanon 1948-2002: The Limits of Laissez-
faire, (Leiden: Brill., 2004). 
300
 See: Khalaf, Heart of Beirut: Reclaiming the Bourj, p.61. 
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European city (see Figure 17).
301
 By virtue of what Beirut apparently ‘lacked’, the French 
planners deployed an ‘Orientalist scheme’ that resulted in changes in urban forms, public 
spaces, architecture, physical patterns, and functions of buildings in the city.
302
 Most 
particularly, the area near the port was redesigned on an orthogonal grid; streets were 
renamed after Allenby, Foch and Weygand – the victorious generals of the First World 
War; national institutions such as the Municipality or the Parliament were built according 
to a new ‘Levantine’ architecture that more closely resembled a ‘south of France 
vernacular’ than a ‘true Arab oriental style’; and the ‘Place d’Etoile’ (along with a clock 
tower at its centre) was superimposed on the old medieval urban fabric as a micro-
imitation of its Parisian namesake (see Figures 18 to 20).
303
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 The eminent French urban historian André Raymond goes as far as to argue that “this tendency was all 
the more natural as French colonization willingly represented itself as reestablishing the Roman ‘imperium’ 
after an interval of some fifteen centuries”. Quoted in: Hanssen, ‘“Your Beirut Is on My Desk” 
Ottomanizing Beirut under Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909)’, p.41. 
302
 The profound physical transformation of Beirut during this period, with its ideational antecedent in the 
colonial notions of the Oriental city, triumphantly monopolised the definition of modernity to create a 
distinction between French rule and the previous rule of the backward Ottomans. See: ibid. 
303
 The Place d’Etoile and the clock tower at its centre symbolised, maybe most persuasively, colonial 
representation of the rupture between Ottoman and French rule. For details, see: Ghorayeb, ‘L’urbanisme 
de la Ville de Beyrouth sous le Mandat Francais’, pp.297-309. 
Figure 17 – A French proposal for the city centre. Source: Khalaf and Khoury, (Eds.), 
Recovering Beirut: Urban Design and Post-War Reconstruction, p.277. 
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Figure 18 – Demolition works in the city centre. Source: Khalaf and Khoury, (Eds.), 
Recovering Beirut: Urban Design and Post-War Reconstruction, p.277. 
 
Figure 19 – View of Martyrs’ Square. Source: Khalaf and Khoury, (Eds.), Recovering 
Beirut: Urban Design and Post-War Reconstruction, p.278. 
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Figure 20 – French construction of Allenby, Foch and Weygand streets (1910s-1930s). 
On the bottom left is an image of the Place d’Etoile. Source: Khalaf, Heart of Beirut: 
Reclaiming the Bourj, p.77. 
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Towards the end of the French Mandate (and in the first few years after Lebanon 
gained full independence), serious planning efforts were launched to tame the urban spill 
beyond the ‘old city’ of Beirut (what is today known as Downtown Beirut). Most notably, 
they included the ‘Danger Plan’ (submitted by the French consulting firm of Frères 
Danger in 1932), the ‘Ecochard Plan’ (submitted by prominent French planner Michel 
Ecochard in 1943), and the ‘Egli Plan’ (submitted by Swiss architect and urban planner 
Ernst Egli in 1950).
304
 See Figure 21 for an illustration of one of the proposals put 
forward by the French during the Mandate period. Together, these plans represented the 
first attempts at comprehensive planning in Beirut. They were important because they 
went beyond the pre-First World War Ottoman practice of urban planning, by including 
more specific details regarding matters such as zoning and land-use, creating new centres 
and transportation hubs, determining the major axes of circulation, regulating the 
densities and heights of buildings, and providing the necessary urban utilities, amongst 
other things. In the absence of proper planning legislation, however, none of these plans 
were ever implemented (it was not until the 1960s that Lebanon witnessed the birth of its 
first urban planning legislation).
305
 Amidst this lack of legislation, the economic, political 
and social upheavals of the 1930s, ‘40s and ‘50s acted as an excuse for the laissez-faire 
policies of the public authorities to continue unabated.
306
 Even so, there was a growing 
belief in some elite circles that this situation was unsustainable, and that a comprehensive 
planning policy that would control the chaotic urban growth had to be created. 
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 For details on the different plans, see: Hashim Sarkis, ‘A Vital Void: Reconstructions of Downtown 
Beirut’, in Lawrence J. Vale and Thomas J. Campanella, (Eds.), Resilient City: How Modern Cities 
Recover from Disaster, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.289; Marlène Ghorayeb, ‘The Work 
and Influence of Michel Ecochard in Lebanon’, in Peter G. Rowe and Hashim Sarkis, (Eds.), Projecting 
Beirut: Episodes in the Construction and the Reconstruction of the City, (Munich: Prestel Verlag, 1998), 
pp.106-121; and parts of: Samir Khalaf and Philip S. Khoury, (Eds.), Recovering Beirut: Urban Design and 
Post-War Reconstruction, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998). 
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 For further details, see: Jad Tabet, ‘Towards a Master Plan for Post-War Lebanon’, in Samir Khalaf and 
Philip S. Khoury, (Eds.), Recovering Beirut: Urban Design and Post-War Reconstruction, (Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 1998), pp.84-85. 
306
 The continuation of a laissez-faire economy came in the midst of several fundamental pressures 
affecting the country at the time. Most particularly, the challenges posed on the country as soon as it 
emerged from the as an independent state after the Second World War. But despite these challenges, the 
Lebanese authorities chose to maintain a laissez-faire economy, not only as a long-term policy, but also as a 
national raison d'être. For further details, see: Gaspard, A Political Economy of Lebanon 1948-2002: The 
Limits of Laissez-faire, pp.54-55. 
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As French planners got busy implementing their ‘modern’ designs, the city saw the 
perpetuation of colonial style and compositions in architecture.
307
 Reacting against the 
formalism of this approach, some local architects sought to create an alternative, ‘post-
modern’ style that better reflected local values and tradition. These efforts converged 
with the post-modern efforts of architects in other developing countries who described 
modern architecture as a violent process whereby ‘modern patterns’ created in the 
Western industrialised countries were being imported and imposed – sometimes, by force 
– on their native cultures. Amongst those pioneers, one name worth mentioning is that of 
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 See: Jad Tabet, ‘From Colonial Style to Regional Revitalism: Modern Architecture in Lebanon and the 
Problem of Cultural Identity’, in Peter G. Rowe and Hashim Sarkis, (Eds.), Projecting Beirut: Episodes in 
the Construction and the Reconstruction of the City, (Munich: Prestel Verlag, 1998), p.84.  
Figure 21 – The Danger Plan (1932). Source: Gavin and Maluf, Beirut Reborn: The 
Restoration and Development of the Central District, p.47. 
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Antoine Tabet, the son of a worker at Veuve Guérin silk factory in Krayeh, Mount 
Lebanon. After moving to Beirut, he co-designed, with his French colleagues at ‘Société 
Méditerranéenne des Grands Hotels’, the St. Georges Hotel and Yacht Club on the 
waterfront district of Downtown Beirut (see Figure 22).
308
 As mentioned in the previous 
subsection, the owner of the St. Georges Hotel is one of the main opponents of the 
Solidere project today. Importantly, Antoine Tabet is the father of architect Jad Tabet, 
who originally criticised the preliminary master plan for the reconstruction of Downtown 
Beirut, only to later become the leading planner for Solidere’s aswaq project.309 More 
details on Jad Tabet’s involvement will be provided in Chapter 5.  
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 For details on the structure of the building and the progressive design behind it, see: ibid, pp.85-86. 
309
 Much of the information in this paragraph obtained from: Interview with Jad Tabet held on 28 
September 2013 in Paris. 
Figure 22 – Aerial view of St. Georges Hotel and Yacht Club (1931). Source: Tabet, 
‘From Colonial Style to Regional Revitalism: Modern Architecture in Lebanon and the 
Problem of Cultural Identity’, p.87. 
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In the first few decades following Lebanese independence in 1943, dozens of 
planning projects were commissioned to this new generation of Lebanese architects, 
some of whom had studied abroad, and were already acquainted with Europe’s post-
World War II experiences of urban planning.
310
 They included: Assem Salam, who 
studied in London and witnessed the birth of the English new towns movement; Henri 
Eddeh, who, after receiving a degree in civil engineering, worked in France during the 
reconstruction period there; and Pierre el-Khoury, who graduated from the École des 
Beaux-Arts in Paris.
311
 These individuals are worth mentioning because of their activism 
against the Solidere project in later years. Assem Salam, for example, was also staunch 
critic of the preliminary plan for the city centre, and would later become a leader of the 
protests against Solidere’s final master plan.312 He was also a close friend of Antoine and 
Jad Tabet, and the cousin of Tammam Salam (mentioned in the previous subsection).
313
 
By contrast, Henri Eddeh was the main architect recruited in 1991 by a Lebanese-
Jordanian consulting firm called Dar Al-Handasah to draw up a master plan, often 
referred to as the ‘Dar Al-Handasah (Eddeh) Plan’, for Downtown Beirut. It was not until 
Rafiq Hariri asked for the floor-area-ratio (FAR) factor in the downtown area to be raised 
Eddeh too became a critic of the Solidere project.
314
 
 
 
II. The Keynesian attempts to address Beirut’s urban issues 
 
Several attempts were made to address Beirut’s urban issues via Keynesian 
regulations. The first of these attempts were made following the conclusion of the first 
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 See: Tabet, ‘From Colonial Style to Regional Revitalism: Modern Architecture in Lebanon and the 
Problem of Cultural Identity’, pp.83-105. See also: Marwan Ghandour, ‘Instituting Exclusiveness: Modern 
Lebanese Architects and their Society’, in, Proceedings of the Association of Collegiate Schools of 
Architecture International Conference: Architecture, Culture, and the challenges of Globalization, Havana 
June 21-24, 2002, (Washington DC: ACSA Press, 2003), pp.363-367. 
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 For more details on all of the individuals mentioned above, see: Tabet, ‘From Colonial Style to Regional 
Revitalism: Modern Architecture in Lebanon and the Problem of Cultural Identity’, pp.83-105.  
312
 Assem Salam was elected as president of the Order of Engineers and Architects in 1996 over the 
candidate supported by Rafiq Hariri at the time. His election was seen as a sign of discontent within the 
profession against Solidere’s proposals. Interview with Assem Salam held on 24 July 2012 in Beirut. 
313
 Interview with Jad Tabet held on 28 September 2013 in Paris. 
314
 See Eddeh’s revelations in the last chapter of his book: Henri Eddeh, Al-Mal in Hakam [Money if it 
ruled], (Beirut: Sharikat Matbou’at lil Tawzee’ wal Nashr, 1999). 
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civil war (the first civil war being a brief one that occurred in 1958). But as Lebanon 
descended again into civil fighting in 1975, new elites emerged to take control of the 
country and affirm their interests. Importantly, competition amongst them was visibly 
displayed in the urban spaces of Beirut. These elites included militia leaders (and the 
businessmen allied to them), a generation of technocrats that carried a Shihabist tradition, 
and most significantly, new contractors who carried with them a neoliberal logic. Thus, 
the neoliberal urban developments that emerged in the post-civil war era have to be 
placed in the context of Lebanon’s descent into two civil wars and the arrival of new 
types of elites; most particularly, those that carried with them a neoliberal logic. Many of 
the names that have been mentioned in this section were chosen on the basis of their close 
association to the Solidere project.  
 
 
i. Keynesianism and its effects on urbanism 
 
Following independence, people migrated to Beirut in search of better access to 
educational and health facilities.
315
 This was especially the case for the poorer segments 
of society who could not afford to travel regularly to the capital. This rural-to-urban 
migration had a significant impact on the urban character of Beirut, which was 
overwhelmed by the influx of rural migrants. The continuous migration did not only 
make Beirut a congested city, but it also became surrounded with ‘belts of misery’ – 
miserable slums full of rural migrants desperately looking for jobs and a better life.
316
 See 
Figure 23 for a map of Beirut illustrating where many of these migrants chose to settle. 
Ultimately, the population of Beirut and its suburbs grew from a mere 250,000 in the 
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 Salim Nasr offers a very detailed account on the levels of migration to the cities. According to Nasr, by 
the 1960s, nearly one-fifth of the rural population had migrated to the towns, mostly to Beirut and its 
suburbs. More particularly, nearly a third of southern Lebanon had migrated to Beirut and its suburbs. 
Obviously, this migration was heightened by the intensive Israeli bombings of the south throughout the 
subsequent years. By 1975, 40 percent of Lebanon’s entire population, including 50 percent of the rural 
population of the Beka’a and 65 percent of that of south Lebanon had migrated to Beirut. For further 
details, see: Salim Nasr, ‘Backdrop to Civil War: The Crisis of Lebanese Capitalism’, MERIP Reports, 73, 
(1978), pp.3-13. 
316
 The unpredictable and unplanned expansion of Beirut spread along the main arteries, was swallowed up 
the beaches and crawled up the scenic mountain slopes. For details, see: Tabet, ‘Towards a Master Plan for 
Post-War Lebanon’, p.85. 
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Figure 23 – Map illustrating the location of the historic city centre and the ‘belts of 
misery’ that emerged in the pre-civil war era. Source: Maha Yahya, ‘Reconstituting 
Space: The Aberration of the Urban in Beirut’, in Samir Khalaf and Philip S. Khoury, 
(Eds.), Recovering Beirut: Urban Design and Post-War Reconstruction, (Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 1998), p.138. 
144 
 
early 1950s to a staggering 1.4 million in 1975.
317
 The unprecedented expansion of Beirut 
revealed great inequalities in living conditions; especially between Beirut and the 
peripheral regions.
318
  
  
During the first two presidential regimes – specifically, those of Khoury and 
Chamoun – the administration was not so much concerned with reducing the regional 
inequalities. Instead, they were more preoccupied with pushing forward laissez-faire 
policies that would allow the zu’ama – who represented the interests of Lebanon’s 
commercial-financial bourgeoisie – to appropriate rent from the trade and financial 
sectors. It was not until Fuad Shihab became the president in 1958 that attempts were 
made to address the disequilibrium between Beirut and its peripheries. Shihab had the 
most unusual background of any Lebanese head of state. He grew up in the most humble 
circumstances: Fuad’s father had disappeared en route to America in 1907, where he had 
hoped to make money to support his almost destitute family. But his great-grandfather, 
Hasan Shihab, had been the eldest brother of Emir Bashir Shihab II. He was thus, an heir 
of the princely house of Shihab. Importantly, Fuad Shihab was a devout Maronite 
Christian, but his Shihab line had Islamic antecedents. All in all, Shihab’s pride in his 
family history, mixed with his family’s humble beginnings, gave him a deep sense of 
responsibility for rehabilitating Lebanon during his ‘watch’.319 
 
Under the presidential regime of Fuad Shihab, several members of the new 
generation of Lebanese architects – mentioned in the previous section – were 
commissioned by the public authorities to help in addressing the disequilibrium between 
Beirut and its peripheries. Of this new generation of architects, one finds that Henri 
Eddeh and Pierre el-Khoury had prepared master plans for Baalbeck and Tyre 
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 These figures were obtained from: Fuad Khuri, ‘The Social Dynamics of the 1975-1977 War in 
Lebanon’, Armed Forces & Society, 7(3), (1981), p.390. 
318
 Even though some wealth did radiate to other parts of the country, it became less pronounced the further 
away a region was from Beirut. Numerous studies can be used to confirm this regional inequality. For one 
example, see: Charles Churchill, ‘Village Life of the Central Beqa’’, Middle East Economic Papers, 
Economic Research Institute, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon (1959), pp.5-6, referenced 
in: Samar Makdisi, The Lessons of Lebanon: The Economics of War and Development, (London: I.B. 
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 The details on Fuad Shihab’s social and political background were obtained from the following source: 
William Harris, Lebanon: A History, 600-2011, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.212-213. 
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respectively.
320
 Many of these architects were later appointed to important positions as 
well.
321
 Their appointments were part of a Keynesian reform process launched by 
President Shihab (1958-1964) – and continued by his successor Charles Helou (1964-
1970) – that involved replacing the zu’ama – who represented the interests of Lebanon’s 
commercial-financial bourgeoisie – with ‘technocrats’ drawn from social progressive 
members of the elite and the middle class.
322
 One name that stands above the rest is Henri 
Eddeh, who would be appointed as president of the Order of Engineers and Architects in 
1961. His performance during his tenure was sufficient to throw him into the political 
realm: in 1970, he was appointed as Minister of Public Works and Transport.
323
  
 
Despite their significance, the Keynesian reforms were very limited in scope as 
they only touched the ‘administrative system’: they did not go as far as overhauling the 
‘political system’, which was still dominated by the zu’ama.324 As a result, the Shihabist 
period was short-lived: the Shihabists lost the presidency when Sleiman Franjieh – a 
za’im and preferred candidate of the zu’ama – defeated Shihabist candidate Elias Sarkis 
in a parliamentary vote to become head of state in 1970.
325
 However, the technocrats still 
operating in a Shihabist tradition remained a hugely important type of elite in Lebanon 
during civil war and post-civil war era. They included President Elias Sarkis (1976-
1982), Prime Minister Salim el-Hoss (1976-1980, 1987-1989, 1989-1990, 1998-2000), 
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 Out of the numerous urban planning projects that were prepared, and that covered major Lebanese cities 
(such as, Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli) and other smaller towns, the two plans (one for Baalbeck and one for 
Tyre), seem to be most representative of the atmosphere at the time. This is according to: Tabet, ‘From 
Colonial Style to Regional Revitalism: Modern Architecture in Lebanon and the Problem of Cultural 
Identity’, pp.94-95. 
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 See: Eric Verdeil, 'State development policy and specialised engineers: The case of urban planners in 
postwar Lebanon', Savoir Travail Société / Knowledge Work Society, 5(1), (2008), pp.29-51. 
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 For a general overview of the administrative reform plans during the Chehab presidential regime, see: 
Kamal Salibi, ‘Lebanon under Fuad Chehab 1958-1964’, Middle Eastern Studies, 2(3), (1966), pp.211-227. 
For details on the campaign to replace the zu’ama – who represented the interests of Lebanon’s 
commercial-financial bourgeoisie – with ‘technocrats’, see: Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern 
Lebanon, (London: Pluto, 2007), pp.139-156. 
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 Eddeh was renowned for being one of the country’s most daring and transparent ministers in Lebanese 
history. In one incident, his vocal stances led President Sleiman Franjieh, a za’im himself, to have Eddeh 
sacked from the cabinet that was at the time headed by Prime Minister Saeb Salam, who described Eddeh 
as a “mutineer, who creates lots of problems”. This information is according to the following article: The 
Daily Star, ‘Vetern politician Henri Eddeh dies’, The Daily Star, 04 February 2010. 
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 For further details on the failure of these reforms, see: Rachela Tonta, ‘Why the Chehabist State Failed – 
the State in Society Approach’, Hempispheres: Studies on Cultures and Societies, 24, (2009), pp.91-104. 
325
 See: Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, p.155.  
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and Finance Minister Georges Corm (1998-2000). The latter two individuals are 
particularly important for the analysis in this thesis because they replaced Rafiq Hariri 
and his protégés. But as will be shown in Chapter 6, this led to confrontations between 
them and Rafiq Hariri, who considered them a threat to the Solidere project and the rent-
creating and -extracting mechanisms he had built around it.  
 
In urban terms, though, the Shihabist period is marked by two important landmarks. 
Firstly, there was the preparation of the legislation necessary for urban planning. This 
was mentioned in the previous section as the birth of the country’s ‘first urban planning 
legislation’. Adopted in 1963, all matters related to urban planning were to be 
concentrated in one single authority: the Directorate-General of Town and Country 
Planning. General urban plans, regional plans, specific regulations for the acquisition of 
land for public use, and the constitution of public-private real estate companies – all these 
were tools that were introduced for the first time in Lebanon’s modern history.326 
Secondly, there was the drawing up and approval of an urban plan for the development of 
‘Greater Beirut’; a metropolis that would extend from Jounieh in the north to Naameh in 
the south. In 1964, the ‘Plan Directoire Beyrouth et Ses Banlieux’ was submitted and 
approved (see Figure 24). The idea behind this plan was to create a space outside the 
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 Other than the Directorate-General of Town and Country Planning, the Shihabists established the 
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Figure 24 – Plan Directoire Beyrouth et Ses Banlieux (1963). Source: Khalaf and 
Khoury, (Eds.), Recovering Beirut: Urban Design and Post-War Reconstruction, p.284. 
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already anarchic and crowded urban centre of Beirut that could absorb the rapidly-
growing population in the city.
327
  
 
 
ii. The failure of Keynesian policies and the rise of neoliberal forces 
 
Lebanon’s laissez-faire policies made the country’s economy unique in the Arab 
world. In the two decades following independence – and despite the brief civil war of 
1958 – Lebanon was even hailed as a successful example of a ‘free market’ economy that 
should be replicated across the region.
328
 By this stage, however, a major shift in power 
away from the mercantile class had occurred. In 1962, Yusif Sayigh writes that although, 
“still very influential socially and politically…power is unmistakably passing to financial 
tycoons,” whose interests now included industry, tourism, and most importantly, real 
estate development. He continues by stating that within fourteen years of independence, 
the Lebanese banking sector had become “possibly more powerful… than any other    
sector” in the Lebanese economy. Importantly, though, Sayigh recognises that the owners 
of the major banks and trading houses belonged to individuals who hailed from the same 
bourgeoisie families. For example, the Sursock family, who were large-scale tax farmers 
under the Ottomans, owners of large swaths of land in Beirut, and the dominant force in 
the textile trade, became partners in Banque G. Trad – Credit Lyonnais after 
independence.
329
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Gulf states have been searching for strategic locations in 
the Arab/Middle Eastern region to invest their petrodollars in. An enormous amount of 
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and Politico-economic Power: Globalisation and the Lebanese Civil War’, pp.295-296. 
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petrodollars were entering Lebanese banks and trading houses as early as the 1960s.
330
 
Deposits placed in local banks were channelled into trade and speculative real estate 
investments in Beirut. In turn, other productive sectors, such as agriculture and industry, 
were starved of needed investment.
331
 Through their Keynesian policies, the Shihabists 
tried to establish a ‘new bourgeois faction’ that would weaken the control of bourgeoisie 
families of the banking sector. The Palestinian-born Yusif Baydas was a leading example 
of this faction. Through Intra Bank, he built the most influential business empire in 
Lebanon – the Intra Bank Group. This empire included Middle East Airlines and the 
Beirut port company. Despite Baydas’s successful rise, Intra Bank was structurally weak 
because it financed itself with very short-term deposits, and, it eventually failed in 1966. 
The ‘Intra Bank Crash’ (as it is famously called), was the result of the Lebanese 
government’s unwillingness – prompted by the established bourgeoisie – to keep the 
bank afloat.
332
 Despite the bourgeoisie’s success, their monopoly over the banking sector 
became a source of friction between them and other families who were barred from 
enjoying the volume of petrodollars entering the Lebanese banking system at the time.
333
 
This friction often manifested itself in ideological terms, tinted by the sectarian 
backgrounds of the main protagonists. The main players were: the Lebanese Left, 
consisting primarily of the largely Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) led by 
prominent members of the Junblatt family; the Christian modernist right, led by the 
populist Phalange (Kataeb) Party led by the Maronite Gemayel family; and the 
predominantly Shiite Harakat al-Mahrumin (The Movement of the Deprived), led by 
leading members of the el-Sadr family.  
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In the early 1970s, a spike in oil prices meant that the deposits and assets held by 
banks rapidly increased. Because existing regulations prohibited the formation of new 
banks, the frustration of those outside the alliance of bourgeois families was amplified.
334
 
However, the monopolistic grip which the commercial-financial bourgeoisie once 
enjoyed was loosened by the civil war of 1975 to 1990. The two major forces in the civil 
war were Junblatt’s PSP militia and the Gemayel’s Lebanese Forces (the armed wing of 
the Kataeb Party). El-Sadr’s militia – Amal – did not get involved in the civil war until 
Nabih Berri became its head.
335
 Each militia was funded by rents, either from external 
sources (foreign state support, emigrants’ remittances), or domestic ones (goods, land and 
financial speculation). They did not so much alter the fundamentals of Lebanon’s laissez-
faire economy – for example, a floating exchange rate and free capital movement – but 
the militias’ grip exacerbated the worst excesses of this form of capitalism, which 
resulted in unfettered and predatory financial activities.
336
 Beirut quickly lost its role as a 
trade and finance intermediary between the Arab East and Western markets.
337
 While 
some bourgeois families chose to stay in Lebanon, others simply internationalised their 
operations and left the country altogether. The weakening control of the commercial-
financial bourgeoisie was visibly demonstrated in 1976: Elias Sarkis – a Shihabist – was 
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elected as the country’s new president. The newly-elected president – and his prime 
minister, Salim el-Hoss – recognised the link between reconstruction and state building. 
This Keynesian spirit was what led to the creation of the Council for Development and 
Reconstruction (CDR) in 1977. But the two men also recognised the need to address the 
social grievances caused by the concentration of wealth in the hands of Lebanon’s 
commercial-financial bourgeoisie. In this regard, they began by passing a number of 
reforms that would open the banking sector to others outside the alliance of bourgeois 
families, while not undermining the sector’s dominant position in the economy.338 The 
most important reform passed was the Free Banking Law of 1977: it relaxed restrictions 
on foreign ownership of bank shares in a bid to attract Gulf-based capital.
339
  
 
But the new reforms that were passed had unintended consequences. To begin with, 
it prompted the militias to scramble for access and control of petrodollar flows. The 
single largest beneficiary of the opening up of the banking sector was the Kataeb Party, 
which established the largest and most organised militia. By 1980, it had solidified its 
grip over Christian East Beirut and the surrounding area of Mount Lebanon through the 
incorporation of rival Christian militias into a unified military wing, the Lebanese Forces, 
under the command of Bashir Gemayel.
340
 Following his assassination in 1982, Bashir’s 
elder brother, Amin, was elected as the country’s new president. Amin used the powers of 
the presidency to colonise existing bodies and institutions (most important of which was 
the newly-organised and well-equipped Lebanese Army), but also, to create new 
institutional nodes that could direct petrodollars towards him and his network of allies. 
One of these new nodes was the Council of Foreign Economic Relations (COFER), 
which enjoyed wide discretion on matters related to trade, tourism and industrial 
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development. According to Najib Hourani, COFER is best described as a ‘super-ministry’ 
because it reported directly to the president.
341
 However, this did not guarantee Kataeb 
control of the flow of petrodollars. To this end, Gemayel developed linkages with 
existing and new businesspeople within the Maronite community. One of these 
businesspeople was Roger Tamraz.
342
 Of course, Gemayel was one of several militia 
leaders seeking to recruit loyal businesspeople into their sectarian-based networks. For 
example, Amal leader Nabih Berri recruited a number of bourgeois families from the 
Shiite population.
343
 But as was explained in Chapter 2, the political ascendancy of these 
businesspeople was blocked by their patron militia leaders, who dominated politics 
within their respective confessional groups. Michel el-Murr – a Greek Orthodox who 
supported Syria’s policy in Lebanon since the mid-1980s – is somewhat an exception. He 
accumulated great wealth as a contractor in West Africa in the 1960s. By the 1990s his 
loyalty to Damascus was rewarded when he became Interior Minister in October 1990. 
He not only controlled security apparatuses and the electoral process, but also used his 
position to protect his quarrying interests.
344
 This goes to show that the Syrian military 
was another possible patron for businesspeople. It is worth mentioning that el-Murr was 
the owner of a half-completed office tower, which sits on the fringes of the area under 
Solidere’s jurisdiction, and which brought him into a confrontation with Rafiq Hariri.345  
 
Yet, the militias were not the only actors to gain access to, and control of, 
petrodollar flows. The new reforms passed by the Shihabists enabled regional networks 
of capitalists to infiltrate and play a role in the Lebanese banking sector. The most 
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significant were those Gulf-based financial networks which were connected to larger 
global networks of power. These were often led by high-profile, transnationally-
connected businesspeople (and/or financial institutions). One of these businesspeople was 
the Saudi-Lebanese billionaire Rafiq Hariri. In 1981, he became involved in the Lebanese 
banking sector when he bought a stake in Groupe Mediterranée, which is a bank holding 
company based in France and Lebanon. Hariri belonged to the ‘new contractor 
bourgeoisie’; a particular group of businesspeople who had grown extremely wealthy in 
the Gulf (and West Africa).
346
 During the civil war, these new contractors returned to 
Lebanon and tried to snatch up contracts at various levels of the Lebanese economy. Of 
course, Rafiq Hariri is the most famous example. Others, however, include Najib Mikati, 
Mohammed Safadi and Issam Fares.
347
 See Figure 28 for some background information 
on these individuals. Like other Lebanese elites, the new contractors are characterised by 
their foreign alliances. The most significant example was Hariri and his strategic alliance 
with the Saudi Royal Family. But Hariri was no exception. Mikati and Fares, for 
example, forged a close relationship with the Syrian leadership.
348
 Other than Michel el-
Murr, though, the Syrian leadership did not rely on businessmen like Mikati and Fares to 
represent their interests in Lebanon. Instead, the Syrian leadership relied more on other 
types of elites – most particularly, militia leaders such as Nabih Berri and Walid Junblatt. 
The characterisation of the new contractors requires one further qualification; namely, a 
more precise description of their relationship with the militia leaders who were running 
Lebanon during the civil war. Other than Fares, all the other businessmen mentioned 
above – specifically, Hariri, Mikati and Safadi – came from the Sunni community (see 
Table 4). Sunni militias were fatally weakened by the Israeli invasion in 1982, which 
expelled their main sponsor, the PLO, from the country. This seems to suggest that Sunni 
new contractors did not have to contend with militias within their own community in the 
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same way that Maronite or Shiite businesspeople had to.
349
 But as will be shown in 
Chapter 5, Hariri built close relations with then-President Amin Gemayel.  
 
 
Names 
Background history in 
the Gulf 
Returning to Lebanon 
Role in Lebanese 
politics 
Rafiq Hariri 
(Sunni) 
Hariri left Lebanon to 
Saudi Arabia in 1964. 
After many years of trying 
to make ends meet, 
Hariri’s big break came 
after he entered a contract 
with a Saudi engineer to 
build a new hotel in the 
Saudi city of Ta'if. This 
gave Hariri access to more 
contracts from the royals. 
He later acquired a French 
company called OGER. 
By the late 1970s, he set up 
the ‘Hariri Foundation’, 
which played a huge role in 
education and healthcare 
projects. By the early 1980s, 
he had acquired ‘Groupe 
Mediterranée’, and began 
snatching up clean-up 
projects in his hometown 
(Sidon) as well as in Beirut. 
Hariri's success in 
achieving the Ta'if 
Peace Accords of 1989 
enabled him to become 
a political leader in the 
post-civil war era. By 
1992, he was appointed 
as prime minister. 
After the 2000 
parliamentary 
elections, he was re-
appointed as prime 
minister. 
Najib and Taha 
Mikati (Sunni) 
The wealth of the Mikati 
brothers comes from the 
Arabian Construction 
Company, which they 
founded in Abu Dhabi in 
1967. In 1982, the two 
brothers co-founded a 
telecommunications 
company called 
Investcom, which 
penetrated emerging 
markets as far afield as 
Liberia, Sudan and 
Yemen. 
By 1983, Taha bought the 
licence for the British Bank 
of Lebanon from the British 
Bank of the Middle East. 
And in 1994, the mobile 
company ‘Cellis’ won a 
‘Build-Operate-Transfer’ 
(BOT) project, of which the 
brothers owned one third of 
the shares. 
Of the two, Najib went 
on to become a 
parliament member, 
minister, and even 
prime minister. He first 
became prime minister 
after Hariri's 
assassination in 2005. 
Mikati became prime 
minister again in 2011. 
 
                                                          
349
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Mohammed 
Safadi (Sunni) 
Safadi migrated to Saudi 
Arabia in 1975 and 
became rich building 
residential compounds for 
companies such as BAE 
Systems (which paid 
commission to Saudi 
princes for the privilege). 
He later moved to London, 
on the behest of Saudi air 
force head Prince Turki 
bin Nasser (son-in-law of 
crown prince Sultan), to 
act as his business 
manager. 
Since moving to London, 
Safadi became involved in a 
British property company 
called STOW Securities. By 
1995, he set up the Safadi 
Group, which enabled 
STOW to expand its 
operations in Lebanon. 
Safadi also set up a charity 
foundation of his own called 
the Safadi Foundation. 
Safadi first entered 
politics in 2000, when 
he won a seat in the 
2000 parliamentary 
elections. In 2005, he 
gained his first 
ministerial post. He has 
been considered for the 
post of prime minister, 
but has not been 
awarded the post yet. 
Issam Fares 
(Greek 
Orthodox) 
Fares started as a merchant 
in Saudi Arabia. He later 
came to own a controlling 
interest in Netherlands-
based Balast Nedam, 
which secured a number of 
lucrative contracts in Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain. He 
later invested in a variety 
of oil, real estate and 
media enterprises through 
a holding company called 
‘Wedge Group’. 
By 1983, he opened ‘Wedge 
Bank’ in Lebanon. He 
employed former President 
Elias Sarkis as the bank's 
chairman. By 1987, he 
started the Issam Fares 
Foundation and launched a 
number of health centres in 
Akkar, and pursued a 
number of cultural and 
social projects in the area. 
Fares was the least 
successful of the names 
mentioned above. From 
2000 to 2004 he served 
as the country's deputy 
prime minister, the 
highest position 
occupied by a Greek 
Orthodox citizen. Other 
than that, he did not 
play much of a political 
role. 
Roger Tamraz 
(Maronite) 
Tamraz formed the First 
Arabian Corporation in 
Paris in 1974 with 
financial backing from a 
small group of Saudi 
investors. They included 
Sheikh Salem bin Laden 
and the Lebanese born 
Ghaith Pharaoun, both of 
whom had developed 
enormous multi-sectoral 
holdings by virtue of their 
connection to Kamal 
Adham (brother-in-law of 
the late King). 
He returned to Lebanon in 
1983, after his friend and 
former assistant, Amine 
Gemayel, became President 
of Lebanon. With Gemayel’s 
support, Tamraz became 
involved with Intra Bank 
Group. By 1988, Tamraz 
had built himself a large 
empire in Lebanon where he 
owned several companies. 
Unlike all of the above, 
Tamraz never played a 
significant political 
role. But he was 
allowed to play the 
leading role in 
managing the levers of 
the Lebanese economy 
when Genmayel was 
president. 
 
 
Table 4 – A list of some of the most prominent businessmen to emerge in Lebanon during 
the civil war year. 
 
156 
 
In short, a whole new group of businesspeople – which were also comprised of new 
contractors – were searching for investment opportunities during the civil war. On many 
occasions, these businesspeople cooperated with one another for contracts. For example, 
in July 1983, Rafiq Hariri partnered up with Joseph Khoury – an engineer from the 
Gemayel family’s hometown of Bikfaya – to implement the president’s ‘pet project’ in 
the northern littoral (Nahr el-Mott) area of Beirut.
350
 On other occasions, though, these 
businesspeople competed with one another. This competition was most visibly 
demonstrated by Roger Tamraz (the most prominent business ally of Amin Gemayel), 
who opposed Gulf interests in Lebanon. As Table 4 suggests, though, Tamraz was not 
opposed to Gulf investment in principle – he himself had forged alliances with Saudi 
investors in the past – but adopting an anti-Gulf sentiment was a convenient way to 
exclude competitors from the Gulf region.
351
 
 
 
iii. Examples of neoliberal urbanism during the civil war 
 
The civil war loosened the grip of the zu’ama over the state. In turn, it provided 
their opponents with an opportunity to infiltrate the main political bodies in order to push 
forward their own interests. During the first lull in the fighting, the newly-elected 
president, Elias Sarkis, and his prime minister, Salim el-Hoss, bolstered the planning arm 
of the state with the creation of the CDR, which was empowered to initiate reconstruction 
projects throughout the country.
352
 The CDR tasked the French public consulting firm, 
‘Atelier parisien d’urbanisme’ (APUR) – along with a group of Lebanese urban planners 
– to prepare a planning study for the city centre. The team developed a scheme called the 
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‘Plan Directeur de Reconstruction du Centre Ville de Beyrouth’ (also known as the 
‘APUR Plan’).353  
 
Interestingly, the APUR Plan – see Figure 25 – had similar goals to those of the 
Solidere project, including: the idea “to speed-up the return of the BCD [Beirut Central 
District] to its traditional role as a unifying ground for Lebanon’s multiconfessional 
communal structure”.354 But the two differed over two main issues: firstly, the matter of 
original property owners; and secondly, that of methods of intervention. The APUR Plan 
was drawn up with the following guidelines: first, to encourage the legal owners and 
occupants of the BCD to return to their previous activities; and second, to create more 
than one real estate company to lead the reconstruction effort.
355
 This plan went partially 
into effect, but was thwarted by renewed fighting in the summer of 1978. Between 1978 
and 1982, Beirut – and the rest of the country, as a matter of fact – witnessed one of the 
most brutal episodes of fighting, which ended with the arrival of a multinational force in 
the autumn of 1982.
356
 
 
The population shifts during this period had far-reaching implications for the urban 
character of Beirut. As the city witnessed some of the most destructive and most violent 
scenes of the war, many people moved out of it to other areas of the country. As a result, 
smaller cities like Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre, Nabatieh and Zahle expanded rapidly and 
acquired a certain degree of autonomy. It was as if the centrality and primacy of 
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Beirut in relation to the rest of the country was dismantled.
357
 But as people moved out of 
the capital, the violence travelled with them. Eventually, fighting blanketed most regions 
of the country and, subsequently, dislocated people in the rural areas migrated back to 
Beirut.
358
 Successive waves of migration back to the country’s capital led to the 
development and expansion of slums and squatter settlements, the growth of which not 
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Figure 25 – The APUR Plan (1977). Source: Gavin and Maluf, Beirut Reborn: The 
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only generated havoc in Beirut, but also led to the spatial and physical degeneration of 
many of the city’s streets and neighbourhoods. 
   
The scale and extent of slums and squatter settlements led to the emergence of an 
informal sector that could not cope with the growing number of unemployed migrants; 
especially amongst the youth. The development of an informal sector was particularly 
noticeable in West Beirut, where the once cosmopolitan and fashionable Hamra Street 
degenerated into a popular souk.
359
 In such a chaotic environment, thousands of 
apartments and houses were illegally occupied, either after owners had been violently 
expelled or when displaced persons squatted in vacant buildings (see Figure 26).
360
 As 
the war dragged on, the demand for ‘safe areas’ increased. Due to the lack of space in 
Beirut, people began to exploit land outside the city; particularly along the northern coast, 
in the hills to the East, and along the southern plains. The insecurity and uncertainty of 
Lebanon’s political future intensified illegal or unpermitted land occupation and 
construction in these areas. This was particularly the case in the southern plains, where 
thousands of mostly Shiite refugees escaping Israeli hostilities in the South occupied the 
land there.
361
 Importantly, this excessive exploitation of real estate led to the creation of 
unsightly ribbons of developments; most notably, along Beirut’s coastline.362  
 
In this regard, wartime constituted an exceptional period that allowed displaced 
people to freely implement private initiatives in the domain of land and real estate 
dealing. Thousands of land transactions took place without registration and without 
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Figure 26 – A residential building in Hamra taken over by squatters. Source: Yahya, 
‘Reconstituting Space: The Aberration of the Urban in Beirut’, p.145. 
161 
 
payment of legal taxes (although hefty informal ‘taxes’ were paid to the de facto militia 
forces).
363
 The scramble for land was not only limited to the displaced people searching 
for safety, but also included militias who strove to secure and enlarge their territorial, and 
hence, economic power. From at least the early 1980s onwards, a number of 
businesspeople – some of whom carried with them a neoliberal logic – showed an interest 
in creating and extracting rents by acquiring and developing land in Beirut. With the 
agreement of the local militias – and often, with their financial support – a number of 
speculative  projects, including coastal land reclamations, marinas, high-rise luxury 
hotels, gated communities, and shopping malls were launched.
364
 Some of these projects, 
such as the many new shopping centres that were opening up in the suburbs in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, were funded by Lebanese businessmen working in association 
with Gulf investors, as well as new contractors who had grown wealthy in the Gulf.
365
  
 
After the Israeli invasion of 1982, a second lull in the fighting emerged, and an 
attempt was made to resolve the unprecedented increase in illegal construction and 
unregulated growth of the capital city. Under the leadership of a newly-elected president, 
Amin Gemayel, the CDR appointed a Lebanese team – with the participation of French 
experts from the ‘Institut d’amenagement et d’urbanisme de la region Ile-d-France’ 
(IAURIF) – to draw up a master plan that would solve the congestion and uncontrolled 
urban sprawl in Greater Beirut. The hope, at the time, was that it would provide new 
directions for Greater Beirut to expand as a city. Despite the resumption of fighting in the 
summer of 1983 – and again in February 1984) – the team of planners continued their 
work. This was a bold and courageous move, especially given the intensity and ferocity 
of the fighting at the time. By 1986, the team of planners finalised a master plan that 
came to be known as ‘Le schéma directeur de la région métropolitaine de Beyrouth’ (this 
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plan is sometimes referred to as the ‘SDRMB Plan’, but is more commonly known as the 
‘IAURIF Plan’). See Figure 27 for an illustration of the IAURIF Plan and its main 
characteristics.
366
 Unfortunately, the IAURIF Plan was never officially approved for 
implementation.
367
 But to the team’s credit, it is still considered the cornerstone of 
general evaluations and guidance on prevailing conditions in Greater Beirut today.
368
  
 
Between 1983 and 1986, though, Gemayel used his title as president to secure and 
enlarge his own territorial foothold. Two areas Gemayel was scrambling for control over 
– other than the in the northern littoral (Nahr el-Mott) area – were the city centre and the 
Khaldeh, Hazmieh and Laylaki districts of the southern suburbs. In the southern suburbs, 
a proposal was put forward that involved demolishing the ‘informal’ and ‘illegal’ housing 
in the area. But it appears that this was a cover to tear down the Palestinian refugee 
camps and squatter settlements consisting of mostly Shiite inhabitants. Undoubtedly, this 
caused a lot of opposition; especially amongst Gemayel’s rivals in the Amal militia. 
Amal leader Nabih Berri interpreted the proposal as a ‘resettlement plan’ by the Maronite 
president to weaken Amal’s influence in the Shiite area. As early as October 1982, the 
Lebanese Army, which was controlled by the president, was sent in to begin demolitions. 
In the Laylaki district, opposition against the demolitions grew into a full-blown uprising. 
By February 1984, the uprising escalated into a war that plunged the city into renewed 
chaos between the then President Amin Gemayel and Berri’s Amal militia.369  
                                                          
366
 One of the main aspects of the plan proposed a new pattern of centrality based on a succession of growth 
poles as opposed to the traditional model of a single historical centre. Importantly, it strove to introduce a 
hierarchy of centres throughout the city (to include its suburbs as well). It introduced four main regional 
centres, to include Nahr el Mott in the north, Hazmieh in the centre, Laylaki in the southern suburbs, and 
Khaldeh further south next to the airport. For further details, see: Mission Franco-Libanaise d’Etudes et 
d’Aménagement, Schema Directeur de la Région Metropolitaine de Beyrouth, (Beirut: CDR/DGU 
République Libanaise, 1986). See also: Nabil Beyhum, ‘Petit Manuel de la reconstruction de Beyrouth’, in 
May Davie (Ed.), Beyrouth: Regards croisés, (Tours: URBAMA, 1997), pp.253-272; Nabil Beyhum, ‘The 
Crisis of Urban Culture: The Three Reconstruction Plans for Beirut’, Beirut Review, 4, (1992), pp.112-114. 
367
 Later, in the early 1990s, it was heavily debated during the beginning of the reconstruction process. But 
it still did not receive official approval. See: Verdeil, ‘Methodological and Political Issues in the Lebanese 
Planning Experiences’, p.20. 
368
 This is according to: Salam, ‘The Role of Government in Urban Planning’, p.130. 
369
 For further details, see: Joe Nasr and Eric Verdeil, 'The reconstructions of Beirut', in Salma Khadra 
Jayyusi, Renata Holod, Attilio Petruccioli, and André Raymond, The city in the Islamic world, (Leiden: 
Brill., 2008), pp.1,124-1,127.  
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Figure 27 – The IAURIF Plan (1986). Source: Gavin and Maluf, Beirut Reborn: The 
Restoration and Development of the Central District, p.48.  
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Indeed, the ‘bulldozing mentality’ adopted by the Lebanese Army in the southern 
suburbs of Beirut raised fears that the city centre would be sanctioned for ruthless 
bludgeoning as well. The prospects of this happening provoked a public debate amongst 
various actors involved in the urban scene. This public debate was symbolised by a 
symposium organised by the American University of Beirut (AUB) between the 17
th
 and 
21
st
 of January 1983.
370
 Importantly, the symposium was held under the auspices of 
architect Pierre el-Khoury (mentioned previously in this chapter), who at that point in 
time was the Minister of Public Works. Unfortunately, the public debate failed to stop 
demolitions from taking place in Downtown Beirut. Between 1983 and 1986, some of the 
most significant surviving buildings and structures were demolished. This included wide 
parts of Souk Nourieh and Souk Sursock near Martyrs’ Square, and much of the Saifi 
area (which had escaped the Ottoman destructions and French layouts). Many of these 
demolitions were carried out with “no authorization or approval—or interference—of any 
official or government institution”.371  
 
But this time, the demolitions were carried out by a private consulting firm which 
was studying the downtown area. This firm was called OGER Liban, which was owned 
by Rafiq Hariri. Earlier in this chapter, it was mentioned that Hariri had built good 
relations with President Gemayel. It is, therefore, difficult to argue that the president was 
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averse to the demolitions. One also finds that the proposal put forward in the southern 
suburbs had Hariri’s finger prints on it.372 This means that the relationship between the 
two men goes back to before Hariri’s partnership with Joseph Khoury. As mentioned 
previously, Hariri had partnered up with Joseph Khoury – an engineer from the Gemayel 
family’s hometown of Bikfaya – to implement the president’s pet-project in the northern 
littoral (Nahr el-Mott) area. This raises the following question: did OGER Liban have a 
construction plan for the city centre as well? The evidence in the next chapter suggests 
that the private firm was, indeed, demolishing according to a master plan that it itself had 
commissioned.
373
  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
It is readily evident that the ascendance of Beirut was triggered by the 
transformative power of transnational networks. This began in the early nineteenth 
century with the integration of Beirut – and the surrounding region – into the 
international market economy. An emerging class of businessmen, entrepreneurs and 
merchants took centre stage in the development of the city. The ability of this class to 
form economic partnerships with primarily French merchants and financial capital (both 
during the late Ottoman and French Mandate periods), enabled the most ‘notable’ 
bourgeoisie families to dominate in Beirut’s trade and finance sectors. These families 
were then able to take advantage of new powers awarded to them following the creation 
of the Lebanese state. Of course, the continued dominance of these families depended on 
their transnational connections, which remained intact for as long as Beirut was an 
intermediary between the Arab East and Western markets.  
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The start of the civil war represented a turning a point in the relationship between 
Beirut and its elites: the city’s intermediary role ended, the transnational connections 
were broken, and thus, the commercial-financial bourgeoisie lost control to other elites 
seeking to affirm their own interests. But like the pre-civil war bourgeiosie, those that 
captured the apex of the Lebanese political economy – particularly, the militia leaders 
and new contractors – came with their own transnational connections and networks. The 
fluid nature of the civil war meant that none of the newcomers were able to dominate 
over the others. Nevertheless, the militias were seen to be the most powerful actors 
throughout this period. Many businesspeople – including the new contractors – accepted 
that reality, and therefore, built good relations with the militia leaders in order to have 
their interests realised. What we see between 1983 and 1986, therefore, is Hariri’s OGER 
receiving military and political support in order to demolish large swaths of the city 
centre according to a master plan it had commissioned. These demolitions were 
understood as being carried out with Gemayel’s knowledge, and more importantly, with 
military and political support from the president. In light of these demolitions, the 
following question arises: What were Rafiq Hariri’s interests exactly? 
 
Chapter 5 will provide a detailed discussion of Hariri’s interests in Beirut. These 
interests stem from a desire to create rents from large-scale urban developments in Beirut. 
As will be shown, this desire to create rents goes back to the early 1980s. But Hariri was 
struggling to pursue these interests throughout the civil war years. He therefore used his 
transnational network to help him in his pursuit. In this context, Hariri’s interests must be 
discussed in conjunction with the network that he had built. The Hariri network was not 
like those belonging to other businesspeople – including the new contractors. What Hariri 
built was a regional – and to some extent, global – network of capitalists that worked 
within and alongside the Saudi monarchy. Importantly, Hariri used his Saudi connection 
to increase his own politico-economic power in Lebanon. In turn, this power enabled him 
to establish the necessary peaceful conditions for the creation and extraction of rents from 
urban developments in Beirut.   
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Chapter Five 
 
Towards neoliberal urban developments: the role of Rafiq Hariri 
 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapter explained the interests of different types of elites in Beirut’s 
urban scene. This was necessary because as well as being shaped by context, neoliberal 
urban developments are shaped by the interests of the elites that controlled them. Without 
a perspective on the interests that former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri had in Beirut’s 
urban scene, however, it is impossible to understand the shape of the Solidere project, and 
in turn, explain its consequences. As will be shown, Hariri’s interests stemmed from a 
desire to create rents from large-scale urban developments in Beirut. This desire to create 
rents goes back to the early 1980s.  
 
The chapter will begin with a section detailing Hariri’s involvement in the ‘clean-
up’ operation of Beirut’s streets, which took place following the 1982 Israeli invasion. 
What most people were unaware of, at the time, was that the clean-up operation masked a 
‘private plan’ by Hariri to implement large-scale urban developments in Beirut. In order 
to implement this plan, Hariri built good relations with then-President Amin Gemayel. 
However, he needed political support from various other political figures as well. 
Soliciting the support of Saeb Salam was key. Through Salam, Hariri befriended several 
other figures, including King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, who wanted to gain control of, and to 
manage, a larger percentage of his country’s petrodollar flows into Lebanon. Not long 
after that, Hariri became the business representative of the Saudi monarch. This was a 
useful political resource that enabled Hariri to push three construction projects forward. 
Despite the significance of Hariri’s relationship with King Fahd, it will be shown that 
these three projects were premised on the fate of Gemayel’s presidential leadership. 
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In turn, the second section will look at Hariri’s role in achieving the peace 
agreement that is commonly known as the Ta’if Peace Accords (signed in 1989). Hariri 
wanted an agreement in order to create the necessary peaceful conditions for the creation 
and extraction of rents from urban developments in Beirut. As will be shown, the war 
created many obstacles in the path of his private plan. He began searching for peace in 
the summer of 1983, after King Fahd formally appointed him as Saudi Arabia’s ‘peace 
envoy’ in Lebanon. Hariri’s successful efforts at reaching a peace settlement meant that 
he was able to establish himself as a new political leader in post-civil war Lebanon. In 
doing so, Hariri was able to negotiate various decrees and laws related to the 
reconstruction effort in general, and in Beirut in particular. Two of the most significant 
decrees and laws that were passed were: Decree No. 790 (dated 24
th
 of January 1991), 
and Law 117 (dated 7
th
 of December 1991). Both were related to the three construction 
projects that Hariri was trying to push forward throughout the civil war years. 
 
The chapter will conclude with an assessment of Hariri’s strategic alliance with 
Saudi Arabia. Of course, such an alliance was not uncommon in Lebanon, especially 
during the civil war years. As mentioned in the previous chapter, many other new 
contractors were seeking foreign sponsors as well. For example, Najib Mikati and Issam 
Fares both forged a close relationship with the Syrian leadership. But as will be shown 
shortly, the Syrian leadership did not rely on either Mikati or Faris to represent their 
interests in Lebanon in the same way that Saudi Arabia relied on Hariri. Instead, the 
Syrian leadership relied more on other types of elites – most particularly, militia leaders 
such as Nabih Berri and Walid Junblatt.  
  
 
I. Hariri and the ‘clean-up’ of Beirut 
 
On its official website, the Hariri Foundation acknowledges that former Prime 
Minister Rafiq Hariri was involved in the clean-up operation of Beirut in the early 1980s: 
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“PM Rafic Hariri is also known for his philanthropic activities, particularly in 
the reconstruction of Lebanon, education and general social welfare. In 1982, 
after the Israeli invasion, OGER Liban, became actively involved in the 
removal of destruction.”374 
 
But this account makes no mention of Hariri’s connection to the conspicuous demolitions 
that took place in the downtown area between 1983 and 1986. While the perpetrators of 
these demolitions remain ‘officially unidentified’, it is generally agreed that the parties 
involved were the same ones that stand behind the Solidere project.
375
 Solidere, as well, 
makes little reference to the demolitions. The private firm’s sole reference is as follows:  
 
“Located at the historical and geographical core of the city, the vibrant 
financial, commercial and administrative hub of the country, the Beirut 
Central District came under fire from all sides throughout most of the 16 
years of fighting. At the end of the war, that area of the city was afflicted with 
overwhelming destruction, total devastation of the infrastructure, the presence 
of squatters in several areas, and extreme fragmentation and entanglement of 
property rights involving owners, tenants and lease-holders.”376 
 
While Solidere makes little reference to the demolitions, this thesis should not ignore the 
clean-up operation. Not least because Hariri’s involvement in the clean-up operation 
demonstrates that the Solidere project was originally part of an overarching private 
scheme that included three construction projects: in Downtown Beirut, the northern 
littoral (Nahr el-Mott) and the southern suburbs.  
 
 
i. Hariri’s life before the clean-up operation 
 
Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was born in his hometown of Sidon 
in 1944. Unlike most Lebanese leaders of his time, Hariri was raised in an environment of 
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hardship and poverty. His family – consisting of Rafiq, his sister Bahiya, his brother 
Shafiq and their parents – shared a small rented house with two rooms on the upper floor, 
and one room on the ground floor for their cows and chickens. His father, Bahaeddine, 
worked as a farmer in two orange orchards: one he owned, and the other he rented. This 
was just enough to provide for his family. But after one particularly bad harvest, 
Bahaeddine was forced to give up the rented plot and work as a labourer in other orchards 
to earn extra income.
377
 
 
Hariri grew up with a number of very close friends. One of his best friends was his 
childhood classmate Fouad Siniora. His close relationship with Siniora culminated in his 
recruitment: first, to manage and expand the Hariri’s business empire; and then, as 
Finance Minister in Hariri’s successive cabinets. Siniora would himself go on to become 
prime minister between 2005 and 2008. Politics took hold of Hariri and Siniora from a 
very young age. By the time they turned 13, they were already taking part in protests with 
many of their Arab nationalist contemporaries.
378
 But as Hariri grew older, he was forced 
to put his political activism on hold, and focus more on his education. According to 
Siniora, Hariri was determined to escape his impoverished living conditions.
379
 After 
completing secondary school, Hariri moved to Beirut to study accounting at the Arab 
University. There, he fell in love with Nida Boustani, an Iraqi student who he later 
married. After his wife became pregnant, Hariri juggled his time between his university 
studies and his newly-acquired job as a proofreader for Al-Sayyad and Al-Hurriyeh 
magazines. But there was little money to be made in this job. So, in 1964, he abandoned 
his studies, left his family in Beirut, and moved to Saudi Arabia; all in the hope of finding 
a job and earning a steady living in the booming Gulf kingdom.
380
  
 
During his first few years in Saudi Arabia, Hariri worked as an accountant and 
teacher, but later worked with his cousin to set up a small contracting company called 
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CICONEST, in 1969. By then, Hariri’s long-term absence had taken its toll on his 
marriage to Nida, and in 1976, he married Nazek Audi (a Palestinian-Lebanese whom he 
met in Saudi Arabia). To Hariri’s disappointment, CICONEST saw a decrease in profit 
margins. This was due to the highly competitive environment at the time.
381
  Hariri’s 
determination to deal with this financial hurdle meant that he spent little time with his 
growing family. His three children, Bahaa, Saad and Husam lived in a two-bedroom 
apartment with their grandparents, aunt and uncle. Saad would later become prime 
minister as well, between 2009 and 2011.
382
 Yet, Hariri’s big break came in 1976, when 
he was approached by Nasser al-Rashid (a local engineer) to help in a contract he had 
won from King Khalid. The contract involved the construction of three luxury blocks in 
Riyadh for the king’s wife. After the successful completion of this project, King Khalid 
asked al-Rashid and Hariri to tackle another highly-ambitious project: the Masara Hotel 
Resort of Ta’if.383 Hariri then approached a French construction company called OGER, 
and proposed that it handle the US$100 million project. At the time, OGER was not 
doing very well either. It thus accepted the offer, considering it a final, ‘make-or-break’ 
bid. To the delight of all parties involved, the project was completed in record time.
384
 
Crown Prince Fahd was undoubtedly impressed with both al-Rashid and Hariri. He 
therefore awarded them both a string of highly lucrative projects. Hariri was also given a 
number of extra perks that were rare for a foreigner; one of them being Saudi citizenship. 
It is for this reason that Hariri’s political opponents portray the man as a ‘Saudi creation’ 
made rich by the King and sent back to Lebanon as a representative of Saudi power. 
 
In a very short amount of time, Hariri accumulated an enormous amount of wealth. 
By 1982 – in other words, only five years after the completion of the Ta’if Hotel – Hariri 
had risen to become one of the world’s richest men; a multi-billionaire with a business 
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empire that included banks, industry, publishing, and most importantly, real estate 
companies. It was during this period, as well, that Hariri the ‘transnational capitalist’ 
made an appearance: by 1978, Hariri and OGER would form a special partnership, Saudi 
OGER, to handle the string of lucrative projects lined up for him. The following year, he 
bought the French parent company, and merged it together to form OGER International. 
Not long after OGER International was created, a Lebanese subsidiary called OGER 
Liban would be formed as well. By this point, therefore, Hariri was operating equally 
between France, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.
385
  
 
While Hariri’s story may sound unique, it must be stressed that there was a growing 
trend of Lebanese nationals migrating abroad: Lebanese architects, engineers, planners, 
and economists – amongst other professions – had long sought markets in the Arabian 
Gulf and West Africa.
386
 There, they developed or joined consulting firms that were 
‘multi-disciplinary’ in nature and reproduced the ‘American model’ of large, 
‘transnational consulting firms’. In this context, one finds that OGER is one of many 
transnational consulting firms that became major stakeholders in the Lebanese planning 
sector. Others included Khatib wa Alami, Associated Consulting Engineers, and most 
significantly, Dar Al-Handasah. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Dar Al-Handasah is a 
Lebanese-Jordanian consulting firm commissioned to draw up a master plan for the 
reconstruction of Downtown Beirut. 
  
 
ii. How Hariri became involved in the clean-up operation 
 
So, while Hariri was building his fortune in Saudi Arabia in the late 1970s, 
Lebanon was descending into a bitter civil war. As this was happening, Hariri turned his 
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attention to his home country. Initially, he focused on philanthropic projects in his native 
Sidon; launching a series of education- and healthcare-related initiatives. Notably, Hariri 
founded The Islamic Foundation for Culture and Higher Education in 1979 in Sidon 
(subsequently known as the ‘Hariri Foundation’). He later turned his attention to the 
Lebanese banking sector. For example, in 1981, he bought a 73 percent stake in the 
Mediterranean Investment Group (MIG), which owns Groupe Méditerranée in France 
and Lebanon.
387
 Not long after that, Hariri ensured that Fouad Siniora – mentioned 
previously as a best friend since childhood – became chairman and general director of 
Groupe Méditerranée, which encompasses four banks: Banque de la Méditerranée, Saudi 
Lebanese Bank, Allied Bank and Banque de la Méditerranée Suisse.
388
 In this respect, 
Siniora is considered to be one of the first individuals to be recruited into Hariri’s 
transnational network of capitalists.  
 
Of most importance, however, was Hariri’s early desire to obtain construction 
contracts. The earliest example of this, as suggested by former MP Najah Wakim in his 
book detailing corruption allegations amongst Lebanon’s political elites (including 
Hariri), was when Hariri met with President Elias Sarkis in 1978 to discuss a maintenance 
contract for the country’s power grid.389 Despite this early interest, Hariri’s most 
significant construction contract would not come until 1982, in the aftermath of the 
Israeli invasion, which left a massive trail of destruction.
390
 Not long after, OGER Liban 
was commissioned in Sidon to clear away rubble, survey the damages, reinstall public 
utilities, and provide emergency aid to the displaced.
391
 By February 1983, a period of 
calm emerged across Lebanon, leaving a strong hope that the country was finally on the 
road towards peace and recovery. While the French forces were tasked with clearing the 
landmines, Hariri offered his assistance – through OGER Liban – to clear the debris and 
rubble off the streets of Beirut as well. Specifically, this would come to include clearing 
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the barricades and sandbags that were placed by the militias, as well as removing the 
rubble and securing fragile buildings.
392
  
 
At the time, Amin Gemayel had succeeded his younger brother, Bachir, to the 
presidency. Unfortunately for Amin, he did not enjoy the same degree of legitimacy as 
his brother had, nor did he have the same levels of political influence or support. In this 
context, his title as president offered Amin Gemayel an opportunity to secure and enlarge 
his own territorial foothold, and hence, influence.
393
 As was mentioned in Chapter 4, it 
was on this basis that the president sent the Lebanese Army into the southern suburbs to 
tear down Palestinian refugee camps and squatter settlements in the area. But Gemayel 
did not want his territorial foothold to be limited to the suburbs: he wanted to secure 
control of the city centre as well. After all, the prevailing myth was that the person who 
controls the downtown area will control all of Beirut.
394
 According to Charbel Nahas (a 
former OGER employee overseeing the clean-up operation in Beirut at the time), the 
president approached Hariri and asked him to include Downtown Beirut in the clean-up 
operation. Nahas claims that he was opposed to this move: “We went to him [Hariri] and 
told him this was not possible. There was already the Plan Directeur de Reconstruction 
du Centre Ville de Beyrouth [APUR Plan]”.395 With approval from Gemayel, however, 
Hariri put Fadel el-Shallaq (head of OGER Liban) in charge and ordered him to include 
the city centre in the clean-up operation.
396
 
 
Not long after that, Hariri’s OGER Liban entered the city centre. The clean-up was 
conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Army, which fell under the control of 
President Gemayel.
397
 But as was suggested towards the end of the previous chapter, this 
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was not the only area of Beirut where OGER Liban and the military were coordinating 
their efforts. First, while the military was demolishing Palestinian refugee camps and 
squatter settlements in the southern suburbs in October 1982, OGER Liban was removing 
rubble and road blocks.
398
 It is not clear whether OGER Liban coordinated the operation 
with the army, but what is clear is that it did coordinate with Gemayel’s Committee for 
the Development of the Southern Suburbs.
399
 It is also evident that OGER Liban had 
developed its own plans for the project (see Figure 28). Another area where Hariri’s 
OGER Liban was involved in was the northern littoral (Nahr el-Mott) area of Beirut. This 
was where Hariri partnered with Joseph Khoury to execute Gemayel’s pet-project.400 In 
this context, OGER Liban can be seen to have focused its cleaning operation in three 
areas of Beirut, all of which had the backing of the president. It is, thus, argued that Hariri 
wanted to create and extract rents from the development of all three areas together, and 
not just from the development of a single area, such as Downtown Beirut.  
 
One must note that the three areas mentioned above are not at all random, and 
instead, were picked for the sake of economic profit. First, all three areas were selected 
on the basis of their close proximity to the sea and the beaches. This falls in line with the 
neoliberal logic of targeting particular areas identified on the basis of ‘their location’, 
‘their place’, and ‘characteristics of their living environment’.401 Moreover, construction 
in all three areas involved the creation of high-value office spaces, luxury residences and 
tourism facilities.
402
 This underscores the profit-oriented rationale of neoliberal urban 
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Figure 28 – A general plan for the southern suburbs by OGER Liban (1983). Source: 
Verdeil, Une ville et ses urbanistes: Beyrouth en reconstruction, p.540.  
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planning. The downside of Hariri’s plan was that all three projects were dependent on the 
fate of Gemayel’s presidential leadership – all relied on military control of the areas 
under construction, and on political support from the presidency (for example, through 
Gemayel’s control of the CDR, which was established as the main agency in charge of 
government construction contracts). As will be shown shortly, Hariri had to abandon all 
three projects when Gemayel was defeated. 
 
 
iii. The clean-up operation as an avenue for large-scale urban developments 
 
Despite receiving Gemayel’s blessing to begin the clean-up operation in Beirut, 
Hariri needed the political support of various other political figures, not just the Lebanese 
president, to implement all three projects. This was because the city was divided between 
various militias, as well as the Israeli occupiers.
403
 Hariri’s biggest accomplishment was 
securing an alliance with six-time Prime Minister Saeb Salam – son of Salim Salam, the 
scion of a prominent Sunni-Beiruti bourgeois family and a politician under Ottoman and 
French rule (see Chapter 4). Saeb was a respectable Beiruti za’im who remained an 
influential mediator between the warring factions throughout the civil war.
404
 It is worth 
remembering that Saeb Salam is the father of Tammam Salam. For Hariri, political 
support from the Beiruti za’im was necessary. As el-Shallaq put it: “The real question 
was not: ‘why Saeb Beik?’ But ‘Who but Saeb Beik?’.”405 For Salam, the clean-up 
project was an opportunity for him to reclaim the leadership of ‘Sunni Beirut’. When the 
project was launched on the 5
th
 of September 1982, Salam thanked Hariri, ‘the son of 
great Sidon’, in the name of ‘heroic Beirut’, and stressed that Hariri was working together 
with the Maqasid Foundation (the Sunni charitable organisation presided over by 
Salam).
406
 Due to Salam’s extensive network of contacts, Hariri was, with time, able to 
establish good relations with various militia leaders including Nabih Berri and Walid 
                                                          
403
 Israel was not the only foreign party involved in Lebanon during the civil war. Several other countries 
were watching events in the country very closely as well; the most significant of which was Syria. For a 
good account on Syrian involvement in the Lebanese Civil War, see: Marius Deeb, Syria’s Terrorist War 
on Lebanon and the Peace Process, (New York: Palgrave, 2003). 
404
 See: Johnson, All Honourable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon, pp.44-45, 52-53.  
405
 Quoted in: el-Shallaq, Tajrabatyy ma'a al-Hariri, p.52. 
406
 This is according to: Baumann, ‘The Ascent of Rafiq Hariri and Sunni Philanthropy’, p.93. 
178 
 
Junblatt. Through Salam, Hariri was even able to befriend Syrian Vice President Abdel-
Halim Khaddam (who was in charge of Syria’s ‘Lebanon file’, and who was President 
Hafez al-Assad’s childhood friend).407  
 
The clean-up of Beirut’s streets has often been misinterpreted as a plan that was 
designed by the Saudis, but executed by Hariri. But it must be stressed that Hariri started 
the clean-up operation on his own initiative. According to Robert Debbas, one of Hariri’s 
contemporaries, he had not yet established a close political alliance with King Fahd (who 
had ascended to the throne in the same year as the Israeli invasion). At the time, al-
Rashid was acting as an intermediary between the two men.
408
 This was until King Fahd 
noticed Hariri’s success at soliciting Saeb Salam’s support for the clean-up effort. At that 
point, Salam had mediated with Fahd to get the latter to pay a donation towards the 
project.
409
 Indeed, Fahd complied to the request and recompensed Hariri’s clean-up 
operation: the initial posters on OGER’s trucks – which read ‘Project of Cleaning Beirut, 
courtesy of Rafiq Hariri, Oger Liban 1982’ – were then replaced with posters advertising 
the operation as a donation by King Fahd. Hariri did this to demonstrate to the Saudi 
monarch that he could become the main avenue for the flow of Saudi petrodollars into 
Lebanon.
410
 But before he could become Saudi’s business-representative in Lebanon, 
Hariri first needed to obtain President Amin Gemayel’s acceptance of increased Saudi 
investments. Gemayel had placed his business representative and protégé Roger Tamraz 
in control of the levers of the Lebanese economy.
411
 As mentioned in Chapter 4, Tamraz 
was actively opposed to Gulf interests in Lebanon because they threatened to undermine 
his own interests in the country. But Gemayel did not share Tamraz’s anti-Gulf 
sentiment: Saudi investment in Lebanon – and in the reconstruction process more 
specifically – would help build that political support which he felt he was lacking. On an 
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official visit to Saudi Arabia in November 1982, Gemayel accepted King Fahd’s request 
to open his country to Saudi investments.
412
  
 
Becoming Saudi’s business representative in Lebanon is, without doubt, an 
important turning point in Hariri’s political career, because it gave the man unlimited 
access to Gemayel. Having access to the presidency meant that Hariri was able to 
influence the decision-making process and negotiate disputes revolving around Gemayel. 
A significant demonstration of this was during Gemayel’s handling of the Council for 
Development and Reconstruction (CDR). Upon becoming president, Gemayel essentially 
side-lined the CDR in favour of the Council of Foreign Economic Relations (COFER); a 
‘super-ministry’ created and controlled by Gemayel.413 Following COFER’s creation, 
President Gemayel worked at blocking CDR contracts that were awarded to it. As 
explained in Chapter 4, the CDR had been created by Shihabist President Elias Sarkis in 
1977. As a product of Shihabist thinking, the CDR would be released from all ‘routine 
and normal regulations’ that had traditionally encumbered administrative bodies and 
institutions at the time. In other words, the CDR was given an ‘autonomous’ status that 
would ‘insulate’ it from interference by the old bourgeoisie, but also, the militia 
leaders.
414
 The autonomy that the agency enjoyed annoyed Gemayel and led to a dispute 
between him and Mohammed Atallah, a Shihabist technocrat appointed by President 
Sarkis in 1977 to head the CDR. This quarrel reached its peak in August 1983, when 
Atallah confronted Gemayel’s COFER. Atallah later resigned from his post and left 
Beirut to ‘holiday’ as Hariri’s guest in the south of France. Atallah was a friend of Hariri 
who came from his hometown Sidon as well. Upon hearing of the dispute, Hariri tried to 
mediate between the two men. His attempt to resolve the conflict took place during a 
meeting with Gemayel, when conveying a message from King Fahd concerning the 
pending Israeli withdrawal from the Shouf district.
415
 The above example demonstrates 
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particularly well Hariri’s increased access to Gemayel, and therefore, the enormous 
power he gained from his relationship with the Saudi royal family. 
 
Importantly, Hariri’s relationship with the Saudi monarch paved the way for the 
launching of projects in Downtown Beirut, the northern littoral and the southern suburbs. 
OGER Liban brought in dozens of bulldozers and trucks, and employed hundreds of 
workers to clean the streets of Beirut. Elie Salem, the foreign minister in the new 
government created in October 1982, recalls Hariri arriving at the presidential palace and 
unloading a scale model of Downtown Beirut from the back of a truck.
416
 Neither Hariri – 
nor Gemayel, for that matter – had the right to accompany such independent studies with 
any on-the-ground policies that would diverge from the official APUR Plan for the 
downtown area. With tacit endorsement from Gemayel, however, OGER Liban went to 
work in the downtown area and refurbished the facades of a ‘few buildings as an 
exemplary reconstruction sample’. This unofficial interference was not accompanied by 
any legal or financial grounding, but the rehabilitation, “did not go beyond a face lift”.417 
In mid-July 1983, the Lebanese army, with backing from the Christian Lebanese Forces, 
launched an eight-hour battle to evict displaced citizens squatting in the Wadi Bou Jmil 
district of the city centre.
418
 Even if the army did not coordinate its actions with Hariri, 
the eviction of the displaced was a necessary requirement if he wanted to claim the area’s 
real estate. Later that year, OGER Liban’s teams entered the downtown area once again. 
This time, they began demolishing large swaths of the city centre under the guise of 
‘cleaning up some of the damage’.419 This included Souk Nourieh and Souk Sursock near 
Martyrs’ Square.420 As mentioned in Chapter 4, there was no official authorisation, but 
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the bulldozing occurred under the president’s watch. The demolitions appeared to have 
been orchestrated according to a plan – see Figures 29 and 30 – OGER Liban had 
commissioned from Dar Al-Handasah (the Lebanese-Jordanian consulting firm 
mentioned earlier in this chapter).
421
 Importantly, this plan bears some distant 
resemblance to the 1991 Dar Al-Handasah (Eddeh) Plan, which called for the ‘modern 
architecture’, ‘densification of the project’ and ‘development of commercial, touristic and 
business functions’.422 See Figures 31 and 32 for a comparison of the two plans. The 
speed with which these demolitions took place was similar to that of earlier OGER 
projects and comparable to the construction of the Ta’if Hotel.423 According to Nahas 
(the former OGER employee), this quick response came as no surprise to anyone: 
 
“For many years before the war, there have been plans to redevelop the city 
centre and introduce new highways, and even a metro system. But these plans 
were never realised because of the objections of the inhabitants in the area. 
When the war transformed the city centre into a war zone, and the city centre 
was abandoned and avoided by most of its landowners and tenants, and 
instead, inhabited only by squatters, Hariri realised that that he could 
implement his own plans without it being noticed. But in order to go 
unnoticed, he had to demolish as quickly as possible, before the landowners 
and tenants had the chance to return and inspect their former properties.”424  
 
The resumption of fighting in 1984 led to the cessation of bulldozing activities in the 
downtown area.
 
Consequently, the OGER team was evacuated to Paris to continue its 
planning activities from there. But when the war entered another lull in 1986, the 
bulldozers resumed their work. The same parties that had been behind the 1983 
demolitions were allegedly at it again; this time implementing a plan that called for the 
destruction of up to 80 percent of the remaining structures in the city centre (although 
only 20 percent of the buildings in the downtown area had been damaged ‘beyond repair’ 
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Figure 30 – A general plan for Saifi and Martyrs’ Square by OGER Liban (1984). 
Source: Verdeil, Une ville et ses urbanistes: Beyrouth en reconstruction, p.439.  
 
Figure 29 – A general plan for Downtown Beirut by OGER Liban (1984). Source: 
Verdeil, Une ville et ses urbanistes: Beyrouth en reconstruction, p.439.  
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Figure 32 – A map of the preliminary, Eddeh Plan (1991). Source: Gavin and Maluf, 
Beirut Reborn: The Restoration and Development of the Central District, p.50. 
  
Figure 31 – A map of the Oger Liban/Dar Al-Handasah Plan (1983). Source: Khalaf, 
Heart of Beirut: Reclaiming the Bourj, p.128. 
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by the fighting).
425
 Again, these activities came without the authorisation, approval – or 
even, the interference – of the official or governmental authorities.426 However, the 
violence resumed, and so, the dance between demolition and fighting continued. In the 
words of the renowned Lebanese architect Assem Salam, who was also a scion of a 
prominent   Sunni-Beiruti family: “it is ironic that the renewed episodes of fighting were 
what saved most of the buildings in Downtown Beirut from destruction”.427 
 
One understands from the account of demolitions presented above that Hariri’s 
relationship with the Saudi monarchy gave the man power to implement his private plan. 
But the interruptions caused by the fighting also indicate that OGER’s ability to continue 
work in the area was completely dependent on Gemayel’s fate.428 Gemayel had come to 
office on a political platform that was supported by Saudi Arabia and the United States. 
But that placed him at odds with Damascus and its local allies, which consisted of: Walid 
Junblatt and his predominantly Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) militia; and 
Nabih Berri and his Amal militia.
429
 As mentioned previously, the OGER team was 
forced to withdraw to Paris when the downtown area became a battle zone again. Syria’s 
local allies had defeated Gemayel and the Lebanese Army in West Beirut on the 6
th
 of 
February 1984.
430
 To Hariri’s detriment, the following period also saw the decline and 
marginalisation of many of the pre-civil war zu’ama; the most significant of these being 
Sunni-Beiruti za’im Saeb Salam, who Hariri had built a close alliance with in previous 
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years.
431
 In this context, Hariri was forced to abandon Downtown Beirut, but he was also 
forced to abandon the other two construction projects that OGER Liban was making 
preparations for in the northern littoral and southern suburbs. The creation of a National 
Unity government which included pro-Syrian allies was also a big blow to Hariri. Many 
institutions came under control of the Syrian-allied militia leaders.
432
 For example, Berri 
gained the right to countersign all payments made by the CDR.
433
 This meant that 
Gemayel, who Hariri had built a working relationship with, was no longer in control of 
the levers of the decision-making process. At this stage, Hariri found it difficult to 
influence the official or governmental authorities. 
 
 
II. Hariri and the Ta’if Peace Accords 
 
After Gemayel’s defeat in 1984, Hariri had to abandon the three projects he was 
involved in; including that in the city centre. But this did not stop him from pursuing his 
interests in Beirut. A year earlier, Hariri had been appointed as Saudi’s ‘peace envoy’ in 
Lebanon. Using this position, Hariri exerted efforts to reach a peace settlement between 
the various warring factions. In 1989, he succeeded with the signing of the Ta’if Peace 
Accords. One of the main consequences of these accords was the adoption of 
‘muhasassa’. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the principle of ‘muhasassa’, or 
‘apportionment’, was designed to divide entire economic sectors amongst the various 
leaders and give them a large degree of autonomy in managing their respective 
‘domains’. The main beneficiaries of the apportionment of the economy were the former 
militia leaders; most particularly, Nabih Berri and Walid Junblatt. But due to Hariri’s 
instrumental role in bring the civil war to an end, he was rewarded with a piece of the pie 
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too. Importantly, he was awarded personal control over the CDR and all reconstruction 
matters related to Beirut.  
 
 
i. The unwritten rule of Ta’if – Hariri in charge of reconstruction in Beirut 
 
In early May 1983, the Israeli government had agreed to a US-brokered agreement 
that was signed on the 17
th
 of May (also known as the ‘May 17 Agreement’). But at the 
last moment, the Israelis had introduced a side letter that essentially killed the agreement. 
This stated that Israel would only withdraw its troops after the Syrian army had pulled out 
of Lebanon as well. That gave Assad an effective veto over the agreement’s 
implementation. Syria mobilised its Lebanese allies against the May 17 Agreement, and 
during the summer, clashes broke out between Christian and Druze militias in the 
northern Chouf region.
434
 The escalation prompted King Fahd to appoint Hariri as his 
‘peace envoy’. 
 
Hariri’s appointment as Saudi Arabia’s envoy was a clear indication of the strategic 
alliance that he was gradually developing with King Fahd. Upon being given access to 
civil war diplomacy, Hariri famously attended negotiations in Geneva in 1983 and 
Lausanne in early 1984, where representatives from the main Lebanese parties met for 
national dialogue. Although these negotiations faltered, they are important to consider 
because King Fahd began to realise that Hariri could become a useful political asset in 
Lebanon.
435
 Gradually, Hariri’s hand was being strengthened at the expense of some of 
the Gulf Kingdom’s other representatives. The most significant example of a Saudi 
representative who was sidelined was the Saudi ambassador to Lebanon, Ali al-Shaer: he 
was pulled out of Lebanon and reassigned to take up his new post in Saudi Arabia as 
Minister of Information. Al-Shaer had previously been a strong representative of Saudi 
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interests in Lebanon.
436
 Eventually, Hariri earned the ‘voice’ of the Saudi monarch as 
well. As Salem put it: “Hariri had real power… When Hariri was talking it was King 
Fahd talking. He would come up with ideas that were forceful and say that this is what 
King Fahd wants. And what King Fahd wants is what Hariri tells him. Fahd, of course, 
was not interested in the details”.437  
 
On the 6
th
 of February 1984, Syria’s local allies defeated the Lebanese army in 
West Beirut. On the 30
th
 of April 1984, Rashid Karami (another Shihabist) was called to 
form a government of National Unity.
438
 The national unity government of April 1984 
included the pro-Syrian warlords Berri and Junblatt. Importantly, they were interested in 
taking over the state and restructuring it as a source of patronage (details on this point 
were provided in Chapter 3). As mentioned before, Hariri had to abandon the three 
projects he was involved in; including that in the city centre. But this did not stop him 
from continuing his role as Saudi peace envoy. At this point, Hariri accepted Syrian 
dominance in the country, and supported Damascus’ efforts at imposing a peace 
settlement on the country’s warring factions. He later moved his centre of operations to 
Damascus.
439
 In Damascus, Hariri’s wealth and prestige underpinned his value as a 
serious negotiator. In this regard, he used ‘cash’ and ‘gifts’ to build his network of close 
relationships. This included close relationships with some key members of the Syrian 
regime. Most particularly, he developed close relations with Vice President Khaddam and 
with Syrian Army chief of staff Hikmat Shehabi (two of the most senior Sunnis in the 
Alawite-dominated regime). According to Blanford (Hariri’s biographer), Hariri even 
attempted to curry favour with Hafez al-Assad by building him a luxurious palace on the 
airport road in Damascus. Apparently, the Syrian president did not care much for Hariri’s 
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generous gift, and instead, chose to remain in his small Rawda Palace.
440
 Importantly, 
Hariri would continue to rely on his financial wealth when it came to forging new 
relationships, even after becoming prime minister in 1992.
441
 
 
Hariri used his financial wealth as leverage in his negotiations. In one account 
given by then Lebanese ambassador to the United States Abdullah Bou Habib, an episode 
of Hariri’s use of money in diplomatic negotiations is revealed.442 In August 1987, Hariri 
suggested to Bou Habib that he would pay Gemayel US$30 million if he handed power 
over to Johnny Abdo (who at the time was the Lebanese ambassador to Switzerland). If 
Bou Habib would help convince Gemayel to step down, Hariri would send King Fahd to 
Damascus to win Assad’s approval. Another US$500 million would be distributed to the 
militias to disarm and to get the Syrians to withdraw from Lebanon. Both Abdo and 
Gemayel would claim later to have not taken Hariri’s offer seriously, while King Fahd 
was believed to have been so insulted by Bou Habib’s revelation that he refused to speak 
to Hariri for a period of three months.
443
 Overall, the revelation makes Hariri look naïvely 
unaware of the limits that money has in Lebanese politics: while he was able to buy 
access to the decision-making process, he could not always determine its outcomes. It is 
worth highlighting that it was only then that Hariri realised his political ambitions, and 
saw himself as the ‘ideal candidate for premiership’.444  
 
                                                          
440
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used to call him ‘the Cheque Book’.” Quoted from: Blanford, Killing Mr Lebanon: The Assassination of 
Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East, p.33. 
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Gemayel’s six-year term in office was due to expire in September 1989. Hariri now 
played a central role in the diplomatic negotiations to find a new president. Eventually, 
these negotiations led to an understanding between Damascus and Washington over 
Syria’s dominance in Lebanon. The diplomatic efforts continued until a peace agreement 
was signed in Ta’if on the 22nd of October 1989 (commonly known as the ‘Ta’if Peace 
Accords’).445 Hariri played a crucial role in the logistics of the peace conference: he 
personally arranged the flights of Lebanon’s parliamentarians to Saudi Arabia.446 Because 
of Hariri’s deep involvement, he also helped in negotiating some of the details of the 
power-sharing formula; something that would benefit him once he became prime minister 
in 1992.
447
 Not long after, Saudi Arabia and Syria moved to elect René Mu’awad – a 
traditional politician from the Syrian-controlled north – as the new president. The US 
accepted Mu’awad’s candidacy as well. Hariri was again intimately involved in 
organising the election. On the 5
th
 of November 1989, he flew the deputies on his private 
jet to Qulei’at airport near the Syrian border, where Mu’awad was elected.448 That same 
month, however, Mu’awad was assassinated.  
 
In less than 24 hours, 53 deputies gathered by parliamentary speaker Hussein el-
Husseini met in a Syrian intelligence building in Shtura in the Bekaa to elect a new 
president. The successful candidate was Elias Hrawi from Zahle who had accepted Syrian 
dominance in Lebanon as well. Once again, Hariri’s plane carried the deputies to the 
vote. He later provided Hrawi with living quarters at his personal apartment in Beirut – a 
‘gift to the state’449 – and “contributed to the cost of staff, accommodation, logistics, 
                                                          
445
 Many analysts describe the Ta’if Accords as a formal agreement between the US and Syria of the 
latter’s control over Lebanon in exchange for peace within the country’s borders. Saudi Arabia also agreed 
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communications, armoured cars and security equipment”.450 The fact that Hariri 
supported the logistics of electing two presidential candidates who both supported Syria’s 
dominance in Lebanon, and in turn, covered their expenses, underscores his 
determination to reach a peace settlement. At this point, Hariri was still hoping to become 
prime minister, and according to Syrian Vice President Khaddam, Damascus was for the 
first time considering him as a serious contender for the post.
451
 In spite of this, Omar 
Karami – the younger brother of the Shihabist Rashid Karami (who was assassinated in 
June 1987) – became the new prime minister.  
 
Aware that Omar Karami’s government had little or no money, Hariri flexed his 
financial muscles once again. The first step came when he offered to renovate the CDR at 
a cost of $5 million – ‘another gift’ to the state.452 The offer made by Hariri was so 
attractive that it was immediately seized upon by Karami’s government. On the 24th of 
January 1991, Decree No. 790 was approved to revamp the CDR, which would involve 
relocating the agency to a Hariri-owned building in the city centre.
453
 The revamped CDR 
presented the perfect opportunity for Hariri to begin infiltrating the agency that is 
considered to be the main authority in reconstruction matters. The appointment of el-
Shallaq – the man charged with over-seeing the clean-up operation in Beirut in 1982 – as 
the new head of the CDR would be the first step in that direction.
454
 El-Shallaq’s 
appointment underscores Ta’if’s unwritten rule: that reconstruction in Beirut would come 
under Hariri’s control. It was now possible for Hariri to re-launch the three construction 
projects that had been stalled for many years in Downtown Beirut, the northern littoral 
(Nahr el-Mott) and the southern suburbs.
455
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Undoubtedly, control of the CDR was a strategic gain for the building contractor 
and businessman Rafiq Hariri. And as a result, many elite figures voiced their 
reservations. For example, Nabil Beyhum – a relative of Abdallah Beyhum and a scion of 
a prominent Sunni-Beiruti family – described it as the ‘confusion’ of public and private 
interests.
456
 While Assem Salam – nephew of Saeb Salam, and cousin of Tammam Salam 
– viewed it as, “a typical example of the dangers inherent in the state’s abdication of its 
role in orienting and controlling one of the most sensitive reconstruction development 
projects in the country”.457 However one describes it, el-Shallaq’s appointment to the top 
position in the CDR must be seen as an indirect ‘transfer of power’ from the Lebanese 
government to a businessman, and was therefore, the foundation-stone of the rent-
creating and -extracting mechanisms that Hariri put in place in subsequent years. These 
mechanisms would become fully developed after Hariri was appointed prime minister in 
October 1992.  
 
 
ii. After Ta’if – the approval of Law 117 to create private real estate companies 
 
At the formal request of el-Shallaq – and ‘the verbal request of Hariri’ – Dar Al-
Handasah was asked to draw up master plans for the three areas of Beirut. In terms of 
Downtown Beirut, Dar Al-Handasah appointed architect Henri Eddeh – a member of the 
new generation of architects who became prominent during the Shihabist interlude – to 
head the design team.
458
 By the summer of 1991, a preliminary master plan for 
Downtown Beirut was disclosed to the public for review.
459
 Importantly, the Dar Al-
Handasah (Eddeh) Plan called for the creation of a ‘Manhattan’ or a ‘Hong Kong’ of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
See: Sarkis, ‘Territorial Claims: Architecture and Post-War Attitudes Toward the Built Environment’, 
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 See: Assem Salam, ‘Lebanon’s Experience with Urban Planning: Problems and Prospects’, in Samir 
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Mediterranean that bore absolutely no resemblance to the old character of the city centre; 
or to the rest of the capital, for that matter (see Figures 33 to 36).
460
 Despite the growing 
support for this plan in certain public- and private-circles, opposition was also increasing, 
which culminated in the formation of a protest group that met to try to generate an 
alternative master plan.  
 
Protests against the Eddeh Master Plan began in July that same year, during the 
public symposiums held by Dar Al-Handasah and the CDR. But expressing critical views 
was very difficult in Beirut at the time, because local newspaper owners were becoming 
closer to Hariri, and were in turn, leaving little room for the public to state its case. One 
example of this was An-Nahar Daily Newspaper.
461
 In some cases, the opposition found 
it easier to express their opinions abroad. For instance, two conferences took place: one in 
the United States at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the other in France at 
the Institut du Monde Arabe. The two conferences facilitated exchanges of views between 
supporters and critics of the plan.
462
 Despite the difficulties, a small group of academics 
and planners was able to make itself heard in Beirut. Amongst its distinguished members 
were architects Assem Salam, who since the 1960s had designed a number of elaborate 
buildings across the country, and Jad Tabet who was the son of Antoine Tabet, whose St. 
Georges Hotel and Yacht Club, amongst other buildings, had been a prominent symbol of 
Beirut before its fall. See Chapter 4 for more details on these two individuals. At this 
point, two of their younger colleagues who had recently finished their studies in the 
United States, Hashim Sarkis – not related to Shihabist President Elias Sarkis – and 
Oussama Kabbani, were also actively involved in the opposition. There was 
                                                          
460
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Figure 34 – A view of Martyrs’ Square in 1975. Source: Makdisi, ‘Laying Claim to 
Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere’, p.661. 
 
Figure 33 – A view of Martyrs’ Square in the 1930s. Source: Khalaf, Heart of Beirut: 
Reclaiming the Bourj, p.187. 
 
194 
 
 
Figure 36 – Illustrations from the Eddeh Plan that bore absolutely no resemblance to the 
old character of the city centre. Source: Gavin and Maluf, Beirut Reborn: The 
Restoration and Development of the Central District, p.54. 
 
Figure 35 – An artist’s impression of what Martyrs’ Square would look like after the 
Eddeh Plan is implemented. Source: Nabil Beyhum et al., I‘mar Bayrut wa-l fursa al-
da’i‘a. Wasat Bayrut al-tijari wa-l-sharikat al-‘iqariya. Al-waqa’i‘, al-murtakazat, 
al-bada’il, (1992). 
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also the economist Georges Corm (who operated in the Shihabist tradition and would 
later become Finance Minister in Salim el-Hoss’s government), the sociologist Nabil 
Beyhum (a scion of a prominent Sunni-Beirut family), and the novelist Elias Khoury (the 
new editor of Al-Mulhaq, which was the cultural supplement of An-Nahar, and which 
became the main outlet for dissent at a time when its parent publication preferred to 
maintain a neutral stance).
463
 Together, they became known as the ‘only credible and 
independent experts’ on the reconstruction effort.464 In several lectures and meetings, 
book publications and appearances on television talk shows, this group of local experts 
demanded modifications to be made to the Eddeh Master Plan.
465
 
  
The Eddeh Master Plan called for the almost total demolition of whatever remained 
in Downtown Beirut. See Figures 37 and 38 for an illustration of the extent of the 
proposed demolitions. As one British free-lance journalist living in Beirut at the time 
eloquently put it: “Today, with the fighting over, there is a new plan to destroy [what was 
left of] the city centre...but this time with the bulldozer and the pick-axe”.466 As a result, 
most of these experts’ criticisms, focused on the extensive demolitions proposed by the 
Eddeh Plan and the impact this would have had on the city. The Eddeh Plan, argued Jad 
Tabet, would have made the city centre an isolated ‘island of modernity’, all but cut off 
from the rest of the city.
467
 In one more poignant critique, Elias Khoury wrote that 
Downtown Beirut would have become an ‘empty face’, a ‘placeless place’ and a ‘hole in 
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Figures 37 and 38 – Before and after demolitions. Black denotes buildings that will be 
preserved. Source: Tabet, Al-I’mar wa-l-Maslaha al-‘Amma [Building Development and 
Public Interest], p.191, and p.201. 
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the memory’, in the face of a ‘frightening amnesia’.468 After a slow start, these criticisms 
spread like wildfire as other personalities joined in and made their voices heard. One of 
these was archaeologist Suzy Hakimian, who underscored that the main weakness in the 
Eddeh Plan was the lack of cooperation amongst architects, archaeologists and city 
planners, and emphasized that archaeological and historical preservation should not be an 
obstacle to reconstruction.
469
 All in all, public debate surrounding the Eddeh Plan 
represented what Beyhum described as, “the first public debate since the beginning of the 
war, and the first on urban matters in Lebanon’s history”.470 In the face of a public outcry, 
the CDR and Dar Al-Handasah were forced to scrap the scheme, return to the drawing 
boards and amend the Eddeh Plan. Out of all the amendments, the most significant was 
the proposed preservation of a hundred more ‘old buildings’ in the area.471 Hariri 
advertised the amended plan as ‘an inclusion of the criticism’, and as the involvement of 
the ‘public’ in a ‘private’ scheme.472 However, the opposition argued that these 
amendments ‘did not go far enough’, and therefore, dismissed them as a ‘corrupting co-
operation’ to win over the opposition.473 The opposition continued to organise public 
relations activities, such as press conferences, newspaper articles, and leaflets.
474
 
 
During this time, Hariri was using his financial wealth to exert economic pressure 
on Omar Karami’s government to put forward a law that would allow for the creation of 
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three private real estate companies to oversee reconstruction projects in Downtown 
Beirut, the northern littoral (Nahr el-Mott) and the southern suburbs. At the time, Hariri’s 
banks were allegedly purchasing US dollars in large quantities to lower the value of the 
Lebanese pound. This was done in order to fuel the economic crisis at the time, and 
increase the street protests that were threatening Karami’s government.475 The Karami 
government did eventually fall on the 6
th
 of May 1992; an event that fuelled Karami’s 
personal opposition to Hariri and the Solidere project in subsequent years.
476
 But Karami 
had already supported Hariri’s proposed law. The proposal of such a law spurred a heated 
debate in the 128-member parliament, which at the time, was headed by Hussein el-
Husseini. The debate focused on several contentious issues, but four were recurrent: 
firstly, the socio-economic dimension of the project and whether the reconstruction of 
Downtown Beirut would have a positive impact on the domestic economy; secondly, the 
constitutionality of the law, especially with regards to property rights being taken away 
from public and private owners and being given to a private firm; thirdly, the 
considerable vagueness of the wording of the law, especially with regards to financing; 
and finally, the rationale behind this ‘single firm concept’, and whether the suggested 
concept was the best model to follow.
477
 But as amendments were being proposed to 
solve these issues, Hariri allegedly resorted to corrupt practices on the sidelines.  
 
According to Najah Wakim (the author of the book detailing corruption allegations 
against Hariri and the rest of the political class), Hariri sent el-Shallaq and Siniora to 
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bribe almost 40 MPs.
478
 Some bribes came in the form of cash payments of between 
$50,000 to $100,000. Others, however, came in the form of interest-free loans from 
Hariri’s Banque Méditerranée and Saudi-Lebanese bank, which allowed them to 
subscribe to Solidere shares issued in January 1994.
479
 In an interview with Elias Saba, 
who was one of the MPs at the time, he and his close friend Hassan el-Rifai were 
amongst the 40 MPs that received bribes to switch their votes. He explains that el-Rifai 
was won over and forced to switch his vote after being offered a generous bribe. But 
unlike el-Rifai, he did not change his stance when confronted with a similar bribe.
480
 In 
another account provided by Henri Eddeh, Hariri was also making a number of ‘promises 
and pledges’ to ensure that his law proposal would pass. In this regard, Hariri allegedly 
made a promise to a certain minister to convince him to support the law. This minister 
was Mohammed Abdel-Hamid Baydoun. Hariri had to garner Baydoun’s support because 
he was the owner of STARCO Centre, a famous office tower built in the Wadi Bou Jmil 
district in the early 1960s that was influenced by the same movement of architecture 
pioneered by the likes of Antoine Tabet, Assem Salam and others (see Chapter 4). 
According to Eddeh, Baydoun was promised that STARCO would not be expropriated 
like other properties in the city centre, and that he would retain ownership.
481
  
 
Thus, after a series of successful ‘influences’ and ‘heavy pressures’482 on Hariri’s 
part, parliament finally convened on the 7
th
 of December 1991 and put the law to a vote. 
To Hariri’s delight, the law was overwhelmingly approved by the Lebanese parliament, 
and was registered in the official gazette as Law 117. Of the MPs who were present on 
the day of the vote, only six voted against the law. When voicing their objections, MP 
Albert Mokhaiber said that he could not get out of the ‘darkness’ that was surrounding 
the law every time he read it. MP Salim Sa’ada concluded his remarks by describing the 
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law as ‘naïve’ and ‘out of touch with reality’. And MP Elias Saba simply said the law 
was ‘massikh’ or ‘foolish’.483 Before the vote, Saba claimed to have received ‘political 
reassurances’ from the Syrian regime for whichever side he took, and received guarantees 
that he would return to office. To Saba’s disappointment, he would lose his seat in the 
1992 parliamentary elections. He later found out that all those who were critical of the 
law lost their seats as well. More upsettingly, those who voted against the law never 
returned to office again. Saba would also find out that, Abdel-Halim Khaddam – who was 
in charge of Syria’s Lebanon File, and who Hariri had built a close relationship with in 
previous years – was paid a sum-total of US$6 million (most probably by Hariri himself) 
to ‘rig the elections’.484 
 
 
iii. The birth of neoliberal urban developments – Solidere, Linord and Elyssar  
 
Soon after Law 117 was approved, the demolition crews converged once again on 
the city centre. It was assumed to be the end-all of requirements for the reconstruction 
effort to begin. However, nowhere in this law was the name of ‘Downtown Beirut’ 
mentioned, nor was the company of ‘Solidere’ signed into existence. It is undeniable that 
Law 117 took the country a step close to the creation of Solidere. But even so, it must be 
remembered that the Lebanese government enacted Law 117 as a general law, applicable 
to the reconstruction of any and all war-damaged areas, and not specifically for the 
reconstruction of Downtown Beirut. As a direct result of this, the government had to: 
firstly, pass a series of laws (known as the Articles of Incorporation) that would lead to 
the official creation of Solidere; and secondly, ratify a master plan that was specific to 
Downtown Beirut.  
 
Following the approval of Law 117, and in anticipation of the formation of a 
company to carry out and fund the reconstruction of Downtown Beirut, the government 
passed Decree No. 2,236 dated the 19
th
 of February 1992, which fixed the geographic 
                                                          
483
 For further details on what they said, see: Karam, Kanoon Assharrika Al-Iqariyya: Annosos Attashri’ia 
wa Attanthimiyya: Monaqashat Majlis Annuwab wa llijan Almoshtaraka, pp.483-529. 
484
 Interview with Elias Saba held on 04 September 2012 in Beirut. 
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limits of the project in Beirut’s Business Central District (BCD) and the number of lots 
within it.
485
 That same day, seven Appraisal Committees and a Higher Appraisal 
Committee were established under Decree No. 2,237, which were charged with the task 
of appraising the value of all the real estate properties falling within the BCD.
486
 In the 
spring of 1992, the CDR began carrying out further demolitions in the identified BCD 
zone – see Figures 39 to 42. Importantly, these demolitions took place when no company 
as of yet had been ratified by the government and so the CDR was, in fact, acting beyond 
the limits of its mandate.
487
 Again, the demolitions were carried out ‘under the guise’ of 
stabilising the area from the dangers posed by condemned buildings. These buildings 
were being brought down through the use of high explosive demolition charges, but the 
explosives used were stronger than necessary, and were employed in a way that would 
affect the foundations of neighbouring buildings. Before the demolitions began, only a 
third of the structures in the area were irreparable. But due to the explosives that were 
used, for every building that was brought down, several other buildings were damaged 
beyond repair.
488
 These buildings would be declared a ‘hazard’ to public safety, and 
would later be demolished as well. It is believed that 80 percent of the total buildings in 
the downtown area were demolished (the same proportion of clearing suggested by the 
1986 OGER Liban/Dar Al-Handasah Plan). According to renowned Lebanese architect 
Assem Salam, “more buildings were brought down by the demolition crews than by the 
civil war itself”.489 In other words, it is understood that more damage was done to 
Downtown Beirut by those who claimed to be interested in salvaging and reconstructing 
it, than had been done by the sixteen years of fighting.
490
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 See: Mango, Solidere: The Battle for Beirut’s Central District, p.56.  
486
 See: ibid, p.7 
487
 See: Makdisi, ‘Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere’, 
p.672. 
488
 See: Beyhum et al., I‘mar Bayrut wa-l fursa al-da’i‘a. Wasat Bayrut al-tijari wa-l-sharikat al-‘iqariya. 
Al-waqa’i‘, al-murtakazat, al-bada’il, pp.15-20. 
489
 Moreover, areas that witnessed excessive demolition, such as Wadi Bou Jmil and Ghalghoul, were 
barely affected by the war, whereas areas that witnessed renovation, such as Saifi and the Place d’Etoile, 
were heavily damaged. This is according to an interview with Assem Salam held on 24 July 2012 in Beirut. 
490
 In addition to that, some critics such as former MP Najah Wakim assert that much of the fighting in the 
city centre was paid for in order to achieve as much destruction as possible. This is according to 
information obtained from: Gambill and Abdelnour, ‘Dossier: Rafiq Hariri’. Such views are certainly 
overly cynical and hard to prove, but given the many twists and turns that occurred during the war, and the 
lack of trust and transparency in the events, these views cannot be entirely ruled out of the question.  
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Figure 40 – Demolition of the Rivoli building (facing north). Ironically, it resisted the 
explosion three times before it finally collapsed. Source: Khalaf, Heart of Beirut: 
Reclaiming the Bourj, p.207. 
 
Figure 39 – View of Martyrs’ Square after the war, but before the demolitions (facing 
south). All the buildings seen here have since been removed. Source: Makdisi, ‘Laying 
Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere’, p.668. 
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Figure 42 – View of Martyrs’ Square (facing north). Notice the poster in the background 
displaying what the area will look like after reconstruction. Source: Makdisi, ‘Laying 
Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere’, p.671. 
 
Figure 41 – View of Martyrs’ Square (facing north). Most of the buildings have been 
removed by this stage. Source: Makdisi, ‘Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and 
Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere’, p.671. 
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As these demolitions were taking place, the opposition grew alongside them. One 
story that was retold many times in Beirut was of Yvonne, Lady Cochrane Sursock’s 
battle with Hariri. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Lady Cochrane Sursock was the founder of 
the Association for the Protection of the Natural Sites and Ancient Buildings (APSAD) 
and daughter of pre-civil war merchant notable Alfred Sursock. The story begins when 
APSAD launched a national and international campaign to pressure Hariri into changing 
the preliminary plan for Downtown Beirut. According to Lady Cochrane Sursock, the 
campaign gained much attention, not just in Lebanon, but also, for reasons unknown to 
her, in Germany.
491
 By May of 1992, the same group of concerned architects came 
together to denounce the – still unofficial – reconstruction plan. The architects organised 
a conference to debate issues to do with the aesthetic, cultural, social, economic and 
political significance of any reconstruction effort, and to call for a halt to the illegal 
demolitions. In addition to that, the conference called for the necessity of public and 
governmental debate, and urged that consideration be given to other proposals before any 
major decisions were taken on the ground. In particular, they urged appropriate 
consideration be given to rights-holders in the downtown area.
492
 On the 22
nd
 and 23
rd
 of 
May 1992, the Urban Research Institute held another symposium – this time at the 
Carlton Hotel – under the heading of: ‘The Beirut of Memory; the Beirut of Sharing; the 
Beirut of the Future: the Politics of Reconstruction and the Public Interest’. The 
objective of the symposium was to address the issue of reconstruction from several 
angles, and to produce recommendations under the headings of ‘administrative’, ‘legal’, 
‘social’, ‘architectural’, ‘financial’, and ‘economic’. The participants at the symposium 
emphasised the need for the state to honour its responsibility to ensure that democratic 
paths were followed in the reconstruction effort, and that an open dialogue be maintained 
between all interested parties. This symposium also called upon the government to 
protect the heritage in the area from illegal demolitions (which were still occurring), and 
                                                          
491
 This is according to interviews with Giorgio Tarraf held on 12 July 2012 in Beirut and with Mounir 
Doumani held on 27 July 2012 in Beirut. 
492
 See: Mango, Solidere: The Battle for Beirut’s Central District, pp.57-58. 
205 
 
to publicise the expropriation of land. Importantly, it concluded that ‘the public’ needed 
to approve the reconstruction plan before any efforts on this front could begin.
493
 
 
Despite exhausting all efforts to prevent the illegal demolitions, more attention and 
coverage was being given to the national parliamentary elections due in September that 
year (the first in which Hariri was due to run). In other words, the electoral campaigns 
overshadowed the debates over Downtown Beirut. Against, this backdrop, the 
government passed a series of laws, whose articles of incorporation would be approved in 
July of that year.
494
 Despite the escalating efforts of the opposition, on the 14
th
 of July 
1992, the Lebanese government held a special session and decided on the basic structure 
for the formation of The Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction of 
Beirut Central District (s.a.l.), which is more famously known by its French acronym 
‘Solidere’. On the 17th of July 1992, the Higher Council of Urban Planning (HCUP), 
whose function it was to render opinions and make suggestions, denounced the idea of 
creating Solidere from a number of different angles. In turn, the HCUP called for 
rethinking the plan. Despite the HCUP’s objections, the Lebanese government went 
ahead and Parliament approved the company’s Articles of Incorporation in Decree No. 
2,537 dated the 22
nd
 of July 1992.
495
 Solidere’s objectives were as follows: to acquire real 
estate properties, to finance and ensure the execution of the infrastructure works in the 
area where real estate properties were acquired, to prepare and reconstruct the area in 
accordance to the provisions of an approved master plan, to reconstruct or restore existing 
buildings, to erect buildings and sell, lease or exploit such buildings and lots, and to 
develop the landfill on the seaside.
496
 Its duration was initially fixed at 25 years, 
beginning from the 10
th
 of May 1994 (the date of its registration at the Commercial 
Register). This duration, however, was extended from 25 years to 35 years by Decree No. 
                                                          
493
 Records of the Urban Research Institute were published with the support of the Ford Foundation. See: 
ibid, pp.58-59. 
494
 The ‘Articles of Incorporation’ is a legal document that every company is required to hold before it is 
able to function. In a sense, the articles are like the firm’s ‘constitution’. Importantly, the articles state and 
describe the name of the company, its objectives, duration and location of its headquarters, while also 
detailing its various organs and their respective prerogatives and responsibilities. 
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 See: Solidere, Articles of Incorporation, (Beirut: Solidere, 1992). 
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 See: ibid, pp.5-6. 
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13,909 of 2005.
497
 The ratified Articles of Incorporation meant that Solidere was now 
granted complete rights to be a fully functional and private company. It was also, in 
effect, legally capable of appropriating any and all land within the city centre. All that 
was left now was to approve a master plan for reconstructing Downtown Beirut.  
 
At this point, the approval of a master plan for Downtown Beirut was the last act of 
the Lebanese government (shortly after parliamentary elections and before the 
government was replaced by one headed by Hariri). In response to the various criticisms 
levelled against its previous master plan, Dar Al-Handasah introduced a revised master 
plan that they claimed responded to public concerns and took into consideration the 
various issues raised during the public debate. Unlike the previous plan, the revamped 
plan was never fully approved through a public process before it was submitted for 
approval by the Lebanese government. The ‘new’ master plan highlighted the intended 
reintegration of the city centre with the greater metropolitan area of Beirut. It also 
included the planned preservation of certain buildings in the historic core (particularly, in 
the relatively small area between the Grand Serail and Martyrs’ Square). The 
reconstruction process would also entail the rehabilitation of the aswaq, the preservation 
of lower- and lower-middle class residential areas, the preservation of various 
archaeological remains found in the area, and the creation of culturally- and 
environmentally-friendly open spaces (such as the planned creation of a seaside park on 
the landfill), which would include some ‘cultural facilities’ such as a library and a centre 
for the arts. In addition to that, there was a policy to limit the high-rise buildings in the 
area.
498
 Many of the amendments that were introduced to the plan can be seen in many of 
the leaflets and publications released by Solidere in the early years of its creation. See 
Figures 43 and 44 for artists’ impressions of the new, revised master plan.  
 
Against this backdrop, the new and improved plan was advertised by Hariri as a 
successful result of mixing the old and new. Lady Cochrane Sursock recalls how Hariri 
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 See Chapter 7. 
498
 Much of the information in this paragraph was obtained from an interview with Jean-Paul Lebas held on 
15 November 2013 in Paris. 
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Figure 44 – Artist’s impression of the new plan. Notice, as well, the emphasis on the 
creation of a friendly and open space. Source: Makdisi, ‘Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban 
Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere’, p.681. 
 
 
Figure 43 – Artist’s impression of the new plan. Notice how the rendering includes 
preserved historic buildings. Source: Makdisi, ‘Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative 
and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere’, p.677. 
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sent her a signed copy of Beirut Reborn
499, in which he had written, “I hope that you are 
satisfied [with the changes]”.500 In this book as well, one cannot help but notice the 
adoption of a new marketing slogan for the project – ‘Beirut: Ancient City of the 
Future’.501 In contrast with the previous ‘Hong Kong of the Mediterranean’ slogan, this 
new slogan exalted a balanced mixture of old and new, as it carefully integrated the 
surviving buildings and structures with a new urban fabric.
502
 Under the guidance of 
Oussama Kabbani – hired by Hariri to review the master plan for the reconstruction 
effort– the new master plan called for the return of a lively and attractive urban core in 
Beirut; one that was similar to the hustle and bustle of the district in the pre-civil war 
days of the 1960s and 1970s. In visual terms, at least, Kabbani’s urban design team was 
trying to ensure that the new city centre would not look like a ‘foreign body’ in the heart 
of the city. In other words, the new plan was meant to signify the return to a more 
‘familiar’ city centre that people could live in and identify with. However, the details of 
the new plan continued to generate considerable criticism against it.  
 
Some of the same concerns and criticisms kept resurfacing, and at times, they led to 
a head-to-head collision between the opposition and those responsible for the new plan. 
In one particular incident, opposition groups who were lobbying for a lower urban 
density in the city centre instigated a heated clash between Hariri and Eddeh (the head of 
the design team appointed by Dar Al-Handasah). The initial master plan had set the floor-
area-ratio (FAR) factor to 4.2. The opposition, however, argued that this should be no 
more than 3, in order to preserve the ‘traditional features’ of the city centre. But Hariri 
wanted to increase this factor to 5. This substantial increase created severe reservations 
on the part of some members of the design team responsible for the old plan. So much so, 
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 As mentioned in Chapter 1, this is a book that was edited by Angus Gavin, who would eventually 
become the Head of Design in Solidere. 
500
 Although satisfied by the changes, Lady Cochrane Sursock would later describe the Solidere project as a 
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 For more information on Solidere’s new motto and the meanings behind it, see: Fares al-Dahdah, “On 
Solidere’s Motto, ‘Beirut: Ancient City of the Future’”, in Peter G. Rowe and Hashim Sarkis, (eds.), 
Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the Construction and Reconstruction of a Modern City, (Munich: Prestel 
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that Eddeh submitted a letter of resignation in protest.
503
 According to Simon Moussalli, 
increasing the FAR does not come as a ‘surprise’ to him, because Hariri wanted nothing 
more than to ‘seek profits’ from reconstruction process in the city centre. According to 
Hariri’s rationale, it would make ‘better economic sense’ to increase the FAR, because ‘a 
higher FAR would mean a higher profitability margin’.504  
 
After Eddeh’s resignation, a team led by French urban planner Louis Sato and other 
foreign consultants, such as Jean-Paul Lebas and Angus Gavin, sketched out a revised 
master plan. Both Lebas and Gavin had worked on several mega-projects before.
505
 As 
the revised master plan was gaining support in government, a group from the Engineers’ 
Union presented a report to the CDR, suggesting that an independent expert committee be 
created to rethink the master plan. The report was then presented to the government on 
the 24
th
 of September 1991. Regardless of their efforts, the group received ‘no response’ 
from the government.
506
 Thinking about all these calls, Saree Makdisi argues that in spite 
of the increasing ‘attention’ and ‘coverage’ being given to the debates over Downtown 
Beirut at the time, the public’s attention was more focused on the upcoming 
parliamentary elections. Thus, in an atmosphere of ‘national anxiety and concern’ about 
the elections, the government went ahead and approved the new master plan on the 14
th
 
of October 1992.
507
 The Detailed Plan – see Figure 45 – was not submitted and endorsed 
by the CDR until the 21
st
 of October 1993.
508
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Beirut. Wakim also documents Eddeh’s clash with Hariri in his book: Wakim, Al-Ayadi al-Sud, pp.155-
156. 
504
 Interview with Simon Moussalli held on 11 July 2012 in Beirut. 
505
 Lebas was a French urban planner who had worked on several urban developments across Europe. Most 
notably, he worked on the La Defense project in Paris. See: Interview with Jean-Paul Lebas held on 15 
November 2013 in Paris. Unlike Lebas, Gavin was a British town planner who had worked on the London 
Docklands project, as well as on a number of projects in Dubai and elsewhere in the Gulf. See: Interview 
with Angus Gavin held on 27 August 2012 in Beirut. 
506
 See: Beyhum, Salam and Tabet, Beyrouth: Construire l’avenir reconstruire le passé?, p.18. 
507
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 The Detailed Plan was approved by Hariri’s government and issued together with some additional 
amendments to the master plan by Decree No. 4,830 (dated the 17
th
 of March 1994). See: Mango, Solidere: 
The Battle for Beirut’s Central District, p.67. See Figure 16.  
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Figure 45 – The Detailed Plan that was endorsed by the CDR on the 21st of October 1993. 
Source: Solidere, Information Memorandum, (Beirut: Solidere, 1993), p.1. 
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Solidere was officially incorporated on the 15
th
 of May 1994. But it was not the 
only company to be created at the time. In his capacity as prime minister, Hariri was 
quick to create real estate holding companies in both the northern littoral (Nahr el-Mott) 
and the southern suburbs. In the northern littoral, a company called Linord was formed to 
implement a project there. This company was established in November 1995. 
Interestingly, a section of this area came under the management of the Société Nationale 
d’Enterprises, which was a construction company privately owned by Joseph Khoury 
(the man Hariri won a contract with to execute Gemayel’s pet project). Khoury’s project 
is commonly known as the Dbayyeh project.
509
 Unlike the Dbayyeh project, the Linord 
project did not reach implementation. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this was because 
popular protests were successful at halting the project altogether. See Figure 46 for a map 
of the Dbayyeh and Linord projects. 
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 See: Atallah, ‘The Northern Sector: Projects and Plans at Sea’, pp.202-215. See also: Verdeil, Une ville 
et ses urbanistes: Beyrouth en reconstruction, pp.501-558. 
Figure 46 – A map illustrating the northern littoral divided between Linord and Joseph 
Khoury’s company. Source: Eric Verdeil, ‘Entre Guerre et Reconstruction: Remblais et 
Empietements Littoraux A Beyrouth’, in N. Baron-Yeles, L. Goeldner-Gianella and S. 
Velut, (Eds.), Le Littoral, regards, pratiques et savoirs, Etudes offertes à F. Verger, 
(Paris: Editions Rue D’Ulm, 2003), p.332. 
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In the southern suburbs, Elyssar was created. It was first revealed to the public in 
early 1994; specifically, when the press announced that a real estate company had been 
created based on Law 117 (the same law that was used to create both Solidere and 
Linord). This immediately provoked a negative reaction from both Amal and Hezbollah 
(the two main patrons of the Shiite community). Amal leader Nabih Berri made a famous 
statement: “Elisar is from Tyre not from Sidon,” suggesting that he was from Tyre and 
Hariri was from Sidon and that, therefore, he should have control over construction in the 
southern suburbs.
510
 Thus, Hariri had to enter negotiations with Amal and Hezbollah, and 
create an agreement whereby the latter two parties would be major players involved in 
the project. After three years of tough negotiations, the shape of the company, its aims 
and plans were announced.
511
 See Figure 47 for a map of the Elyssar project in the 
southern suburbs. 
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Figure 47 – A map illustrating the Elyssar project. Source: Harb el-Kak, “Transforming 
the Site of Dereliction into the Urban Culture of Modernity: Beirut’s Southern Suburb 
and Elisar Project”, p.177. 
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Conclusions 
 
To conclude, what distinguished Hariri from other new contractors was the amount 
of politico-economic power he was able to accumulate from his Saudi connection. Of 
course, he was one of several new contractors who sought foreign sponsors in order to 
increase their domestic standing. But while there were many new contractors who 
developed close relationships with the other countries (such as Najib Mikati and Issam 
Fares with the Syrian leadership), none of these countries relied on any one of them to 
represent their interests in the same way that Saudi Arabia relied on Hariri to gain control 
of, and manage, a larger percentage of their petrodollars entering Lebanon at the time. 
Thus, Hariri’s choice of Saudi Arabia as a foreign ally was a major determinant of his 
success in pushing the three construction projects forwards.  
 
So what does all this mean for the discussion on the neoliberalisaton process in 
Lebanon? In short, it means that by the early 1990s, Hariri was the main – if not the only 
– protagonist in his country pursuing neoliberal globalisation as a political project.512 Of 
all the new contractors, Hariri was the first to establish himself as a new political leader: 
not only had he demonstrated a certain degree of idealism and nationalism – emphasised 
by his philanthropic projects in his native Sidon, as well as by his private firm OGER 
Liban and its participation in the clean-up operation in Beirut – but he had also 
demonstrated a strong commitment to reaching a peace settlement, which he finally 
achieved in 1989 with the signing of the Ta’if Peace Accords. Hariri was also the first to 
be given exclusive rights of control over an administrative body or institution such as the 
CDR. Although there were several other new contractors like Hariri searching for 
investment opportunities at the time, none were able to negotiate the details of decrees 
and laws in the same way that he did. The final point to make is that Hariri was the first 
member of the new contractor bourgeoisie to become prime minister of the country. And 
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therefore, he was the first in line to be given authoritative, as well as allocative, powers to 
recruit allies and protégés from his network to the top posts of the state. 
 
Having identified and explained the interests of the different elites – including those 
of Rafiq Hariri – we can now assess the Solidere project itself. As explained at the start of 
this thesis, the Solidere project was pushed forward with two particular objectives: firstly, 
that it would help bring economic growth and prosperity to the country’s population; and 
secondly, that it would help to reconcile and reintegrate a divided society. But two 
decades since the company’s incorporation, the reconstruction process appears to have 
contributed towards: firstly, increasing the public debt; and secondly, reproducing 
sectarian divisions. In order to explain this outcome, the analysis will focus on the rent-
creating and -extracting mechanisms that Hariri put in place.  
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PART III 
 
 
 
Analysing and assessing the Solidere project: 
Exploratory case study 
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Chapter Six 
 
The consequences of the Solidere project 
 
 
 
 
 
In the previous two chapters, the discussion began by introducing the reader to the 
different types of elites involved in Beirut’s urban scene. Details were given on the 
historical sociology of each type of elite, and in turn, the kinds of interests they were 
pursuing over time. For example, it was shown that before the civil war, there was a 
commercial-financial bourgeoisie seeking to extract rents from the trade and financial 
sectors. In contrast, the militia leaders that emerged during the civil war came to depend 
on rents either from external sources (foreign state support, emigrants’ remittances), or 
domestic ones (goods, land and financial speculation). And finally, the analysis shed light 
on the new contractors, who were searching for investment opportunities during the civil 
war years. The analysis then explained Rafiq Hariri’s desire to create rents from large-
scale urban developments in Beirut: specifically, in Downtown Beirut, the northern 
littoral (Nahr el-Mott) and the southern suburbs.  
 
The discussion in the next couple of chapters will focus on the larger-scale 
reconstruction of Downtown Beirut, which was overseen by Solidere. The first of these 
two chapters will explain how the Solidere project contributed towards: firstly, increasing 
a public debt that was burdening the country at the time; and secondly, reproducing 
sectarian divisions in Lebanese politics and society. Importantly, most of the evidence 
used to explain this outcome is based on a rough ten-year period after Solidere was 
established and before Hariri was assassinated. In contrast, the second of the two chapters 
will look at the period following Hariri’s assassination in 2005. Here, it will be argued 
that those individuals who have stood behind the company since 2005 have maintained 
the rent-creation and -extraction mechanisms put in place by Hariri in previous years. 
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More importantly, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the backgrounds of those 
individuals, and explain where they fit in with regards to the neoliberalisation process.  
 
The current chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will explain 
how the Solidere project contributed towards the country’s staggering public debt. In 
short, it will be shown that Hariri’s desire to create and appropriate as much rent as 
possible from reconstruction in Downtown Beirut, the northern littoral (Nahr el-Mott) 
and the southern suburbs, mixed with huge amounts of public resources spent by the 
CDR on corruption and patron-client exchanges, led to increasing levels of public debt. 
This argument, however, will be placed in the context of other factors driving up the debt 
(most particularly, prior debt and other public expenditures). The second section of this 
chapter will explain how the Solidere project contributed towards reproducing sectarian 
divisions. This will be explained through analysing the effects of the ‘anti-corruption 
campaign’ that targeted Hariri and his protégés. This campaign triggered Hariri’s turn to 
a sectarian discourse, which became visibly demonstrated in the reconstruction process, 
and which inevitably transformed the Solidere project from one that used to be described 
as a ‘national project’, to one that became more closely identified with the Sunni 
community (which Hariri belonged to). This argument, again, will need to be placed in 
the context of a gradual breakdown in intra-elite relations and the deteriorating regional 
situation, both of which coincided with the neoliberal drive of Hariri and his technocrats. 
 
The chapter will then turn its attention to neoliberal urban developments in 
Lebanon more generally. To begin with, the patterns of competition and cooperation 
between Hariri and rival elites shaped the costs of the Solidere project. So, will all 
neoliberal urban developments reproduce similar economic and social costs?  Secondly, 
the Solidere project transformed from a national project to a Sunni project. Does this 
mean that neoliberal urban developments have a tendency to appeal to particularist, 
sectarian interests or not? 
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I. How did Solidere contribute towards increasing the public debt? 
 
To begin with, the Solidere project contributed towards increasing a public debt 
that was burdening the country at the time. Public debt had been virtually unknown in 
pre-civil war Lebanon. As discussed in Chapter 4, militias took over the ports and their 
customs points (which acted as the main source of government revenue). Even so, the 
state continued to pay its employees and, as a result, the country slipped into debt. In the 
first couple of years after the end of the civil war (and before Hariri came into office), the 
government regained some ability to collect customs and taxes and, therefore, public debt 
came under control. However, under the Hariri government expenditure and deficits 
skyrocketed and debt grew from 48% of GDP in 1992 to 176% in 2005 (the year that 
Hariri was assassinated).
513
 Therefore, to understand how the Solidere project contributed 
towards increasing the public debt, we need to have a closer look at public expenditures 
during this period, which did not just benefit new contractors involved in reconstruction: 
while government spending of public resources benefited the institutions that came under 
Hariri’s control, it also benefited other agencies – most significant of which were the 
‘welfare-related’ institutions and ministries that were being used as patronage instruments 
by other elite figures. 
 
 
i. The main institutions involved in rent-seeking 
 
Until his assassination on the 14
th
 of February 2005, Hariri served as prime minister 
from 1992 to 1998, and again from 2000 until his resignation on the 20
th
 of October 2004. 
During these two periods, he headed five different cabinets. Upon becoming prime 
minister on the 31
st
 of October 1992, Hariri distributed administrative bodies and 
institutions – and even cabinet positions – to a number of his rivals. This distribution 
                                                          
513
 According to the Lebanese Ministry of Finance, the net public debt as a percentage of estimated GDP 
increased from 48% in 1992, to 109% in 1998 and to 176% in 2005. According to figures published by the 
Finance Ministry, available at: http://www.finance.gov.lb/en-
US/finance/PublicDebt/Documents/PublicDebtTimesSeries/General%20Debt%20Overview.zip (Accessed 
15 August 2013). It must be noted that while the public debt appears to have started to decrease in recent 
years, it remains to be significantly above the 100% margin. 
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benefited various elite figures; most significant of which were former militia leaders 
Nabih Berri and Walid Junblatt. As discussed in Chapter 3, the former militia leaders 
used the welfare-related agencies that were allocated to them as patronage instruments. In 
contrast, Hariri sought to create and appropriate rents from the reconstruction process in 
Downtown Beirut, the northern littoral (Nahr el-Mott) and southern suburbs. It therefore 
raises the following question: which administrative bodies and institutions did Hariri 
instrumentalise to collect rent?  
 
In order to appropriate rents from the reconstruction process in Downtown Beirut, 
Hariri needed to ‘personally control’ all the key institutions that were concerned with 
reconstruction; most important of which were the Finance Ministry, the Central Bank, 
and the CDR. Before becoming prime minister, he did not have personal control over 
these institutions. At most, he could only ‘collaborate’ with the people who ran them.514 
When Hariri was appointed as prime minister in 1992, he used his newly-acquired 
‘authoritative’ and ‘allocative’ powers to install his technocratic allies and friends in all 
the relevant institutions concerned with reconstruction.
515
 This included finance 
specialists, engineers and lawyers; many of whom had worked for Hariri’s construction 
company OGER, or for one of his banks (notably, Banque Méditerranée and the Saudi 
Lebanese Bank). These people tended to come from all sects, and therefore, Hariri’s 
network was more cross-confessional than the networks of other politicians.
516
 Thus, the 
appointment of employees and confidents to important positions within these institutions 
was a strategic move that allowed Hariri to establish personal control over the decision-
making process in reconstruction matters. This can be demonstrated if we explore the 
three aforementioned institutions in detail. 
 
                                                          
514
 During the civil war, for example, Hariri had to deal with CDR head Mohammed Atallah – a Shihabist 
appointed by President Elias Sarkis in 1977 – if he wanted to influence decision-making in the CDR. See 
Chapter 5. 
515
 These terms of ‘authoritative’ and ‘allocative’ are borrowed from Heiko Schmid’s work: For further 
details, see: Schmid, ‘The Reconstruction of Downtown Beirut in the Context of Political Geography’, 
pp.239-240. 
516
 This point is made by Tom Najem as well in his study of reconstruction in post-civil war Lebanon. See: 
Najem, Lebanon’s Renaissance: The Political Economy of Reconstruction, p.95. 
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To begin with, one finds that Hariri gained personal control of the Finance Ministry 
and the Central Bank: the two main institutional bodies that would be involved in the 
financing of the reconstruction process in Downtown Beirut. With regards to the Finance 
Ministry, Hariri formally assumed the post himself, but later appointed Fouad Siniora as 
the person in charge at the rank of Minister of State. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Siniora 
was one of Hariri’s oldest childhood friends. He later joined Hariri’s business empire in 
1982 when he started running Hariri’s Groupe Mediterranee banking interests. It was 
because of Siniora’s background as Hariri’s most important financial advisor, that he was 
awarded the top post in the Finance Ministry. It is also worth mentioning that Siniora 
served as Finance Minister in all of Hariri’s future cabinets. Another central institution 
for financing the reconstruction process was the Central Bank. On the 1
st
 of August 1993, 
a previously unknown man called Riyadh Salameh became Governor of the Central 
Bank. When his appointment was announced, Beirut papers reported that Salameh had 
previously managed Hariri’s personal finance portfolio at Merrill Lynch in Paris.517 
Salameh’s six-year mandate as Central Bank Governor would be renewed for three 
further terms in 1999, 2005 and 2011. Thus, like the Finance Ministry, Hariri placed one 
of his former employees at the head of the Central Bank. Compared to the Finance 
Ministry and the Central Bank, however, the CDR is considered to be the most important 
institution in reconstruction matters. This is because it is the main agency in charge of 
government expenditures on reconstruction projects in the country. Hariri already 
enjoyed personal control over the CDR through Fadel el-Shallaq – who became the head 
of the agency in 1991 (see Chapter 5). While el-Shallaq was accountable to the 
government as a whole, Hariri alone had influence over him.
518
 When el-Shallaq’s term 
as the head of the CDR came to an end on the 9
th
 of June 1995, he was succeeded by 
Nabil el-Jisr (who was another close confidante of Hariri). Like el-Shallaq, el-Jisr held 
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 See: Gambill and Abdelnour, ‘Dossier: Rafiq Hariri’. 
518
 This led to disputes with some of the other ministers complaining about the lack of influence that they 
had on reconstruction matters. For example, in the spring of 1993, Tourism Minister Nicolas Fattoush 
criticised the role of the CDR, saying: “the cabinet was kept in the dark about many details of the 
government’s finances and the CDR was allowed to operate as a kind of super ministry accountable to no-
one.” Quoted in: Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 23 April 1993, p.27, in: Najem, Lebanon’s 
Renaissance: The Political Economy of Reconstruction, p.95. 
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senior management positions in Hariri’s Saudi OGER and OGER International.519 All in 
all, Siniora, Salameh and el-Shallaq are described here as ‘technocrats’ who fit the profile 
of ‘globalising elites’, defined by Gill as a grouping of ‘organic intellectuals’ and 
‘political leaders’ that were – in the cases above – strategically located in transnational 
companies and banks.
520
 The most important fact to note is that Hariri’s recruits came 
from a variety of confessional backgrounds, and were not necessarily from the Sunni 
community. Take Salameh, for example: he was a Maronite Christian. This therefore 
accords to Wallerstein’s observation (mentioned in Chapter 3), that the ‘cadres’ of many 
companies (or bureaucracies) are picked based on merit rather than identity.
521
 
 
Thus, Rafiq Hariri enjoyed personal control over the key institutions that were 
concerned with reconstruction matters in Downtown Beirut, the northern littoral (Nahr el-
Mott) and the southern suburbs. But this was not enough to control the reconstruction 
process in Downtown Beirut. The reconstruction was to be carried out by a private 
company called Solidere. This company was to consist of shareholders, who would have 
the final say on all reconstruction matters in the area. Out of the 33,000 shareholders, 
Hariri was the biggest. However, he subscribed to only 6.5% of the total shares (valued at 
US$125 million).
522
 He may have bought more shares in subsequent years, but he could 
not have owned more than 10% of the 165 million shares available in the company.
523
 In 
order to build his subscription, Hariri held shares through his private banks. He also used 
employees, family members and friends to control a much larger share of voting rights. 
For example, Hariri’s associate and former OGER employee Nasser Chammaa was 
instructed to hold shares on behalf of Hariri’s family and friends, including his son (Saad 
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 El-Jisr was also the former head of OGER in Paris. See: Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 23 
June 1995, p.15, in: ibid. 
520
 See: Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order: Second Edition Fully Revised and Updated, 
p.194. 
521
 See: Wallerstein, World Systems Analysis: An Introduction, p.40. 
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 This is according to: Blanford, Killing Mr Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on 
the Middle East, p.44. 
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 Despite the many rumours claiming that he owned as much as 50% of the shares in the company, the 
truth is that he could not have owned (directly or indirectly) more than 10% of the shares. This is according 
to people interviewed who were close to Hariri at the time. Many staunch critics have made claims that 
Hariri owned somewhere between 19 to 50% of shares in Solidere. But as stipulated in Law 117, and in 
Article 17 of the company’s Articles of Incorporation: “No shareholder, whether he be a natural person or 
body corporate, may directly or indirectly own more than 10% (ten percent) of the Company’s capital.” As 
quoted in: Solidere, Articles of Incorporation, p.11. 
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Hariri) and his childhood friend (Siniora).
524
 It is worth mentioning that Chammaa was 
also appointed as the Chairman of the company’s Board of Directors, and still holds this 
position today. Another example worth mentioning is one of Hariri’s close business 
associates Issam Fayez Makarem.
525
 Like Hariri, Makarem was a successful expatriate 
businessman who had built his fortunes abroad (specifically, in Nigeria). In this context, 
Makarem fits the profile of a new contractor, like Hariri, Mikati, Safadi (and others). 
When Makarem returned to Lebanon, he was inspired by Hariri’s ambitious plan to 
reconstruct Downtown Beirut. Upon hearing about it, he approached Hariri: 
 
“[Like Hariri] I came back to Lebanon in the beginning of the 1990s. When 
Hariri joined politics, I was impressed by what he was saying and doing. I 
watched him, and marveled at the good intentions he had to help the country. 
As an emigrant as well, I thought I should go introduce myself to Hariri and 
offer my services in contributing to the country. Not long after that, we 
became very good friends and even working partners.”526  
 
Not long after becoming friends, Makarem was approached by Hariri and asked to 
become a major investor in Solidere and also to buy property in Downtown Beirut: 
 
“When Solidere was first established, he [Hariri] contacted me and said, 
‘Issam, I advise you to buy shares in Solidere.’ So I bought shares. And later 
when Solidere was selling land, Hariri contacted me again and said, ‘Issam, I 
advise you to buy a plot of land, and even more than one plot if you can.’ So I 
did. But then, after I had signed the contract, I had a meeting with Hariri and 
showed him the plot of land I had chosen. He looked at the map and said, 
‘Issam, you are my friend, and therefore, I should tell you that this plot you 
chose is not for you. I want to give you a better plot.’ So, as he was giving me 
an alternative suggestion, I told him, ‘but Rafiq, I have already signed the 
contract for this other plot.’ He then reassured me, saying, ‘That doesn’t 
matter. Tomorrow, call Nasser [Chammaa] and he will change your papers no 
problem. I will tell him as well.’ When I arrived to Nasser’s office the next 
morning, he said, ‘Do not worry, Hariri already told me, and I have changed 
the papers.’”527  
                                                          
524
 According to a document obtained by the newspaper Al-Akhbar in 2012, Hariri’s Banque Méditerranée 
is believed to be holding over 15 million shares, while Chammaa is believed to be acting upon the behalf of 
the original owners of a further 6.7 million shares. See: Mouhamad Wehbe, ‘Lebanon Real Estate: Who 
Owns Solidere?’, Al-Akhbar, [in Arabic], 02 August 2012. 
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 It is worth noting that Issam Fayez Makarem is related to the author. 
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 Interview with Issam Fayez Makarem on 22 July 2012 in Ras el Metn (Lebanon). 
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 Interview with Issam Fayez Makarem on 22 July 2012 in Ras el Metn (Lebanon). 
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Today, Makarem holds around 479,000 shares in the company. He is also the proud 
owner of Berytus Parks, which is a Class-A office space that is leased to various 
international companies. Some examples include Credit Suisse, Citi Bank and Microsoft, 
amongst others.
528
 The most important fact to note is that Makarem did not belong to the 
Sunni community either. He was recruited by Hariri because of his merits; not his 
identity. Again, this seems to conform to Wallerstein’s observation that ‘cadres’ of 
economic managements are recruited based on ‘universal criteria’.529   
 
Going back to the idea of personally controlling all the key institutions that were 
concerned with reconstruction, the major decision-makers in the reconstruction process 
were the following: the Board of Directors of Solidere (in which Hariri was heavily 
represented by himself and through others), the president of the CDR Fadel el-Shallaq 
(who as mentioned in the previous chapter was a former employee in Hariri’s OGER 
Liban), and Hariri himself in his capacity as prime minister to appoint his confidantes to 
different ministries and agencies concerned with reconstruction. In relation to this, 
Reinoud Leenders comments: “In the murky institutional environment of Lebanon’s 
largest reconstruction project in history, Hariri had thus basically negotiated the contract 
terms with himself”.530 
 
 
ii. How were rents being created and extracted from these institutions? 
 
To understand how the Solidere project contributed towards increasing the public 
debt, we must begin by looking at how rents were being created and extracted (more 
generally). In the welfare-related agencies, for example, there were indications that 
enormous rents were derived: firstly, from over-staffing (by providing jobs to 
                                                          
528
 The number of shares held by Makarem is based on the figure given by him during an interview. Of 
course, the number of shares owned by him may subsequently have changed.  
529
 See: Wallerstein, World Systems Analysis: An Introduction, p.40. 
530
 See: Leenders, ‘Public Means to Private Ends: State Building and Power in Post-war Lebanon’, p.321. 
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supporters); and secondly, from allowing fraudulent practices to take place unnoticed.
531
 
In terms of reconstruction in Downtown Beirut (and elsewhere), the main source of rents 
was to come from the transfer of property rights to a single real estate company (REC) in 
exchange for shares in the company to the original owners. The justification for creating a 
private REC was drawn up by combining pragmatic arguments rooted in the particularity 
of the post-civil war environment with neoliberal ideology that advocated for private 
sector-led reconstruction and low government involvement. However, the concept of 
creating an REC to carry out and finance the reconstruction project did have a historical 
precedent. 
 
The concept of RECs first gained traction in 1977, when the Lebanese government 
approved a law that established a mechanism for public and private partnerships to occur. 
The intention behind the 1977 REC law was to liberate the relatively impoverished 
government from the burden of publically financing projects of such a sheer scale and 
size. The law would also provide private developers and investors with the opportunity to 
approach the government with redevelopment proposals, which, if approved by the 
relevant authorities, would obtain proper legal backing for their implementation.
532
 
Between 1983 and 1986, the CDR launched a major study of the metropolitan area of 
Beirut. While the study focused on most of the city and its outskirts, it did not include the 
city centre. The study culminated in the publication of the ‘Le schéma directeur de la 
région métropolitaine de Beyrouth’ (details of this master plan were provided in Chapter 
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 These issues have been widely discussed in Lebanon and some evidence crops up in several reports. In 
education, pupil-teacher ratios in public schools stood at 8:1 compared to 17:1 in private schools in the 
1990s. See: Ramla Khalidi-Beyhum, Poverty Reduction Policies in Jordan and Lebanon: An Overview, 
(New York: UN, 1999), p.61. Over-staffing is one reason for this discrepancy, with reports suggesting that 
teachers were receiving salaries without actually working. In the health sector, private hospitals were over-
charging public social security funds while ‘political pressure’ prevented the Ministry of Health from 
investigating the abuses. See: Walid Ammar, Health System and Reform in Lebanon, (Beirut: WHO and 
Ministry of Public Health, Lebanon, 2003), p.56. There is also evidence to suggest that ministers were 
channelling social benefits to their electoral constituencies rather than to those who need them most. An 
internal paper by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) shows that spending did not benefit the poorest. 
The north, for example, is home to 30.0% of the most deprived, but they received only 13.9% of the MOSA 
budget in support of NGOs, social care institutions, and development projects. In contrast, the governorate 
of Mount Lebanon – which is home to 27.2% of the deprived – received 44.6% of the budget. This suggests 
that political factors, rather than need, were the basis for allocating public funds. See: Ministry of Social 
Affairs, ‘Situation of the relationship between the Ministry of Social Affairs and the NGO sector in 
Lebanon’, [in Arabic], Internal Report, 2001. 
532
 See: Kabbani, Prospects for Lebanon: The Reconstruction of Beirut, p.8. 
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4). When the CDR released this master plan to the public, it took everyone by surprise. 
The funding requirements for such a master plan had grown significantly in terms of 
financial and infrastructural needs. Indeed, a World Bank team that visited Lebanon in 
November 1982, suggested in a report produced in February 1983 that a reconstruction 
programme to cover the Greater Beirut area alone would cost an estimated total of 
US$6.4 billion.
533
 Based on the government’s financial situation, the CDR produced a 
report in early 1985 explaining that about three-quarters of the funds required would have 
to come from ‘external sources’. Ideally – it suggested – 50 to 60% of this would come in 
the form of grants, 20 to 30% would come in the form of long-term soft loans, and the 
rest would come in the form of syndicated loans.
534
 But such figures were still out of the 
government’s reach. Even if this ambitious target was met, the government would still 
have to come up with around US$1.6 billion.  
 
In light of these financial problems that the government was facing at the time, the 
Middle East Economic Consultants (MEEC) prepared a report in June 1985 proposing the 
idea of completely abandoning the public-private collaboration and instead permitting the 
establishment of completely ‘private institutions’ which would oversee reconstruction 
projects in the country.
535
 Importantly, the MEEC report concluded that private 
institutions (complete with the necessary funding and institutional capacities that the 
government lacked), would be the only possible means of reconstructing war-damaged 
areas in a meaningful manner. This report provided an important basis for the creation of 
an REC to carry out and finance the reconstruction of Downtown Beirut. By the summer 
                                                          
533
 It is difficult to conduct a complete survey and inventory of the waste, damage and destruction inflicted 
on the country and its economy. However, fairly extensive surveys have been conducted by the CDR. 
According to one such survey conducted in late 1982, a reconstruction programme for the entire country 
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of 1991, the Dar al-Handassah (Eddeh) Plan was disclosed to the public for review. 
Importantly, the accompanying report concluded that there was ‘no other solution’ than 
the creation of a private REC to carry out and fund this plan, and recommended the 1977 
REC law to be updated so as to expand the responsibilities of the CDR to include 
monitoring such a firm. The updated law came to be known as ‘Law 117’ (discussed in 
Chapter 5). Importantly, this modified law broadened the scope of the REC. Unlike 
before, the REC would now have the legal prerogatives to be entirely responsible for the 
construction of public properties (such as roads, squares and public gardens), and ensure 
the execution of infrastructure improvements (such as the water system, electricity, 
sewage and drainage systems, roads, sidewalks, lampposts, garages, telecommunications 
network and all other public facilities and installations in the area concerned) at the 
expense of the state.
536
 In turn, the state would reimburse the REC for all ‘infrastructure 
costs’ incurred, either in the form of cash (to be paid in US dollars), a share of reclaimed 
land (if the damaged area was adjacent to the sea) and/or of state-owned land in the area 
concerned, a concession for the exploitation of infrastructure services (with the 
stipulation that “such exploitation shall be made by virtue of laws to promulgated in this 
respect”), or through a combination of all the above.537 The new law also grants the REC 
a series of incentives to entice development. One such incentive would be a ten-year tax 
exemption from income tax from the date of its formation.
538
 It is worth noting that these 
‘perks’ apply to other companies, like Linord and Elyssar. 
 
As Harvey explains, Law 117 is a typical example of neoliberal legislation 
produced by the state that advantages private corporations: “the state assumes much of 
the risk while the private sector takes most of the profits”.539 When this law was first 
passed, it was difficult to assess how much the state was risking. However, it is now 
possible to assess the extent. In 1994, the Lebanese government – which was headed by 
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 See: Article 3, Clause VII, ‘Rights and Obligations of the Company’, in: Solidere, Law No. 91 – 117 of 
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 December 1991: Fifth Edition, p.13. 
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 See: ibid. See also: Solidere, Information Memorandum, p.29. 
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Hariri – signed over reclaimed land converted from a landfill area that had sprung up 
during the war (what would later become the Waterfront district).
540
 See Figures 48 and 
49 for images of the reclaimed land. This was done in order to recompense the private 
company for ‘infrastructure works’ it was to conduct in the city centre.541 Solidere also 
acquired an additional land area in the traditional BCD. But critics raised concerns that 
the government may have overpaid Solidere. This can be confirmed by calculations made 
by Leenders, according to whom Solidere was expecting to make US$900 million from 
land sales in the landfill. For the additional land it acquired in the traditional BCD, 
Solidere made an additional US$237 million in profits. In total, this meant that Solidere 
made up to US$1.137 billion in revenues.
542
 According to Mounir Douaidy (Solidere’s 
General Manager and Financial Director), the real costs of the infrastructure works 
carried out on behalf of the state amounted to US$650 million.
543
 The company’s profits, 
therefore, amounted to US$487 million.
544
 As Leenders rightly points out, the 
fundamental flaw in the law comes down to the serious mismatch between the real costs 
of the operations and the revenues that Solidere generated from the landfill and the 
additional surface area acquired in the traditional BCD. Importantly, the excess income 
that Solidere made from the landfill should not be understood to imply corruption; rather, 
it should be understood as rents: illegal transactions should not be confused with legal 
payments that are officially approved. The difference between the two is not always 
delineated clearly, but it is central to the analysis if we want to understand the 
implications of rent-seeking. What follows is a question about efficiency. As some 
scholars have argued, rent-seeking can sometimes be efficient, and in other cases, be 
essential for promoting growth and development.
545
 But as will be shown shortly, the 
conflicts of interest that emerged as a result of caused more harm than good.  
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 This information was obtained from: Leenders, ‘Public Means to Private Ends: State Building and 
Power in Post-war Lebanon’, pp.313-315. 
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Figure 49 – Another image of the reclaimed land converted from a landfill. Source: 
Mosbah Assi (Solidere photographer).  
 
Figure 48 – An image of the reclaimed land converted from a landfill. Source: Solidere, 
Annual Report, (Beirut: Solidere, 2004), p.4.  
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While Law 117 provided a framework for the creation of RECs to reconstruct war-
damaged areas, it was in fact updated in a way that would fit the contemporary needs of 
the city centre as well. According to the law, the REC would, “earmark a certain 
percentage of its available funds received from cash subscriptions for restoring buildings 
which are not intended to be demolished and for the construction of new buildings in the 
area concerned”.546 Essentially, this meant that all properties within any war-damaged 
area would now be treated as a single development block. This approach was justified by 
the extent of the damage inflicted on the city centre. In other words, the severe damage to 
properties and infrastructure made it necessary to entrust the whole area to one company 
rather than dividing up the area into several smaller-sized areas assigned to separate 
companies. This would give the company a free hand to smoothly redesign the area, with 
any losses incurred being treated as a cost spread out over the entire project. The 
government of the time also justified the idea of treating the entire area as a single 
development block based on the claim that such an approach ensured ‘absolute equality 
of treatment’ of all the property-rights holders inside the city centre; irrespective of the 
status of the properties.
547
 This second point is worth particular attention because the 
transfer of property rights was to be the main source of rents. The idea here was to 
transfer property rights in exchange for shares in the REC.
548
 The rationale for the 
expropriation was the complex web of ownership rights, with both landowners and 
tenants having claims to properties – some dating back to Ottoman times (as 
demonstrated previously in Chapter 4). According to some estimates, the number of 
rights holders was believed to range from 100,000 to 150,000 landowners and tenants.
549
 
The rights holders received US$1.17 billion in shares as compensation, while another 
US$650 million was raised through a public issue in January 1994, which was 
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oversubscribed by 142%.
550
 Over 90% of rights holders accepted the deal and took the 
shares.
551
 But most did not benefit from the shares they received from Solidere. This was 
because the properties were undervalued: what had been valued at US$800 per square 
metre of built-up area began selling at US$5,000 to US$10,000.
552
 This was even before 
infrastructure works were completed. By 2007, land was being sold at US$15,000 to 
US$20,000 per square metre.
553
 Combined with the substantial tax breaks (such as the 
dividends to shareholders, capital gains from the sale of shares, as well as direct income 
that was exempted from tax for ten years following the company’s incorporation in 
1994), Solidere made huge profits from the land sales.
554
 It is worth stressing that the 
former landowners – many of whom belonged to the pre-civil war bourgeoisie – were not 
completely opposed to the idea of a financially-lucrative company such as Solidere. What 
they were unhappy about was the fact that Hariri and his protégés benefited more than 
they did. Some of the rights holders complained that their shares were issued late, even 
when the secondary market had already been established: of the total 11.7 million shares 
allocated to the former landowners, only 2.6 million had been distributed by April 
1995.
555
 This means that most had missed the peak when the share price skyrocketed 
from US$100 (at issue) to US$170 in August 1994. The share price fell back down to 
US$150 and US$130 within two weeks.
556
 This continued to fall until share prices 
hovered between US$3 and US$10 in 1997 to 2004.
557
 The picture that therefore emerges 
is one in which the former landowners (and tenants) did not share in the land rents 
realised by the company’s main shareholders, which included Hariri and his protégés.  
 
Once the company had gained full control of Downtown Beirut, it pursued a 
strategy of maximising profit by doubling the urban density of the area and tripling the 
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floor-area-ratio (FAR) factor.
558
 Chapter 5 covered the heated clash that emerged 
between Hariri and Eddeh (the head of the design team appointed by Dar Al-Handasah) 
concerning the proposed increase of the urban density in the city centre. Importantly, the 
drastic increase in urban density meant that much of the area’s historic fabric had to be 
demolished. According to renowned Lebanese architect Assem Salam, 80% of the 
original fabric was cleared by Solidere: “In the end, more buildings were demolished by 
Solidere than had been destroyed during the civil war”.559 Those parts of the city centre 
that were recuperated were those that already had the highest density:  
 
“Certain districts like the Wadi Bou Jmil and Ghalghoul did not suffer from 
the war as much as others such as Place d’Etoile and Saifi. But because the 
majority of the buildings in Wadi Bou Jmil and Ghalghoul had a very low 
density, the old fabric of these two areas was labelled as ‘not worth 
preserving’. Now when you look at the master plan of downtown, most of the 
high-rise buildings will be built in these two districts.”560  
 
Even though more historic buildings were, eventually, preserved – not least since 
Ousamma Kabbani was hired to review the Eddeh Master Plan (see Chapter 5) – the 
Solidere project is still replete with high-rise buildings. The construction of several glass 
and steel high-rises in the city centre falls in line with the trend elsewhere in the region, 
where cities and city-regions are replicating the tall buildings that can be found in Gulf 
cities like Dubai.
561
 One journalist makes this comparison with Gulf cities when 
describing the reconstruction process: “Solidere has a ‘desert mentality’… it sees 
Downtown Beirut as an ‘empty desert’ where we can build another desert city”.562 Not 
everyone was surprised by the transformation of Downtown Beirut into a desert city. 
Nabil Beyhum, for example, predicted that this would happen from as early as 1992:  
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“But is Beirut really a desert city? Is it a city without a history, which one can 
simply abandon to the bulldozers? ... Will Beirut be reconstructed without 
being lost, without closing itself off, without ultimately being forced to deny 
itself? Will the feeling of tolerance which existed in the Ottoman city be 
allowed to prevail once again?”563 
 
Again, profits were to be realised by shareholders in Solidere, as well as the property 
developers who bought land from the private company. Many of the buyers were local, 
but they also included international buyers, most of whom were based in the Gulf. As a 
result, the Solidere project is considered an ‘elite playing field’, where various players are 
shaping Downtown Beirut in line with their own interests.
564
 All in all, the aim of the 
property developers has been to cater to the high-end and luxury segment of the market; 
be it hotels, retail, or residential buildings. It was precisely this effort to capture the 
lucrative end of the market that was intended to attract the international investor. 
Targeting the international investor falls in line with the neoliberal rationale of deferring 
to the needs of capital.
565
 See Figures 50 to 52 for images of some of the buildings that 
were constructed in the area. 
 
At this stage, an exploration of the Lebanese state’s compensation to Solidere is 
required. It is worth remembered that, Law 117 stipulates that Solidere (as an REC) 
would be reimbursed by the state (through the CDR) for all infrastructure costs incurred. 
One form of reimbursement involved signing over the Waterfront district. Cash (US 
dollars) was another form of reimbursement. But due to the high volume of welfare-
related expenditures, the government had little money at the time to fulfil its end of the 
agreement.  In light of such circumstances, Hariri and his technocrats believed that the 
best way to solve this problem would be to introduce the notion of ‘government 
borrowing’. Since they were in charge of the main agencies concerned with economics  
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Figure 50 – An image of completed 5-star hotels and luxury apartment buildings in the 
Hotel district. Photo taken by author.  
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Figure 52 – An image of construction sites in the Hotel district. Notice that high-rises are 
being built in these plots as well. Photo taken by author.  
 
Figure 51 – Another image of completed 5-star hotels and luxury apartment buildings in 
the Hotel district. Not a significant change from the Eddeh Plan. Photo taken by author.  
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and finance, they were able to make this idea a reality.
566
 The Central Bank Governor, 
Salameh, formalised this notion of borrowing in the ‘Horizon 2000’ plan, which 
consisted of securing a cumulative volume of public investments of US$18 billion over 
the period of 1995 to 2007.
567
 Importantly, the government expected that 
indebtednesswould grow during this period. Indeed, figures would later show that a sharp 
increase in public spending, coupled with substantial government over-borrowing and 
growing interest rates, led to a ballooning public debt.
568
 The Shihabist former Finance 
Minister Georges Corm argues that Hariri was deliberately permitting the debt burden to 
reach astronomical levels in order to benefit from it.
569
 In order to understand the extent 
with which Hariri benefited, we need to have a general look at the main beneficiaries of 
rent created by government over-borrowing. The government financed its debt by selling 
Lebanese pound denominated treasury bills, which were primarily bought up by 
commercial banks (the vast majority of which were Lebanese). Between December 1993 
and December 1998, banks held between two thirds and three quarters of all Lebanese 
Pound denominated debt at any one time.
570
 The World Bank calculated that government 
expenditure on public debt transactions – the cost of rent-creation through government 
debt management – reached 14.5% of GDP in 1997. While this figure is high, it should be 
put in the context of spending on community and social services, which includes 
education, health, and social and welfare, and which reached 7.8% of GDP in 1997.
571
 
This meant that Lebanese commercial banks benefited more from government spending 
than welfare-related agencies did. But some observers suggest that Hariri’s banks, which 
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included Banque Mediterranée, became some of the largest investors in Lebanese debt. 
For example, Richard Becherer argues that Hariri’s banks were purchasing the ‘lion’s 
share’ of the Lebanese pound denominated treasury bills, which was sometimes at an 
interest rate that topped 30%.
572
 While such estimates cannot be proven as long as they 
are based on ‘allegations’ and ‘accusations’, the sentiment behind this data deserves to be 
spelled out when comparing it to Hariri’s personal wealth, which almost doubled during 
the same period.
573
 
 
It cannot be stressed enough that Solidere was not the only REC to be created at the 
time. As mentioned in Chapter 5, other RECs included Linord in the northern littoral and 
Elyssar in the southern suburbs. Before it was abandoned, Linord resembled Solidere in 
that it would facilitate rent-creation and -extraction for investors. For example, the 
Lebanese state recompensed the company for the cost of land reclamation by giving it 
property rights over the reclaimed land. Furthermore, urban planning was oriented around 
the strategy of maximising profits but deliberately isolating it from the surrounding 
environment to emphasise its exclusivity.
574
 The idea behind Elyssar was also very much 
like that of Solidere and Linord: to create rents from land that would be developed for 
high-value office spaces, luxury residences and tourism facilities. The only difference 
was that Amal and Hezbollah held up Hariri’s plans. But both parties were not 
necessarily opposed to the project in principle. Rather, they sought to become part of it in 
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order to gain a share of the rents which they could direct towards their Shiite supporters 
in the area.
575
 
 
 
iii. Expenditures on corruption and patron-client exchanges to capture rents 
 
The second step towards understanding how the Solidere project contributed 
towards increasing the public debt, is by addressing government expenditures on 
corruption and patron-client exchanges to capture rents.
576
 Of course, such expenditures 
were not limited to the CDR when dealing with reconstruction matters in Downtown 
Beirut, the northern littoral (Nahr el-Mott) and southern suburbs: welfare-related 
agencies, most significant of which were the Council for South Lebanon and the Ministry 
of the Displaced, expended public resources on these two processes as well.
577
 The 
welfare-related agencies mentioned here are analysed in terms of rent-creation and -
extraction, but this does not mean that the provision of welfare is a ‘rent’. It is the 
wastage and political use of state welfare as a patronage instrument that constitutes the 
rent element.
578
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Though Hariri was the prime minister, and in a position to control all the key 
institutions concerned with reconstruction matters in Beirut, this did not guarantee that 
there would not be any ‘spoilers’ along the way. If he wanted to maintain his mechanisms 
of rent-creation and -extraction, he had to ensure that his rivals constantly ‘got what they 
wanted’. Hariri negotiated with properties, shares and positions in Solidere, Linord and 
Elyssar. He also distributed public (and private) resources to them. These resources 
reached their intended recipient, either as cash bribes, or as patronage money. According 
to Harvey, this is what Reagan and Thatcher did: “once the state apparatus made the neo-
liberal turn it could use its powers of persuasion, co-optation, bribery, and threat to 
maintain the climate of consent necessary to perpetuate its power.”579 All in all, the 
expenditure of public resources on corruption and clientelism – both in matters related to 
the reconstruction process and the welfare-related agencies – contributed towards 
increasing the public debt. But it raises the following question: who exactly did Hariri 
distribute public resources to, and why?  
 
Before answering this question, we must begin by identifying those individuals and 
groups that opposed the Solidere project. In less than a year since its establishment, 
Solidere had generated a staunch opposition against it. Of course, it is misleading to 
simply say ‘the opposition’. While sometimes joined in their efforts and advertising 
campaigns, the opposition was by no means a unified block, and was instead, split into 
four distinct groupings: firstly, the former landowners and tenants, who objected to the 
existence of a company that appropriated private land; secondly, the displaced/refugees 
who were squatting in the abandoned buildings; thirdly, the intellectuals and 
professionals, who objected on purely aesthetic, environmental, or intellectual grounds or 
those of historical precedent; and finally, the Christian and Muslim foundations, which 
maintained a symbolic representation of their religions in the city centre through the 
mosques and church buildings, and which could hardly be ignored in the reconstruction 
process because they could rely on strong socio-political support.
580
 Since becoming 
prime minister, and after appointing technocratic allies and friends to all the key 
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institutions concerned with reconstruction, one finds high levels of public and private 
resources being distributed by Hariri to undermine the efforts of these groups. Of course, 
expenditures on these two processes are not unique to Lebanon.
581
 
 
With regards to the former landowners and tenants, Hariri used cash incentives, but 
he also distributed properties, shares and positions in Solidere to the most powerful 
figures in this group. Most significantly, he offered Maher Daouk membership of the 
board of directors of Solidere.
582
 Maher Daouk came from a well-known Sunni-Beiruti 
family with significant properties in the city centre (see Chapter 4). Importantly, he was 
the cousin of Omar Daouk, who headed the Association of Owners of Rights in the Beirut 
Central District (one of the many committees of landowners and tenants that banded 
together to prevent the reconstruction project from taking place). Hariri then used Maher 
Daouk to create a ‘counter-committee’ that would hinder the work of the mainstream 
opposition committees.
583
 This was a heavily symbolic gesture, as Hariri sought to 
delegitimise his opponents. Besides Maher Daouk, Hariri also managed to ‘co-opt’ some 
large property owners with political influence as well. One example was businessman and 
politician Michel el-Murr. Initially, el-Murr was opposed to Solidere’s planned 
expropriation of his Murr Tower (see Figure 53) – a half-completed office tower sitting 
on the fringes of the Solidere area.
584
 But in 1994, he agreed to sell his property in 
exchange for US$12 million worth of Solidere shares. Hariri later paid him another US$3 
million in cash.
585
 El-Murr was also allowed to stay as Deputy Prime Minister in Hariri’s 
1995 cabinet line-up.
586
 A similar situation happened with Tammam Salam, who was the 
head of the Maqasid Foundation, and a major landowner in the city centre. In this regard,  
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Figure 53 – An image of Murr Tower (Arabic: Burj el-Murr). It is a 35-storey unfinished 
tower situated in the south-western corner of the Solidere area. Photo taken by author. 
 
241 
 
Salam eventually acquiesced when a seat on the company’s board was created and 
awarded to Sami Nahas as a ‘representative of the Maqasid Foundation’.587 And finally, 
Hariri managed to gain the support of veteran journalist and politician Ghassan Tuwayni. 
Like el-Murr and Salam, he and his family were major landowners in the downtown area. 
As chief-in-editor of An-Nahar (one of Lebanon’s leading Arabic newspapers), Tuwayni 
used his position in his family’s newspaper to campaign against the Solidere project.588 
However, this campaign came to an end as soon as Hariri offered Tuwayni a plot of land 
next to Martyrs’ Square to build a new headquarters for An-Nahar (see Figure 54).589  
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Figure 54 – An image of An-Nahar’s new headquarters. It is situated in the north-western 
corner of Martyrs’s Square. Photo taken by author. 
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This co-optation tactic was not only used on the former landowners. It was also 
used on many of the intellectuals and professionals that opposed Solidere as well. One 
example was Oussama Kabbani (mentioned in Chapter 5). In 1992, Kabbani was invited 
by Oxford University’s Centre for Lebanese Studies (CLS) to give a presentation at a 
conference in London on the reconstruction of Beirut. By September of 1992, with the 
support of CLS, he compiled his criticisms of the Eddeh Master Plan and published a 
small book entitled Prospects for Lebanon: The Reconstruction of Beirut.
590
 Later that 
year, Solidere hired Kabbani to review the master plan for its reconstruction project. In 
1994, he became the manager of the town planning department, and in 1997, he became 
the head of the urban management department at Solidere.
591
 More significantly, Kabbani 
became a member of Solidere’s Board of Directors in July of 2012.592 Another example is 
Jad Tabet (also mentioned in Chapter 5), who had originally criticised the initial master 
plan, only to later become the leading planner for the reconstruction of the aswaq in 
Downtown Beirut.
593
 Interestingly though, Tabet stresses that his opposition to Solidere 
did not ‘waver’ like that of Kabbani (and others). In this context, he rejects the suggestion 
that he was co-opted by Hariri and Solidere. Rather, he explains his recruitment as 
coming at a time when he sensed the opposition movement was already defeated, and 
therefore, describes his acceptance of the job offer as a last-ditch attempt to change the 
master plan from ‘within the company’. According to Tabet, his long-time friend Assem 
Salam had encouraged him to accept the job offer as well. When Tabet realised his limits 
in influencing the decision-making process within the company, he chose to quit.
594
 
 
Then there were the ‘Awqaf’: in other words, the ‘charitable religious endowments’ 
which refused to relinquish their property interests in the downtown area. Because the 
Awqaf had the power to mobilise their followers against the Solidere project, Hariri made 
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sure to distribute as many shares as possible to close associates who could also represent 
the interests of each religious community. Some examples of close associates that held 
shares on behalf of the Awqaf include: Fouad El-Khazen as the representative of the 
Maronite Waqf; Raphael Sabbagha as the representative of the Greek Orthodox Waqf; 
Basile Yared as the representative of the Greek Catholic Waqf; and Faysal Tabbarah as 
the representative of the Islamic (Sunni) Waqf.
595
 Interestingly, these four people were 
also amongst the first members to be elected to the company’s Board of Directors. 
Essentially, the way shares were distributed meant that the Solidere project was now 
surrounded by an intersection of sectarian interests. This therefore requires a re-
exploration of Hariri’s own sectarianism. Before Solidere was established, the late 
businessman surrounded himself with advisors and associates based on competence, not 
confession. The appointments of Siniora, Salameh and el-Shallaq are cases in point. And 
as mentioned before, this conforms to Wallerstein’s observation of ‘cadres’ that are 
recruited to ensure the smooth running of companies (or bureaucracies).
596
 Indeed, when 
analysing the relationships between the above individuals and the former prime minister, 
we discover that many had a long history of working with Hariri before becoming 
involved in the Solidere project. To take Yared as an example: before becoming the 
representative of the Greek Catholic Waqf, he served as a board member in Hariri’s 
Banque Méditerranée (since 1985), as well as Hariri’s legal advisor.597 Therefore, Hariri 
was able to utilise these advisors later on because they came from different sects. 
 
In terms of public resources, the most significant expenditure on corruption and 
patron-client exchanges came about when Hariri and Solidere had to deal with the 
‘squatter issue’ in Downtown Beirut. The reconstruction process in Downtown Beirut 
was to undergo a process of ‘class segregation’ in order to turn it into ‘an island for the 
rich’.598 In order to achieve this, however, Hariri needed to evict the displaced citizens 
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who had occupied the abandoned buildings in the area (see Figures 55 and 56). As 
demolition crews went in to bulldoze the area, Solidere began paying squatters to leave. 
According to Mounir Douaidy (Solidere’s General Manager and Financial Director), 
families elsewhere in the city began arriving in order to benefit from the pay-offs as 
well.
599
 Some were genuine refugees from South Lebanon, while others were simply 
squatters. A1991 Solidere survey of the population in Downtown Beirut initially showed 
that there were only 2,500 illegal families. In a 1993 count, the number had soared to 
4,500.
600
 According to Douaidy, the final count said that there were as many as 20,000 
refugee families that received compensation.
601
 The Solidere pay-off scale was fixed at 
US$8,000 to US$12,000 per family. But considering the hardship some of these families 
endured, some were demanding higher payments. In this regard, it is alleged that some 
families were paid as much as US$100,000 before they agreed to leave.
602
 Since most of 
the families squatting in the area were Shiites from Israeli-occupied South Lebanon, their 
patrons, Amal and Hezbollah, were quick to defend their interests.
603
 In this context, 
Douaidy claims that the two parties were responsible for driving in pick-up trucks full of 
other Shiite families, telling them to settle in quickly in order to receive payments as 
well.
604
 But with Hariri in public office, both parties saw an opportunity to extract 
favours as well.
605
 At this point, patronage and corruption began to overlap.
606
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600
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World, (Oxford: Berg. 2003), pp.289. 
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(1973), p.537, quoted in Hutchcroft, ‘Obstructive corruption: The Politics of Privilege in the Philippines’, 
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Figure 55 – Abandoned building in Downtown Beirut occupied by displaced citizens 
after the civil war. Source: Trawi, Beirut’s Memory; Dhakirat Bayrut; La Memoire du 
Beyrouth, p.170. 
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As the squatter issue became an instrument for both Amal and Hezbollah to extract 
favours, Hariri (and his allies and friends) came to the conclusion that they had to deal 
directly with the two parties. According to Jean-Paul Lebas (mentioned briefly in Chapter 
5), Solidere engineered a ‘political premium’ to ensure the two parties’ support for the 
reconstruction process in Downtown Beirut. This political premium would involve 
Solidere paying Amal and Hezbollah huge sums of money, and in turn, Amal and 
Hezbollah would distribute the money ‘as they saw fit’.607 According to most estimates, 
the two parties were paid US$250 million to ensure their compliance and support for the 
Solidere project.
608
 Lebas, however, believes that it was much higher than that.
609
 It is not 
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 Interview with Jean-Paul Lebas held on 15 November 2013in Paris. 
608
 This figure is according to: Ohrstrom, “Solidere: ‘Vigilantism under color of law’”. 
Figure 56 – The people in the picture above are displaced persons from the South of 
Lebanon after the Israeli invasion. Such people took shelter in the buildings that were 
destroyed early in the war in Downtown Beirut, as well as those buildings that were 
abandoned. Source: Trawi, Beirut’s Memory; Dhakirat Bayrut; La Memoire du Beyrouth, 
p.248. 
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entirely clear where this money came from, but according to Leenders, it appears that the 
state was compensating Solidere for all that it was spending on the ‘squatter issue’. He 
argues that the company’s finance department had included the costs incurred by the 
eviction of squatters from Downtown Beirut (estimated at around US$250 million) in its 
calculation of total expenses relating to ‘infrastructure works’.610 Combined with all other 
incidents of public resources being spent in favour of ‘private contractors overarching the 
state’, Leenders estimates that up to 20 percent of the nearly US$6,595 million – in other 
words, around US$1,319 million – spent by the CDR between 1992 and 2003 was 
‘wasted’.611 Other analysts have offered higher estimates: Yahya Hakim (Managing 
Director of the Lebanese Transparency Association), claims that this wastage could have 
been as high as 70 percent.
612
  
 
On 15
th
 February 1996, 15 members of the Ayyad family were killed – and another 
8 were wounded – when a Solidere crew demolished the building they were squatting in. 
Despite being enough to cause a public uproar against the private company, the incident 
was followed by little media attention and outcry.
613
 The lack of public concern, 
therefore, suggests that Solidere had successfully ‘bought-out’ the displaced Shiites and 
their political backers. 
 
 
II. How did Solidere contribute towards reproducing sectarian divisions? 
 
The second consequence of the Solidere project is that it contributed towards 
reproducing sectarian divisions in Lebanese politics and society. Sectarian divisions date 
                                                                                                                                                                             
609
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610
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in Post-war Lebanon’, p.314. Alongside this, Kathrin Hockel makes a shocking revelation that while the 
total costs covering the infrastructure works in Downtown Beirut were declared to be $50 billion, the actual 
costs of infrastructure works are estimated to have been no more than $5 billion. See: Kathrin Höckel, 
‘Beyond Beirut: Why Reconstruction in Lebanon did not Contribute to State-making and Stability’, Crisis 
States Research Centre, 4, (2007), p.7. 
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in Lebanon: Reconstructing the Nation-State’, Middle East Report, 200, (1996), p.23. 
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back to the civil war period, when Lebanon was associated with intractable political 
conflict, kidnappings, and terrorism. After Ta’if, sectarian rivalries played out in relative 
harmony because Syrian hegemony (under Hafez al-Assad) mandated cordial relations 
and compromise between Lebanon’s elite. This changed after 1998, when the concord 
within Lebanon’s elite cartel gradually broke down. This breakdown was driven by 
intensifying intra-elite competition, fuelled by the rise of Bashar al-Assad (Hafez’s son). 
The development of a Saudi-Syrian and US-Syrian rift gave intra-elite competition over 
the country and its economy a new edge. Syrian hegemony in Lebanon was initially 
based on a Saudi-Syrian understanding, which itself depended on a US-Syrian 
rapprochement dating back to the late 1980s. All this started to fall apart in 2000, when 
the Bush administration began to pursue a neo-conservative project to ‘remake’ the 
Middle East.
614
 The shift in US strategy created a rift between Washington and Damascus 
which, in turn, created rising tensions between Lebanon’s elite. In this regard, it provides 
the background for understanding Solidere’s role in reproducing sectarian divisions. 
 
 
i. Elite rivalries and the anti-corruption campaign against Hariri 
 
Throughout the early 1990s, political rivalries between Hariri and others members 
of the elite were played out in relative harmony. This was because Syrian hegemony, 
under Hafez al-Assad, mandated cordial relations and compromise between Lebanon’s 
elite.
615
 However, this co-existence turned sour with the election of the then Lebanese 
Army Commander Emile Lahoud to the presidency in late 1998. Upon his election, 
Lahoud replaced Hariri with Salim el-Hoss. Importantly, Lahoud and el-Hoss followed a 
Shihabist tradition, and therefore, shared a determination to stamp out corruption from 
Lebanese politics. The anti-corruption campaign launched by the two figures led to rising 
                                                          
614
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elite tensions; particularly, between them and Hariri. The intra-elite competition that 
ensued later culminated in the assassination of Hariri in early 2005.  
 
To understand the depth and breadth of the conflict that was emerging, it is worth 
delving into Syria’s growing involvement in Lebanese politics first. As mentioned in 
Chapter 5, Hariri had developed close relations with Syrian Vice President Khaddam and 
with Syrian Army chief of staff Hikmat Shehabi (two of the most senior Sunnis in the 
Alawite-dominated regime). Khaddam, in particular, was the main architect of Syria’s 
hegemony over Lebanon, being in charge of Syria’s ‘Lebanon file’ at the time.616 
Unsurprisingly, Khaddam and Shehabi (and others in the Syrian regime) stood to benefit 
richly from their dealings with Hariri.
617
 According to Nicholas Blanford, Hariri’s wealth 
was the ‘glue’ that ‘bound the group together’.618 However, the relationship Hariri shared 
with these figures – and Khaddam, in particular – put him at odds with the ‘Assad 
children’, which revolved around Basil al-Assad until his death.619 These Syrian figures 
were in a dispute with the Assad children over the issue of succession.
620
 The dispute can 
be described in generational and confessional terms, pitting the younger, mainly Alawite, 
generation against the older, mainly Sunni, contemporaries of Hafez al-Assad.
621
 Since 
the latter clique was closely connected to Hariri, Basil found it difficult not to link Hariri 
with Khaddam (and others) in a possible conspiracy against his presidential ambitions. 
 
Undoubtedly, Basil’s distrust of Hariri put Solidere, which was Hariri’s brainchild, 
in the line of fire as well. Throughout the 1990s, Hariri was always reluctant to deal with 
him when it came to discussing the reconstruction of Downtown Beirut, believing, 
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somewhat naïvely, that all he needed was to maintain contacts with Basil’s father. 
However, Hariri did meet Basil once when promoting the Solidere project. According to 
Hariri’s former aide, Nohad Mashnouq, it was an ‘uncomfortable encounter’. During the 
meeting, Basil made it clear that he opposed the Solidere project.
622
 Thus, the way in 
which Basil viewed the reconstruction of Downtown Beirut is quite revealing about the 
way in which Damascus would treat the Solidere project when his brother, Bashar, 
became president in 2000. Guided by the same distrust of Hariri that Basil had, Bashar 
decided to support the candidacy of Lahoud to the Lebanese presidency. It is worth 
noting that Lahoud fits into the category of military and security officials. But, he carried 
a ‘neo-Shihabist’ vision as well: just as former President Fuad Shihab had sought to rein 
in the power of the zu’ama (see Chapter 4), Lahoud also sought to rein in what he 
regarded as the ‘corruption’ of Lebanon’s post-civil war elite.623 In his inaugural address 
on the 24
th
 of November 1998, Lahoud vowed to adhere to the ‘rule of law’ and pledged 
to clamp down on corruption; a thinly veiled attack on Hariri and his protégés: 
 
“The people want an administration that will be strictly supervised, 
characterised by honesty and expertise, run by officials whose immunity is 
derived by their professional performance, not from political or sectarian 
protection. They want an administration from which they can obtain services 
by paying taxes, not by bribery as well as taxes.”624 
 
Importantly, Lahoud’s anti-corruption campaign mirrored that of Bashar in Syria. After 
the death of his brother, Basil, in 1994, Bashar was given new responsibilities. One of 
these was managing a campaign against corruption.
625
 It is because of this that Nicholas 
Blanford – Rafiq Hariri’s biographer – makes the suggestion that the future Syrian leader 
was the muscle behind Lebanon’s newly elected president.626  
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Upon becoming president, Lahoud replaced Hariri with Salim el-Hoss; a highly-
respected member of parliament representing Beirut. As a former banker, el-Hoss was 
what Michael Johnson describes as ‘a technocrat in a Shihabist mould’.627 He established 
a political reputation when he first served as prime minister (1976-80) during the 
presidential regime of Elias Sarkis; he was also the man who ran Fuad Shihab’s 
presidential office in the 1960s, and later, the governor of the central bank from 1967 to 
1973 (see Chapter 4). In light of this past working history, it seemed appropriate to 
Lahoud that el-Hoss be appointed prime minister to a president, who like Shihab, had 
previously been the army commander. In place of Hariri’s cabinet, el-Hoss formed a 
government of 15 technocrats.
628
 Amongst them was Georges Corm; an economist who 
had long been opposed to Hariri’s economic policies.629 With Corm at his side, el-Hoss 
opened several corruption files against Hariri and his protégés. It was no surprise, 
therefore, that all those institutions which were personally controlled by Hariri and his 
technocratic allies and friends became the target of these investigations.
630
 This was 
particularly the case with the CDR. The agency’s president, Nabil el-Jisr, was removed 
and replaced with Mahmoud Othman (viewed as being close to Lahoud).
631
 In turn, el-
Jisr stood accused of ‘administrative irregularities and corruption’. It all began when 
lawyer and human-rights activist Mohammed Mughraby accused the CDR of 
squandering public money – on Solidere’s behalf – to bribe the judges who assessed the 
value of Downtown Beirut properties.
632
 Mughraby also pointed out that these payments 
continued until January 1999, when el-Jisr left office. At a news conference at the 
Alexandre Hotel in the Ashrafiyeh neighbourhood of Beirut, Mughraby explained that 
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none of these payments were listed in the CDR’s budget, which therefore means that they 
were not ‘salary payments’, but rather, ‘bribes’. Mughraby also claimed that Hariri went 
as far as paying el-Jisr ‘additional salaries’ from his own pocket so that the CDR would 
pay off the judges.
633
 If true, then it would verify the suspicions of many former 
landowners and tenants who believed that previous court proceedings were refused or 
delayed because Hariri and his protégés were using corrupt practices to influence the 
judicial system during his term in office.
634
 
 
At this point, some words are needed on the rest of the elites. Because of his close 
ties with King Saud al-Faysal of Saudi Arabia – and French President Jacques Chirac (as 
well as some basic US support) – many within the political class were cultivating close 
relations with Bashar al-Assad over the years.
635
 Because some of these elites were bitter 
rivals of Hariri, Bashar was able to secure them a spot in the el-Hoss government. Most 
notably, this included representatives of Nabih Berri’s Amal Party – such as Michel 
Mousa, Anwar Khalil and Ghazi Zeaiter. In spite of being given rents by Hariri, many of 
these elite figures were reluctant to support him in the face of Lahoud’s anti-corruption 
campaign: Hariri’s neoliberal agenda – involving the neoliberal restructuring of the 
Lebanese state and economy – threatened the service ministries and state-controlled 
enterprises that they used as patronage resources.
636
 Instead, they chose to jump onto the 
‘bandwagon’ against Hariri. 
 
 
ii. The repercussions of the anti-corruption campaign against Hariri 
 
To understand why Hariri gradually embraced the role of a sectarian leader, we 
must begin by explaining the repercussions that this (Shihabist-inspired) anti-corruption 
campaign had on Hariri’s ability to continue extracting rents. The most obvious 
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consequence of the anti-corruption campaign was that it led to the removal of many of 
Hariri’s technocratic allies and friends from their positions; most significant of which – as 
demonstrated above – was the removal and replacement of el-Jisr with Mahmoud 
Othman. In turn, Hariri’s loss of control of these key institutions led to the collapse of 
Solidere profits. This therefore goes to show the importance of Hariri’s protégés for rent-
creation and -extraction through such institutions.  
 
In a matter of months, the crackdown on corruption went beyond the CDR’s offices 
to include many senior political figures in the former government. This began with the 
arrest of former Oil Minister (and close political ally of Hariri) Shahe Barsoumian on the 
5th of March 1999. Barsoumian was accused of misappropriating state funds during his 
tenure as minister in the previous government. The detention of Barsoumian was 
significant because it raised questions about whether corruption inquiries would stretch to 
other officials as well.
637
 Minister of Defence Ghazi Zeaiter (who, as mentioned earlier, 
was a member of Berri’s Amal Party), hailed the arrest of Barsoumian and described the 
judiciary’s move against Hariri’s ally, “as a translation of President Emile Lahoud’s 
pledge in his inauguration speech to crack down on corruption.”638 Later that month, the 
Auditing Department released a 157-page report implicating Hariri and three former 
ministers (including Fouad Siniora) of ‘embezzlement and corruption’.639 The Auditing 
Department report was discussed in al-Hoss’s government on the 31st of March 1999 and 
thereafter referred to the State Prosecutor General Adnan Addoum, who was assigned by 
the cabinet to examine the report.
640
 It must be noted that it was an investigation into the 
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payment of US$50 million to the Italian government for a ‘bogus’ waste incinerator in 
the Bourj Hammoud district of Beirut and it nearly put Siniora in prison.
641
  
 
As corruption cases continued rolling through, the el-Hoss government prepared a 
drastic overhaul of the Lebanese state in order to regain control from Hariri’s protégés. In 
this regard, they launched a plan to reorganise the staff of the different state-run bodies. 
To this end, Law 247 – dated the 7th of August 2000 – was adopted, which led to major 
staff appointments in most institutions.
642
 In one example, Hariri-loyalist Nicolas Saba 
was replaced with Yaacoub Sarraf (also considered to be close to Lahoud), as governor of 
Beirut.
643
 Following Sarraf’s appointment, Solidere started to feel the pressure. The 
company complained that the municipality (headed by Sarraf) was preventing it from 
connecting to the national electricity grid, and that it was obstructing developers seeking 
building licences for projects in the area.
644
 In this regard, Solidere claimed that some 50 
permits (for projects valued at more than US$500 million) were being delayed by 
Beirut’s municipal council.645 In 1999, Solidere had reported that its profits had fallen by 
30%.
646
 But in 2000, the company recorded losses.
647
 To complicate matters further, 
Solidere got locked into bitter disputes with its nervous investors.
648
 One of the most 
serious of these was with el-Murr (mentioned in the previous section). With shares prices 
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falling to an all-time-low, el-Murr demanded the Murr Tower be sold back to him.
649
 Still 
occupying the post of Interior Minister, el-Murr was believed to have caused the most 
delays to construction permits in Downtown Beirut – especially as company shareholders 
kept postponing the vote on whether to allow el-Murr to repurchase the tower.
650
 It must 
be stressed that one of the greatest perks of the Interior Ministry in Lebanon is that it is 
empowered with the right to issue all construction permits in the country.
651
 
 
When Lahoud came to power with his anti-corruption campaign, there was 
considerable public support for him. This was because many people had turned against 
the corrupt and repressive governments of Hariri. But it did not take long for people to 
turn against the el-Hoss government as well. One reason for this was the government’s 
poor performance in managing the economy: the country continued to witness an 
increasing public debt and a deepening economic recession during this period.
652
 But the 
other, more upsetting, reason was the fact that the government failed to crack down on 
other incidents of corruption. Corruption did not just involve Hariri and his protégés. It 
also involved other elites; most particularly, the former militia leaders. Indeed, el-Hoss 
formed a government of ‘technocrats’, none of whom had been a ‘militia leader’ in the 
past. But a number of corrupt politicians, many of whom owed their positions to 
connections with the former militia leaders, remained in their positions in other state-run 
bodies. For example, when the CDR’s entire boad of directors was replaced, one person 
who was able to retain his seat on it was Yasser Berri – the brother of former militia 
leader Nabih Berri. Yasser was initially brought in to the CDR in 1995, when he became 
a member of the agency’s board. By 1997, he was appointed as deputy president of the 
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agency.
653
 In this context, a suggestion was being floated in the media that the anti-
corruption campaign reflected ‘vengeful’ feelings towards Hariri and his protégés, rather 
than an attempt to enforce the law and promote economic recovery.
654
 In addition to that, 
arguments began to surface that Lahoud himself was a corrupt politician: any business 
that needed doing merely required connections with a military officer who was close to 
Lahoud.
655
 With Lebanon’s political system becoming more – or perhaps, more overtly – 
corrupt, it comes as no surprise that people turned against the el-Hoss government.  
 
As people became disillusioned, it was easy for Hariri to capitalise on the failures 
of the el-Hoss government and turn the tables back in his favour. In the 2000 
parliamentary elections, Hariri and his allies were able to achieve a landslide victory, 
taking all 19 seats in Beirut and defeating the lists of many of their opponents (including 
that of el-Hoss).
656
 Being met with an increasingly hostile parliament, Lahoud was 
therefore forced to reappoint Hariri as premier. Reclaiming the post, he reappointed 
Siniora as his Finance Minister. Hariri then went on to quash the corruption probes 
against him and his protégés. Siniora was able to witness first-hand how a change in 
government caused the Lebanese judiciary to reverse itself overnight and to shelve the 
mismanagement case against him.
657
 Hariri then sought to bolster his personal grip over 
the CDR. In January 2002, the CDR’s board of directors was removed (amongst them 
was Nabih Berri’s brother, Yasser Berri), and its president, Othman, was fired and 
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replaced with Jamal Itani – another Hariri protégé.658 It is worth remembering that the 
relationship between Nabih Berri and Rafiq Hariri – as with other relationships – had 
reached an all-time low during this period because of the repercussions that the neoliberal 
drive was having on the former’s sources of patronage.659 In light of this deteriorating 
relationship between the two leaders, Hariri opted to keep Yasser Berri out of the CDR’s 
board of directors in order to avoid any further obstacles.  
 
At this stage, Hariri worked hard to salvage the two rent-creating and -extracting 
mechanisms he had built. First with regards to reconstruction itself, Hariri passed a new 
property ownership law (Law 296 dated 3
rd
 of April 2001), which removed restrictions on 
non-nationals owning property.
660
 Soon after, Solidere began marketing its properties 
directly to Gulf Arabs; an opportunity that Hariri enthusiastically advertised in the Gulf 
media.
661
 The company’s net profits climbed sharply from US$1.9 million in 2001 to 
US$42 million in 2002.
662
 In this regard, the company explained that land sales had risen 
by 94% year on year, while rental income strengthened by 32% as a growing number of 
local and foreign offices, restaurants and shops were opening in the increasingly 
fashionable district.
663
 With regards to government borrowing, Hariri passed new 
legislation (Law 295 dated 5
th
 of April 2001), which bolstered the powers of the CDR. 
Essentially, this law ensured that the CDR was now the ‘exclusive conduit of foreign-
financed reconstruction projects’.664 The following year, Hariri was able to secure a 
US$1.2 billion loan for projects at the Paris II Donors Conference.
665
 Undoubtedly, this 
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Corruption and State-Building in Postwar Lebanon, p.212. 
659
 The deterioration in the relationship between the two figures reached an all-time low over the latter’s 
government fiscal adjustment programme. Despite committing himself in early 2001 to backing the 
government’s fiscal adjustment programme, Berri later rejected spending cuts because they were impacting 
on his own Shiite constituency (which is also one of the poorest in the country). The impact became more 
apparent when Berri began losing support within the community to his better financed and politically more 
attractive rival, Hezbollah. For further details, see: EIU, Country Report: Lebanon, January 2002, p.7. 
660
 See: EIU, Country Report: Lebanon, April 2001, p.26. 
661
 See Rafiq Hariri’s interview to the Saudi newspaper Al-Jazirah, 20th April 2001. Available at: 
http://www.rhariri.com/news.aspx?ID=63&Category=Interviews (Accessed 27
 
August 2013). 
662
 See: EIU, Country Report: Lebanon, July 2003, p.25. 
663
 See: ibid. 
664
 See: EIU, Country Report: Lebanon, April 2001, p.25. This law is also mentioned in: Leenders, Spoils 
or Truce: Corruption and State-Building in Postwar Lebanon, p.212. 
665
 Although this increase in debt was significant, it was not growing substantially faster than over the same 
period of 2002. See: EIU, Country Report: Lebanon, December 2002, p.2. 
258 
 
conference benefited Hariri’s banks: one year later, the government’s foreign debt grew 
by US$2.7 billion.
666
  
 
 
iii. Hariri’s transformation into a sectarian leader and its reflection in the image 
of the Solidere project 
 
The repercussions of Lahoud’s anti-corruption campaign are important to consider 
in the analysis because they led to heightened competition between Lebanon’s fractious 
elites. In light of this competition, we find Hariri embracing the role of a sectarian leader 
and turning into a specifically ‘Sunni leader’ towards the end of the 1990s. Hariri’s 
transformation into a sectarian leader was reflected in the Solidere project as well: the 
reconstruction process transformed from one that used to be described as a ‘national 
project’, to one that became more closely identified with the Sunni community, which 
Hariri belonged to. Importantly, this turn towards sectarian populism should be seen as 
part of Hariri’s struggle to salvage the rent-creating and -extracting processes he had built 
around the Solidere project, as well as to expand the neoliberal economic project he was 
driving in the country. 
 
The political biography of Rafiq Hariri addresses the question about whether Hariri 
was a sectarian leader. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, during the 1980s Hariri did not 
endorse a sectarian discourse much. He had played an instrumental role in organising the 
Ta’if Peace Accords of 1989 and had styled himself as an outsider with a ‘clean’ 
background compared to the many militia leaders who were tainted by sectarian violence. 
Even when Hariri first became prime minister, he claimed to be a ‘national leader’, 
surrounding himself with advisors from all different sects. His legal advisor Basile Yared, 
for example, was a Greek Catholic. However, there were many expectations within the 
Sunni community that he would ‘represent’ and ‘defend’ their interests. After all, the 
prime minister’s post is the leading political representative of the Sunni community. 
From 1996 onwards, Hariri abandoned claims to ‘national leadership’ and slowly styled 
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himself as a specifically Sunni leader. In December 1996, Hariri supported the election of 
Sheikh Mohammed Rashid Kabbani as ‘Mufti of the Lebanese Republic’ and head of Dar 
al-Fatwa.
667
 By 1999, Hariri had started building health centres and schools in Sunni 
neighbourhoods of Beirut through his Hariri Foundation. In turn, he used his 
philanthropic contributions as evidence that he, unlike his rival Salim el-Hoss (who was 
the prime minister at the time), was better equipped to defend Beirut’s Sunni community. 
By running philanthropic activities in Beirut, however, the Hariri Foundation came into 
competition with the work of the Maqasid Foundation – the patronage vehicle of the 
Sunni-Beiruti Salam family. Undoubtedly, this affected Hariri’s relationship with 
Tammam Salam. Salam was first elected to parliament in the 1996 elections on Hariri’s 
electoral list for Beirut. Not long after Hariri launched his philanthropic activities in 
Beirut, this alliance ended, and Salam lost his seat in the 2000 elections. Overall, it all 
goes to show that Hariri embraced a more sectarian discourse over the years; something 
that he had previously avoided.
668
 
 
Importantly, Hariri’s transformation into a sectarian leader was also reflected in the 
Solidere project, especially when he became involved in the construction of the 
Mohammed Al-Amin Mosque (also known as the ‘Hariri mosque’), next to Martyrs’ 
Square (see Figure 57). Hariri was under pressure from different Sunni sides (particularly 
Dar al-Fatwa, Lebanon’s main Sunni Foundation) to construct a new mosque on zawiya 
Abu Nasr – a location on the southwestern corner of Martyr’s Square. This was because a 
mosque here would reassert the Sunni community’s historical presence in the area, in the 
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Figure 57 – An image of the Mohammed Al-Amin mosque in Downtown Beirut. Photo 
taken by author.  
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city, and hence, the rest of the country.
669
 Hariri initially had no lust for the project, and 
therefore, disregarded it altogether. In an apparent attempt to target Hariri within his own 
constituency, President Lahoud reportedly invited Al-Walid bin Talal (a Saudi prince and 
one of the richest men in the world) to participate in financing the construction of the 
mosque. In 2001, Al-Walid contributed US$2 million as a donation towards purchasing 
parts of the parcel. It is worth mentioning that Al-Walid is connected to Lebanon through 
his mother, Mona el-Solh – the daughter of Riad el-Solh (the first prime minister of 
Lebanon after independence). As indicated earlier, Hariri was initially opposed to the 
idea of a mosque. But upon hearing of Lahoud’s attempt to weaken his position on ‘his 
own territory’, Hariri felt forced to act so as to uphold his reputation in his community as 
a devout Sunni Muslim. He could not accept the consequences of not contributing, 
namely being perceived as ‘stingy’ or ‘sidelined’ by a rival on ‘a major project in his own 
backyard’. A year after Al-Walid made his donation, Hariri was able to obtain, with 
backing from Dar al-Fatwa, signatures from both the Minister of Interior Elias el-Murr 
and President Lahoud for Decree No. 8,572 (dated the 31
st
 of August 2002).
670
 In this 
regard, the alliance between Hariri and Mufti Kabbani paid off. Essentially, this decree 
declared the Mohammed Al-Amin Association to be illegal and dissolved by virtue of 
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law, which in turn, enabled Hariri to become closely involved in every phase of the 
operations and personally oversee every single step in the mosque’s construction.671  
 
The new Al-Amin mosque was built next to the old St. George Maronite Cathedral, 
over which it towers. According to Solidere’s Head of Design Angus Gavin – who had 
previously worked on the London Docklands project and other mega-projects in the Gulf 
– the mosque was initially planned to be even bigger than it actually is today:  
 
“It was the initial design that caused a huge outcry against the mosque. It was 
huge! Hariri then asked us to get involved. We managed to reduce it a little 
bit, but today, when looking at the mosque, it still looks out of place…Now 
when we take photographs of Downtown Beirut for our promotional 
brochures we purposefully take it from the opposite end of Martyrs’ Square to 
make the mosque not seem as big as it actually is.”672  
 
Today, the ‘gargantuan’ mosque is ‘dwarfing’ the neighbouring cathedral (see Figure 
58).
673
 Because of its colossal proportions, this has led many Christians to the belief that 
Hariri was ‘Islamicising’ the city centre. For the Maronites in particular, its construction 
is seen to “epitomise the regained political strength of the Sunni community in post-war 
Lebanon”.674 This was a reference to the benefits given to the prime minister’s post by 
the Ta’if Peace Accords, some of the details of which Hariri had been deeply involved in 
negotiating. In the pre-civil war era, the National Pact had created a power-sharing 
mechanism that placed Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims as the main beneficiaries. 
At the end of the war, the Ta’if Accords amended the power-sharing mechanism by 
giving preference to the Sunni community. As a result, the premiership – a position 
constitutionally entitled to the Sunni Muslims now controlled all the real power; the 
presidency – a position constitutionally entitled to the Maronite Christians – became a 
‘ceremonial and consultative role’.675 As Pierre Gemayel (son of former President Amin 
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Gemayel), once famously proclaimed, the construction of such a mosque next to the 
church serves to indicate ‘where exactly they were sitting today’.676 But what is more 
interesting is that the construction of the mosque led to a redefinition of the St. George 
Cathedral. Considering the construction of such a large-scale mosque a ‘provocation’, 
Archbishop Boulos Matar unilaterally responded (regardless of the political 
consequences) by building a campanile next to the cathedral that is in the form of a 65 
metre clock-tower (the same height as the mosque’s minarets).677 See Figure 59 for an 
image of the new campanile. Thus, this rivalry reveals the impact that Hariri’s turn to 
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Figure 58 – An image of the Mohammed Al-Amin mosque towering over the St. George 
Cathedral next to it. Photo taken by author.  
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Figure 59 – An image of a campanile under construction next to the St. George 
Cathedral. Notice how it was designed to match the height of the minarets on the 
neighbouring mosque. Photo taken by author.  
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sectarianism had, not just on the nonpartisan reputation that he had meticulously built in 
previous years, but also on the image of the reconstruction process in Downtwon Beirut. 
 
Furthermore, the Solidere project became more closely associated with Hariri’s 
predominantly Sunni Al-Mustaqbal party. This association became more visibly 
demonstrated in the years following Hariri’s assassination on the 14th of February 2005. 
At this point, it is essential to emphasise that intra-elite competition in Lebanon had 
intensified to levels unseen since the end of the civil war. This intensification was also 
fuelled by the emergence of a Saudi-Syrian and US-Syrian rift that had been brewing 
since Bashar al-Assad officially succeeded his father in 2000.
678
 The political climate that 
befell on Lebanon was one of political confrontation between pro- and anti-Syrian 
factions. Immediately after Hariri’s assassination, a funeral procession took off from 
Hariri’s residence in West Beirut, to the monumental Mohammed al-Amin Mosque 
(which at the time, was still under construction). Importantly, the procession turned out 
tobe a highly politicised event, as the Hariri family made it clear that pro-Syrian 
politicians, such as then President Lahoud, were not welcome at the gathering. 
Immediately after the procession, the Hariri family decided to bury Hariri, and the 
bodyguards killed with him, on a plot of land adjacent to the Mohammed Al-Amin 
Mosque. Installing a tomb (darih) in the heart of the capital contradicted previous plans 
to lay Hariri to rest next to his father’s grave in his family hometown of Sidon (see 
Figures 60 and 61).
679
 In this regard, just as with the decision to turn the funeral into an 
anti-Syrian event, the decision to lay the martyred prime minister to rest in Downtown 
Beirut was a political statement. Within a month, two broad political coalitions emerged 
in the country: the ‘8th March’ (in reference to an enormous pro-Syrian manifestation led 
by Hezbollah) and the ‘14th March’ (in reference to an equally enormous pro-US and pro- 
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Figure 61 – An image of Rafiq Hariri’s tomb (darih). Photo taken by author.  
 
Figure 60 – An image of Rafiq Hariri’s tomb (darih) in the white tent next to Mohammed 
Al-Amin mosque. Photo taken by author.  
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Saudi manifestation organised by Al-Mustaqbal to commemorate Hariri’s assassination). 
Both of these camps evolved into two opposing political currents. The gap between them 
was further exacerbated by their respective allies abroad. Astonishingly, this divide had 
spatial repercussions that were most visibly expressed in Downtown Beirut.   
   
The 14
th
 March camp tried to develop the darih into a ‘national mausoleum’ that 
would attract visitors of all confessions. By the first annual commemoration of Hariri’s 
assassination, however, the mosque and the neighbouring Martyr’s Square became a 
space that clearly belonged to 14
th
 March supporters. In response to this development, the 
8
th
 March camp organised a major sit-in (‘i’tisam) in Riyadh el-Solh Square and laid 
siege to the prime minister’s office in the Grand Serail (which at the time was under the 
control of the 14
th
 March camp). See Figures 62 and 63. By December 2006, the ‘i’tisam 
became a tent-city that transformed Riyadh el-Solh Square into a clearly marked political 
space belonging to the 8
th
 March camp. People were now forced to choose sides; either 
entering the tent-city installed by the 8
th
 March supporters, or passing by the darih and 
paying respect to the 14
th
 March camp. As time evolved, protests and counter-protests 
between the two contested ‘spaces’ became a regular occurrence in Downtown Beirut. 
Eventually, the numbers of visitors in the city centre dwindled.
680
 Numerous businesses 
and restaurants shut their doors and moved out completely.
681
 Many construction projects 
were either cancelled or put on hold.
682
 And the Lebanese Bourse saw significant (and 
worrying) buying and selling activity in Solidere shares.
683
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Figure 63 – Image taken of the 14th March protest in 2005. Notice the masses filling an 
empty Martyrs’ Square that is still waiting for construction. Source: Al-Mustaqbal Daily 
Newspaper, Issue No. 1861, (Beirut: 15 March 2005), p.1.  
 
Figure 62 – Image taken of the 8th March protest in 2005. Source: Al-Mustaqbal Daily 
Newspaper, Issue No. 1855, (Beirut: 09 March 2005), p.1. 
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Against this background, Solidere believed that it had fallen ‘victim’ to the political 
wrangling between the opposing camps. According to Solidere’s Press Attaché Nabil 
Rached: 
 
“There is a group [the 8th March camp] that thinks that if we destroy the 
country, we will destroy ‘March 14’. This group [the 8th March camp] is 
doing all that it can to bring down the other group [the 14
th
 March camp], 
even if it means destroying all the good that there is in the country. ‘March 
14’, on the other hand, is doing all that it can to protect and defend the 
country. We should not hurt the good things we have done in this country… 
We should not attack the good work of Solidere because we want to hurt 
‘March 14’.”684 
 
This statement is significant; even though Solidere has always tried to portray itself as a 
politically-neutral company, it believed that the 14
th
 March camp was ‘protecting’ the 
reconstruction process against the ‘unjust’ attacks of the 8th March camp – a clear 
demonstration that it had taken sides in the political dispute. Of course, it was difficult for 
Solidere to characterise itself as a neutral body, not simply because it increased the 
wealth of Hariri (and his inner circle), but also because some of its main investors were 
leading the 14
th
 March camp; the most significant name being Hariri’s childhood friend 
Siniora. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Solidere project appears to have been initiated on the grounds that it would be 
free of the ‘traditional Lebanese mentality’ of corruption and sectarianism. It was 
presented as a neutral venture – isolated from politics and sectarianism – to ensure 
Lebanon’s recovery and re-insertion into the universal developmental trajectory that had 
bypassed the country during the war. Of course, the key protagonist behind the project 
was former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. But he was not the only elite figure to support 
the proposal of creating ‘private institutions’ to oversee reconstruction projects in the 
country. Clearly, many others types of elite – including the pre-civil war bourgeoisie and 
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the former militia leaders – backed the idea and lent their support to the neoliberal 
rationale articulated by the former prime minister; not least because they sought to benefit 
from the Solidere project and/or launch other projects like it.  
 
Hariri recruited his allies and friends, and presented them as ‘technocrats’ – or as 
Gill calls them ‘globalising elites’ – who did not have a political or confessional 
affiliation.
685
 The fact that he appointed a Maronite Christian – as opposed to a Sunni 
Muslim – to the post of Central Bank Governor is a clear demonstration of this. In turn, 
Hariri styled his technocrats as the best and the brightest ‘cadres’ who are removed from 
Lebanese politics and society, and instead, guided by the all-powerful logic of 
capitalism.
686
 Accordingly, the decrees and laws that these technocrats formulated to 
facilitate private institutions carrying out reconstruction projects are – to many of 
Solidere’s supporters – driven by the most abstract and purest form of economic 
rationality. Importantly, Hariri and his entourage extended this ontology and applied it to 
the Solidere project. The interview with Solidere’s Press Attaché Nabil Rached (for 
example) reveals an understanding of the reconstruction process that is liberated from the 
political and cultural obstacles of Lebanese politics and society, and that is driven by 
financial capital only. But the Solidere project was not a politically-neutral technocratic 
programme: the rent-creating and -extracting mechanisms that Hariri built around it had 
strong distributive effects that fuelled a lot of resentment against the former prime 
minister, and therefore, the project as well. In particular, it created serious divisions 
between the former prime minister and those elites that felt they had missed out on the 
benefits. Moreover, sectarianism has had a way of creeping into the Solidere project: 
today, it is more closely associated with the Sunni-led 14
th
 March camp. To some extent, 
this was inevitable because of the project’s location in the heart of the capital city: 
arguably the most symbolic piece of territory in a politically-fractured and religiously-
divided society. But it was also due to the fact that Hariri was the face behind Solidere. 
                                                          
685
 See: Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order: Second Edition Fully Revised and Updated, 
p.194. 
686
 This falls in line with Wallerstein’s description of technocrats who are recruited based on merit over 
identity. See: Wallerstein, World Systems Analysis: An Introduction, p.40. 
271 
 
So when he decided to become a specifically Sunni leader, it did not take long before 
people began to associate the Solidere project with the Sunni community.  
 
So what does this tell us about neoliberal urban developments in post-civil war 
Lebanon? In short, it tells us that even those that claim to be neutral have a way of being 
‘Lebanonised’. Most are controlled by a political class that uses corruption and populist 
appeals to sectarian identity to forward their interests. Rafiq Hariri – as a member of the 
new contractors bourgeoisie – tried to separate himself from the political and cultural 
dynamics of Lebanese politics and society, but as demonstrated by the analysis above, he 
himself was ‘Lebanonised’ in the process, and therefore, resorted to the same practices as 
his counterparts. The next chapter will explore the course of the reconstruction process in 
Downtown Beirut in the period following Hariri’s assassination. Specifically, it will 
explore the social backgrounds of the individuals that maintained the rent-creation and 
extraction mechanisms put in place by Hariri in previous years. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
The Solidere project after Rafiq Hariri 
 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapter helped to explain how the Solidere project contributed 
towards: firstly, increasing the public debt; and secondly, reproducing sectarian divisions. 
The evidence used to explain these two consequences was based on a rough ten-year 
period after Solidere was established and before Hariri was assassinated. This chapter 
will explore the period following Hariri’s assassination; specifically, between 2005 and 
2013. 
 
Solidere – as a private real estate company – was launched and led by former Prime 
Minister Rafiq Hariri, but the Solidere project was in no way limited to him and his 
protégés. Like other neoliberal urban developments at the time, the Solidere project was 
an ‘elite playing field’, where a number of key elites were brought together to reshape the 
city centre according to their own aspirations and visions.
687
 They included members of 
the pre-civil war bourgeoisie and former militia leaders. Other than local elites, it brought 
together a number of social, cultural, political and economic elite players from the 
regional – and sometimes also, international – circles. Of course, this grouping of elites 
is not as united as it seems. And therefore, it is not strange to sometimes find these same 
elites, outside Solidere, competing for power and influence. Yet, the underlying goal of 
all involved in the Solidere project remains the same: to accumulate capital.  
 
In this context, the first section of this chapter will look at the local elites that were 
invested in the Solidere project, but that were also competing for control over the state. 
                                                          
687
 See: Swyngedouw, Moulaert and Rodriguez, ‘Neoliberal urbanization in Europe: Large-scale urban 
development projects and the new urban policy’, pp.567-568. 
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Again, the role of the state is crucial to mention, because it is through the state that such 
elites are enriching themselves and their allies. Importantly, it will be shown that these 
elites have individual business interests, but also a collective economic interest in the 
Solidere project. The difference between these two types of interests will be clarified. But 
what happened to the Hariri network? The second section will look at how much the 
network of capitalists that the former prime minister built has evolved since 2005. Much 
of this section will look at it in terms of Solidere’s decision to expand its operations 
abroad, through Solidere International (SI). The management of SI is controlled by many 
of the same members that controlled Solidere. It is, therefore, clear that surviving 
members of the Hariri network are still in a position to determine who is included in, and 
who is excluded from, the decision-making structures that oversee the Solidere project.  
 
The chapter will then conclude by asking the following question: did the Solidere 
project re-establish conditions for capital accumulation and the reconstitution of power to 
capitalists (both national and transnational) – as diagnosed by scholars such as David 
Harvey, Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy (amongst others)?
688
 As will be shown, 
the Solidere project was an expression of the reconstitution of power to capitalists, but it 
was also the flagship project that enabled elites across the political spectrum to enhance 
their economic and political power.  
 
 
I. The Solidere project and the post-2005 governments 
 
After Hariri’s death, we find that successive governments – as well as the key 
institutions concerned with reconstruction (in other words, the Finance Ministry, the 
Central Bank and the CDR) – have been occupied by elites that were embroiled in 
profound power struggles and position-taking. Some of these elites were heavily invested 
in Downtown Beirut (either as shareholders or property owners). Their main priority, 
obviously, was to protect their individual business interests in Solidere. But despite their 
                                                          
688
 See: Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p.19. See also: Duménil and Lévy, ‘The Neoliberal 
(Counter-)Revolution’, pp.9-19. 
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personal and/or political differences, they were all committed towards protecting the 
Solidere project (more generally). Why did they share this collective economic interest? 
In short, they did so because the Solidere project was the main economic venture giving 
Beirut (and the rest of the country) a competitive advantage in the region.
689
 Therefore, 
without it, Beirut (and other parts of the country) would struggle to attract international 
investment into other economic sectors (which the same elites were invested in). In this 
context, property developers in Downtown Beirut continued to cater to the high-end and 
luxury segment of the market.
690
 This was visibly demonstrated by the construction of: a 
marina, a yacht club, five-star hotels, high-end office spaces, and hundreds of luxury 
boutiques and stores. The section below will explain all this in more detail.  
 
 
i. The governments of Siniora, Saad Hariri and Mikati 
 
Between 2005 and 2013, Lebanon was headed by four governments. The first two 
were led by Hariri’s childhood friend Fouad Siniora (2005-8 and 2008-9). Siniora had by 
this stage acquired significant political influence and power, allowing him to create a 
clientelist network of his own. The third government was headed by Hariri’s son Saad 
Hariri (2009-11). This not only shows that the feudal nepotistic style of Lebanese 
governance lived on, but that it was adopted by the Hariri family to continue the father’s 
legacy. The last government was headed by Najib Mikati (2011-13). It must be 
remembered that Mikati was part of the same new contractor bourgeoisie that Rafiq 
Hariri came from (see Chapter 4). All three individuals, along with their allies and 
friends, were major investors in Downtown Beirut. In this context, these three men used 
their posts to bolster and develop their individual business interests in the city centre. Of 
course, their interests were not only limited to Downtown Beirut, they also stretched to 
                                                          
689
 See Chapter 2 for details. 
690
 For details, see: Healey, Cars, Madanipour and de Magalhaes, ‘Transforming governance, institutionalist 
analysis and institutional capacity’, pp.6–28; Pierre, ‘Introduction: Understanding governance’, pp.1-10; 
Moulaert, Swyngedouw and Rodriguez, ‘Large scale urban development projects and local governance: 
From democratic urban planning to besieged local governance’, pp.71-84; Harvey, ‘From managerialism to 
entrepreneurialism: The transformation in urban governance in late Capitalism’, pp.3-17. 
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other economic sectors and regions in the country. But for heuristic purposes, we will 
focus on the interests they had in Downtown Beirut.  
 
Just as Rafiq Hariri had done before them, they installed technocrats in the 
institutions that played important roles in reconstruction – in other words, the Finance 
Ministry, the Central Bank and the CDR.
691
 What was interesting, though, was that the 
relationship between them and the technocrats they recruited was not as good as before. 
Of particular significance was the divide between Siniora and Fadel el-Shallaq, who 
returned as president of the CDR in 2004. According to one article published by Al-
Akhbar Daily Newspaper, a large divide had emerged between the top echelons in the Al-
Mustaqbal Party on one side (led by Siniora), and those who previously worked for Rafiq 
Hariri but were not heavily engaged in political squabbling.
692
 In this regard, it is argued 
in the Al-Akhbar article that el-Shallaq represented this latter group. Importantly, el-
Shallaq criticised Siniora, Saad Hariri and other members of the Hariri family for steering 
the Al-Mustaqbal Party away from the ideals of its founder, Rafiq Hariri. In particular, el-
Shallaq disagreed with the way these figures were inciting popular opposition against 
Hezbollah: he argued that the late prime minister would have encouraged the Al-
Mustaqbal Party to take a vocal, united stance in support of the resistance in order to 
counter Israeli attacks.
693
 El-Shallaq eventually resigned from his post in 2006 after he 
and Siniora disagreed over how reconstruction after the devastating July War should 
proceed.
694
 He was then replaced by former CDR President Nabil el-Jisr.
695
 Another 
                                                          
691
 Some new names included Jihad Azour, Mohammed Chatah and Raya al-Hasan; all of whom became 
finance ministers in the governments headed by Siniora and Saad Hariri. What all three individuals have in 
common is a previous working experience in international financial institutions before being recruited. 
Azour, for example, worked as a consultant for McKinsey & Company in Paris between 1989 and 1993, 
while Chatah was an employee at the IMF for several years before 1993 and again between 2001 and 2005. 
Like many of the previous technocrats recruited by Rafiq Hariri, these three individuals considered 
themselves more purely as ‘technocratic’ and ‘non-political’, and therefore, tended to be interested in 
neoliberalism as an economic project rather than a political one. Al-Hasan is a good example of this. 
Although she was appointed as Finance Minister in Saad Hariri’s government, Al-Hasan had no previous 
experience in Lebanese politics, working instead on economic projects for the United Nationas 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. Even after her tenure ended, she did not pursue a 
career in Lebanese politics.  
692
 See: Leenders, Spoils of Truce: Corruption and State-Building in Postwar Lebanon, pp.212-213.  
693
 See: Jim Quilty and Lysandra Ohrstrom, ‘The Second Time as a Farce: Stories of Another Lebanese 
Reconstruction’, MERIP, 243, (2007), pp.31-41.  
694
 For more details on el-Shallaq’s resignation, see: The Daily Star, “‘Future Movement rift’ drove CDR 
chief to quit: Report says PM tried to sideline Shalak”, The Daily Star, 26 August 2006.  
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visible discord was between Siniora and Central Bank Governor Riyadh Salameh. Siniora 
and Salameh have had a tense relationship that dates back to the early 1990s.
696
 This 
tension reached its peak in the years following Rafiq Hariri’s assassination, when Siniora 
heard of Salameh’s presidential bid. According to a confidential diplomatic cable 
published by Wikileaks, Siniora’s Finance Minister Jihad Azour had warned US 
Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman against supporting Salameh’s presidential bid, describing 
him as the ‘banker version’ of Emile Lahoud.697 Importantly, Ambassador Feltman noted 
that Azour’s warnings reflected Siniora’s own distaste for Salameh, and explains that 
whatever the reasons, there appears to have been a personal distrust towards Salameh.
698
  
 
There was also a political divide between Siniora and Saad Hariri on the one hand 
and Mikati on the other. This divide did not come into existence until 2011, when Najib 
Mikati became Lebanon’s new prime minister. In the 1990s, Mikati was known for being 
a close ally of the then President Emile Lahoud. This earned him a position in the el-Hoss 
government as Minister of Public Works and Transport. Despite this alliance, he was a 
moderate politician who maintained a normal relationship with Rafiq Hariri as well. His 
moderate approach enabled him to retain his cabinet position when Rafiq Hariri returned 
as prime minister in 2000.
699
 After Hariri’s assassination, Mikati became prime minister 
for the first time, and during his mandate between April and July of 2005, he helped steer 
the country towards parliamentary elections. Mikati remained a consensus figure for 
much of the following period. This was until the 8
th
 March camp nominated him as their 
candidate for the premiership in 2011. Because Siniora and Saad Hariri belonged to the 
14
th
 March camp, Mikati was automatically labelled as their political adversary. Despite 
the soured relationship between him and many members of the 14
th
 March coalition, it 
                                                                                                                                                                             
695
 See: Nafez Qawas, “Cabinet names Jisr to take Shalaq’s spot as CDR boss”, The Daily Star, 25 August 
2006. 
696
 Wikileaks Cable, 07BEIRUT352, LEBANON: CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR CAMPAIGNS FOR 
THE PRESIDENCY, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BEIRUT352_a.html (Accessed 05 
November 2013). 
697
 For further details, see: Wikileaks Cable, 07BEIRUT794, HADDAD, AZOUR CONVINCED SYRIA 
WANTS RIAD SALAMEH AS LEBANON’S NEXT PRESIDENT, 
http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BEIRUT794_a.html (Accessed 05 November 2013). 
698
 According to the same Wikileaks cable, Siniora “despises Salameh for a lot of historic and personal 
reasons”. For further details, see: ibid. 
699
 After the resignation of Omar Karami on the 13
th
 of April 2005, Mikati was appointed to act as caretaker 
premier until parliamentary elections later that year.  
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must be understood that Mikati, like Rafiq Hariri, remained a major advocate of 
deepening the neoliberal restructuring of the Lebanese state. As a result, many of those 
technocrats appointed to the key institutions concerned with reconstruction in previous 
years retained their positions. For example, it was Mikati’s government that renewed 
Salameh’s mandate as Central Bank Governor in 2005, and again in 2011.700 Moreover, 
the Mikati government did not remove and replace CDR President el-Jisr from his 
post.
701
 This demonstrates that these technocrats remained protected and secured, 
regardless of the conflicts and rifts between the 8
th
 March and 14
th
 March members. 
 
One other significant name to mention here is Mohammed Safadi, who belongs to 
the same new contractor bourgeoisie that Rafiq Hariri belonged to (see Chapter 4 for 
details). Safadi first entered politics in 2000, when he won a seat in that year’s 
parliamentary elections. In 2005, he gained his first ministerial post as Minister of Public 
Works and Transport in the Siniora government. In 2008 he was appointed as Minister of 
Economy and Trade in Siniora’s second cabinet line-up, and was reappointed to the same 
post in 2009 when Saad Hariri became prime minister. While trying to follow an 
independent path, Safadi is known for being a close ally of Mikati.
702
 When Mikati 
became prime minister in 2011, therefore, he appointed Safadi as his Finance Minister. 
To some extent, his appointment can be compared to Siniora’s appointment as Finance 
Minister in Rafiq Hariri’s cabinets.  
 
Of course, the names mentioned above are only but a few of the many elite players 
(inside and outside the government) with investment interests in the Solidere project. As 
shown in the sample list in Table 5, there were also: businessmen allied to Nabih Berri (a 
former militia leader), members of the pre-civil war bourgeoisie, and new contractors – 
other than those mentioned above – invested in the Solidere project. Notice, as well, how 
                                                          
700
 See: Osama Habib, ‘Business community hails Salameh term renewal’, The Daily Star, 15 July 2011.  
701
 It is worth noting that throughout the two years that Mikati was prime minister, el-Jisr remained in his 
post as CDR President. 
702
 Though Safadi was a close ally of Mikati, he also had a political ambition to replace Mikati as prime 
minister. As a Sunni Muslim as well, Safadi could be nominated for the premiership one day. He also has a 
significant political following in his hometown of Tripoli which could propel him to the post. For details, 
see: The Daily Star, ‘Future MP: Safadi is vying to replace Mikati as prime minister’, The Daily Star, 23 
March 2011. 
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some of the elite figures on the list have not been categorised. This goes to show that the 
categories used to differentiate between the elites are in themselves broad terms that can 
be misleading.
703
 
  
Building Use 
Company or 
companies 
involved 
Person(s) 
associated 
with 
company(ies) 
involved 
Nationality of 
developer 
Elite type 
MIKA Land Residential 
MIKA Real 
Estate 
Najib Mikati 
(and Taha 
Mikati) 
Lebanese New contractor 
MIKA Sea Residential 
MIKA Real 
Estate office 
Offices 
Zaitunay Bay 
Hotel and 
Retail 
Beirut 
Waterfront 
Development 
s.a.l. 50/50 
venture between 
STOW and 
Solidere. 
Mohammed 
Safadi as 
reprentative of 
STOW (and 
Solidere 
shareholders) 
Marina Towers Residential 
Marina Towers 
s.a.l. 
Mohammad 
Safadi and 
Khaled Al-Seif 
Saffadi is 
Lebanese and 
Seif is Saudi. 
New constractor 
(and Gulf 
businessman) 
Berytus Parks Offices 
Berytus Park 
s.a.l.   
Essam Fayez 
Makarem 
Lebanese 
New contractor 
(became rich in 
West Africa) 
An-Nahar 
Building 
Offices 
An-Nahar 
Headquarters 
Ghassan 
Tuwayni 
pre-civil war 
bourgeiosie  
Maqasid 
Building 
Offices 
Maqasid 
Foundation 
Tammam 
Salam 
Beirut Village Residential 
Beirut Trade 
Real-Estate 
Ali Nazem 
Ahmad 
Businessman 
allied to former 
militia leader 
Nabih Berri 
                                                          
703
 See conclusions in Chapter 3. 
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Damac Tower Residential 
Damac 
Properties 
Hussain 
Sajwani 
Emirati 
Gulf businessman 
Phoenician 
Village 
Mixed Use 
Levant Holding 
(part of Al Dhow 
Investment) 
Nasser Al-
Sayer (and 
family) 
Kuwaiti   
The Landmark Mixed Use 
The Landmark 
company 
Hamad Al-
Wazzan and 
Sheikha Souad 
and Ahmed 
Baadarani and 
Nassif Karam 
Al-Wazzan 
and Souad are 
Kuwaiti and 
Baadarani and 
Karam are 
Lebanese 
Gulf and local 
businessmen  
Beirut Gardens Residential 
Arabian Civil 
Works Company 
Hassan Jaafar 
and others 
Saudi and 
Lebanese 
Grand Hyatt Hotel 
Société 
Méditérranéenne 
des Grands 
Hotels s.a.l. 
Jihad Tannir 
and others 
Other projects involving other Lebanese elite players which have not been categorised 
Royal Hotel and 
Resorts 
Hotel 
Royal Hotels and 
Resorts (RHR) 
Marwan 
Kheireddine  
Lebanese 
Started career in 
London in Qatari 
National Bank. 
Later became 
chairman of Al 
Mawared Bank. 
Was then 
appointed as 
Minister of State 
in Mikati 
government 
(representative of 
Talal Arslan) 
Al Mawared Bank Al Mawared 
Plus Towers Residential Plus Properties 
George 
Chehwane 
Lebanese media 
mogul 
Venus Towers Residential 
Venus Real 
Estate (part of 
Plus Properties) 
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The Palladium Mixed Use 
Mouawad 
Projects (part of 
Mouawwad 
Investment 
Group) 
Joseph 
Mouawad 
Educated in the 
US with a Master 
of Science in Civil 
Engineering and 
with a family 
exposure to real 
estate and 
contracting 
business 
The Atrium Offices 
The Pavilions Residential 
Stratum Offices 
Wadi Grand 
Residence 
Residential 
Ven-Invest 
Three 
brothers: 
Sarkis, 
Edmond and 
Joseph Kabchi 
(and Pierre 
Abou Jaber) 
The Kabchis 
became successful 
businessmen in 
Venezuela in 
many sectors 
before returning to 
Lebanon. 
Le Gray Hotel 
District//S Residential 
Estates s.a.l. 
Property 
Development & 
Investment 
Anthony el-
Khoury and 
Namir Cortas 
El-Khoury began 
his career as a 
consultant in 
London, and 
Cortas began his 
career with 
Deloitte in New 
York, before they 
both met in 
London. 
Eden Gardens Residential 
A&H 
Construction and 
Development 
s.a.l.  
Hani Haddad 
(and family) 
Comes from a 
family of 
engineers 
Beirut Terraces Residential 
Benchmark 
Development 
Bassim 
Halaby, Nader 
Hariri and 
Mohammed 
Choucair 
Halaby worked as 
a Senior 
Consultant to 
Merril Lynch and 
World Bank. 
Nader Hariri was a 
cofounder, and 
Choucair was 
CEO of Patchi 
Chocolates 
 
 
Table 5 – A small sample of projects that have been completed (or are under 
construction) in the city centre. Source: Solidere, The Beirut City Centre: Cadastrals, 
(Beirut: Solidere, 2010). 
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ii. The three governments and the individual business interests in the Solidere 
project 
 
All three prime ministers held individual business interests in the Solidere project. 
This was more obvious in the cases of Siniora and Saad Hariri: they were shareholders in 
the company. But what was Mikati’s interest in the Solidere project? As was shown in 
Table 5, Mikati (and his brother, Taha) are developing three properties in the downtown 
area. Of the three, ‘MIKA Land’ and ‘MIKA Sea’ are the most significant to consider. 
Both are located in what will become the Waterfront district.
704
 See Figure 64 for a 
digital image of what the new Waterfront district will look like. All three men used their 
posts to enrich themselves and their allies. For heuristic purposes, though, we will focus 
on the efforts of Mikati.  
 
It is unclear when exactly Mikati developed an interest in the Waterfront district. 
But according to some evidence, it may have occurred around about the same time as his 
reappointment as Minister of Public Works and Transport in 2000. In February of the 
previous year (before his reappointment), Mikati had released a report stipulating that 
‘Sector 5’ of the St. Georges Bay area – see Figure 64 – did not fall within the boundaries 
of the ‘Western Marina’.705 Sector 5 is a ‘public maritime domain’ used by the St. 
Georges Hotel and Yacht Club – mentioned in earlier chapters – to access the sea. Not 
long after his reappointment, however, Rafiq Hariri asked Mikati to prepare a decree that 
would ratify Resolution 83/1995, which considered Sector 5 to be an integral part of the 
Western Marina.
706
 Essentially, this meant that the St. Georges Hotel would lose access 
to the sea. By the 3
rd
 of February 2001, Mikati had done just that.
707
 A few weeks later, 
                                                          
704
 MIKA Land and MIKA Sea are registered in plots 1,493 and 1,548 respectively. See: Solidere, Annual 
Report, (Beirut: Solidere, 2010), p.162.  
705
 This is according to information obtained from the following article: Warren Singh-Bartlett, ‘St. 
Georges and Solidere do battle over soul of BCD’, The Daily Star, 23 February 2001. 
706
 According to some available information, the Council of Ministers ‘approved’ a CDR recommendation 
to ask the Directorate General of Transport (DGT) – the technical unit of the Ministry of Public Works and 
Transport – to prepare the issuing of a decree that would ratify resolution 83 dated the 15 th of November 
1995. This is according to a Solidere Quarterly Report: Solidere, Quarterly Report: Issue 4, (Beirut: 
Solidere, 2000).  
707
 According to the Lebanese Official Gazette, this is Decree 4,838. Khoury points out that legally, a 
decree must carry the signature of the president, as well as the prime minister. There is much argument over 
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the Ministry of Public Works and Transport – accompanied by the police – descended on 
the St. Georges Marina and slapped notices of eviction on all the boats moored in the 
area. Owners were informed that they had a week to find another mooring space.
708
 
According to Fadi Khoury (the owner of the St. Georges Hotel), he tried telephoning 
Mikati – and the Director-General of Transport Abdel-Hafiz Qaisi – after the eviction 
notices were made: “I couldn’t reach them…We want to sit with the ministry officials 
around a table in the presence of the St. Georges’ lawyer…to discuss and clarify who is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
this particular point of law. A provision in the Ta’if Accords lends legal legitimacy to decisions taken by 
the Cabinet but this provision is fiercely contested and has repeatedly been attacked for being 
unconstitutional. This is according to an interview with Fadi Khoury held on 28 August 2012 in Beirut. 
708
 According to The Daily Star article, these orders were originally drafted six months earlier but only 
released in February of 2001. See: Singh-Bartlett, ‘St. Georges and Solidere do battle over soul of BCD’. 
Figure 64 – Digital model of what the Waterfront district will look like after 
construction. Source: Solidere, Annual Report, (Beirut: Solidere, 2005), p.39. 
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violating the law and in what sense”.709 The showdown finally happened on the 27th of 
February, as the ministry spent the entire day confiscating the remaining 20 boats which 
had not been moved by their respective owners.
710
 It was then, Khoury argues, that 
Mikati developed an interest in the Waterfront district. As he put it: “why else would 
Mikati contradict the report he had signed off in the previous year?”711  
 
On the 11
th
 of February 2004, Solidere announced the creation of Beirut Waterfront 
Development s.a.l. (BWD).
712
 Importantly, BWD would oversee the implementation of 
the Zaitunay Bay project (which overlooks the St. Georges Bay and includes the disputed 
Sector 5 of the Western Marina).
713
 As BWD began its work, Khoury noticed how much 
impact the Zaitunay Bay project would have on his hotel’s future:  
 
“They directed sewers into the marina instead of extending them out into the 
sea. They placed barges across the main entrance of the marina. They built 
an 8-metre-high breakwater that does not comply with Lebanese law, which 
stipulates that such structures cannot be over 6 metres high. And most 
importantly, they reclaimed more land than they were supposed to, which 
means that what will be built on the other side of the marina will block the 
hotel’s view of the Mediterranean Sea and Lebanese mountains. So when 
that happens, why would anyone want to stay in this hotel?”714  
 
Making matters worse, Khoury also experienced difficulties obtaining a building permit 
to repair his war-damaged hotel (see Figure 65). By the 2
nd
 of April 2004, Khoury held a 
press conference to reveal the reasons why his hotel had not been renovated yet. In his 
statement to the press, Khoury repeated many of the same accusations that he had made 
previously. But what was new was that he introduced a new name into the line of fire: 
“The problem comes from Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Transportation Minister Najib 
Mikati and Solidere. All these parties are the same in my eyes, [and] don’t want [to 
                                                          
709
 Quoted in: Dania Shebaro, ‘Government wins latest battle with St. Georges’, The Daily Star, 28 
February 2001. 
710
 See: ibid. 
711
 Interview with Fadi Khoury held on 28 August 2012 in Beirut. 
712
 See Table 5. 
713
 Zaitunay Bay is spread over two plots of land. Specifically, plots 1,455 and 1,456. See: Solidere, Annual 
Report, (Beirut: Solidere, 2010), p.166. 
714
 Interview with Fadi Khoury held on 28 August 2012 in Beirut. 
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see] the St. Georges [Hotel] renovated because they want it for themselves”.715 While his 
vested interests mean that his accusations should be treated with caution, the quote is 
important because it suggests that Mikati was using his authoritative powers as the 
Minister of Public Works and Transport to ensure that his interests – along with those of 
Hariri – were met.716 Of course, their allies and friends – inside and outside government – 
had interests in BWD as well; most significant of whom was Mikati’s close friend 
Mohammed Safadi: the Zaitunay Bay project is a 50/50 joint venture between Solidere 
                                                          
715
 Quoted in: Tarek El Zein, ‘St. Georges chairman says Solidere stands in the way’, The Daily Star, 03 
April 2004. 
716
 It is worth noting that MIKA Land was the first project to be launched in the Waterfront district. See: 
Solidere, Annual Report, (Beirut: Solidere, 2009), p.104. 
Figure 65 – A recent image of the St. Georges Hotel. Notice how the building is still 
empty and waiting to be renovated. Also notice the ‘Stop Solidere’ that is draped on the 
side of the building. Photo taken by author.  
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and STOW Capital; a company whose primary shareholder is Safadi.
717
 It also sits across 
the road from ‘Marina Towers’ (plot number 1354), which was built by a consortium of 
three companies; one of which was Safadi Group Holding s.a.l.
718
 One, thus, understands 
that Mikati was not just using his position as the Minister of Public Works and Transport 
to protect his own business interests, but also to protect the interests of his close ally.
719
 
 
In 2005 (not long after BWD was established), Mikati was replaced by Mohammed 
Safadi. As the new Minister of Public Works and Transport, Safadi granted BWD special 
building exemptions. The most significant of these exemptions draws reference to the 
‘permitted height of a building on plot 1,456’. Indeed, the building on plot 1,456 refers to 
the apartment and yacht club building – see Figure 66 – that is part of the Zaitunay 
project.
720
 Importantly, this exemption comes as a complete reversal of a previous decree 
(Decree No. 3,808 dated the 8
th
 of September 2000), which stipulates that this area, “is 
not suitable for the construction of any buildings.”721 Essentially, this meant that Safadi 
bypassed all previous building regulations for the city centre that, otherwise, would have 
worked against his own aspirations. For Khoury, however, this meant that the building 
would block the only remaining sea view that the St. Georges Hotel still enjoyed. 
Undoubtedly, the prospect of this happening infuriated Khoury, as today he refers to 
Safadi’s decrees as ‘illegal alterations’.722 On the 13th of November 2007, as Khoury 
continued to claim that his hotel was being denied permits from the Beirut Municipality, 
the acting governor of Beirut, Nassif Qaloush, granted BWD a six-year 
                                                          
717
 According to the agreement, Solidere would contribute 22,351 square metres of land (with about 20,000 
square metres in built-up area), and STOW Capital would contribute US$31.6 million. See: Solidere, 
Annual Report, (Beirut: Solidere, 2004), p.22. 
718
 According to Solidere’s Quarterly Report, the other two companies in this consortium are Riyadh 
Holding s.a.l. and STOW Capital. For more details, see: Solidere, Quarterly Report: Issue 2, (Beirut: 
Solidere, 1998). 
719
 For further details, see: Mohammad Zbeeb, ‘Public Property…For the Rich Only’, Al-Akhbar [in 
Arabic], 02 October 2012; Mohammad Zbeeb, ‘Lebanon’s Seafront Aggressors: The Names and the 
Details’, Al-Akhbar, [in Arabic], 06 December 2012. See also blog article: Gino Raidy, ‘The Truth Behind 
the Zaitunay Bay Rumors and Rents’, Gino’s Blog, 05 December 2012.  
720
 This was Decree No. 16,546 (dated the 9
th
 of March 2006). See: Al-Jarida ar-Rasmiya, No. 14, 16 
March 2006, p.1291. Available at: http://www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/subpgoldJo.aspx?pageid=3836 (Accessed 
15 October 2013). 
721
 As quoted in: Zbeeb, ‘Public Property…For the Rich Only’. 
722
 Interview with Fadi Khoury held on 28 August 2012 in Beirut. 
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building permit.
723
 Importantly, this permit provided BWD with permission to construct a 
building on plot 1,456, with three floors below ground level, and two floors above it. But 
on the 7
th
 of July 2009, Qalloush ‘altered’ the building permit so that BWD would instead 
be allowed to add four floors above ground level.
724
 The physical result of this alteration 
is most noticeable from the adjacent quayside (where the St. Georges Hotel is located). 
Today, the building on plot 1,456 is almost complete, and has six floors – instead of the 
original two – above ground level. And as Khoury had predicted, the building is blocking 
                                                          
723
 This permit was issued on the 13
th
 of November 2007. See: Zbeeb, ‘Public Property…For the Rich 
Only’. 
724
 See: ibid. It is not clear what prompted Qalloush to alter the building permit, but it was suspected that 
corruption was involved. For details, see: The Daily Star, ‘Beirut governor protecting corrupt employees: 
council member’, The Daily Star, 22 December 2011. 
Figure 66 – An image of Zaitunay Bay. Notice on the far end the construction of Safadi’s 
apartment and yacht club building on plot 1,456. Photo taken by author.  
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the remaining view of the sea from the St. Georges Hotel. This shows that Safadi used his 
authoritative powers as Minister of Public Works and Transport to ensure that his 
interests in Downtown Beirut were met as well.  
 
Of course, things became more complicated after Safadi was reassigned as Finance 
Minister. In late 2013, the new Minister of Public Works and Transport Ghazi el-Aridi 
organised a press conference to explain why his ministry had not cleaned the sewers 
ahead of the winter season. At it, el-Aridi explained that his ministry needed funding 
from the Finance Ministry to carry out its work. But the Finance Minister, who was 
Safadi, had apparently backtracked on issuing the necessary funds because el-Aridi 
refused to approve a law that would legalise a ‘construction violation’ in Zaitunay Bay.725 
Of course, it is difficult to verify this claim. But what is understood from the incident 
above is the pertaining culture of controlling an official post that can be used to further 
one’s own business interests. 
 
 
iii. The three governments and the collective economic interest in the Solidere 
project 
 
As well as individual business interests, the governments of Fouad Siniora, Saad 
Hariri and Najib Mikati shared a collective economic interest in the Solidere project. As 
explained previously, the Solidere project was the main economic venture giving Beirut 
(and the rest of the country) a competitive advantage in the region.
726
 Therefore, without 
it, Beirut (and other parts of the country) would struggle to attract international 
investment into other economic sectors (which the same elites were invested in). To 
demonstrate this collective interest, we can look at how these three prime ministers 
                                                          
725
 For details, see: Kareem Shaheen, ‘Lebanon unprepared as winter storms loom’, The Daily Star, 06 
December 2013; Jana El Hassan, ‘Aridi says Safadi blackmail halting ministry work’, The Daily Star, 09 
December 2013; Bassam Alkantar, ‘Aridi vs Safadi: The sewer of corruption has opened…so where is the 
justice?’ Al-Akhbar, [in Arabic], 10 December 2013; Mohammad Nazzal, ‘Al-Aridi and Safadi in Court’, 
Al-Akhbar, [in Arabic], 13 December 2013; Mohammad Nazzal, ‘Minister of Asphalt’ Resigns: Public 
Works Overflow with Corruption’, Al-Akhbar, [in Arabic], 17 December 2013; Bassam Alkantar, ‘Zaitunay 
Bay: The Crocodile Searches for a Path’, Al-Akhbar, [in Arabic], 18 December 2013. 
726
 See Chapter 2 for details. 
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offered protection to the investments of other elites, regardless of their social or political 
affiliations. Here, we find that the three men – in their respective governments – avoided 
‘proper protocol’ when addressing issues regarding archaeological discoveries. One 
example in particular comes to mind: that of the Roman Hippodrome.  
 
The Roman Hippodrome – see Figure 67 – was discovered by the Lebanese 
Directorate General of Antiquities (DGA) between March 2007 and April 2008 in the 
Wadi Bou Jmil district of Downtown Beirut (next to the newly-renovated Jewish 
Synagogue).
727
 The uncovered portions were spread across three plots of land, numbered 
834, 1,370 and 1,410. But the controversy began on plot number 1,370, owned by Ali 
Nazem Ahmad’s Beirut Trade Real-Estate (see Table 5). Since purchasing this plot of 
land in 2007, Ahmad had issued ongoing requests for his company to build a 12,000 
square metre block of luxury residential flats called Beirut Village.
728
 However, his 
ongoing requests were refused by the Ministry of Culture.
729
 Ahmad had invested heavily 
in this project, and therefore, he could not afford to lose out on it. When the Ministry of 
Culture tried to clean and rehabilitate the site, the prime minister’s office did not provide 
the necessary permits. Instead, the permits were referred to Solidere to issue. At this 
point, Solidere refused to comply, and in turn, denied staff from the DGA access to the 
site.
730
 The row between the Ministry of Culture and Solidere over access to the property 
persisted until the then Minister of Culture Tammam Salam (whose Maqasid Foundation 
was now in  competition with the Hariri Foundation) issued Decree No. 63 (dated the 26
th
 
of August 2009) to officially include the site on the Lebanese Official List of Registered 
Historic Monuments and Sites.
731
 It is important to note that Ahmad had political 
                                                          
727
 For details, see: May Aboud Abi Aql, ‘The Discovery of the Roman Hippodrome, first of its kind in 
Beirut and fifth in the East’, An-Nahar Newspaper, [in Arabic], 21 April 2008. 
728
 See: Solidere, Annual Report, (Beirut: Solidere, 2006), p.79. 
729
 See blog article: Elie Fares, ‘Save Beirut Heritage: The Roman Hippodrome to be Demolished’, A 
Separate State of Mind, 18 March 2012.  
730
 In one incident, the Ministry of Culture wanted to clean the weeds and trees that had sprung up on the 
site. However so, Solidere had apparently denied staff from the DGA to access the site. For details, see: 
Alkantar, ‘Minister of Culture “Dismantles” Beirut’s Roman Hippodrome’. 
731
 The minister ruled that the Roman hippodrome should be preserved in situ (kept in their original place) 
due to its archaeological, historic, and architectural significance, pending a decision to rehabilitate the site 
and open it up to public access as a tourist landmark – like others that have been preserved in downtown 
Beirut. See: Al-Jarida ar-Rasmiya, No. 42, 10 September 2009, p.5738. Available at: 
http://www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/subpgoldJo.aspx?pageid=3836 (Accessed 15 October 2013). 
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connections with Nabih Berri’s Amal Party.732 A former government official – who 
agreed to be interviewed on the condition of anonymity – makes the following comment:  
 
“There were many wealthy politicians with investments in Solidere. They 
came from both the 8
th
 March and 14
th
 March camps. I heard from Tarek 
Metri that when he was Minister of Culture, members close to Amal [Nabih 
Berri’s party] came to him and asked him to change the laws related to many 
disputed properties both inside and outside Solidere.”733 
 
The fact that they were political adversaries did not stop Siniora and Saad Hariri from 
offering their help. According to an article published by As-Safir Daily Newspaper in 
2012, Ahmad approached Saad Hariri at his private residence in Downtown Beirut. 
                                                          
732
 This is according to an MTV report. See: Rakal Mubarak, ‘Roman Hippodrome under threat’, MTV 
Report, [in Arabic], 10 August 2013. 
733
 Interview with a former government official who wishes to remain anonymous. 
Figure 67 – An image of the excavation site where parts of the Roman Hippodrome were 
discovered. Source: Bassam Alkantar, “Minister of Culture ‘Dismantles’ Beirut’s Roman 
Hippodrome”, Al-Akhbar, [in Arabic], 13 March 2012. 
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There, he appealed for help in resolving the matter. According to the As-Safir article, 
Saad Hariri gave Ahmad his word that he would find a solution, but ‘in his own way’.734  
 
Normally, decrees to officially include sites on the Lebanese Official List of 
Registered Historic Monuments and Sites are followed by a cabinet decision to ‘purchase 
the site’. But Prime Minister Fouad Siniora – and later, Prime Minister Saad Hariri – 
chose to ‘procrastinate’ over acquiring the property.735 It therefore suggests that both men 
had answered Ahmad’s call for help. But both men could not sway Tammam Salam (and 
his successor Salim Wardeh) to revoke Decree No. 63. This all changed as soon as Najib 
Mikati became prime minister. Upon taking up the post, Mikati appointed Gaby Layyoun 
as the new Minister of Culture. It is worth mentioning that Layyoun was a member of 
Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement – a party allied to Berri’s Amal Party and 
opposed to Siniora and Saad Hariri’s Al-Mustaqbal Party. Under the rubric of ‘the state 
cannot acquire properties in Downtown Beirut’, Layyoun proposed an idea that would 
involve ‘dismantling and re-integrating’ ancient ruins on several disputed sites. The move 
was significant: 
 
“When the Minister of Culture refused to change the laws to suit the 
demands of the investors, they told him ‘no worries, you will not change the 
law, but the government will change one day, and then we can ask the new 
Minister of Culture to fulfil our demands’. That day happened when 
Layyoun was appointed. And since his party is closely allied to Amal, there 
is reason to believe that he was swayed in one way or another.”736 
 
By the beginning of 2012, a ‘leaked document’ revealed that Layyoun had issued an 
‘unpublished’ decree (specifically, Decree No. 849 dated the 14th of February 2012), that 
gave Beirut Trade approval to dismantle some sections of the Roman Hippodrome on its 
                                                          
734
 According to this article, Ahmad privately approached Saad Hariri at his residence and asked him to 
help him with the issue. For details, see: Claire Shukr, “The Story of plot number 1370, who created it: It’s 
prohibited to tamper with the garden of the ‘Centre House’”, As-Safir Newspaper, [in Arabic] 21 March 
2012. 
735
 According to the article, Salam’s decree was not followed up by a government decision to purchase the 
site. See: Alkantar, “Minister of Culture ‘Dismantles’ Beirut’s Roman Hippodrome”. 
736
 Interview with a former government official who wishes to remain anonymous. 
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plot (plot number 1,370), and in turn, re-integrating them using a small museum.
737
 
During this time, a similar idea was being floated to dismantle the Phoenician Port. This 
ancient site was discovered by the DGA during excavations conducted between 
December 2010 and April 2011 in the Hotel district of Downtown Beirut – specifically, 
on plot number 1,398.
738
 This plot of approximately 7,500 square metres was sold to 
Venus Real-Estate (VRE), a company that falls under the umbrella of the Plus Holding 
Group (a conglomerate of 14 companies operating in five countries). Plus Holding is 
owned by Lebanese media mogul Georges Chehwane (see Table 5). Like Ahmad, 
Chehwane was not pleased by the archaeological finds on his land because it threatened 
his half-billion dollar investment in the area.
739
  
 
Not long after, Layyoun passed another unpublished decree (Decree No. 2,437 
dated the 5
th
 of June 2013) granting permits to the owners of plots 834 and 1,410 to begin 
construction there. Like before, the decree delegated to the owners of the properties the 
task of dismantling some of the remains and re-integrating them in a small museum.
740
 
On the 25
th
 of October 2013, it was reported by some local activists that walls belonging 
to the Roman Hippodrome had already ‘disappeared’.741 This was reminiscent of what 
had occurred the previous year, when activists showing up for a protest at VRE’s 
property found the Phoenician Port being levelled to the ground.
742
 See Figures 68 and 
69. According to various sources, the decision to demolish the site was not published in 
                                                          
737
 See, for example: Mubarak, ‘Roman Hippodrome under threat’; Nohad Toplian, “Officials debate future 
of Beirut’s historic Roman Hippodrome”, Al-Shorfa, 27 April 2012. See also: Youth Economic Forum, 
Cultural heritage in Lebanon put at stake by policy makers, (Beirut: Youth Economic Forum Policy, 
Position Paper, 2012).  
738
 See: May Aboud Abi Aql, ‘Discovery of first Phoenician port in Beirut and foundations of a Roman 
Temple in Mina al-Hosn’, An-Nahar Newspaper, [in Arabic], 08 April 2011. 
739
 See: Solidere, Annual Report, (Beirut: Solidere, 2010), p.164. 
740
 In this regard, the owner of the two plots are registered under Royal Hotels and Resorts (RHR); a 
company that is known to belong to the Kheireddine family (see Figure 68). Marwan Kheireddine, who was 
also a Minister of State in the Mikati government, said he had generously offered 4,000 square metres of 
basement space - worth an estimated US$10m - to display some 38 metres of the foundation wall that falls 
on his property. For details, see: Bassam Alkantar, ‘Layyoun and the Roman Hippodrome: The Last 
Episode’, Al-Akhbar, [in Arabic], 27 July 2013. 
741
 See blog article: Habib Battah, ‘Roman wall removed from Beirut Hippodrome site’, The Beirut Report, 
25 October 2013.  
742
 This is according to an interview with Giorgio Tarraf held on 12 July 2012 in Beirut, and an interview 
with Habib Battah held on 31 August 2012 in Beirut. 
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Figure 68 – An image of the excavation site where parts of the Phoenician Port were 
discovered. Source: Van Meguerditchian, ‘Construction firm demolishes Phoenician 
port’, The Daily Star, 28 June 2012.  
 
Figure 69 – An image of the Phoenician Port after it was demolished. Source: 
Meguerditchian, ‘Construction firm demolishes Phoenician port’.  
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the Official Gazette until the 28
th
 of June; a full day after the demolition took place.
743
 
This time, many activists argued that Layyoun tried to ‘pre-empt’ activists by giving 
VRE ‘tacit permission’ to demolish the remains.744 Layyoun accused his critics of being 
politically-motivated. While doing so, he even made a swipe at those behind Solidere: 
“What we did…corrects the mistake by Solidere, which deceived property owners by not 
informingthem that there were archaeological finds before buying the property”.745 It is 
clear, however one assesses it, that elites from across the political spectrum were working 
together not only to protect individual properties belonging to them and their allies, but 
also to safeguard the trajectory of the Solidere project. And they did this in spite of 
personal or political differences that existed between them and those standing behind the 
private company. 
 
  
II. From Solidere to Solidere International 
 
As mentioned at the start of this chapter (and elsewhere), the Solidere project is an 
‘elite playing field’, where a number of key elites have been brought together to reshape 
the city centre according to their own aspirations and visions.
746
 In the years that followed 
Hariri’s assassination, a decision was made by the company’s leading shareholders to 
expand Solidere’s operations abroad. On the 7th of June 2007, Solidere announced the 
establishment of Solidere International (SI). This international branch has since launched 
a number of large-scale urban developments inside and outside Lebanon. Like the 
Solidere project, these new developments bring together a number of social, cultural, 
political and economic elite players from national, regional – and sometimes also, 
international – circles. Importantly, all are dominated by the most powerful segment(s) of 
                                                          
743
 This was Decree No. 70 (dated the 26
th
 of June 2012). See: Al-Jarida ar-Rasmiya, No. 28, 28 June 2012, 
p.2975. Available at: http://www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/subpgoldJo.aspx?pageid=3836 (Accessed 15 October 
2013). 
744
 For details, see: Van Meguerditchian, ‘Phoenician Port in Beirut faces Mega Project’, The Daily Star, 25 
June 2012; Bassam Alkantar and Joanne Bajjaly, ‘Phoenician Port Sold Down The River In Beirut’, Al-
Akhbar, [in Arabic], 27 June 2012. 
745
 As quoted in: ibid. See also: Nafez Kawas, ‘Culture Ministry defends plans for Roman Hippodrome’, 
The Daily Star, 16 March 2012. 
746
 See: Swyngedouw, Moulaert and Rodriguez, ‘Neoliberal urbanization in Europe: Large-scale urban 
development projects and the new urban policy’, pp.567-568. 
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the Hariri network. What this means is that the Hariri network is no longer limited to 
reshaping the urban future of Beirut: now, it is ‘imagineering’ the urban future of 
multiple cities. The move from Solidere to SI narrates the socio-historical trajectory of 
the Hariri network after 2005. It is, therefore, pivotal for understanding how networks of 
capitalists change over time and from place to place. 
 
 
i. Solidere’s post-2005 challenges 
 
Ten years after its establishment, Solidere was faced with a number of challenges 
that prompted the board to look for an alternative source of rents. The most significant 
challenge that Solidere had to deal with was the political crisis that engulfed Lebanon 
after Hariri’s assassination in 2005. This took a huge toll on economic growth in the 
country: visitors dwindled, businesses closed down, and many investors scurried to 
withdraw their capital.
747
 Despite the political impasse, real estate business was still 
flourishing in Downtown Beirut. This was because there remained a high demand for 
‘land’ in general; thanks mainly to rich property buyers and tenants in Lebanon and the 
Arab Gulf.
748
  
 
In fact, this demand was reaching ‘unheard-of proportions’ as well.749 And even 
after the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah came to an end, Gulf investors returned 
and funnelled billions of petro-dollars into high-end real estate projects in the city 
centre.
750
 Aided by the post-9/11 climate, Gulf investors found Lebanon to be a safer 
place to invest their money in, and therefore, continued to channel petrodollars into 
                                                          
747
 According to one source, the country took a major hit from the political turmoil that plagued the country 
in 2005, as growth plunged from five percent in 2004 to around 0 percent in 2005. See: AFP, ‘Lebanon’s 
economy reeling from a year of violence’, The Daily Star, 22 December 2005. 
748
 This is according to information obtained from the following report: EIU, Country Report: Lebanon, 
April 2006, p.27.  
749
 This demand was visibly demonstrated by the numerous cranes rising above Beirut’s skyline. For 
details, see: Nada Bakri, ‘Construction fever sweeps Lebanon’, The Daily Star, 17 May 2006; Lysandra 
Ohrstrom, ‘Development boom heads for Beirut’, The Daily Star, 30 June 2006. 
750
 See: Lysandra Ohrstrom, ‘Construction boom goes bust – for now’, The Daily Star, 22 July 2006. See 
also: Osama Habib, ‘Accord sparks renewed expat interest, resumption of real-estate projects’, The Daily 
Star, 29 May 2008. 
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projects in the city centre. Some of the most significant projects included Ivana Trump 
Tower (a US$150 million residential tower by Dubai real estate giant DAMAC), Beirut 
Gate (a US$600 million project involving residential and business facilities by Abu 
Dhabi-based Investment House), and Phoenician Village (a whopping US$1.3 billion 
residential and business project by Kuwaiti firm Levant Holding).
751
 In this context, one 
can imagine how much the company’s shareholders benefited from these projects. A 
close look at Solidere’s financial reports would show that the company was performing 
well throughout this period. Solidere continued to make substantial profits from land 
sales (and rental income).
752
 In turn, these profits drove the value of the company’s shares 
sharply upwards.
753
 See Figure 70 for an artist’s impression of one of these new 
developments under construction. 
 
But even with such projects underway, the security situation was progressively 
worsening. Between 2011 and 2013 especially, the uprising in neighbouring Syria had 
turned into a full-blown civil war and Lebanon began to feel the repercussions.
754
 The 
city centre, which once acted as tourist magnet, attracting hordes of wealthy visitors from 
Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, had now become a ‘ghost town’ (see Figure 71). 
                                                          
751
 This fact can also be supported by the number of projects that were launched by Gulf-based investors. 
See: Will Rasmussen, ‘Dubai firm unveils plans for $120 million tower in Beirut’, The Daily Star, 30 
November 2005; Henri Mamarbachi, ‘Investment in Solidere surges after Hariri’s assassination’, The Daily 
Star, 20 February 2006; Nada Bakri, ‘Gulf money pours into Downtown Beirut’, The Daily Star, 01 April 
2006; The Daily Star, ‘Solidere announces $1.3 billion project’, The Daily Star, 27 April 2006; Lysandra 
Ohrstrom, ‘Phoenicia Village: Beirut’s largest development yet’, The Daily Star, 19 May 2006; Lysandra 
Ohstrom, ‘DAMAC unveils plans for ‘Ivana Trump’ apartments’, The Daily Star, 27 June 2006; Lysandra 
Ohrstrom, ‘Gulf developer to start building $600-million Beirut complex’, The Daily Star, 14 October 
2006. 
752
 Solidere continued to report impressive year-on-year profits. This is according to information obtained 
from The Daily Star archive. See: The Daily Star, ‘Solidere reports 22 percent spike in profits despite war’, 
The Daily Star, 03 April 2007; The Daily Star, ‘Solidere posts net profits of $155.9 million’, The Daily 
Star, 05 June 2008; The Daily Star, ‘Real-estate giant Solidere reports net profit of $214.3 million in 2008’, 
The Daily Star, 16 June 2009; The Daily Star, ‘Solidere records net profits of $182.2 million in 2009’, The 
Daily Star, 01 June 2010; The Daily Star, ‘Solidere 2010 profits surge 8 percent’, The Daily Star, 16 June 
2011.  
753
 This is according to: EIU, Country Report: Lebanon, January 2006, p.28.  
754
 For details, see: Mouhamad Wehbe, ‘Lebanon: Bye Bye Tourists’, Al-Akhbar, [in Arabic] 22 August 
2012. 
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Figure 70 – An artist’s impression of the Phoenician Village project in Downtown 
Beirut. Notice how this is another high-rise building designed to maximise profit. 
Source: The Phoenician Village webpage: 
http://www.phoenicianvillage.com/gallery.html (Accessed 20 November 2013).  
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Land sales and rental income began to plunge, and with it, Solidere share prices.
755
 
According to economists, the decline in share prices reflected the cautious mood of 
investors and consumers, particularly those from the Gulf, to the unstable conditions in 
Lebanon brought about by political turmoil in the region, as well as domestic tensions 
resulting from the civil war in neighbouring Syria.
756
 The most significant incident took 
                                                          
755
 By the 15
th
 of July 2011, Solidere A and B shares fell to US$16.54 and US$16.42 respectively. 
According to economists, the decrease reflected the negative mood of investors and brokers who were 
becoming deeply concerned about political developments in the region – and especially, in Syria – 
impacting Lebanon. By the 1
st
 of June 2012, Solidere A and B shares fell further to US$12.62 and 
US$12.41 respectively. Again, economists cited that investors and brokers were still deeply concerned with 
the security and political developments in the country as a result of the unstable conditions in the region 
and neighbouring Syria. Importantly, this was the first time that Solidere shares fell to these levels since 
2005. By the 20
th
 of September 2013, Solidere A and B shares fell further to US$10.75 and US$10.72 
respectively. For details on the downward spiral of Solidere share prices, see Solidere’s ‘Stock Information’ 
on its website: http://www.solidere.com/corporate/investor-relations/stock-information (Accessed 30 
November 2013). 
756
 This viewpoint is shared by Solidere officials as well. See the statement made by the Chairman and 
General Manager of Solidere Nasser Chammaa in: Solidere, Annual Report, (Beirut: Solidere, 2012), p.2. 
Figure 71 – An image of the Place d’Etoile in Downtown Beirut. Notice how empty the 
street is. Photo taken by author.  
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place towards the end of 2013, when a suicide bomber targeted the motorcade of a former 
minister next to the STARCO building in the downtown area. According to former 
Finance Minister and Shihabist Georges Corm, he was not surprised by the downturn that 
Solidere experienced in those last couple of years: “From the beginning I was warning 
them against transforming Downtown Beirut into an ‘island for the rich’. This island 
would not be used by Lebanese residents, but rather, by rich immigrants and Gulf 
tourists. So when these people stop visiting, of course the area will become dark and 
empty”.757 Today, there is an obvious disparity between the city centre and the rest of the 
city: while Downtown Beirut has become ‘dark’ and ‘empty’, other parts of the city, such 
as Hamra and Achrafiyeh, are still busy and thriving. In light of this, the initiative to 
expand abroad was necessary to make up for the losses incurred from the worsening 
political crisis at the time.
758
 
 
It must be stressed, though, that Solidere’s expansion is part of a strategy to search 
for alternative rents. In turn, appropriated rents would benefit Solidere’s shareholders. 
Solidere officials are not shy to admit this, as confirmed by Douaidy: 
 
“The price of our shares is not just connected to our land sales in Downtown 
Beirut. It is also connected to our operations abroad. Creating Solidere 
International was really part of an effort to create a new ‘land bank’ where 
our know-how can continue to operate. Here in Downtown Beirut the land 
bank is depleting. By going abroad, we are creating new land banks where 
this know-how can continue. Eventually, the revenue that will be generated 
from ‘exporting our expertise’ will come back to us, and therefore, be 
another source of income for Solidere. This, in turn, will improve the value 
of the shares in the company.”759  
  
And this is exactly what happened. On the 29
th
 of June 2007 (the day before Solidere 
International was officially established), Solidere A and B shares both closed at 
                                                          
757
 Interview with Georges Corm held on 25 July 2012 in Beirut. 
758
 Interview with Mounir Douaidy held on 23 July 2012 in Beirut. 
759
 Interview with Mounir Douaidy held on 23 July 2012 in Beirut. 
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US$15.39. By the 11
th
 of July 2008, Solidere A and B shares closed at US$38.86 and 
US$38.60 respectively; an increase of well over 50%.
760
  
 
By 2008, however, land sales began to plunge, and by 2011, they were almost non-
existent.
761
 Of course, this caused a decline in Solidere’s share prices.762 As explained 
previously, the decline in share prices reflected the cautious mood of investors and 
consumers to the unstable conditions brought about by the political crisis in the country. 
But despite the gloomy picture, Solidere shares have the potential to rebound in the future 
due to huge returns in revenue from SI. This point has been made by FFA Private 
Bank.
763
  
 
 
ii. The plan to expand Solidere’s operations abroad 
 
In light of the political crisis at the time, Solidere pursued a plan to expand its 
operations abroad. The arrival of the Siniora government aided this expansion. A number 
of amendments – which needed governmental approval – were suddenly approved by 
Siniora’s government; the most significant being the extension of Solidere’s duration 
from 25 years to 35 years.
764
 Other amendments that were passed included modifications 
                                                          
760
 This information is according to Solidere’s ‘Stock Information’ on its website. See: 
http://www.solidere.com/corporate/investor-relations/stock-information (Accessed 30 November 2013). 
761
 According to a chart showing Solidere’s remaining land inventory, this inventory has remained largely 
static at under 2,000,000 square metres from 2011 to 2013. See: Solidere, Excerpts for Analysts, (Beirut: 
Solidere, 2013), p.10. 
762
 By the 15
th
 of July 2011, Solidere A and B shares fell to US$16.54 and US$16.42 respectively. 
According to economists, the decrease reflected the negative mood of investors and brokers who were 
becoming deeply concerned about political developments in the region – and especially, in Syria – 
impacting Lebanon. By the 1
st
 of June 2012, Solidere A and B shares fell further to US$12.62 and 
US$12.41 respectively. Again, economists cited that investors and brokers were still deeply concerned with 
the security and political developments in the country as a result of the unstable conditions in the region 
and neighbouring Syria. Importantly, this was the first time that Solidere shares fell to these levels since 
2005. By the 20
th
 of September 2013, Solidere A and B shares fell further to US$10.75 and US$10.72 
respectively. For details on the downward spiral of Solidere share prices, see Solidere’s ‘Stock Information’ 
on its website: http://www.solidere.com/corporate/investor-relations/stock-information (Accessed 30 
November 2013). 
763
 For details, see: FFA Private Bank Analysts, ‘Solidere Analyst Day 2012’, FFA Private Bank, 13 July 
2012; FFA Private Bank Analysts, ‘Solidere Analyst Day 2013’, FFA Private Bank, 13 September 2013.  
764
 Solidere's duration was extended by Decree No. 13,909 of 2005 from 25 years to 35 years, starting from 
the 10
th
 of May 1994, the date of its registration at the Commercial Register. See: Solidere, Annual Report, 
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to the master plan reflecting new sector plans for the Martyrs’ Square axis, Ghalghoul, 
aswaq, Hotel and Waterfront Districts.
765
 There was, however, one amendment that was 
very controversial; specifically, it had to do with allowing Solidere to provide ‘services 
and consultancy’ to real estate development projects ‘outside the downtown area’ and ‘all 
over the world’.766 
 
The controversy began on the 25
th
 of April 2006, when Raya Daouk accused 
Solidere of attempting to, “amend its regulations to allow it to extend its work turf 
outside Lebanon.”767 Raya had by this stage replaced her husband, Omar Daouk, as head 
of the ‘Association of Owners of Rights in the Beirut Central District’. Initially, these 
accusations were based on rumours that Solidere was involved in a multi-million dollar 
real estate project being developed by Baha’ Hariri (Saad Hariri’s brother) in Aqaba, 
Jordan.
768
 While there was no proof at the time confirming Solidere’s involvement, 
Douaidy reveals in an interview that his company was being ‘solicited’ by many different 
countries and investors to go and ‘replicate’ what they had done in Downtown Beirut in 
other places.
769
 Later that year – on the 13th of November to be exact – Solidere’s board 
approved a resolution put forward at an extraordinary general meeting held by Solidere 
shareholders to ‘export its expertise’ outside the city centre: 
 
“We will apply our know-how in urban regeneration and city making within 
the Middle East and around the Mediterranean basin, teaming up with our 
network of consultants, investors and operators. External projects will offer a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(Beirut: Solidere, 2005), p.11. It is important to note that this extension was based on a suggestion that 
came out of an extraordinary general assembly of Solidere shareholders dated the 29
th
 of June 1998, which 
resolved to amend the duration of the company to 75 years, but which had been waiting for the approval of 
the Council of Ministers. See: Solidere, Quarterly Report: Issue 2, (Beirut: Solidere, 1998).  
765
 See ‘Chairman’s Message’ section for more details: Solidere, Annual Report, (Beirut: Solidere, 2005), 
pp.6-8. 
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 An extraordinary general assembly of Solidere shareholders dated the 13
th
 of November 2006 resolved 
to amend the ‘objectives’ section of the company’s bylaws to include providing services and consultancy in 
real estate development for projects outside the BCD area and all over the world. See Solidere, Annual 
Report, (Beirut: Solidere, 2006), p.102. 
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 Quoted in: Leila Hatoum, ‘Solidere, Hariri family face fresh criticism’, The Daily Star, 26 April 2006. 
768
 Multibillionaire Bahaa Hariri, the eldest son of slain Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, announced 
on the 7
th
 of April 2006 his intentions to invest between US$7 and US$10 billion for the construction of a 
large scale city in the Aqaba Economic Zone (ASEZ) in southern Jordan on the Red Sea Coast. For more 
details, see: Shikrallah Nakhoul, ‘Bahaa Hariri to Invest Up to $10 Billion in Real Estate Project in Aqaba’, 
APD, 08 April 2006. 
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 Interview with Mounir Douaidy held on 23 July 2012 in Beirut. 
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new source of revenue in the form of fee income as well as equity and/or 
profit participations, while avoiding to invest any of our cash abroad.”770 
 
The move is very significant, as it clearly shows that Solidere itself has become a ‘model’ 
to be replicated in other cities. This is what Rami Daher has called the ‘Solidere 
phenomenon’.771 This comes in contrast to the regional trend – outlined in Chapter 2 – in 
which urban projects in the Arab Gulf cities are serving as models to be replicated in 
other cities in the Arab/Middle Eastern region.
772
  
 
At this point, Solidere’s decision needed governmental approval first. Taking 
advantage of guaranteed support from Prime Minister Siniora, the company had already 
entered negotiations about going forward with development projects in a number of 
countries.
773
 According to a weekly bulletin published by Bank Audi Saradar, for 
example, Solidere had even gone as far as finalising a plan to invest US$6.8 billion in a 
US$13 billion real estate project in the UAE emirate of Ajman.
774
 Importantly, there was 
no official statement released by Solidere at the time to confirm this, therefore suggesting 
that the company was trying to pre-empt any opposition to the move. On the 29
th
 of 
March 2007, Siniora finally passed a decree that officially approved the company’s 
decision.
775
 Undoubtedly, this shocked the committee of former landowners. On the 29
th
 
of May, the committee – represented by lawyer Albert Farhat – filed a lawsuit at Majlis 
al-Shura against the decree; describing it as ‘unconstitutional’ because it ‘violates 
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 Nasser Chammaa, quoted in: Solidere, Annual Report, (Beirut: Solidere, 2006), p.8. 
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 This point was initially suggested by Rami Daher in his study of Amman, Jordan. For details, see: 
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Jordan and Turkey. See: Lysandra Ohrstrom, ‘Solidere activity abroad angers Lebanese shareholders’, The 
Daily Star, 18 July 2007. 
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10 square kilometres in the Al Zoura area in Ajman, and will be known as ‘Downtown Ajman’. It would be 
a new city consisting of hospitals, schools, offices, shopping centres, residential buildings, five-star hotels, 
a golf course, and a marina. It is expected to attract individuals as well as investors and companies. One can 
already begin to understand how this concept already sounds very similar to Solidere’s concept of 
reconstructing Downtown Beirut. See: Bank Audi Research Department, ‘The Lebanon Weekly Monitor’, 
Bank Audi sal – Audi Saradar Group, Week 4, Jan 22 – Jan 27, (2007), p.3. 
775
 This was Ministerial Decree No. 207 (dated the 29
th
 of March 2007). See: Al-Jarida ar-Rasmiya, No. 18, 
29 March 2007, p.1705. Available at: http://www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/subpgoldJo.aspx?pageid=3836 
(Accessed 15 October 2013). 
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Lebanese property law’.776 However, the lawsuit became the latest of the long line of 
lawsuits against Solidere that never received a ruling. Led by Raya Daouk, the former 
landowners committee accused the Hariri family of turning Solidere into a ‘family 
business’. The committee also warned shareholders in Solidere that the company’s main 
sponsors wanted to ‘abandon’ Downtown Beirut altogether in search of other ‘more 
lucrative’ projects.777 Solidere officials, however, denied such a diversion was happening: 
 
“The decision to expand abroad absolutely does not mean [Solidere 
Lebanon] will abandon its projects in central Beirut especially when local 
operations are what gave Solidere access to foreign markets ... In contrast to 
what they claimed this expansion of activities abroad ... will use Lebanese 
assets to strengthen [Solidere's] presence in international markets and its 
balance sheet.”778  
 
They also described the committee’s attack as being part of their decade-long ‘smear 
campaign’ against their company; in effect suggesting that it had been the ‘victim’ this 
whole time. According to a statement released by Solidere: 
 
“…the so-called Beirut Central District Right-holders Committee is 
continuing its smear campaign against Solidere's activities and achievements 
at a time when the recovery of Beirut City Center is so obvious and clear to 
everyone around, and when Beirut itself is regaining its well-known regional 
and international role through its city center…At a time when the Solidere 
project for the development and reconstruction of Beirut City Center has 
become a pioneer model, a successful experience and a reference for city 
regeneration all over the world, it is regrettable the above-mentioned 
committee is keeping up with its policy of throwing false accusations 
through the media and misleading the public opinion.”779 
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 See: Ohrstrom, ‘Solidere activity abroad angers Lebanese shareholders’. 
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 Daouk accused officials of the firm of first “conspiring against Downtown by ejecting its [original] 
inhabitants,” with its controversial reconstruction drive, and, “now emptying [BCD] of cash and assets.” 
See: Ohrstrom, ‘Solidere activity abroad angers Lebanese shareholders’. 
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 This was according to a statement released by Solidere press attaché Rached. 
See: Lysnadra Ohrstrom, ‘Solidere defends regional expansion’, The Daily Star, 24 July 2007. 
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Whatever the motives, it must be stressed that the views presented by both sides are a 
reflection of a wider struggle for inclusion in, or exclusion from, the elite circle that 
controls the decision-making process in Solidere. 
 
Since launching its operations abroad, SI has been managing real estate projects in 
the Middle East and the Mediterranean Basin – what it labels as its ‘Target Area’. SI has 
engaged with partners in the development of the following projects: the Al Zorah project 
in Ajman (UAE); the Eastown and Westown projects in Cairo (Egypt); and the Bodrum 
project in Turkey.
780
 In addition to that, SI has signed a contract to execute the Beirut 
Village project in the Beirut suburb of Hazmieh.
781
 Like Solidere, SI has pursued a 
strategy of maximising profit: through the construction of high-end business towers, 5-
star hotels and luxury apartments that offer exclusive spaces for consumption and refuge. 
Thus, Solidere created rents from the land it acquired in Downtown Beirut, and now, it 
was ready to share in the rents that were to be created from lands SI was acquiring 
elsewhere. 
 
 
iii. Who decided to expand Solidere’s operations? 
 
To answer this question, we need to know the identity of the major shareholders at 
the time. Since 2005, the most significant transfer of shares to have occurred was the 
transfer of Rafiq Hariri’s 6.5% stake of Solidere shares to members of his family. Other 
than that, not much else changed. His banks still held a significant percentage of shares. 
The same goes for his employees, family members and friends. And finally, shares were 
still being held by those ‘middlemen’ who represented an intersection of political and/or 
religious interests. Namely: Fouad el-Khazen still held shares on behalf of the Maronite 
Waqf; Raphael Sabbagha on behalf of the Greek Orthodox Waqf; Basile Yared on behalf 
of the Greek Catholic Waqf; and Faysal Tabbarah on behalf of the Islamic (Sunni) 
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 In addition to those listed, several projects have been signed in Saudi Arabia, which SI considers to be a 
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Waqf.
782
 The precise number of shares owned by these shareholders has definitely 
changed due to sales and purchases over the years. But according to information obtained 
by Al-Akhbar Daily Newspaper, the aforementioned names are still the largest 
stakeholders in the company.
783
 Thus, the board represents an intersection of interests that 
is still closely associated with the Hariri network. 
 
During this period, however, some significant changes were made in the ranks of 
the company’s Board of Directors. The most significant change occurred in the summer 
of 2012, when the general assembly elected a board that included four new members. The 
elections were significant because they replaced some of the ‘veteran’ members, such as 
el-Khazen. But according to Violette Balaa, Economic Editor of An-Nahar Daily 
Newspaper, this drastic change within Solidere was not the result of new internal politics: 
 
“Every time there is a change in a company’s Board of Directors, we try to 
explain the reasons for the change and the goals behind it. There is not much 
to explain when it comes to the case of Solidere. This is because large stakes 
in the company’s shares are still being held by the same shareholders that 
existed before. This means that there was no significant change in the 
internal politics of the company, which in turn, suggests that the change in 
board members was ‘cosmetic’ in nature; nothing more and nothing less.”784 
 
So why was el-Khazen removed? Simply, it was because he was growing old. Three 
years earlier, Nabil Boustany – the vice chairman on the company’s board since 1997 – 
passed away at the age of 85.
785
 He was automatically replaced by his son, Fadi 
Boustany.
786
 According to Oussama Kabbani (one of the new members to be elected to 
the company’s board in the summer of 2012), the outgoing members had been on the 
board for some time now, and most likely resigned for personal reasons. He therefore 
states: “the new comers bring with them new blood and new expertise.”787  
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 Most of the information in this paragraph was mentioned in Chapter 6. 
783
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As was explained in Chapter 6, Rafiq Hariri was able to benefit the most from the 
Solidere project because he was heavily represented; either in his personal capacity as the 
biggest shareholder, or through other shareholders. While the numbers of shares owned 
by shareholders are hard to come by, some figures obtained by previous research can help 
to highlight how many shares represent this group of shareholders today. When Solidere 
was first established, it was decided that rights holders (former landowners and tenants) 
would receive 65% of the total number of shares – with an estimated value of $1.2 billion 
– as A-shares, while the remaining shares – with an estimated value of $650 million – 
would be sold to the Lebanese public as B-shares.
788
 At this point, Hariri and his 
associates were believed to have acquired up to 19% of the company’s shares.789 Solidere 
has never revealed the number of rights holders who accepted shares. But according to 
one article published in The Daily Star, those who accepted the offer held 50% of the 
company’s shares.790 In the same article, it is written that 92% of the rights holders who 
received shares sold them on over the years.
791
 It is impossible to verify who these shares 
were sold on to, but according to Balaa, the people that bought the greatest proportion of 
these shares were most likely those with the largest stakes in the company. Balaa writes 
in An-Nahar that between 2011 and 2012, only 10 million of the 165 million shares 
available in Solidere were traded.
792
 As Balaa explains, this is a very low number of sales 
and purchases for a firm that is meant to be Lebanon’s biggest in the real estate industry. 
More importantly, it shows that the company has reached a point where most of its shares 
are being held by what she terms ‘strategic shareholders’; in other words, many of the 
long-term holders (mentioned above) with large stakes in the company. In the article, 
Balaa also makes a significant revelation when she writes that the percentage of the 
stakes held by these long-term holders equates to (approximately) 70% of the shares.
793
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Going back to the 2012 Board elections, one notices that the new members are all 
closely connected to the Hariri network. To begin with, Nasser Chammaa (Rafiq Hariri’s 
associate and former OGER employee) was still the Chairman of the company’s Board of 
Directors.
794
 Moreover, many of the other original board members were re-elected. Most 
notably, they include Basile Yared, who was still the legal advisor to the Hariri family.
795
 
When analysing the backgrounds of the four newest members on the company’s board, 
we find that they had a long record of working with the company previously. Oussama 
Kabbani is one example: in 1994, he became the manager of the town planning 
department, and in 1997, he became the head of the urban management department (see 
Chapter 6). Another example that is of particular relevance to the analysis in this section 
is Mounir Douidy. In this regard, Douaidy has been in Solidere since the company’s 
inception. He first joined as Financial Director, only to then take up the dual role of 
General Manager and Financial Director in 2001. His prior working experience involved 
responsibilities in controlling the financial operations of two real estate companies, one of 
which was STOW Capital. This enabled him to become a board member of BWD – the 
subsidiary of Solidere in charge of constructing Zaitunay Bay (mentioned in the previous 
section).
796
 One can therefore argue that the Hariri network was still firmly in charge, and 
that they were the ones who decided to expand Solidere’s operations abroad. 
 
SI was announced with a share capital of US$700 million. Its shareholders include 
a range of elite individuals and institutional investors from the Middle East and Europe. 
But its main shareholder is Solidere, which holds up to 37.19% of SI’s share capital.797 Its 
board also consists of some of Solidere’s ‘core team’. Most notably, they include: 
Solidere Chairman Nasser Chammaa, who acts as SI’s Chairman and General Manager; 
and Basile Yared, who is still the Hariri family’s legal advisor. The shape of SI’s board 
demonstrates that Solidere’s main shareholders – with the Hariri network as its head – 
have become instrumental in shaping new large-scale developments outside Downtown 
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Beirut. As such, access to these shareholders is crucial for those who want to play a role 
in shaping these new developments as well. Interestingly, SI is headquartered in the 
Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). This, again, goes to show the dominance 
and attractiveness of Dubai which is fuelled by an abundance of capital that can be found 
there (see Chapter 2). Moreover, much of SI’s board consists of leading businessmen in 
the Gulf region; four of whom are from Saudi Arabia.
798
 The high number of Saudi 
nationals involved in SI is a reflection of the Hariri network itself, which developed by 
virtue of Rafiq Hariri’s position within and alongside Saudi networks of politico-
economic power (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Governments between 2005 and 2013 were occupied by elites that supported the 
Solidere project. To begin with, there were those who were in the inner circle of the 
Hariri network. These included not only the son of Rafiq Hariri (who succeeded in 
following his father’s footsteps to become prime minister), but also Fouad Siniora (who 
for many years was a technocrat serving in Rafiq Hariri’s cabinets). Then there were 
those that did not belong to the Hariri network. For example, there were new contractors 
such as Najib Mikati and Mohammed Safadi. There were also elite players who were 
connected to the pre-civil war bourgeoisie and former militia leaders. One example was 
Ali Nazem Ahmad, who was politically connected to Nabih Berri’s Amal Party. All in 
all, their ability to influence the key institutions concerned with reconstruction meant that 
they were able to exercise power over the Solidere project and change the neoliberal 
approach put in place by Rafiq Hariri in previous years. But they all chose to maintain the 
approach; not least because it was drawing international investment into other economic 
sectors (which the same elites were invested in).   
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Despite the political divisions that existed between the so-called 8
th
 March and 14
th
 
March coalitions, successive governments during this period did not have a negative 
impact on the flow of petrodollars into the Solidere project. Instead, this flow remained 
protected and secured. This was particularly the case when Mikati was appointed as the 
country’s new prime minister, and when a shift in power occurred from the 14th March 
camp to the 8
th
 March camp. Explaining this is simple: successive cabinets have been 
controlled by elites who were either directly invested in the project themselves, or else 
connected to other elites who were. The conclusion that can be made, therefore, is that 
the Solidere project is surrounded by a large intersection of interests that encompassed 
most of – if not the entire – political class. While the group of elites mentioned above did 
not conspire as an ‘alliance’, and while there may have been frequent tensions between 
them, they will nevertheless continue to work together in relation to the Solidere project. 
There is, however, one conundrum: it would be misleading to assume that these elites do 
not compete with one another in the pursuit of individual business interests in other 
economic sectors outside the Solidere project. All in all, the chapter demonstrates 
particularly well that the Solidere project was an expression of the reconstitution of 
power to capitalists (both national and transnational). But it not only demonstrates the 
ability to reconstitute power to capitalists – as diagnosed by scholars such as David 
Harvey, Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy (amongst others).
799
 More importantly, it 
demonstrates the ability of more and more elites to attach themselves to neoliberal 
processes for both the advantages and the protections that this affords them. Becoming 
increasingly empowered, the economic activities they pursued flourished as never before, 
just as they did for Rafiq Hariri and his network of allies and friends. 
   
On a final note, one of the main metaphors borrowed and used in this chapter is 
‘elite playing fields’. As was shown, elite players hunger for playing fields where they 
can compete freely and fairly. Therefore, the expansion of these playing fields, both 
inside and outside Downtown Beirut, is carried out in order to accommodate their needs. 
This raises the following questions. Is the expansion of elite playing fields in Lebanon – 
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and in the Arab/Middle Eastern region more generally – driven (simply) by an association 
of elites that carry with them an all-powerful logic of capitalism? Or is it driven by other 
factors that are gripping the nation-states of the region? It must be remembered that the 
spread of neoliberal urban developments is also driven by a seemingly all-powerful, inter-
urban competition as well. Such competition has generated a hierarchy of cities in the 
regional and world urban system. Those that fail to integrate into the processes of 
neoliberal globalisation risk becoming lost in a ‘black hole’ outside the global 
economy.
800
 In the Arab world especially, where petrodollars are searching for places to 
be invested in, this competition has remained markedly high, and could remain this way 
for many years to come. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the end of the civil war, Lebanon witnessed a large-scale reconstruction effort in 
Downtown Beirut, which was delegated to a private real estate company called Solidere. 
Because this company enjoyed special freedoms and powers awarded to it by the 
Lebanese government, the reconstruction effort was placed in the wider context of 
neoliberal urban developments that have taken place in other cities and urban areas in our 
world today. 
 
The private company set out on its mission of reconstruction with two objectives: to 
bring economic growth and prosperity to the country’s population; and to reconcile and 
reintegrate a divided society. These goals were deemed to be realistic, for the simple 
reason that the reconstruction effort was to take place in the most important piece of 
territory in the country. Like in most other capitals, the downtown area plays a symbolic 
and practical role as the social and economic heart of the rest of the country. In light of 
this, it was not impossible for a large-scale reconstruction project, such as the Solidere 
project, to meet its goals. The reality though is that the Solidere project, thus far, has not 
lived up to people’s expectations. Instead, it has sparked a fierce opposition that 
comprises of many protagonists from various backgrounds. 
 
At the heart of the problem lies a burgeoning disparity between the declared public 
aims of the Solidere project – the well-being of all – and its actual consequences: firstly, 
its contribution towards increasing the public debt; and secondly, its contribution towards 
reproducing sectarian divisions. These two consequences were explained in terms of the 
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rent-seeking activities and behaviours that occurred around the reconstruction process. 
While rent-seeking is – as Gordon Tullock (amongst other scholars) describes – a 
‘ubiquitous’ phenomenon that occurs in all economies, the amount spent to capture rents 
from the reconstruction effort in Downtown Beirut was astonishing.
801
 Importantly, it was 
shown that huge amounts of public (and private) resources were spent on corruption and 
patron-client exchanges. Such expenditures reflect what some scholars refer to as a clear 
overlap between rent-seeking and these two other processes.
802
 
 
The central goal of this thesis has been to assess the Solidere project based on the 
two specific consequences mentioned above. This was done via a detailed engagement 
with the agents involved in the reconstruction effort. The overarching conclusion that can 
be made is that the reconstruction of Downtown Beirut was a missed opportunity; not 
simply because Solidere did not meet its stated goals, but also because it failed the 
expectations of many Lebanese citizens. But at the same time, it was stressed that the 
creation of Solidere (as a company), and its survival for many years later (especially after 
2005), was a sign of the success of Lebanon’s capitalist elites in accumulating power and 
bolstering itself over and above everyone else.  
 
 
I. The Solidere project as an artefact of the neoliberalisation phenomenon 
 
The reconstruction process in Downtown Beirut was placed in the wider context of 
neoliberal urban developments that are reshaping cities in many parts of the world today. 
This creates the impression that the Solidere project is very similar to privately-led large-
scale developments taking place elsewhere. To a large extent, this is true. But any critical 
analysis of the Solidere project must pay close attention to the fact that these 
developments take on a different manifestation – in terms of incorporation and 
implementation – between different contexts. This is because of regional and national 
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factors.
803
 So while the same models and practices used in the West were taken and 
reproduced in other parts of the world, ‘internal’ issues – such as regional politics and 
sectarian culture in the case of Lebanon – have a profound impact on the character and 
shape of these developments as well. 
 
The Solidere project followed the neoliberal logic of making Beirut and Lebanon a 
more ‘competitive’ place in an ever increasingly globalised and interconnected world. 
But as was highlighted in Chapter 2, there was a regional competition for global capital 
as well. In this regard, we have seen Arab/Middle Eastern cities competing with each 
other to attract capital. However, this capital would come in the form of petrodollars from 
the oil-rich countries of the Arab Gulf region. This regional competition for Gulf capital 
became more pronounced from the early 1990s onwards, when the idea of a ‘New Middle 
East’, in which peace would be achieved between the Arabs and the Israelis, became 
more ‘real’. Beirut was no exception. The destruction of the downtown area during the 
civil war also offered an opportunity, through reconstruction, to create a new role for 
Beirut that could enable it to compete against other cities in the region; most particularly, 
those in the Gulf such as Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Doha, amongst others.
804
  
 
Arab/Middle Eastern competition for Gulf capital meant that regional economies 
would be opened up, and this was achieved by a new generation of monarchs and 
presidents in the 1980s and 1990s. Assisted by businesspeople and private sector 
representatives who they recruited into the realm of economic policy decision-making, 
countries across the region passed a number of neoliberal laws and regulations that would 
ease the inward flow of capital into their respective economies. In this regard, they were 
part of what was described as a capitalist class. Here, a problem arises over whether this 
class is to be understood within the parameters of the nation-state. In this respect, it is 
stressed that many of these new recruits shared numerous international linkages. Many of 
them, if not all, had studied or worked abroad and then sought to invest their capital and 
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skills in their homeland. If we take Rafiq Hariri as an example, he became the owner of 
the French company OGER. This company was primarily active in Saudi Arabia, but was 
later moved into Lebanon after Hariri was invited by the then President Amine Gemayel 
to clean up the streets of Beirut in 1982. Such linkages is what leads some scholars, such 
as Leslie Sklair, to use the label of ‘transnational capitalist class’ instead.805 This does not 
mean, however, that leading individuals within this class do not attempt to attach 
themselves to specific decision-making bodies within the state for both the advantages 
and protections that this affords them. If we take Hariri’s example again, he began to 
realise after many years of trying to implement his reconstruction plans that the only way 
his goals would be met without any disruption was through becoming prime minister. 
 
While there is regional competition for Gulf capital, one also observes that the fast 
pace of urban development in Gulf countries was very inspiring for their Arab 
neighbours. In turn, this inspiration has pushed rulers across the region to look to the fast 
developing Gulf cities as ‘models’ to follow. The literature on urban development in the 
Arab world is littered with studies on how countries across the region are building 5-star 
hotels, high-end business towers and gated communities that offer exclusive spaces for 
consumption and refuge in a similar fashion to those found in Gulf cities.
806
 The variety 
of terms used to describe this growing phenomenon of ‘replication’, such as ‘the Gulf 
Model’ or ‘the Dubai Model’, suggest that the urban development of Gulf cities has 
indeed become a very attractive model to follow. On so many occasions, there is ‘direct 
intervention’ from Gulf investors as well. Throughout this research, scholars point to 
Gulf investors directly influencing and shaping urban developments across the region. It 
must be remembered that the ability of these investors to intervene and directly influence 
and shape urban developments was made possible by the neoliberalisation process that 
has affected all countries in the region. In post-civil war Lebanon as well, Gulf investors 
have left their mark on Beirut’s urban environment, through the numerous five-star 
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hotels, luxury residential blocks, shopping malls and high-end office spaces. In 
Downtown Beirut as well, one finds various projects involving Gulf investors, such as the 
Ivana Trump Tower, Beirut Gate and Phoenicia Village (see Chapter 7 for details). 
 
Focusing specifically on the Lebanese context, Chapter 3 exposed some of the 
influences that national factors have had on the character and shape of neoliberal urban 
developments in the country. Specifically, one finds that regional politics and sectarian 
culture have influenced some of these developments. It was shown, for example, that 
some local leaders and political parties exploited the neoliberal laws and regulations that 
were passed in the early 1990s, in order to launch developments that could be used to 
build and/or maintain their own clientelist networks. The Waad Initiative in the southern 
suburbs was given as an example. Here, Hezbollah created a private construction firm 
known as Jihad al-Bina, which was responsible for rebuilding some 200 multi-storey 
apartment buildings to the most up-to-date standards. The analysis showed how the 
reconstruction effort was an opportunity for Hezbollah to gain support from the Shiite 
constituency. This was done by ‘integrating’ local voices into the reconstruction effort. 
For example, by developing pre-project plans and embarking on rounds of consultations 
with the locals, and showing willingness to revise plans in the light of community 
reactions, Hezbollah was able to connect with the hearts and minds of the local 
inhabitants, and in turn, gain popular support.
807
 This argument was stretched to include 
the Solidere project as well. In this regard, the private firm created new jobs and 
investment opportunities for many locals. But it also distributed shares to all the former 
landowners and tenants. As shareholders, they were given voting power on all major 
issues, including: the election of board directors, as well as on proposals for fundamental 
changes affecting the company (such as mergers and expansions). Of course, however, 
not everyone was satisfied (as demonstrated in subsequent chapters). 
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II. The arrival of new contractors and its local, regional and global implications 
 
In this thesis, the author adopted a sociological approach. This involved intimate 
face-to-face interviews with locals who were deeply involved in the reconstruction 
process
808
. It also included information obtained from secondary resources on the 
structure of the political class, as well as biographies of specific elite figures; the most 
important of whom was the late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. All in all, this thesis rested 
on the use of a comprehensive, and mainly qualitative, set of interpersonal and in-depth 
methods. Such an approach was useful because detailed accounts highlighting the 
relationships between the different actors and interest groups involved in the 
reconstruction of Downtown Beirut were produced. 
 
One of the most interesting accounts given in this thesis was that of Rafiq Hariri. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 5, Hariri rose from a simple fruit picker in Sidon, to a 
construction tycoon, peace mediator, prime minister, sectarian leader, and eventually, ‘a 
martyr’. This earned him the name of ‘Mr. Lebanon’, as presented in the title of Nicholas 
Blanford’s autobiography of the late prime minister.809 On the way, Hariri built an 
extensive network of ‘technocrats’ specialising in engineering, finance, and even social 
mobilisation (as demonstrated by the backgrounds of the main shareholders in Solidere). 
This network of technocrats became a formidable force for the realisation of the Solidere 
project, and for all the neoliberal aspects related to it. But the specific shape of the project 
arises more from the contradictions within the company and from the constraints imposed 
by Hariri’s rivals, rather than from its neoliberal aspects. The Solidere project was 
neoliberal, but it was shaped by the specific condition of post-civil war Lebanon. The 
network grew and consolidated itself over time; so much so, that its members continued 
to push through the Solidere project, even after Hariri’s death. 
 
                                                          
808
 For further readings on collecting qualitative data through interviews, see: Fontana and Frey, 
‘Interviewing: The Art of Science’, pp.47-78; Holsten, and Gubrium, The Active Interview; Seidman, 
Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social Sciences: 
Second Edition. 
809
 See: Blanford, Killing Mr Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle 
East. 
316 
 
Rafiq Hariri is described throughout the study as a ‘new contractor’. These new 
contractors arose in the 1980s and 1990s when the country’s political economy 
experienced huge changes as a result of the raging civil war. Lebanon lost its place as a 
trade and services intermediary between the Arab East and Western markets, as well as 
an entrepôt for consumer goods entering the Arab world from the West. Between 1975 
and 1990, the families that constituted Lebanon’s pre-civil war commercial-financial 
bourgeoisie lost their position as the dominant capitalist class to the new contractors. The 
latter group often comprised of Lebanese émigrés who had accumulated great wealth as 
contractors in the Arab Gulf, West Africa and elsewhere. Again, it is worth stressing that 
a similar process of class formation was taking place in many other countries around the 
world during this same period. As David Harvey explains, they included a range of 
businessmen coming from various new sectors of the economy, such as information 
technology (Bill Gates), global media (Rupert Murdoch), and telecommunications 
(Carlos Slim).
810
 In their efforts to deepen neoliberalism in their respective countries, 
they exercised political influence in the background. Others, however, tried and managed 
to reach political office; just like Hariri had done. Some examples include Silvio 
Berlusconi in Italy, Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand and Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan.    
 
Hariri was not the only émigré who had become rich in the Gulf and then returned 
to Lebanon as an investor and politician. Other names that were mentioned – particularly 
in Chapter 7 – included Najib Mikati and Mohammed Safadi.811 The difference was that 
Hariri was the most successful of the three in political terms. The reason for this is 
simple: not only was he well endowed with considerable financial capital, but he also 
able to build a strong alliance and relationship with the Saudi royals. No other new 
contractor of his generation was also able to match Hariri in terms of the financial and 
political backing he received from a regional powerhouse such as Saudi Arabia. Of 
course, Hariri was able to develop a close relationship with the Saudi monarchy thanks to 
Nasser al-Rashid – a reputable Saudi businessman and close friend of Hariri. Before 
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1982, al-Rashid acted as a ‘gatekeeper’ between the king and Hariri. All this changed 
when Hariri became involved in the clean-up effort of Beirut after the Israeli invasion. He 
was able to get King Fahd to fund the clean-up project, which in turn, demonstrated his 
political usefulness in Lebanon. Not long after, Hariri became “Saudi’s man” in Lebanon, 
engaging in diplomatic efforts to end the civil war. Simply put, Hariri’s roles as King 
Fahd’s voice and chequebook gave him access to the negotiation table, where the Ta’if 
Peace Accords and the post-civil war order would later be negotiated.    
 
Hariri was a member of the new contractor bourgeoisie. But the new contractors 
have to be understood as a ‘type’ of elite in the specific context that is Lebanon. The new 
contractors were interacting with other types of elites that were present at the time. These, 
which were identified as relevant to the story of the reconstruction process in Downtown 
Beirut, included: the pre-civil war bourgeoisie, the Shihabists and the former militia 
leaders.
812
 Details on where these different elites came from, and the interests they had in 
Lebanon’s political economy – and in Downtown Beirut more specifically – were 
provided in Chapter 4. Specific names (both from the past and the present) were also 
highlighted. Importantly, the patterns of competition and cooperation that existed 
between these types of elites influenced the shape of the Solidere project as well. These 
elites had their own economic and political agendas. They also built transnational 
networks of their own. All in all, Hariri could not implement his reconstruction plans 
without first dealing with those elites who could act as potential ‘spoilers’ of the Solidere 
project. As a result, Hariri and his protégés responded by ‘co-opting’ some of the key 
elites that held major interests in the downtown area. While some were bribed through 
cash incentives, others were given shares in Solidere, properties in Downtown Beirut, and 
decision-making positions inside and outside the company. Specific details on those who 
were co-opted by Hariri were provided in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
                                                          
812
 Again, the categories used to distinguish between the different types of elites were obtained from a 
range of studies looking at the socio-topography of Lebanon’s classes. Some of the literature used which 
employs some of the same categories includes: Gates, The Merchant Republic of Lebanon: Rise of an Open 
Economy; Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth Century Beirut; Traboulsi, A History of Modern 
Lebanon; Dib, Warlords and Merchants: The Lebanese Business and Political Establishment. 
318 
 
While Hariri had to deal with elites within Lebanon, he also had to deal with those 
influencing Lebanon from abroad; most particularly, from neighbouring Syria. The 
dominant control that Damascus was exercising over Lebanon had existed since the days 
of the civil war. Through its local proxies, Syria was able to pose a challenge to Hariri 
and his construction ambitions. Accepting Syria’s dominance over the country, Hariri 
sought to appease Damascus by abandoning his previous support for Lebanese President 
Amine Gemayel. Over the years, Hariri developed a relationship with a number of 
leading figures within the Syrian regime. Many of these figures benefited richly from 
their relationships with Hariri, as the latter distributed much of his wealth to them as well. 
Most notably, Hariri offered to build a new presidential palace for President Hafez al-
Assad. Despite his efforts, Hariri found it more difficult to win the favour of Hafez’s son 
Bashar al-Assad. After succeeding his father, Bashar used his allies in Lebanon to 
undermine Hariri and the Solidere project. This was demonstrated by the election of 
Army General Emile Lahoud as Lebanese president, and the subsequent appointment of 
Shihabist Salim el-Hoss as his prime minister.
813
 
 
The biggest challenge for Solidere came after Hariri’s assassination on the 14th of 
February 2005. The death of Solidere’s founding father was seen as a big blow. The 
ensuing political crisis that engulfed the country, and that pitted two opposing currents 
against one another, also threatened to derail the reconstruction process in Downtown 
Beirut. But the reconstruction process was bolstered and has continued long after Hariri’s 
death. This was due to the fact that successive governments comprised of many leading 
investors in the project. Namely, they included figures such as Fouad Siniora (Hariri’s 
childhood friend), Saad Hariri (Hariri’s son), and Mikati and Safadi (new contractors). 
Becoming increasingly empowered, the economic activities they pursued flourished as 
never before, just as they did for Rafiq Hariri before them. According to Harvey, the 
continuation of the Solidere project demonstrates the success of neoliberalisation, as a 
process, in ‘restoring power’ to them, or ‘creating conditions’ for the formation of a 
                                                          
813
 For details, see: Lesch, The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria, pp.62-65; 
Blanford, Killing Mr Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East, p.70; 
Johnson, All Honourable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon, p.247; Gambill and Abdelnour, 
‘Dossier: Rafiq Hariri’. 
319 
 
capitalist class (as in the US, Britain and elsewhere).
814
 But in post-civil war Lebanon, it 
bolstered the positions of other types of elites as well – most significant of which were 
the former militia leaders.  
 
 
III. Closing thoughts and questions 
 
Despite the depth of this study, many things remain unsaid. One important question 
that arises from such a critical study of the reconstruction process in Downtown Beirut is 
whether any other approach would have achieved better results than that used by the 
Solidere approach. It is difficult to speak of other approaches that would have achieved 
better results. It is possible, however, to identify the various options that were proposed 
on how to go about the reconstruction process in Downtown Beirut. According to the 
numerous discussions in government circles in the early 1990s, three distinct options 
were considered.  
 
The first option involved complete government financing of the reconstruction 
project. The idea here was that the government would make capital available to 
individual property owners to redevelop their plots through loans. According to some 
sources, however, this option was deliberated on only briefly in parliament.
815
 As 
demonstrated in the study, the extreme land fragmentation and entanglement of property 
rights made this option almost unfeasible. Moreover, the government did not have the 
adequate resources to finance such a massive project, let alone, the institutional capacity 
or staff necessary to support the process of reconstruction. And even if the government 
had been able to afford to direct a large proportion of funds to the city centre alone, it 
would have seemed almost impossible to justify, given the long list of pressing social, 
economic and political issues that the country needed to address beforehand. 
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In turn, the second option that was proposed at the time was to enable a centralised 
government agency with compulsory purchase powers to buy out all the problem areas in 
Downtown Beirut. However, this option was highly unpopular, because, apart from the 
lack of funds, laissez-faire economics had reached a more advanced stage than elsewhere 
in the world. It must be remembered that Lebanon had a long history of low government 
involvement and high private sector participation. The public institutions – including 
those of parliament and government – were still occupied by private businessmen. More 
importantly, the country’s political economy was witnessing an influx of private 
contractors, such as Rafiq Hariri, who were particularly scornful towards the concept of 
increasing government power and involvement. Thus, it was only inevitable that this 
option – like the first – would be scrapped very quickly. 
 
It was in this context that the option of creating a private real estate company to 
handle the reconstruction process was proposed. This idea of privately-led reconstruction 
was presented as ‘the only viable choice’.816 While asserting the national importance of 
reconstructing the city centre, pragmatic arguments rooted in the particularity of the post-
civil war environment were combined with neoliberal ideology to advocate for ‘private 
sector-led reconstruction’ and ‘low government involvement’.817 Three arguments are 
worth mentioning because they were recurring throughout the discussions in government 
circles. First, it was argued that Lebanon’s private sector had considerable amounts of 
money, which, under the right economic, political and social conditions, could be 
‘attracted’ to the domestic economy. Secondly, it was argued that the private sector was 
better able to tap into international finances because it was free of the ‘inefficient 
governmental bureaucracy’ of the domestic government. Finally, it was argued that the 
private sector would provide ‘proper leadership’, as private firms would ‘insulate’ the 
project from ‘political polarisation’ and ‘governmental corruption’.818  
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A second question that emerges is one to do with the implications of these findings 
for future research. In particular, it would be interesting to expand the analysis and apply 
it to other neoliberal urban developments in Lebanon and the wider Arab/Middle Eastern 
region. As mentioned in Chapter 2, neoliberal urban developments are taking place across 
the Arab world. All have become ‘elite playing fields’ that bring together a number of 
social, cultural, political and economic elite players from regional – and sometimes also, 
international – circles.819 These elites appear to be involved in a number of cities. If we 
take the Abdali project in Amman (Jordan), for example, we find that this development is 
a 50/50 joint venture between the state-owned Mawared and the private OGER Jordan – a 
subsidiary of OGER owned by the Hariri family. In light of this, further questions are 
posed. What trans-Arab connections do these elites share exactly? What kind of rent-
creating and -extracting mechanisms are they involved in from one country to the other? 
And finally, are resources being spent on corruption and/or patron-client exchanges in 
these cases as well? By answering these questions, we not only understand how elites 
throughout the region are competing and cooperating with one another, but also, how the 
political economy of the Arab/Middle Eastern region as a whole is structured. There is, 
however, one factor that is hindering the reproduction of neoliberal urban developments 
in the region at the moment, and that is the civil upheaval caused by the ‘Arab Uprisings’. 
 
As expressed at the end of Chapter 7, those cities that fail to integrate into the 
processes of neoliberal globalisation risk becoming lost in a ‘black hole’ outside the reach 
of the global economy.
820
 As a result of the Arab Uprisings, many cities and city-regions 
of the Middle East are believed to have become black holes to which capital flows do not 
extend anymore. Yet, there is good reason to believe otherwise. As Chapters 4 and 5 
demonstrated, capital still arrives in areas that have fallen deep into civil war. During the 
Lebanese civil war, such capital was concentrated in particular activities, such as the 
clean-up operation in Beirut after 1982. In his analysis of Africa in the neoliberal world 
order, James Ferguson draws similar conclusions. He explains that capital gets 
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concentrated in ‘secured enclaves’ that do not provide economic benefits to the ‘wider 
society’. Ferguson therefore argues that capital does not ‘flow’: it skips over most of what 
lies in between, and connects at ‘discrete points’.821 We can already see this happening 
across the Arab world. In wartorn Syria, for example, the city of Tartus – which has 
sparred the worst of the civil war there – has been the target of private projects worth 
US$50 million. One such project includes a glitzy new shopping mall. Importantly, the 
new Tartus Mall has sparked a rare criticism from local inhabitants.
822
  
 
Caroline Nordstrom concurs with Ferguson’s analysis when she talks about an 
orphan selling Marlboro cigarette on a remote street in Africa. What brings a pack of 
cigarettes from an official source, through a complex global network of exchanges and 
negotiations, into the hands of a poor orphan on the frontlines? To her, it is interesting to 
see that only the orphan living on the streets and selling cigarette packs can see the logic 
of that question: “the entire spectrum of the extra-legal networks that move from the 
centers of cosmopolitan production across the various il/legalities of trade to bring a 
packet of cigarettes to his hand”. When an agent is freed from the hurdles and restrictions 
that shape much of the global economy, what emerges are a series of connections and 
networks that are made up of individuals (like Rafiq Hariri), and institutions and 
corporations (such as OGER), that work, “on both sides of the law”.823 So, what can be 
learned from Lebanon’s experience of a war which was, supposedly, a black hole period 
for the country? More specifically, how does the Arab/Middle Eastern region, with all its 
mess and socio-political upheavals, fit into all this? 
 
The Lebanese political economy was never in a black hole. The militias that 
dominated during the sixteen years of infighting were caught up in their vast and 
transnational connections, associations and relationships. At the same time, new 
contractors, with their transnational networks of capitalists, were entering the mix and 
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snatching up contracts from as early as 1979. Importantly, these agents and their 
transnational connections were not invisible, marginal, or unnamed. The same approach 
and understanding can be adopted and adapted to construct an understanding of what is – 
or what could – emerge in other places across the region, such as Iraq, Libya, Syria and 
Yemen (amongst others). Their political economies are not absent from the global 
economy, and never will be. It may take many years for the wars in these countries to 
finally settle (as was the case in Lebanon). When it does, reconstruction will take its 
course. But it must be remembered that movements of capital into these countries have 
not stopped. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
List of Interviews* 
 
(07 June 2011 – 07 September 2011, 01 June 2012 – 30 September 2012 & 01 
September 2013 – 29 December 2013) 
 
conducted in Lebanon and France 
 Name 
 
Relation to the Solidere 
project 
Date / Location 
sorted by date in 
ascending order 
1 Nabil Rachid Solidere’s Press Attaché 09/08/2011 – 
Beirut  
2 Raja Makarem Founder and Managing 
Director of RAMCO Real 
Estate Advisers 
18/08/2011 – 
Beirut 
3 Toufic Abi Semaan Local architect  02/07/2012 – 
Beirut 
4 Hisham el-Ashkar Local urban planner 06/07/2012 – 
Beirut 
5 Abdel-Rahman Ayyas Economic Editor of Al-
Hayat newspaper  
10/07/2012 – 
Beirut 
6 Simon Moussalli Urban planner and former 
Solidere employee 
11/07/2012 – 
Beirut 
7 Giorgio Tarraf Spokesperson for ‘Save 
Beirut Heritage’ 
12/07/2012 – 
Beirut 
8 Leon Telvisian Local academic in 
architecture 
13/07/2012 – 
Beirut 
9 Osama Habib 
 
Economic Editor of The 
Daily Star newspaper 
16/07/2012 – 
Beirut 
10 Robert Saliba Local academic in 
architecture 
17/07/2012 – 
Beirut 
11 Essam Fayez Makarem Solidere investor and 
owner of Berytus Parks. 
22/07/2012 – Ras 
el Metn 
12 Mounir Douaidi Solidere’s General 
Manager and Financial 
Director 
23/07/2012 – 
Beirut 
13 Bernard Khoury Local architect 23/07/2012 – 
Beirut 
14 Assem Salam Local architect and 
former Head of Engineers 
and Architects 
24/07/2012 – 
Beirut 
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15 Georges Corm Former Finance Minister 
(1998-2000) 
25/07/2012 – 
Beirut 
16 Mounir Doumani Former property owner in 
Downtown Beirut 
27/07/2012 – 
Beirut 
17 Yahya Hakim Managing Director of the 
‘Lebanese Transparency 
Association’ 
03/08/2012 – 
Beirut 
18 Charbel Nahas Former employee of 
OGER Liban 
06/08/2012 – 
Beirut 
19 Elie Karam Director of IDRAAC, 
with knowledge on issues 
of memory 
06/08/2012 – 
Beirut 
20 Nancy Hilal  Local urban planner with 
research on the Waad 
Initiative 
07/08/2012 – 
Beirut 
21 Mona Fawaz Local academic in urban 
planning 
07/08/2012 – 
Beirut 
22 Violette Balaa Economic Editor of An-
Nahar Daily newspaper 
07/08/2012 – 
Beirut 
23 Kamal Hamdan Local economist and 
contributing author in 
Beyhum et al., I‘mar 
Bayrut wa-l fursa al-
da’i‘a. 
08/08/2012 – 
Beirut 
24 Bilal Hamad Mayor of Beirut 09/08/2012 – 
Beirut 
25 Angus Gavin Solidere’s Head of Design 27/08/2012 – 
Beirut 
26 Fadi Khalaf Former President of the 
Lebanese Bourse 
28/08/2012 – 
Beirut 
27 Fadi Khoury Owner of St. Georges 
Hotel and Yacht Club 
28/08/2012 – 
Beirut 
28 Habib Battah Independent journalist 
and media analyst 
31/08/2012 – 
Beirut 
29 Elias Saba Former MP and critic of 
Law 117 in 1991. 
04/09/2012 – 
Beirut 
30 Ahmad Makouk Dar Al-Handasah 
employee and senior 
urban planner in the 
Elyssar project 
05/09/2012 – 
Beirut 
31 Mohammed Zbib Economic Editor at Al-
Akhbar newspaper 
05/09/2012 – 
Beirut 
32 Mona Harb Academic in urban 
planning 
20/09/2012 – 
Beirut 
33 Jad Tabet Architect and former 
consultant to Solidere’s 
28/09/2013 – 
Paris 
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aswaq project in 
Downtown Beirut  
34 Hervé Dupont Engineer and former 
Solidere employee 
23/10/2013 – 
Paris 
35 Jean-Paul Lebas Urban planner and former 
Solidere employee 
15/11/2013 – 
Paris 
36 Ghassan Salameh Former Minister of 
Culture 
21/11/2013 – 
Paris 
37 Basile Yared Legal advisor to the 
Hariri family and Solidere 
board member  
25/11/2013 – 
Paris 
 
* Note: This list does not include conversations and meetings with people not formally 
interviewed for the thesis (the author had a number of conversations with people visiting 
or working in the downtown area). None of the individuals interviewed asked for full 
anonymity. But some requested partial anonymity for some of the information shared.  
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